



A Comparative Survey of

*DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT*

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**GLOBALBAROMETER™**

A Longitudinal and Comparative Analysis of  
Citizens' Orientations toward Democracy and Their  
Evaluation of the Overall Performance of the  
Democratic Regime in East Asia

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## **Asian Barometer**

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

# **Working Paper Series**

Jointly Published by

**Globalbarometer**

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## **Introduction**

Over the last two decades, three organizing concepts – democratic transition, democratic consolidation and quality of democracy – have in turn guided the analysis of political change in the developing world. In the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the analysis of the concurrent movement toward democracy in the developing world was influenced by the pioneering work by Guillermo O’Donnell, Juan Linz and Lawrence Whitehead as well as that of Adam Przeworski. Their analysis on democratic transition placed enormous emphasis on the analysis of the choices and strategic interactions of contending elites in an authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition (Munck, 2011).

Entering the second half of 1990s, the focus of the analysis on third-wave democracies has shifted to consolidation as most countries have moved beyond the stage of the introduction of democracy. While literature on democratic consolidation has varied greatly in terms of the breadth and depth of coverage of political arena, they share one central research question, i.e., the survivability of the new democratic regime. This lopsided emphasis on the endurance of democracy was understandable but it also left social scientists, democracy practitioners, concerned citizens and aid agencies with a growing sense of dissatisfaction. As Philippe Schmitter (2005) has pointed out, democracy may become consolidated at any level of quality, so long as citizens and politicians come to accept the rules of democratic competition.

Over the last few years, a growing number of students of democracy have sought to develop means of framing and assessing the quality of democracy and identify ways to improve the quality of democratic governance (Chang et al., 2011; Dressel et al., 2011). This stream of theory, methodological innovation, and empirical research was prompted by a growing concern among social scientists, democracy practitioners and donor organizations that many third-wave democracies might be stuck in a

low-quality equilibrium and run out of the steam in their attempts to deepen democratic reform. Many empirical studies have shown that the gap between the reality and promise of democracy has been widening and there are widespread perceptions that democratically elected governments and officials are corrupt, incompetent and unresponsive and untrustworthy. In the bulk of third-wave countries without concerted efforts to improve democratic quality it is unlikely that democracy can achieve a broad and durable legitimacy.

If deepening democratic reform is an imperative for all emerging democracies, it is even more so for young democracies in East Asia. In this region democracy not only faces gathering problem of growing popular dissatisfaction or even disillusion but some fierce competitors. Democracy has to compete not only with its predecessor that still lingers on in people's memory (sometimes in a nostalgic way) but also with its efficacious authoritarian and semi-authoritarian neighbors. In this context, the democratic future of East Asia depends very much on the emerging characteristics as well as the performance of the region's existing democracies. If the perceived quality of democracy fails to live up to people's expectation, democracy will not be able to win over the heart of the people in the long run. Also, if democracy does not shine in the eyes of the people of East Asia, its demonstration effect will be very limited and the region's further democratization will be cast in doubt.

However the relationship between democratic legitimacy and quality of democracy is a complex one (Emmerson, 2012). The conventional wisdom holds that popular commitment to democratic regime will gain strength if the characteristics as well as the performance of the democratic regime are perceived to be superior to the old regime on some important indicators of good governance, such as political liberty, equality, rule of law, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. On the other hand, symptoms of bad governance, such as rampant corruption, electoral fraud and

protracted gridlock, corrode people's trust in democratic institution.

In this paper, we aim to accomplish a three-fold analytical task. First, we review the recent efforts to conceptualize and measure democratic legitimacy and quality of democracy by way of introducing a comprehensive battery for measuring some essential properties of liberal democracy. This battery was designed and employed by Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Next, we present an empirical assessment of the democratic legitimacy and quality of East Asian third-wave democracies based on the data gathered from the three waves of ABS. Third, we explore the complex relationship among various aspects of quality of democracy, popular support for democracy and belief in liberal democratic values. Through a multivariate analysis, we identify dimensions of quality of democracy that are most important to the growth of popular commitment to democracy. Also, we examine the syndrome of "disaffected democrats" and explore its implications for the development of liberal democracy.

### **Three dimensions of Democratic Legitimacy**

Democratic legitimacy is central to understanding the third wave of democratization. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, human behavior is affected by two different mechanisms. The first is the logic of expected consequences – people make behavioral choices on the basis of expected utility. The second is the logic of appropriateness – social norms and belief systems affect behavioral choices. People may make certain choices not on the basis of expected utility, but because they believe them to be good, desirable, or appropriate (March and Olsen 1998). Scholars on democratization generally believe that when citizens recognize democracy as the only rule of the game, they will also accept it as a universal belief and value. When this happens, democracy will be able to endure any social or economic crisis (Dalton 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2011). When democratic legitimacy is

deepened with society and widely accepted by the vast majority of citizens, most people will be willing to actively defend the democratic system. In this context, calls to replace democracy with an alternative regime form are not likely to gain acceptance. Furthermore, any attempts by political actors to use illegal means to challenge the democratic status-quo will be met with widespread social resistance. Finally, any illegally established non-democratic regime will immediately face a catastrophic crisis of legitimacy.

Most Global Barometer Survey (GBS) teams use two measures of democratic legitimacy; we add a third. The first is the direct measure, which calculates expressed support for democracy (SD) without asking what the citizen thinks democracy is. Our version of the direct measure employs five items which ask respectively about democracy as a preferred political system, democracy as a desired political system, democracy as a suitable political system, democracy as a political system viewed as effective in solving society's problems, and democracy as a political system considered to have priority over such a valued alternative goal as economic development (Bratton et al. 2005; Chu et al. 2008; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Shin, 2007).

Second is the indirect measure, which looks at liberal democratic values (LDV) held by citizens as a way of assessing support for democracy. Our measure of LDV is a seven-item battery. None of the items in this battery mentions the "d" word (democracy). Instead, they tap into respondents' value orientations toward four fundamental organizing principles of liberal democracy: popular accountability, political liberalism, political pluralism, and separation of power. Indicators designed around these core liberal democratic values measure respondents' support for specific values without assuming that they have the same cognitive understanding about the meaning of the word "democracy."

The third approach to measuring for democratic legitimacy, which the ABS introduced, is to look at rejection of authoritarian alternatives, which we label detachment from authoritarianism (DA). This is a three-item battery. It is an inverse measure of support for democracy via rejection of nondemocratic alternatives, and often proves the most useful way to assess the commitment of the public to the existing democratic regime even when the public expresses disappointment in the regime's achievements.

