

**Attitudes Toward Democracy in Seven Countries :
Dimensional Structure and Behavioral Correlates**

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One of the key ingredients in the transformation of authoritarian or post-totalitarian political systems into stable and healthy democracies is the existence of widespread attitudes that acknowledge the legitimacy of the new system and encourage political behavior that is consistent with fundamental democratic norms. At a minimum, mass-level attitudes should not lead to destabilizing polarization, violent behavior or to support for parties or movements committed to the overthrow of the democratic regime. More optimally, one would hope to see the development of attitudes, norms and values regarding the rights and obligations of citizens to be informed participants in the political process. In short, mass-level attitudes supporting democracy may serve as the bedrock of democratic stability, particularly over the long term. Accordingly, much of the literature on democratic consolidation places considerable emphasis on the establishment and dissemination of democratic attitudes and values. Linz and Stepan (1996, 6), for example, set forth three principal dimensions of regime consolidation, one of which is that, "attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces." And as Przeworski and others (1995, 59) have also stated, "When the legitimacy of democracy...is unconditionally accepted by large majorities, we have prima facie evidence of normative consolidation."

This chapter presents a detailed analysis of various attitudes towards democracy and the behavioral correlates of those attitudes in seven democratic systems that had emerged from the "Third Wave" of democratization since the mid 1970s. The countries are Greece, Portugal and Spain in Southern Europe, Hungary and Bulgaria in Central and Eastern Europe, and Uruguay and Chile in Latin America, which are currently members of the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP).²

The political attitudes that we shall focus our analysis upon involve basic support for democracy, as well as attitudes tapping into what we shall refer to as political discontent and political disaffection. Following a detailed examination of the interrelationships among these three clusters of attitudes, we shall explore their behavioral consequences, as well as their links with the three basic channels of political intermediation (exposure to political information through the print and broadcasting media, through membership in secondary associations, and through direct face-to-face discussion of politics).

The arguments that we will develop depart from much of the standard literature on attitudes towards democracy. To begin with, we raise fundamental questions about how these orientations have been conceptualized and operationalized in most previous empirical studies. In general, most published studies share two characteristics. First, they tend to assume that attitudes towards the political system constitute one single attitudinal domain (or at most, two), including such seemingly distinct orientations as basic support for democracy and satisfaction with the current performance of governmental institutions. Many scholars (e.g., Fuchs 1993, 235-7) have contended that, although it is possible to differentiate at the conceptual level between what Easton (1965 and 1975) referred to as diffuse and specific support for the regime, it is not possible to operationalize this distinction and examine it empirically.³ This is, they argue, because Easton's original conceptualization was so vague as to lead invariably to research that is "ambiguous, confusing and noncumulative" (Kaase 1988, 117), because the relevant measurement problems are insuperable (Loewenberg 1971), because this distinction is tautological and derived exclusively from the employment of an inferior methodology (Craig 1993), or because citizens are simply not capable of distinguishing between them (Muller and Jukam 1977).⁴

Second, many of these studies assume a close (if not deterministic) relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with the performance of political institutions or the economy, and support for the democratic regime *per se*. This question of whether citizens' attitudes towards their governments and political regimes can be meaningfully separated into such categories as specific and diffuse support, on

the one hand, or are largely undifferentiated, on the other, could be regarded as well within the realm of sterile academic debate were it not for the fact that several scholars have asserted that regime support, stability and even survival is highly contingent on popular satisfaction with the performance of governments and, more broadly, democratic institutions. Weatherford (1987, 13), for example, states that "Over the long run, of course, legitimacy is wholly determined by policy performance." And Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson add that "The stability of representative democracy depends not just on the trend in satisfaction but also on the level of satisfaction" (1995, 342). And given the findings of numerous studies that the level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy is strongly associated with the degree of satisfaction with the current condition of the economy, coupled with the fact many new democratic regimes (particularly among countries of the former Soviet bloc) are or have been confronting extremely severe economic crises, they assert that the prospects for democratic stability and the very survival of these regimes may hinge on their capacity to solve intractable economic problems. For example, Adam Przeworski (1991, 95) wrote shortly after the collapse of Soviet Communism, "As everyone agrees, the eventual survival of the new democracies will depend to a large extent on their economic performance. And since many among them emerged in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis, economic factors work against their survival." Some scholars have even suggested that the legitimacy of established Western democracies is increasingly dependent on their performance (see Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, 440).