### **Support for Democracy**

A necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy is met when an overwhelming proportion of citizens believe that “the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine” (Diamond, 1999: 65). By this standard, East Asia's young democracies do not enjoy a strong and resilient popular base for democratic legitimacy. The three waves of Asian Barometer Survey confirm that East Asian citizens possess ambivalent attitudes toward democracy and that new democracies in the region have experienced nil growth or even some noticeable waning in popular legitimacy. On the one hand, democracy as an ideal appeals to a great majority of ordinary citizens.

On the five measures of support for democracy, Table 1 shows that between 2001 and 2011, the largest number of citizens in the region affirmed the desirability of democracy. This was next highest responses were for the suitability, effectiveness, and preference for democracy. The lowest score was for the item measuring prioritization of democracy over economic development. Aside from the Philippines and China, over 80% of citizens on the remaining eleven countries deemed democracy to be “desirable for our country now.” Over 60% of citizens in all thirteen East Asian countries agreed that democracy is suitable for their country, and this score was over



80% in South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia. On responses to the effectiveness item – whether democracy can solve society’s problems, there was large variation across the region. Cambodia and Malaysia returned the highest scores at over 80%, but the lowest scores did not reach 40%. Responses to whether democracy should be take preference over other forms of government were in the 40% to 60% range across the region. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong returned scores of under 50%, while scores for other countries in the region were between 50% and 60%. However, scores were lower when asked whether democracy should take priority over economic development, mostly falling in the 20-30% range.

More significantly, the support level has registered noticeable decline on most indicators when these countries were surveyed for the second time between 2001 and 2011. In terms of preferability the average support of the five new democracies dropped by almost 10% and in terms of efficacy it dropped by 5%. The averages of desirability and suitability also declined albeit not as noticeable. In most countries, we witness some sharp decline on certain measures. Between the three surveys, more than 14% of Thais have lost their preference in democracy and close to 13% of Singapore citizens felt the same way. Between 2002 and 2006, among Mongolian those believing “democracy is always preferable” has dropped by 16% to only 39%. Outside East Asia, this depressingly low level of support was found only in some struggling Latin American democracies such as Ecuador. In 2010, only 62% of our Filipino respondents still believed that “democracy is suitable for our country”, registering 18% drop in eight years. Taiwan is only East Asian young democracy that has shown sign of strengthening on most measures albeit from a rather low base.

To measure the overall level of attachment to democracy, we constructed a

6-point index ranging from 0 to 6 by counting the number of pro-democratic responses on the five items discussed above. The result is reported in the second last row of Table 1. On this 6-point index, both the Korean and Japanese citizens have shown only lukewarm support for democracy and their mean scores were barely above the region's average and trailed behind countries with much less favorable economic and social conditions, such as Mongolia. Thailand in 2001 registered the highest level of overall support (with an average of 4.0). This euphoria reflected the supportive and optimistic mind frame that most Thais held in the beginning of a new administration under Thaksin Shnavatra, whose party had just captured an unprecedented single-party majority in the parliament. On the other hand, Taiwan in 2001 registered the lowest (with 2.4) mean score. This was perhaps incidental to the political earthquake that came with the island's first power rotation in 2000 and its collateral damage to the economy, which contracted for 4.7 percent in 2001, the worst recession since the first oil crisis of 1972-73.

[Table 1 about here]

Overall speaking, most East Asian democracies are still wrestling with a fragile and fluid foundation of popular support. The ensuing governing crisis in many East Asian new democracies has taken a toll on popular commitment to democracy, pushing down the region's average mean score from 2.5 to 3.0 between the three surveys. This means that between 2005-2011, East Asians on average can identify only three (and no more than three) good reasons (out of five plausible justifications) to embrace democracy. Our findings also suggest that in East Asia as elsewhere and

the strength of citizens' attachment to democracy is context-dependent. The more abstract the context, the stronger is the normative commitment; the more concrete the context, the weaker the commitment. Democracy as an abstract idea is embraced by almost everyone, but not that many people endorsed it as the preferred form of government under all circumstances, and much fewer prefer it to economic development.

### **Liberal Democracy Values**

The second method of measuring democratic support used in this book is based on values found in Western tradition of liberal democracy. The formation of liberal democratic values encompasses three basic dimensions: First, relationships of power between members of the political community; second, relationships between members of the political system and those in power; and third, relationships between different government bodies. In the liberal democratic value system, relationships between members of the political system are based on the principle of equality. Each individual has the right to equal treatment and enjoys the same political rights; differences should not exist on the basis of ethnicity, gender, education, wealth, religion, class, or social background. Second, according the principle of popular sovereignty, in the liberal democratic value system, political power is exercised with popular consent, and the government therefore must be held accountable to the people. Governments are no longer able to make decisions on behalf of the people without considering the popular will in the way that authoritarian rulers did in the past. Third, in terms of individual liberties, in Western liberal democratic tradition, the power of the state is limited. Individual rights, including freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, are protected from violation by government. Fourth, in terms of social

pluralism, in democratic countries the government cannot restrict the people's rights to establish autonomous civil society organizations for any reason. Finally, the liberal democratic tradition calls for a separation and balancing of powers between different government bodies, in particular the legislative and executive branches and the judicial and executive branches. Therefore, in democratic societies, power is separated between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches to guard against abuse of power. The checks and balances between the three branches prevent those in power from abusing their position.

Table 2 shows measures of LDV in East Asian countries. We obtained very different results when compared to direct measures of democratic support. LDV scores are highest in Japan, in particular the principle of popular sovereignty which was supported by over 80% of respondents over three surveys. However, commitment to the balancing of powers was lower, with less than 50% of respondents expressing support over the three surveys. The next highest LDV scores were found in South Korea, with commitment to popular sovereignty at levels close to Japan. However, there is still room for improvement on social pluralism. The third highest LDV scores were found in Taiwan, where public support for popular sovereignty is also at levels close to Japan. However, in Taiwan a high proportion of respondents still adhere to the idea of the moral state. Mainland China and Vietnam have the lowest LDV values in East Asia, with scores on individual rights and the balancing of powers particularly low. The next lowest scores are found in Thailand and Cambodia, which also do poorly on individual rights and the balancing of powers.

[Table 2 about here]

While we do not find a full-blown positive feeling toward democracy in most of the East Asian democracies we surveyed, this does not mean that democracy is in imminent danger in these countries. Most East Asian democracies could remain secure if there is a lack of support for alternatives – that is, due to strong authoritarian detachment. However, the empirical evidences clued from the three waves of ABS are not so reassuring. In a number of countries pockets of residual support for authoritarianism among the populace are growing, rather than diminishing.

### **Detachment from Authoritarianism**

If we look at the level of popular rejection to each of the three conceivable non-democratic alternatives -- strongman rule, single-party rule and military rule – one by one, the citizens' antipathy for authoritarianism was quite high around early 2000s. According to the three waves of the ABS, a more than two-thirds majority in every country except Mongolia (42.7% in 2010) rejected the idea of replacing democracy with strongman rule. Rejection of single-party rule was less emphatic but still exceeded two-thirds in all countries except Vietnam where the portion was 2.8% in 2010. Military rule was rejected even more vigorously, at levels over 80%, in every country except Indonesia and Cambodia where the level of rejection was 52%. When all three measures are considered jointly, the aggregate picture raises some cause for concern. Only in Korea, Japan and Taiwan, did more than half the people reject all three alternatives. In the other area of East Asia, the figures were alarmingly low, with only 40 to 50% of respondents respectively rejecting all three authoritarian options. For this later group, democratic system was not adequately protected by strong and unequivocal popular antipathy toward authoritarianism. Rather, it was under the

veiled threat of significant residual authoritarian inclination among the populace when the first-wave ABS was conducted around early 2000s.

If we compare the figures between the two surveys, the gap between the first and third groups has widened even more significantly. The portion of respondents rejecting all three authoritarian options has grown from 56.2% to 73% in Taiwan and from 69.9% to 74.1% in South Korea. But the same summary measure has dropped to 37.5% in Mongolia and to 1.0% in Vietnam. Most notably, in both countries the yearning for returning to strongman rule has grown substantially. In 2006, only 35.8% of Mongolians rejected the option that “we should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.” On the eve of the military coup, some worrisome signs also popped up in Thailand. On the surface, this summary measure has improved (moving up to over 51.3%) between 2001 and 2010, but it was only due to the fact that more Thais registered their objection to one-party rule. The portion of Thai respondents disapproving military rule has dropped by 7% and objection to strongman rule has shrunk by 7%.

[Table 3 about here]

If we compare Tables 1, 2 and 3, another important contrast between the two groups immediately pops up. On measures of support for democracy, the foundation of regime legitimacy in Thailand, Mongolia and the Philippines looked seemingly stronger than that of Taiwan and South Korea but the former group lagged much behind on measures of authoritarian detachment. This suggests that in Thailand, Mongolia, and the Philippines, there exist a large number of disoriented and confused citizens, whose inconsistent political orientations would burden their democracies

with a fragile and fluid foundation of legitimation. In Taiwan and South Korea, while authoritarianism has gradually lost its appeal, democracy has not yet lived up to their citizens' high expectation.

To what extent is popular support for democracy in East Asia deeply rooted in a liberal democratic political culture? This is an important empirical issue for gauging the region's democratic future. This constitutes a rigorous test of how robust is the observed popular commitment to democracy. If citizens' embracement of democracy is not anchored on internalized liberal democratic values, the foundation of regime legitimacy will remain shallow and fragile.

### **Measuring Quality of Democracy**

There are two ways to make sense of people's evaluation of the quality of democracy. From the supply side, political leaders and institutions are oftentimes identified as major factors shaping the characteristics of a democracy. One can always trace the root cause of bad governance to corrupt politicians and faulty institutional design, which have failed to supply the valued properties of liberal democracy. The other side of the same equation, however, concerns the demand side. How people evaluate quality of democracy on various scores also depends on what and how much they expect out of a democratic regime. Some prior empirical research suggests that people holding stronger belief in liberal democratic values may demand more out of a democratic regime and become more critical of the actual performance of their real-life democracy. In this sense, "democrats" can be democracy's tough customers. This is intrinsically not a bad thing because at the macro level the causal relationship may operate in a reverse way. At the macro level, strong aggregate demand based on widespread popular commitment to liberal democratic values may compel politicians and parties to deliver good governance, which in turn reinforces the legitimacy of the

democratic regime.

Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino have put forward a most systematic conceptual scheme to date for identifying the essential properties of liberal democracy. They began their analysis by offering clear-cut definitions of the terms “democracy” and “quality,” and then tried to integrate the two into a multidimensional conception of democratic quality. They posited that democracy requires four elements at the minimum: 1) universal, adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information. They further reasoned that there must be some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena, permitting citizens to articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests to make truly meaningful, free and fair elections possible. In addition, formal democratic institutions should be sovereign in fact, that is they should not be constrained by elites or external powers that are not directly or indirectly accountable to the people. Furthermore, they suggested that once a regime meets these basic conditions, it can be further analyzed if and to what extent it achieves the three main goals of an ideal democracy—political and civil freedom, popular accountability and political equality—as well as broader standards of good governance, such as transparency, legality, and responsible rule (Diamond and Leonardo, 2005).

Quality usually refers to one of three following things: procedure, content or result. From the perspective of quality in terms of procedure, they identify five dimensions: the rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability, both vertical and horizontal, on which democracies vary in quality. From the perspective of quality in terms of content, they identify two dimensions: respect for civil and political freedoms, and the progressive implementation of greater political equality. From the perspective of quality in terms of result, they identify one key dimension,



i.e., responsiveness, which links the procedural dimensions to the substantive ones by measuring the extent to which public policies correspond to citizen demands and preferences, as aggregated through the political process.

Riding on the tail of their intellectual advancement, Asian Barometer Survey developed and employed a full array of indicators that correspond to the eight dimensions mentioned above in its latest wave of region-wide comparative survey. For most of the eight dimensions, ABS typically designed two or three indicators. There are two major exceptions. First we broke down “Rule of Law” dimension into two sub-dimensions, one measuring “law-abiding government” and the other “corruption”. This is necessary we believe that to capture the extraordinary impact of political corruption in shaping people’s orientation toward democracy. Next, we broke down participation dimensions into three sub-dimensions, namely electoral participation, political interest and political efficacy. All together ABS employed the following twenty items to cover the eight dimensions:

#### **A. Rule of Law**

##### ***Law-abiding government***

- 1) Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.
- 2) How often do national government officials abide by the law?

##### ***Corruption***

- 1) How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?
- 2) In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?

## **B. Competition**

- 1) Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.
- 2) How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?
- 3) On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?

## **C. Participation**

### ***Electoral Participation***

- 1) In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?
- 2) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?
- 3) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?

### ***Political Interest***

- 1) How interested would you say you are in politics?
- 2) How often do you follow news about politics and government?

### ***Political Efficacy***

- (1) I think I have the ability to participate in politics.
- (2) Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me

can't really understand what is going on.

#### **D. Vertical Accountability**

- 1) People have the power to change a government they don't like.
- 2) Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions.
- 3) How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?

#### **E. Horizontal Accountability**

- 1) When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.
- 2) To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?

#### **F. Freedom**

- 1) People are free to speak what they think without fear.
- 2) People can join any organization they like without fear.

#### **G. Equality**

- 1) Everyone is treated equally by the government.
- 2) People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.

#### **H. Responsiveness**

- 1) How well do you think the government responds to what people want?
- 2) How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?