Detailed case studies, however, cast doubt upon such claims. Spain's new democracy, for example, became consolidated in the early 1980s (according to a broad consensus of opinion among scholars and politicians alike), at about the same time that its economy was passing through its most severe economic crisis. Despite widespread discontent resulting from the dislocation associated with economic restructuring, and from unemployment rates that exceeded 20 percent, support for democracy in Spain rose to levels comparable to other West European democracies by the mid 1980s, and has remained solid ever since, despite subsequent economic difficulties, problems arising out of a

profound decentralization of the state, political scandals and continuing Basque terrorism (see Maravall 1997, ch. 5). Extensive analysis of relevant survey data from Spain over a period spanning two decades, using several different analytical techniques, further revealed that these attitudes could not be regarded as constituting one single dimension. Instead, three distinctly different dimensions could be clearly defined conceptually and measured empirically: these are what we referred to regime legitimacy (which, out of deference to the terminology used in the introductory chapter of this volume, we shall here call *democratic support*); *political discontent*; and a third set of attitudinal orientations that can be regarded as part of a broad syndrome of *political disaffection*.⁵ We also found that the origins of these attitudes, their stability or volatility over time, their behavioral correlates, and their implications for the survival of democratic regimes and the "quality of democracy" are distinctly different.

In this chapter we present the results of a parallel exploratory analysis of other newly established democratic systems to determine if a similar structure of attitudinal dimensionality can be found in these political systems as well. As we shall see, a replication of this analysis in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Hungary and Uruguay produces identical findings. We will also see that attitudinal clustering in Bulgaria differs somewhat from the three dimensions found in the other five countries, while Chile is markedly different in one important respect. In that latter case, support for democracy and satisfaction with the political and economic situation are highly correlated. We shall argue that these departures from the previously observed patterns are the products of considerable differences in the nature of the transitions to democracy in these countries, and in particular, of the roles in that process played by key political elites and parties. And from a methodological point of view, we will also claim that many of the confusing and contradictory findings in this field of research are the product of improper inferences drawn from the use of inappropriate indicators based upon an unwarranted assumption that the many commonly used empirical indicators are interchangeable, if not conceptually equivalent. Some scholars have used what we regard as measures of satisfaction in their analyses (e.g.,

Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, 427; Fuchs and Roller 1996, 63-64; Anderson and Guillory 1997; and Anderson 1998b). Others have explicitly asserted that these are adequate and sufficient indicators of system support "at a relatively low level of generalization" (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995, 330), or have argued that indicators on satisfaction are equivalent to, or interchangeable with, measures of legitimacy (Tóka 1995, 359; Weil 1989, 691), or have equated dissatisfaction with political alienation (Lockerbie 1993). Some have used items that we believe are firmly rooted in the disaffection syndrome (e.g., Weatherford 1984; Craig 1993; Fuchs 1993), while others (e.g., Franz 1986) shift back and forth between dissatisfaction and disaffection measures. And yet, in most cases, they refer to "legitimacy," "system support," "regime support," or simply "political support," to which they commonly add speculative comments about the stability and prospects for survival of the democratic regime.

Our conceptual differentiation among these three sets of attitudes towards democracy leads us to a second point of departure from established theoretical perspectives regarding the origins of support for democracy. The two primary theoretical perspectives contend that "diffuse support" for democracy is a product of childhood socialization processes (e.g., Easton and Dennis 1969) or, alternatively, of instrumental judgments of government performance (e.g., Rogowski 1974). The fact that we base our analysis on data collected in countries whose citizens have lived under both authoritarian and democratic regimes allows us to test the relative impact on democratic support of socialization influences and of assessments of economic or political assessments (Mishler and Rose 2002; Weil 2000). If early childhood socialization were the only source of these attitudes, then we would find that the new democracies of Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria and Portugal could not have been consolidated or be regarded as legitimate by a majority of the population, since most of their citizens had been socialized under authoritarian or post-totalitarian regimes whose formal socialization efforts were explicitly anti-democratic. And even though authoritarian interludes in Uruguay, Greece and Chile were so brief as to not have dominated the childhood socialization of such a large portion of these countries' populations,

we should expect to find deep divisions of opinion concerning fundamental support for democracy. With regard to the "instrumental assessment of performance" hypothesis, if citizens were to base their support for democracy exclusively or primarily on their evaluations of changing and (given the economic downturns experienced by most countries in the early 1990s) generally unfavorable economic and political conditions, we should expect to find that democratic support would fluctuate over time and would be quite weak in several of the new democracies examined here. In accord with the childhood socialization hypothesis, we will find that some attitudes (particularly those belonging to a cluster that we will call *disaffection*) do appear to have been the products of early socialization, and have remained remarkably durable despite major changes in the political environment. Similarly, consistent with the "instrumental assessment" hypothesis, we will see that some political attitudes (pertaining to what we call *discontent*) fluctuate substantially over time in close relationship with changing economic and political circumstances. However, neither of these predictions is borne out with regard to basic support for democracy in the countries examined in this study. We fundamentally disagree with these "classic" arguments, at least with regard to political regimes that have undergone transitions to democracy. Instead, we will see that *democratic support* or legitimacy is much more profoundly affected by political learning later in life, particularly during the crucial early stages of the transition to democracy. In short, we shall argue that these mass-level attitudinal underpinnings of stable democracy are the products of adult learning or resocialization processes that are closely linked to the behavior of political elites and their supportive partisan organizations during critical, formative stages of the democratization process. In short, *disaffection* has its origins in early socialization, and *discontent* reflects assessments of the current condition of the country and the government's responsibility for it, but *democratic support* is in large measure a product of the varying stands taken by key political elites during critical phases of the transition to democracy.