For the sake of measurement quality, we intentionally avoid following the same question format for all twenty-five items. Some questions were phrased as a descriptive (factual) statement to solicit agreement or disagreement from the respondents. A disagreement means that the respondents don't think the description fit the current situation. An example is the first item for measuring Rule of Law, "Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials", which is followed by a four-point response grid, ranging from "Strongly Agree," "Somewhat Agree," "Somewhat Disagree," to "Strongly Disagree." Also, not all the questions are phrased in positive direction. Some of them are intentionally set in a negative tone. For example, the second question measuring vertical accountability, which reads, "Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions." Disagreement to this statement is taken as a positive assessment.

At the same time, many questions were phrased as an interpolative statement to solicit a substantive response from the interviewees. The second item for measuring "Law-Abiding Government" belongs to this category. After we prompted our respondents with the statement, "How often do national government officials abide by the law?" they were asked to select one out of four substantive response categories: "Always," "Most of the Time," "Sometimes," "Rarely".

Most of the twenty-five questions follow either one of these two formats with the exception of three items for measuring level of "electoral participation", which were designed as dichotomous variables getting straight "Yes" or "No" answer.

Given the constraints of questionnaire space, respondents' patience and their willingness to cooperate, we were not able to employ as many indicators as necessary to match the full breadth and depth of the conceptual scheme developed by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. But the twenty-five-item battery the second-wave ABS employed, we believe, represents the most comprehensive and systematic effort

thus far to empirically assess the quality of democracy through survey research in East Asia or anywhere in the world.

Our approach privileges public opinion survey because epistemologically we believe that quality, like beauty, is assumed to lie in the eye of the beholder or the person experiencing the democracy. Regardless of how international donors or academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will be consolidated only when the bulk of the public believes that democracy actually is better for their society and that democracy of an acceptable quality is being supplied. In a nutshell, the citizens are the final judges of the legitimacy as well as the characteristics of their democracy. Public opinion surveys such as Asian Barometer offer a valuable vantage point on whether the citizenry considers that political institutions produce an acceptable degree of democracy and deliver an acceptable level of good governance.

### **Assessing Quality of Democracy in East Asia**

The ABS conducted its three-round survey in the region's six third-wave democracies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand (which was a democracy before the military coup of September 2006) and East Asia's only established democracy, Japan. During the same period, the survey was also implemented in Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, being popularly referred to as Asia's semi-democratic regimes, plus Vietnam, one of the region's fast-growing transitional societies. Surveys in semi-democratic regimes and transitional societies can serve as useful cases of reference for comparative research.

We report the percentage distribution of positive evaluation based on each of the twenty-five questions. For the sake of space, all four-point response grids were collapsed into dichotomous variables and only the percentage of giving a positive

answer is reported in the tables. All questions are given an ID code, which corresponds to its serial number in the original questionnaire.

Table 4 shows that in most East Asian countries a majority of people expressed some confidence in the independence of their judicial system when it comes to punishing wrong-doing high-ranking officials. Citizens in semi-democratic regime tend to place more confidence than citizens in emerging democracies in the independence of the judiciary. In 2010, most notably Singaporean citizens registered the highest level of confidence in judicial independence with 84.8% of the respondents giving a positive answer. Among established and emerging democracies, Taiwan fares rather poorly on this measure where only 36.3% think that “our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.”

Table 4 also show that when it comes to the second criterion of law-abiding government, in all East Asian emerging democracies only a tiny minority believe think that their national government officials always or most of the time abide by the law. In Mogolia and South Korea, only 18.9% and 28.9% of the respondents respectively gave a positive answer. The popular perception on this score in semi-democratic regimes varies greatly. In Singapore 87.9% of the respondents believe that their national government always or most of the time abides by the law while in Malaysia only 48.6% thinking the same way. By and large, citizens in emerging democracies gave a more disparaging assessment than their counterpart in semi-democratic regimes.

We find that combating corruption is a major challenge to East Asian young democracies. On the second question, among the six third-wave democracies, only a minority believes that in the national government “hardly anyone is involved” in corruption or “not a lot of officials are corrupt. The only exception is Singapore where over 80% of people offered a positive evaluation. In Mongolia and Taiwan, only

31.7% and 15.7% respectively of our respondents gave a positive answer. A majority of Taiwanese and Mongolian citizens believe that in their respective national government “most officials are corrupt” or “almost everyone is corrupt”. This is a very disparaging assessment. On the third question, in most East Asian countries, more than half of the population think the government is working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes. But in Thailand only 38.8% and in Mongolia only 35.1% think that way. On both accounts Singapore fares far better than the rest with 85.4% of Singaporeans believing that the government is working seriously to crackdown corruption and root out bribes.

Most East Asian young democracies by and large meet the minimum standard of allowing for competitive, free and fair elections. Most citizens in East Asian emerging democracies think that in their country “political parties or candidates have equal access to the mass media during the election period.” But in Singapore, only 36.6% of our respondents think that political parties or candidates have equal access to the mass media. Next, a majority of citizens in East Asian emerging democracies regard the country’s last national election as largely free and fair. Taiwan is a notable exception, where partisan control of the Central Election Commission has been an outstanding issue and only 47% of the respondents evaluate the freeness and fairness of the presidential election in 2004 positively. However, the perceived fairness and freeness of the election varies greatly among semi-democratic regimes. In Hong Kong only 38% of our respondents (which is lowest level registered among all eleven cases) believed the territory’s last Legislative Council election was largely fair and free, a result that stands in stark contrast to Singapore where a large majority shared the opposite view.

On the question “whether our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates”, the picture is more mixed. In Thailand and Indonesia,

citizens are more positive about the choices the election has to offer while a majority of voters in South Korea and the Philippines don't feel that way. On this measure, the difference between the emerging democracies and semi-democratic regime looms large. Many citizens in Singapore and Hong Kong don't think their election offer a meaningful choice. Only 36.6% of Singaporeans and only 43.3% of Hong Kong people feel that "elections offer the voters a real choice".

The level of participation varies significantly among East Asian countries. Mongolian voters are most active participants in electoral process with 26.8% engaging in all three types of activities – voting, attending rallies and persuading others how to vote – and 40.1% engaging in two out of three. Adding the two together, more than two third (66.9%) of the Mongolian electorate participated in at least two election-related activities during the last national election. In contrast, Singaporeans are least active with less than 1% of its citizenry taking part in all three activities. In Hong Kong, level of electoral participation is also depressingly low, with only 1.6% of respondents attending a campaign meeting or rally while only 4.7% tried to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party during the last election. Apparently, the non-competitiveness of the electoral process in these two semi-democratic systems has turned off most voters. In most other East Asian young democracies, the level of electoral participation is comparable to the established democracies in the West.