This chapter will also examine some of the behavioral consequences and theoretical implications of these attitudinal dimensions. Perhaps the most important of these ramifications

involves the oft-stated assertion that democratic consolidation depends on the condition of the economy. This common claim is based on the assumption that democratic support is the product of satisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions and, in turn, with the condition of the economy. We test this proposition by examining measures of association between items tapping democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and satisfaction with the performance of democracy and with the economy, on the other. We will also explore a more modest and less regime-threatening behavioral correlate of discontent, based on the simple notion that those who are dissatisfied with the performance of a democratic government will express their displeasure in a manner fully consistent with classic democratic theory--by voting against the incumbent government. We then turn our attention to a more extreme behavioral correlate of a lack basic support for democracy that *could* have disruptive implications for the future of democracy in a particular country (and that is commonly regarded as a symptom of a lack of democratic consolidation of a regime--see Linz 1978a; Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996): active support for anti-system parties. A strong association between a lack of widespread democratic legitimacy and support for anti-system parties would reinforce the construct validity of our conceptualization of legitimacy or diffuse support for democracy--indicating that it is, indeed, a meaningful concept with real implications for governability and the persistence of new democratic regimes.

Finally, we will explore some behavioral consequences of political disaffection. As we shall argue, one facet of the broader disaffection syndrome is marginalization from the political system, manifested in low levels of involvement in democratic politics. The extensive battery of "political intermediation" variables included in CNEP data sets makes it possible for us to examine a broad array of types of involvement with the political system--from the more active, such as work for a political party or participating in campaign activities, to the more passive, as measured by the frequency with which an individual follows politics through news coverage in the print and broadcast media. As we shall see, political disaffection is strongly associated with low levels of interest in, exposure to and

information about politics, to infrequent discussion of politics with peers, and to low levels of organizational membership. At the same time, and somewhat surprisingly, it does not consistently lead to low levels of participation in elections. Instead, the overall affect of widespread disaffection is to undermine the "quality of democracy," insofar as large numbers of uninformed, uninvolved "citizens" nonetheless cast ballots to elect national governments.

Three Concepts and Seven Countries

The first two concepts that we shall explore, democratic support and performance satisfaction or its obverse, *political discontent*, are roughly similar to Easton's distinction between diffuse and specific support. *Democratic support* pertains to citizens' beliefs that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. This is the key attitudinal component of regime legitimacy. Such beliefs focus on the political regime in the aggregate, and should be expected to be stable over time and immune from the influence of such factors as the popularity of the government and partisanship--specifically, the correspondence between the citizen's partisan preferences and the party of the incumbent government. Democratic support is a relative concept; no system should be expected to be regarded as fully legitimate in the eyes of each and every citizen, and the intensity of positive support for these institutions varies from one person to another. Accordingly, legitimacy may be considered to be "the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any others that might be established" (Linz 1988, 65; 1978a, 16). This definition is also relative insofar as it refers to the belief that a democratic political system is the "least bad" of all forms of government.⁶ As Linz (1978b, 18) has written, "ultimately, democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular juncture, no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals.

In contrast, *political discontent* is based on "peoples' judgments about the day-to-day actions of

political leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes" (Kornberg and Clarke 1992, 20). In other words, political dissatisfaction arises from citizens' evaluations of the performance of the regime or authorities, as well as of their political outcomes (Farah, Barnes and Heunks 1979). In contrast with fundamental support for democracy, it should thus be expected to fluctuate over time in accord with the government's performance, the condition of the society and economy, or the performance of key political institutions. And since it is focused on partisan political leaders and the governments they lead, it would not be surprising to find that, other things being equal, citizens supporting the same party as that of the incumbent government would be more positive in their assessments than those who voted for the opposition.⁷

The third cluster of attitudes that we shall explore, *political disaffection*, is conceptually distinct from both of those described above, although it is often indiscriminately lumped together with measures of citizen support for and satisfaction with democracy. Following DiPalma (1970, 30; also see Torcal 2002a, ch. 3), we regard political disaffection as a certain estrangement of members of the polity from both its core political institutions and, more generally, from politics. As described by Torcal (2002c, 15), political disaffection refers to "the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime." This syndrome is characterized by a number of specific symptoms including disinterest in politics, a sense of personal inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, a general sense of detachment from the political system and/or disengagement from its most relevant institutions (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). While this syndrome shares with the discontent dimension a negative attitude towards politics, it is different in one important respect. Political discontent may be regarded as the result of a discrepancy between generally positive expectations regarding the political system, on the one hand, and a negative evaluation of the way it is currently functioning, on the other. In contrast, political disaffection is a reflection of a fundamentally distrusting and suspicious vision of political life. And