Table 4 shows that most East Asian emerging democracies meet the minimum standard of vertical accountability for an electoral democracy, i.e., throwing the rascals out through voting. In all six young democracies a majority feel that their current system gives them "the power to change the government people don't like" with the exception of South Korea. In contrast, sense of exercising vertical accountability through election is relatively low among Singaporeans (35.5%) and



Hong Kong citizens (only 28.2%). At the same time, far fewer people feel that they can “hold the government responsible for its action between elections.” This is a widely shared perception across all emerging democracies. On the question of transparency, arguable a pre-requisite for effective vertical accountability, the picture is more mixed. In Thailand, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Singapore, most people think that only “sometimes” or “rarely” do “government officials withhold important information from the public view”. In South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Mongolia, Malaysia and Vietnam only a minority feel that way, suggesting that many citizens suspect that government officials “always” or “most of the time” withhold important information from the public. On this last question, one can interpret its meaning and cross-country variation in two opposing ways. It is plausible to argue that most people in Thailand (where 59.6% of the respondents believing in government transparency) do not necessarily know how much they don’t know while skeptical citizens in South Korea (where only 25.2% of respondents believing in government transparency) maybe know something about the “known unknown”. However, popular perception of a lack of transparency still matters. It tends to undermine people’s trust in democratically elected government and political institutions.

Table 4 reports the findings from our measures for horizontal accountability. It shows in most East Asian emerging democracies, many people sense that “when the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.” The perception that the judicial system cannot keep a law-breaching government in check is most strongly felt among citizens in Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. In South Korea, only 40% of our respondents answered “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” to this question. When it comes to the question about legislative oversight, more people think “the legislature is capable of keeping the government in

check”. In virtually all young democracies, slightly more than 50% of the citizenry sense that the legislative is “very capable” or “capable” of doing so. On the other hand, the number of people who don’t think effective legislative oversight has been in place remains considerably large. The proportion of the respondents who think the parliament is wielding effective oversight is surprisingly high in the three semi-democratic regimes, with Singapore surging to the top. This perception perhaps stems from constitutional arrangements that underscore the supremacy of the parliament.

For the measurement of the freedom dimension, the paired set that ABS employed address freedom of speech and freedom of association respectively. Table 4 shows that on both scores most East Asian citizens think that their political system permits citizens to articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests. The only exception is Singapore, where only 49.3% of our respondents agreed that “people are free to speak what they think without fear and only 52.9 % felt that “people can join any organization they like without fear.” In virtually all East Asian young democracies, either one of the two indicators get positive responses from more than two thirds of their citizenry. However, our survey also shows that most East Asian democracies are still far from being “completely free”.

Table 4 reports the distribution on the paired questions on equality. The result from the first question suggests that in East Asian third-wave democracies, equal treatment remains an unfulfilled promise for most citizens. The percentages of positive assessment in Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan are all below 50%. The three semi-democratic regimes fare substantially better on this score than most East Asian young democracies. On the question of guarantee of basic socio-economic necessities, most East Asians countries turn in some encouraging figures. However, there are two puzzling figures which require further investigation. On the question asking whether

“people have the basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter,” the percentage of giving positive assessment by respondents from South Korea, one of the most affluent countries, is surprisingly low (39.4%) while the ratio from the Philippines, one of the socio-economically less developed countries, is impressively high (73.4%).

Lastly, in Table 4 we examine the outcomes from two most encompassing questions dealing with the responsiveness of government. The overall picture is not very encouraging. On the first question, a majority of people in the six emerging democracies don't think that the government is “very responsive” or “largely responsive” to what people want. In South Korea, Mongolia and the Philippines, the percentage of respondents believing the governing is “very responsive” or “largely responsive” is below one third. Paradoxically, the proportion of positive answers to the first question is much higher in Singapore and Malaysia. Actually Singapore is the only East Asian country where two third of its citizenry perceive their government being responsive to what people want. On the second question, the contrast between democratic regimes and semi-democratic regimes is less salient. Citizens in Japan are most pessimistic about the likelihood that the government will solve the most important issue that they identified. Only 15.4% of our Japanese respondents answered “very likely” or “likely” to this question. This reflects the wide perception among the Japanese about the intractability of many daunting challenges -- from economic stagnation, runaway fiscal deficit, to adverse demographic trend -- facing this only established democracy in the region. Citizens in Vietnam, one of the region's fastest growing economies, are most optimistic, with 63.7% believing that it is likely or very likely that the government will solve the problem they concern most.

[Table 4 about here]

Overall speaking, our survey shows that for the great majority of East Asian citizens in emerging democracies, their respective political system is still far from being a high-quality democracy. Most third-wave democracies systems in the region are still lacking many of the highly valued properties of liberal democracy. In particular, three procedural dimensions, controlling corruption, horizontal accountability and rule of law are most lacking in most countries. Also, the result dimension in terms of responsiveness has ample room for improvement. In stark contrast, East Asian semi-democratic regimes are faulty in terms of competition, freedom, vertical accountability, and participation. But in the eyes of its citizens, these regimes deliver high-quality governance in terms of rule of law, controlling corruption, horizontal accountability, equality and responsiveness. Democracy in East Asia is indeed facing some fierce competitors.

## **Tentative Conclusion**

The growth of democratic legitimacy is shaped by some short-term factors, such as economic performance, as well as by some long-term forces, such as values change. It is important to know that citizens in East Asian democracies are able to distinguish between the political and economic dimensions of regime performance. This means a large number of citizens may come to value democracy for the political goods it produces even when its economic performance is perceived to be sluggish. This is a no small point because most East Asian emerging democracies are not likely to repeat its past record of miraculous growth. The global financial meltdown triggered by the sub-prime loan crisis and the resultant slower growth in the United States and Europe will dampen the growth momentum across the region for the foreseeable future. Over

the long-term, the state's overall capacity in the provision of a stable and enabling economic environment is severely constrained by the forces of globalization. New democracies have to wrestle with the unforgiving nature of the "global market forces" which penalize slow and inefficient democratic process on a daily basis in terms of currency fluctuation, capital outflow and disappearing of foreign buyers. Globalization accelerates the hollowing-out of national politics. It shifts the locus of governing power away from national capital to international organizations (such as IMF), multinational firms, foreign institutional investors and private transnational actors.

For East Asian citizens, of all of the properties people expect out of liberal democracy, nothing is more importance than the responsiveness of the government to their needs and concern. On this score, democratically elected government do not necessarily fare better than non-democratic regime in the eyes of their citizens. Equally important are maintaining a competitive electoral system and the delivery of clean politics. Most of the emerging democracies are rated more favorably on the former but not the latter. This suggests that all East Asian democracies desperately need more serious attempts to strength the legal deterrence against the corruption of elected politicians. They all need more rigorous regulations on campaign finance and financial disclosures to arrest the encroachment of money politics. At the same time, it is imperative to strength the independence and integrity the judicial branch making it less susceptible to political influence. Without this a systematic crackdown on the un-ethical conduct of elected politicians remains an elusive goal.

In the future, we need more research on ways to improve democratic quality. Drawing on experiences of East Asia, one can identify at least three important set of factors that are significantly associated with the quality of democracy. First, mass political culture matters. If a majority of citizens are attentive to political affairs and

firmly endorse the principle of freedom and rights protection, limited government, democratic accountability, and rule of law, state officials will feel compelled to follow the procedure of good democracy. State officials violating individual freedom and or engaging in illegal practices and corruption will definitely worry about being replaced through elections. Second, political elites matter. Lack of strong commitment of a country's significant leaders of opinion, culture, business, and social organizations, and all major leaders of government and politically significant parties to democratic norms and procedures is a sure recipe for cooking low quality of democracy. Lastly, civil society plays an important role in determining the quality of democracy. A strong civil society and a tradition of civil engagement are also crucial in shaping politicians and parties' incentives. Under such circumstance, the civil society as a whole is more likely to generate strong constraints on state officials.

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**TABLE 1 SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY**

(Percent of respondents)

DEMOCRACY IS...	CN <sup>e</sup>			HK			TW			KR			MN			TH			PH			JP			ID		SG		VN		KH		MY	
	2002	2008	2011	2001	2007	-	2001	2006	2010	2001	2006	2011	2002	2006	2010	2001	2006	2010	2002	2005	2010	2002	2007	2011	2006	2011	2006	2010	2007	2010	2007	-	2008	2011
Desirable for our country now <sup>a</sup>	72.3	64.8	- <sup>f</sup>	87.6	82.1	-	72.2	83.4	- <sup>f</sup>	95.4	94.4	- <sup>f</sup>	91.6	94.4	- <sup>f</sup>	93.0	84.9	- <sup>f</sup>	88.1	69.4	- <sup>f</sup>	87.1	88.8	- <sup>f</sup>	86.4	- <sup>f</sup>	90.8	- <sup>f</sup>	92.9	- <sup>f</sup>	94.5	-	86.5	- <sup>f</sup>
Suitable for our country now <sup>b</sup>	67.7	69.3	64.3	66.8	77.1	-	59.0	67.9	73.8	84.2	78.0	82.2	86.3	84.4	84.1	88.1	82.7	80.4	80.2	55.2	62.1	76.3	75.2	71.8	79.8	71.4	86.8	90.6	90.4	83.3	73.1	-	81.1	80.5
Effective in solving the problems of society	60.5	59.1	65.8	39.0	39.2	-	46.8	54.8	59.4	71.7	54.2	70.2	78.4	77.0	74.6	89.6	66.5	75.3	60.7	55.6	55.3	61.4	65.9	68.5	76.2	68.0	67.1	61.7	81.0	70.8	87.1	-	77.9	84.2
Preferable to all other kinds of government <sup>c</sup>	53.8	53.6	52.1	40.3	43.1	-	40.4	47.2	49.9	49.4	43.2	65.5	57.1	39.7	48.4	82.6	73.0	68.2	63.6	50.4	54.2	67.2	62.2	61.7	64.3	58.6	58.8	45.5	71.8	65.4	51.8	-	70.6	74.8
Equally or more important than economic development <sup>d</sup>	40.3	12.8	23.5	19.6	9.7	-	23.5	15.6	15.3	30.1	12.5	23.2	48.6	28.0	28.2	51.3	20.9	19.4	21.8	19.1	23.1	44.0	42.1	37.7	9.9	9.8	12.1	15.2	21.7	20.1	26.0	-	24.0	19.4
None of the above	13.6	18.7	3.1	7.2	6.7	-	13.0	7.4	7.6	0.7	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.0	4.3	0.5	4.8	1.3	1.5	8.5	6.6	5.7	5.5	6.7	5.6	1.7	2.6	1.7	5.3	0.2	1.3	-	3.0	2.7
All of the above	17.8	7.3	11.2	7.0	4.4	-	7.4	6.4	7.7	15.7	5.2	12.6	25.9	13.1	15.4	35.6	11.1	11.0	6.7	5.0	4.5	23.4	23.8	21.8	6.4	5.2	5.7	6.8	16.4	14.2	11.0	-	14.7	13.7
Mean number of items	2.9	2.6	2.1	2.5	2.5	-	2.4	2.7	2.0	3.3	2.8	2.4	3.6	3.2	2.4	4.0	3.3	2.5	3.1	2.5	1.9	3.4	3.3	2.4	3.2	2.1	3.2	2.1	3.6	2.4	3.3	-	3.4	2.6

Note: <sup>a</sup> Six or above on a 10-point dictatorship-democracy scale of where the country should or could be now.

<sup>b</sup> Dichotomous variable.

<sup>c</sup> Trichotomous variable recoded into a dichotomous variable.

<sup>d</sup> Five-way variable recoded into dichotomous variable.

<sup>e</sup> CN:CHINA; HK:HONG KONG; TW:TAIWAN; KR:KOREA; MN:MONGOLIA; TH:THAILAND; PH:PHILIPPINES; JP:JAPAN; ID: INDONESIA; SG: SINGAPORE; VN: VIETNAM; KH: CAMBODIA; MY:MALAYSIA.

<sup>f</sup> Not asked in China (2011), Taiwan(2010), Korea(2011), Mongolia(2010), Thailand(2010), Philippines(2010), Japan(2011), Indonesia(2011), Singapore(2010), Vietnam(2010), Malaysia(2011)

**TABLE 2 LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUE**

(Percent of respondents)

	CN <sup>a</sup>			HK			TW			KR			MN			TH			PH			JP			ID		SG		VN		KH		MY	
	2002	2008	2011	2001	2007	-	2001	2006	2010	2001	2006	2011	2002	2006	2010	2001	2006	2010	2002	2005	2010	2002	2007	2011	2006	2011	2006	2010	2007	2010	2007	-	2008	2011
Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions	34.2	13.8	32.5	62.6	62.8	-	60.3	71.1	75.1	52.9	60.5	59.8	33.6	26.3	42.8	41.5	39.8	52.5	47.5	43.9	59.4	77.2	70.1	83.2	22.8	25.6	41.6	38.1	19.0	28.2	29.9	-	34.6	30.7
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society	26.0	25.8	39.6	58.9	50.4	-	60.2	71.5	71.5	60.1	58.5	55.9	22.3	14.5	23.7	46.9	44.3	29.1	39.7	40.5	45.7	55.6	72.2	80.7	46.4	39.0	25.6	35.3	9.8	7.1	8.1	-	26.1	27.6
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups	18.8	16.3	26.0	46.6	43.9	-	34.0	37.3	42.4	64.7	54.5	58.9	30.7	16.2	27.4	16.1	12.6	29.9	46.2	41.9	44.6	34.0	44.9	54.1	50.6	41.3	47.3	36.9	44.2	20.4	46.9	-	27.6	24.8
When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch	30.9	30.3	38.1	46.7	52.7	-	53.7	56.9	59.0	69.0	72.2	66.8	71.0	42.8	54.7	40.1	27.8	59.3	38.7	32.1	31.7	62.2	60.5	71.7	55.6	42.8	49.1	34.2	20.2	18.6	27.5	-	40.3	45.2