unlike discontent (which should be expected to ebb and flow in accord with current assessments of the performance of incumbents or democratic institutions), attitudes of disaffection are likely to have been fixed at some stage of the socialization process, and should subsequently be more resistant to change. In addition, while discontent is usually charged with a partisan component (with supporters of opposition parties generally more critical of the performance of the government and dissatisfied with its policy outputs than those who identify with the incumbent party), disaffection is more far-reaching and indiscriminate in its objects of negativity.⁸ In short, the disaffected hold political attitudes that are distinctly different from those who have been referred to as "dissatisfied democrats" (Klingemann 1999, 54; Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001).

In an earlier empirical study of Spain (Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1997), we found strong evidence that these three dimensions--political satisfaction, disaffection and democratic legitimacy--are empirically distinct.⁹ Analyzing survey data in several different ways, we concluded that the conceptual distinctions described above are clearly reflected in Spanish citizens' responses to the relevant questionnaire items. First, we examined time-series data over two decades and found that two different measures of democratic legitimacy (both of which are used in this chapter) were quite stable over time: support for democracy rose from a comparatively low level in the late 1970s and early 1980s to one comparable to those of established West European democracies by the mid 1980s, and remained remarkably constant thereafter. This finding provides empirical corroboration that Spanish democracy had become consolidated at the mass level by the mid 1980s (as argued in Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995; Linz and Stepan, ch. 6; and elsewhere). Attitudes falling within the disaffection syndrome were also quite stable over this same time period. In contrast, measures of discontent fluctuated substantially over this same time period. What is noteworthy is that several different measures of satisfaction were strikingly parallel to one another in their evolution over time regardless of the wording of the questionnaire item: whether the face content of the survey item focused on satisfaction with "the way democracy is functioning in Spain," with the performance of the

incumbent government, with the political situation of the country, or even with the current condition of the economy, all measures of satisfaction were quite positive at the time the new democracy was coming into existence around 1977. They all fell to a very low level in 1981 (which coincided with the depths of Spain's economic and political crises); they all rose to a peak around 1990 following nearly a decade of stable Socialist government and strong economic growth, and declined again as a series of scandals beset that same incumbent Socialist government and the economy slid into recession in 1992 and 1993; and they all then rose as the economy recovered in the mid 1990s.¹⁰ The sharp contrast between the stability over time of attitudes pertaining to democratic legitimacy and disaffection, on the one hand, and the considerable fluctuation of satisfaction with the performance of democracy/the incumbent government/the condition of the economy/etc., on the other, provided *prima facie* evidence of the distinctiveness of these attitudinal dimensions.¹¹

These findings were further corroborated by an analysis of the evolution of these attitudes over a period of 14 years among various age cohorts (Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1997; and Torcal 2000a, ch.7). Strong "period effects" were observed among all age groups with regard to measures of satisfaction, suggesting that they fluctuated over time among Spaniards of all ages in accord with short-term economic and political conditions. In contrast, the evolution of attitudes tapping into the legitimacy and disaffection dimensions were characterized by strong cohort effects: once Spanish democracy was consolidated (around 1982), they changed very little over time. But they also reflected consistent differences among age cohorts, suggesting that such attitudes were influenced by early socialization experiences--which varied enormously, ranging from the violence and polarization of the civil war era to four decades of authoritarian rule to full democracy beginning in 1977. Moreover, dimensional analysis based upon cross-sectional survey data further confirmed the distinctiveness of these three dimensions.

To what extent do these conceptual distinctions also find empirical corroboration from analyses of other new democracies? Given the lack of comparable time-series data for the other countries in this

current study, this cross-national analysis will be preliminary and only partial in its testing of these propositions: it will be based primarily on a combination of factor analyses (both "exploratory" and "confirmatory") and measures of bivariate association among the relevant political attitudes and their hypothesized behavioral consequences in several of the 13 countries currently included within the CNEP,¹² as well in Portugal.

Post-election surveys undertaken in Spain (1993), Greece (1996), Uruguay (1994), Bulgaria (1996), Portugal (2002), Hungary (1998) and Chile (1993) included identical or very similar items measuring the three core concepts of democratic support, political discontent and political disaffection. (In addition, the inclusion of some of these items in the 1985 Four Nation Study, and the 1996 Italian and 2000 Chilean CNEP surveys makes it possible for us to test one crucial hypothesis, although so many of the other items were not included in those surveys as to preclude broader comparisons with the other countries in this analysis.) Not only does the geographical, institutional and social diversity of the cases analyzed in this study facilitate our efforts to test the generalizability of our earlier findings from Spain, but the greatly different historical experiences and democratization trajectories give us a better opportunity to speculate about the origins of these democratic attitudes in widely varying contexts, as well as to explore their behavioral consequences and implications for regime stability. As can be seen in Table 1, moreover, these countries spanned the full range of democracies arrayed in accord with our core measures of democratic legitimacy, with Greece near the very top in terms of the extent of support for democracy, while support for democracy in Bulgaria is much lower. The Portuguese data (derived, as noted, from a 2002 survey that was not part of the CNEP project) utilized a response format that precludes a direct comparison of marginals with these others, but the overwhelming level of support for democracy in Portugal would have placed it near the top of this rank-ordering of countries.¹³