If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things	34.2	21.0	32.5	46.8	43.2	-	24.7	34.2	38.2	53.8	57.3	61.6	38.8	36.1	43.3	47.4	38.3	47.8	49.9	43.7	33.2	50.2	54.0	59.0	55.9	50.0	45.9	49.4	52.1	33.8	33.6	-	40.7	45.3
If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything	41.8	44.5	52.3	54.1	57.1	-	57.2	63.1	73.1	37.2	34.2	40.7	29.7	17.7	23.7	25.0	26.3	20.8	46.9	40.1	39.7	59.2	56.4	56.5	52.2	49.6	40.8	36.2	30.5	24.2	4.1	-	47.8	55.4
If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.	30.8	26.4	39.7	42.0	36.3	-	23.5	30.5	31.5	52.7	51.8	56.2	19.3	23.2	35.0	23.6	18.0	19.0	43.4	36.2	30.2	36.9	40.8	44.1	41.8	40.6	31.8	37.8	44.8	25.4	35.9	-	26.6	29.4
Average percent LDV	31.0	25.4	37.2	51.1	49.5	-	44.8	52.1	55.8	55.8	55.6	57.1	35.1	25.3	35.8	34.4	29.6	36.9	44.6	39.8	40.6	53.6	57.0	64.2	46.5	41.3	40.3	38.3	31.5	22.5	26.6	-	34.8	36.9
Disagree all of above <sup>b</sup>	1.2	0.5	4.7	14.6	10.2	-	4.0	7	9.4	6.7	9.1	11.4	1.0	0.4	1.1	1.6	1.4	0.7	7.2	2.9	1.7	11.2	13.3	15.3	2.9	4.7	3.7	4.4	0.8	0.3	0.1	-	1.7	1.7
Disagree none of above <sup>c</sup>	5.0	6.6	9.6	5.4	5.1	-	1.4	3	1.8	1.9	2.7	3.2	9.6	15.3	10.0	14.3	11.5	5.2	10.7	8.4	9.8	0.9	1.8	1.1	3.5	7.9	10.3	17.8	6.0	5.1	6.2	-	11.7	10.4
Mean number of items	3.0	1.8	2.6	4.2	3.5	-	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	2.5	1.8	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.6	3.1	2.8	2.8	4.5	4.0	4.5	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.2	1.6	1.9	-	2.4	2.6

Note: <sup>a</sup> .CN:CHINA; HK:HONG KONG; TW:TAIWAN; KR:KOREA; MN:MONGOLIA; TH:THAILAND; PH:PHILIPPINES; JP:JAPAN; ID: INDONESIA; SG: SINGAPORE; VN: VIETNAM; KH: CAMBODIA; MY:MALAYSIA.

<sup>b</sup> all items are the positive values.

<sup>c</sup> all items are the negative values.

**TABLE 3 AUTHORITARIAN DETACHMENT**

(Percent of respondents)

ITEM	CN <sup>d</sup>			HK			TW			KR			MN			TH			PH			JP			ID			SG			VN			KH			MY		
	2002	2008	2011	2001	2007	- 2001	2006	2010	2001	2006	2011	2002	2006	2010	2001	2006	2010	2002	2005	2010	2002	2007	2011	2006	2011	2006	2010	2007	2010	2007	-	2008	2011						
Reject "strong leader"	74.5	61.4	60.2	73.5	78.8	- 71.3	76.5	79.4	82.3	83.4	80.0	66.1	35.8	42.7	77.7	69.4	69.5	76.8	60.3	64.3	85.4	78.3	81.4	83.5	74.3	86.5	87.2	76.1	68.7	72.4	-	62.6	61.7						
Reject "military rule"	61.4	57.2	67.0	85.7	87.5	- 81.6	88.4	92.2	89.8	89.8	91.3	85.8	83.3	86.1	81.2	71.8	74.3	62.7	73.2	75.1	94.4	92.1	95.2	62.3	51.5	92.7	85.7	64.0	59.7	51.6	-	87.2	79.0						
Reject "opposition party"	-- <sup>a</sup>	-- <sup>a</sup>	-- <sup>a</sup>	62.4	83.5	- 70.3	83.0	86.1	86.7	88.4	87.9	72.4	70.4	73.7	61.3	73.5	75.6	69.6	65.3	67.5	66.7	84.1	90.3	87.1	77.6	88.4	78.2	34.7	2.8	67.0	-	76.0	70.9						
Reject all authoritarian options	57.9 <sup>b</sup>	52.1 <sup>b</sup>	51.6 <sup>b</sup>	54.0	73.0	- 56.2	69.2	73.0	69.9	76.9	74.1	50.0	29.6	37.5	46.0	55.1	51.3	40.6	40.2	44.6	61.2	72.1	76.4	55.5	43.6	81.7	66.5	26.2	1.0	37.8	-	52.0	46.4						
Reject no authoritarian options	22.0 <sup>b</sup>	33.5 <sup>b</sup>	11.4 <sup>b</sup>	10.8	8.5	- 11.2	6.2	1.6	1.2	5.1	2.3	5.5	9.6	6.3	6.3	15.3	4.4	5.2	10.7	8.5	3.9	5.2	1.2	6.1	5.1	4.2	1.7	15.3	4.4	11.9	-	6.6	7.1						
Mean number of items rejected (0 to 3)	1.4 <sup>c</sup>	1.2 <sup>c</sup>	1.3	2.2	2.5	- 2.2	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.0	2.7	2.5	1.7	1.3	1.9	-	2.3	2.1						

Note: <sup>a</sup> Not asked in China.

<sup>b</sup> based on two questions

<sup>c</sup> Mean score multiplied by two questions.

<sup>d</sup> CN:CHINA; HK:HONG KONG; TW:TAIWAN; KR:KOREA; MN:MONGOLIA; TH:THAILAND; PH:PHILIPPINES; JP:JAPAN; ID:INDONESIA; SG:SINGAPORE; VN:VIETNAM; KH:CAMBODIA; MY:MALAYSIA.