[Table 1]

The surveys conducted in Spain, Uruguay and Chile included as a measure of support for

democracy the respondent's agreement or disagreement with the proposition that "Democracy is the best political system for a country like ours," which is labeled *DemBest* in the following tables. The other surveys also included a second measure of democratic support, *DemAuth*, which asks respondents to choose among the following three sentences: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government;" "Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system;" and "For people like me, one regime is the same as another" (with the latter recoded to fall between the other two as an intermediate category). Most of the CNEP surveys also included three different measures of discontent: these are *DemSat* (the respondent's degree of dissatisfaction with "the way democracy is functioning in Spain [...Greece, Uruguay, etc]"); *PolitSat* (the level of discontent over "the political situation of the country"); and *EconSat* (the extent of dissatisfaction with "the economic situation of the country"). Three indicators of disaffection were also included in the questionnaires administered in each of these countries: *PolComp* reflects agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Generally, politics seems so complicated that people like me cannot understand what is happening;" *DontCare* is the respondent's agreement or disagreement with the proposition that "Politicians do not worry much about what people like me think;" and *NoInflu* taps into the respondent's belief in or rejection of the idea that "People like me do not have any influence over what the government does."¹⁴

Spain, Greece and Uruguay

Our analysis begins with an exploration of the dimensionality of these various attitudes towards democracy. Table 2 presents the results of two different approaches to analyzing the dimensional structures underpinning the clustering of these attitudes and behaviors in Spain, Uruguay and Greece. In the matrix represented by the figures appearing in the first six or seven columns are measures of bivariate association (Tau-b) among all of these items. The final two or three columns in this table display the loadings that emerged from an exploratory factor analysis of all of these items following a Varimax rotation of the principal component solution. It is clear from data for all three of these

countries that Factor I is made up of items involving political discontent. As we hypothesized, all three measures of dissatisfaction belong to this cluster; both the factor loadings and inter-item measures of association are all strong and statistically significant (at the .001 level or better). It is also noteworthy that the degree of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in all three countries was strongly linked to assessments of the economic and political conditions of the country. In sharp contrast, basic support for democracy, as measured by DemBest and (when available) DemAuth, is weakly related to dissatisfaction with the economic or political situation of the country. In Uruguay, there is no statistically significant relationship between support for democracy and either of these two measures of discontent, while in Spain and Greece the relationships are quite weak (ranging between Tau-b scores of -.06 and -.11). Dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in each country is moderately associated with our measures of support (with Tau-b scores ranging from -.14 to -.22), but the factor analyses indicate that support for democracy and the three discontent measures are not part of the same attitudinal domain. In Spain, DemBest simply fails to fit with the other items in the discontent cluster, while in both Uruguay and Greece the measures of democratic support constitute their own separate attitudinal dimension. It is also clear that, as hypothesized above, the various disaffection items cluster to make up a third distinct attitudinal dimension. The weakness of the relationships between the disaffection measures and those that relate to democratic support is particularly noteworthy.¹⁵

[Table 2]

In order to subject these hypotheses to more rigorous empirical tests, a "confirmatory factor analysis" was performed using these same variables clustered in accord with the three latent factors described above.¹⁶ The results of these analyses confirmed the same dimensional structure for all three countries. All of the individual variables were found to be linked to one another as in the initial clusters that emerged from the exploratory factor analysis whose results are presented in Table 2.¹⁷ Moreover, the correlations among latent factors further revealed that these clusters are independent of one another: these inter-factor correlations ranged between .00 and .19. Given our particular interest

in the relationship between discontent and fundamental support for democracy, it is most noteworthy that these correlations were negligible in all three cases: .07 for Spain, .04 for Uruguay, and .07 for Greece. Overall, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) "goodness-of-fit" statistic reveals that these three-factor models adequately capture the nature of the relationships among these variables: the RMSEA statistic for Spain is .055, for Uruguay is .067, and for Greece is .054.¹⁸

It is important to note that these findings are highly significant for theories of democratic consolidation: in none of these countries is dissatisfaction with the political or economic situation of the country strongly associated with fundamental support for democracy. Even the bivariate link between democratic legitimacy and the broader measure of dissatisfaction with the "performance of democracy" is only of moderate strength, and is not located in any of these factor analyses within the same attitudinal domain as support for democracy.