TABLE 4 QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

(Percent of respondents)

		CN		HK		TW		KR		MN		TH		PH		JP		ID		SG		VN		KH		MY	
		2008	2011	2007	-	2006	2010	2006	2011	2006	2010	2006	2010	2005	2010	2007	2011	2006	2011	2006	2010	2007	2010	2007	-	2008	2011
<b>1. Rule of Law</b>	Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials/ Do officials who commit crimes go unpunished?	74.0	58.3	77.4	-	44.6	36.3	60.6	39.7	62.7	27.6	71.1	58.3	59.2	44.5	47.2	61.7	81.2	51.9	83.0	84.8	77.8	55.8	65.5	-	67.7	50.6
	Law-abiding Government	66.0	24.9	53.0	-	36.9	36.9	16.1	28.9	24.7	18.9	14.5	54.8	28.6	33.9	37.0	55.0	28.5	32.4	76.2	87.9	69.8	54.3	38.5	-	35.4	48.6
	Controlling Corruption	30.7	33.4	73.6	-	30.0	30.9	54.3	45.3	47.5	40.6	67.5	64.4	39.0	39.5	53.3	79.2	53.1	47.5	-	-	77.0	69.0	49.4	-	51.1	67.9
		32.9	49.6	-	-	28.5	31.7	48.2	42.3	22.1	15.7	59.7	51.5	32.5	29.8	48.7	71.7	44.4	36.8	84.5	81.9	66.9	-	26.9	-	50.6	60.2
	63.1	-	90.0	-	63.2	68.3	44.3	49.0	51.2	35.1	58.5	38.8	34.6	49.6	31.1	51.2	52.6	48.2	86.7	85.4	78.6	79.8	56.1	-	64.1	76.0	
<b>2. Competition</b>	How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?	-	55.6	43.3	-	51.5	56.6	46.7	50.6	48.4	36.6	55.9	63.3	36.9	61.3	43.3	50.8	76.0	71.9	47.8	36.6	76.0	67.4	70.8	-	47.6	55.4
	Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period	-	-	76.1	-	62.6	70.5	66.7	64.7	62.5	78.3	61.0	77.3	57.8	65.2	58.2	54.4	67.8	59.1	51.7	57.6	78.2	73.0	73.2	-	57.7	66.5
	On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?	50.2	45.5	37.6	-	47.0	78.8	57.5	75.0	66.8	67.6	66.5	68.3	56.4	59.2	65.2	77.0	83.4	74.5	85.4	77.4	85.1	88.7	-	-	72.9	79.2
<b>3. Participation</b>	Did you vote in the last national election?	55.8	49.8	44.4	-	81.5	83.1	66.8	75.2	83.5	85.7	87.1	93.7	80.2	69.8	82.7	80.7	93.3	89.3	62.0	49.3	85.8	86.1	-	-	59.4	65.1
	Attend a campaign meeting or rally	38.3	30.9	1.6	-	13.4	10.7	19.6	13.8	60.8	51.7	23.3	53.8	23.4	20.4	18.7	14.6	23.4	26.2	10.1	7.6	53.9	62.4	-	-	27.1	31.5
	Try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party	67.0	11.3	4.7	-	16.1	16.1	16.1	9.0	31.4	35.3	19.9	23.1	19.3	18.5	6.2	7.7	12.3	18.7	2.6	3.8	-	10.1	-	-	14.1	15.4

<b>4. Vertical Accountability</b>	People have the power to change a government they don't like	-	-	28.2	-	60.3	56.1	44.4	50.9	81.8	75.5	77.2	74.7	68.7	80.1	56.2	56.9	67.1	63.7	51.3	35.5	55.6	33.8	78.4	-	76.1	79.5
	Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions	37.7	-	-	-	33.6	39.3	36.0	34.7	25.6	23.9	31.5	32.4	45.3	45.9	27.4	31.5	41.7	40.4	40.2	43.3	43.1	48.1	19.8	-	30.4	49.8
	How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?	39.3	49.5	62.8	-	41.9	40.6	25.0	25.2	34.6	26.5	65.5	59.6	41.1	28.8	36.9	37.2	62.0	39.6	64.3	77.8	16.3	36.4	57.5	-	37.0	42.7
<b>5. Horizontal Accountability</b>	When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do/ When government leaders break the laws, there is nothing the court can do.	44.3	46.9	-	-	37.8	47.7	42.7	40.0	23.2	12.2	44.7	52.3	50.9	57.4	26.8	51.7	58.8	61.3	62.8	68.7	60.2	49.8	43.7	-	44.4	62.6
	To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check? / To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping government leaders in check?	-	66.4	58.4	-	51.6	47.3	53.6	49.8	54.9	19.9	39.8	42.1	58.2	73.9	37.9	20.5	63.4	55.9	78.9	78.5	79.8	73.0	57.1	-	64.1	73.0
<b>6. Freedom</b>	People are free to speak what they think without fear	75.9	68.4	83.9	-	73.4	73.9	54.7	52.4	68.8	57.7	70.1	83.7	66.6	77.1	47.5	54.2	89.5	80.5	38.7	49.3	74.7	65.3	64.5	-	65.7	79.2
	People can join any organization they like without fear	54.6	51.2	80.1	-	77.5	78.1	63.2	66.0	78.6	75.4	68.7	82.7	66.4	74.8	54.0	61.8	90.1	79.6	46.1	52.9	65.3	51.0	82.8	-	71.9	81.8
<b>7. Equality</b>	Everyone is treated equally by the government/ All citizens from different ethnic communities in Country X are treated equally by the government.	70.2	69.1	63.4	-	43.2	45.9	12.9	33.0	34.1	79.1	55.4	86.5	36.4	42.4	17.0	42.5	72.7	78.6	68.2	79.4	78.5	78.0	66.7	-	50.5	70.6
	People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter	83.0	81.0	78.0	-	63.6	59.7	28.2	39.4	32.8	26.5	87.1	91.0	84.1	73.4	62.5	68.6	74.2	76.1	82.6	88.7	81.6	80.4	90.0	-	80.5	88.4
<b>8. Responsiveness</b>	How well do you think the government responds to what people want?	76.7	77.3	43.6	-	36.0	38.0	20.6	29.4	24.6	13.5	46.9	40.3	32.2	44.3	31.9	32.4	45.2	41.3	66.7	64.3	79.7	78.3	48.6	-	55.8	66.8
	How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified? / How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?	51.3	42.8	33.2	-	30.1	32.5	-	42.4	61.3	60.2	58.8	38.1	37.6	56.8	21.3	15.4	74.8	78.1	55.2	59.6	76.1	67.3	53.6	-	53.3	63.1