Portugal, Bulgaria and Hungary

To what extent do these same findings hold up in other countries, particularly those that have suffered worse economic and/or political crises than Spain, Greece or Uruguay? In contrast with the relatively tranquil transitions to democracy in Spain, Uruguay and Greece, the downfall of the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship in Portugal was followed by over a year of revolutionary chaos and tumult. Indeed, it was not until a year and a half later that a counter-coup by more moderate military officers set Portugal on the path towards democracy and ultimate regime consolidation. As can be seen in Table 3, the pattern of relationships among these individual variables and dimensional factors is precisely the same as we saw above. There is no statistically significant relationship between dissatisfaction with the condition of the economy or the performance of the incumbent government, on the one hand, and an item that is quite similar to DemBest,¹⁹ on the other. And the degree of association between basic support for democracy and dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy (-.09) is significantly weaker than we saw in Spain, Uruguay and Greece. Similarly, the two disaffection measures included in this survey were not substantially associated with either the

democratic support or political discontent measures. Confirmatory factor analysis of these data are supportive of these findings: while the absence of some key variables and slight differences in item wording lead to weaker closeness of fit with the three-factor model than we have observed above (the RMSEA statistic is .090), and the factor loadings among items within each cluster are lower than we observed in analyses of Spain, Greece and Uruguay,²⁰ the correlations among the Discontent, Disaffection and Democratic support factors are extraordinarily low, ranging between -.01 and +.01. Among these findings, the latter data relating to the separability of the three dimensions is the most significant theoretically.

Unlike the democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, several East European countries experienced a profound economic collapse at the same time they were undergoing their respective post-Soviet political transformations. One might suspect that, even though economic recessions, periods of stagnation or (in the case of Spain) persistently high levels of unemployment created social strains and contributed to political discontent in the Southern European and Latin American countries, the economic circumstances of most individuals were not so severe as to shake their support for democracy. Per capita income levels remained relatively stable in Spain, Greece and Uruguay, and a social-welfare safety net was already in existence in each country, helping to ease the economic strains on most individuals. What about the relationship between economic or political discontent and support for democracy in an Eastern European country whose economy has suffered a severe collapse, and where social or political conditions have deteriorated substantially? The case of Bulgaria provides an excellent opportunity to reexamine the relationship between economic and political dissatisfaction and support for democracy. Between 1989 and 1994 per capita income in Bulgaria decreased by 57 percent, the country's industrial output and total exports fell by 50 percent, and agricultural production by more than 35 percent (Vassilev 2000, 219). *Prima facie* evidence of the severity of the impact of this economic collapse on personal well-being can be seen in the reduction in the average life-span from 70.9 years in the late 1980s to 67.6 years in the late 1990s (Vassilev 2000,

226). And this economic crisis was accompanied by a crime wave and a crippling of basic services provided by the state. What has been the impact of this economic decline on support for democracy?

To be sure, the aggregate level of support for democracy in Bulgaria is lower than is to be found in most other democratic systems, as we saw in the marginals from DemBest and DemAuth that were presented Table 1. These two measures (which are strongly associated with each other, $Tau-b=.47$) reveal that support for democracy in Bulgaria was relatively weak in the mid 1990s (although it is preferred over other types of political regime by most Bulgarians), while support for an authoritarian alternative under some circumstances was disturbingly strong.

The data presented in Table 3, however, indicate that the relationships between dissatisfaction with the economic and the political situation of Bulgaria, on the one hand, and two measures of support for democracy, on the other, are not only not statistically significant at the .05 level, but they are of the wrong sign! And the correlation between the latent factors of discontent and democratic support that were generated by the confirmatory factor analysis was just .02--a figure that was lower than comparable statistics for Spain, Uruguay and Greece. To some extent, the weakness of the relationship between support for democracy and dissatisfaction with the status of the economy is affected by a relative lack of variance on the EconSit item: in 1996, 35 percent of respondents rated the economic situation of the country as "bad" and 61 percent "very bad." Accordingly, we re-ran this analysis using a different measure of economic satisfaction, about which there were more diverse opinions: an assessment of the respondent's own economic situation.²¹ This slightly strengthened the relationship, to a $Tau-b$ of -.11 with DemBest and -.13 with DemAuth. Still, the overall conclusion is that the link between support for democracy and assessments of the economic situation is surprisingly weak.²²

[Table 3]

The Bulgarian data also reveal that those attitudes that we hypothesized would fall within a distinct political disaffection cluster do, indeed, inhabit a separate attitudinal domain, and are only weakly (or not at all) associated with those making up the political discontent and democratic support.

This can be seen in the results of the exploratory factor analysis presented in Table 3, and also in the extremely low correlations between disaffection and the two other latent factors in the confirmatory factor analysis: -.01 with discontent, and -.03 with the democratic support cluster.

As we saw in Spain, Greece, Uruguay and Portugal, dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in Bulgaria has somewhat stronger bivariate linkages with each of our two measures of democratic legitimacy, but these relationships (Tau-b scores of -.21 and -.24) are still only of moderate strength (Table 3). Perhaps most importantly, the factor loadings reveal that support for democracy and satisfaction with the political and economic situation of the country constitute two distinctly different attitudinal domains, with DemSat straddling the two dimensions. Given the logical overlap between the face content of that item (satisfaction with the performance of democracy) and our measures of democratic legitimacy (the belief that democracy is the best form of government for the country), this empirical overlap is not surprising. Accordingly, the RMSEA statistic for the three-factor model in Bulgaria (.081) reveals that the model fits these patterns of relationships among variables somewhat less well than we saw above in the Spanish, Uruguayan, Greek and Portuguese analyses, but that this model still provides a reasonable mapping of these relationships. It is important to note, however, that the correlations among the three latent factors that resulted from the confirmatory factor analysis (ranging between -.03 and .02) are even lower than we saw in those three other countries, reflecting an even higher level of independence among those dimensions, and the factor loadings among the variables within each cluster are acceptably strong.²³ In short, the Bulgarian case provides additional evidence of the empirical separability of these three attitudinal dimensions.

To what extent does Hungary resemble Bulgaria in this regard? The case of Hungary provides another opportunity to explore the dimensionality of democratic attitudes in a post-Communist country that has also had to confront serious economic difficulties (although by no means as severe as in Bulgaria) simultaneous with democratization. In this case, the key elites of the non-democratic predecessor regime initiated and willingly collaborated in far-reaching processes of economic and

political liberalization, as well as with the early stages of the democratization process itself. Accordingly, we can take advantage of this fundamental difference in the transition process to effectively manipulate one of our central explanatory variables--the formative role of political elites.

Unfortunately, none of our standard "satisfaction" items was included in this survey. The closest to our item tapping satisfaction with the economic situation of the country is a question (*EconCon*) measuring the respondent's confidence that the economy will improve in the coming year.²⁴ The Hungarian questionnaire also lacked an item dealing with the respondent's level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy. As a means of fleshing out the satisfaction dimension, a measure of the respondent's confidence that his/her financial situation will improve over the coming year (*RespCon*) was included in the analysis. Despite these differences in the face content of the satisfaction items, the data presented in Table 3 are perfectly compatible with our earlier findings: the two economic optimism measures are highly intercorrelated.

As can be seen in Table 3, the results of the exploratory factor analysis and the bivariate measures of association clearly indicate that the two items in this satisfaction/optimism cluster are dimensionally distinct from those dealing with democratic support. The independence of these two clusters of attitudes is further reflected in the extremely low correlation between these two latent factors that was generated by the confirmatory factor analysis (.02). The clustering of attitudes constituting the disaffection dimension is also clear-cut and quite consistent with our earlier findings. The latent factor of disaffection items correlates with those of democratic support and discontent at extremely low levels--.04 and .02, respectively. And neither the discontent nor disaffection item clusters is strongly related to the two measures of democratic legitimacy, which clearly constitute a third attitudinal dimension in the factor analysis. Thus, the three-dimensional structure of these attitudes found in Spain, Uruguay, Greece, Portugal and Bulgaria also emerges from our analysis of Hungary. Indeed, the RMSEA statistic for Hungary (.044) indicates a closer fit with the three-factor model than in the first three countries we have analyzed.²⁵

Chile

It is only in the case of Chile in 1993 that we encounter evidence suggesting that support for democracy is significantly linked with the items in the discontent cluster. As can be seen in Table 4, the bivariate measures of association (Tau-b) linking the belief that democracy is the best form of government for Chile and dissatisfaction with the economy, with the political situation of the country and with the performance of democracy range between -.12 and -.24, and the exploratory factor analysis placed DemBest in the same cluster as those satisfaction measures.

[Table 4]

A confirmatory factor analysis testing our three-dimensional model, however, produced strikingly different results. While the correlation between the latent factors of democratic support and discontent is slightly higher (.10) than we found with the other cases, the overall pattern of correlations among latent factors (summarized in Table 5) definitely reveals the same clustering of items as in the other countries. Most striking in this regard, the RMSEA statistic produced by the Chilean confirmatory factor analysis (.031) indicates better fit with the three-factor model than in those other countries.

[Table 5]

Why are the findings of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for Chile inconsistent? One potential explanation lies in the combination of certain unusual characteristics of Chile's transition to democracy and the particular alignment of political forces at the time of the Chilean election survey. As we shall argue in the following section, these attitudinal patterns are to some extent the product of a deep cleavage in the Chilean polity separating those on the center and left with strongly pro-democratic attitudes, who tended overwhelmingly to vote for parties belonging to the Concertación coalition, from those on the right, who harbored reservations about the merits of democracy, favorably evaluated the economic accomplishments achieved under the military dictatorship, and gave their electoral support to candidates and parties that are generally sympathetic towards the Pinochet regime (Torcal and

Mainwaring 2003; Tironi and Agüero 1999). As we shall further argue, measures of discontent are strongly associated with one's partisan preferences: supporters of the incumbent party (in any democratic system) tend to be much more satisfied with the political and economic conditions of the country than are those who support the opposition party. We contend that the link in Chile between low levels of support for democracy *and* dissatisfaction with various performance indicators is an artifact of the particular alignment of political forces at the time of this survey. Specifically, the pro-Pinochet party which consistently attracted votes from those who were not supportive of democracy was also the principal party of opposition; accordingly, supporters of this semi-loyal or antisystem party were predisposed towards discontent or dissatisfaction with politics and the economy as a reflection of that party's opposition status, thereby producing a significant correlation between the discontent and democratic support attitudinal dimensions. A broader implication of this argument is that many of these patterns of mass-level attitudes are strongly affected by the strategies and behavior of political elites and parties, particularly during crucial stages of the transition to democracy (see Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).

Behavioral Correlates and/or Consequences

A more far-reaching examination of the correlates of these attitudes, especially those involving overt political behavior or with proto-behavioral implications, is important for several reasons. First, such additional data can strengthen (or undermine) the construct validity of the concepts that we delineated earlier in this paper. Second, these data speak directly to the most devastating of questions in the social sciences: "so what?" If we were to find that those holding one set of attitudes behaved in a manner indistinguishable from those with the opposite orientations, the very value of studying these aspects of political culture might be called into question. Third, and most importantly, empirical data concerning these behavioral or proto-behavioral correlates makes it possible to explore some of the implications of such attitudes for the quality, the performance, and perhaps even the survival, of democratic regimes.

The first step in this stage of the analysis was to construct scales based upon the items that the preceding analysis confirmed are located on the same attitudinal dimension. Accordingly, a *Discontent* scale was constructed out of responses to the EconSit, PolitSit and DemSat items,²⁶ and a second scale was created by adding together responses to the three *Disaffection* measures, PolComp, NoInflu and DontCare. One behavioral and one proto-behavioral measure was used in this analysis: *Vote* distinguishes between ballots in favor of the incumbent party, on the one hand, and support for all other parties, or blank ballots, on the other. And *Involve* is a scale dealing with the respondent's degree of involvement with politics. It is made up of one item measuring the frequency with which the respondent tries "to convince friends, relatives or co-workers to share [his/her] point of view;" a second, which is itself a multi-item scale, gauging the respondent's ability to correctly identify prominent and not-so-prominent political figures; and a third, tapping into the respondent's self-reported level of interest in politics. These behavioral or quasi-behavioral measures were included in Tau-b correlation matrices and factor analyses along with the three types of attitudes towards democracy.

Table 6 presents the results of this analysis for Spain, Uruguay and Greece. As in the preceding tables, the first four or five columns present the bivariate Tau-b relationships, and the final two or three the factor loadings resulting from a Varimax rotation of the principal component solution. The results are remarkably similar for all three countries. Consistent with the theoretical delineation of concepts with which we began this study, satisfaction with the performance-of-democracy/the-political-situation-of-the-country/the-condition-of-the-economy is highly partisan in character, and is clearly associated with support for the incumbent government (as was also reported in many studies, such as Anderson and Guillory 1997; and Anderson and Tverdova 2001). As cognitive consistency theory would hypothesize, those who cast ballots in favor of the governing party are much more likely to assess these conditions favorably than are those who supported opposition parties. One cannot, however, determine the direction of causality of this relationship on the basis of these data alone: it is not clear if the respondent's prior partisan predilections (which should be strongly linked to the

decision to vote for the governing party or the opposition) color his or her feelings of satisfaction with the performance of the government/economy, etc., or whether dissatisfaction with the state of the polity or the economy leads the individual to cast a vote to "throw the bums out," as classic democratic theory would dictate. In either case, it is quite clear that discontent (with the situation of the economy, with the political situation of the country and/or with the performance of democracy) is strongly associated with a vote against the incumbent party. And, consistent with the results of the earlier item-by-item analysis, the discontent scale is not strongly associated with support for democracy (with Tau-b figures ranging between .02 and -.16), and, moreover, is located on a separate attitudinal dimension.

[Table 6]

Also in accord with our conceptualization of these three clusters of attitudes towards democracy, the principal proto-behavioral correlate of the disaffection scale is a low level of involvement in politics--both in the attitudinal sense (as measured by self-reported interest in politics) and behaviorally (as measured by the frequency of efforts to convince others of the wisdom of one's political preferences, and by the respondent's actual level of political information). In the concluding section of this chapter, we will explore the impact of disaffection on involvement with or exposure to the three basic types of political intermediation.

The data presented in Table 7 reveal precisely the same patterns of association among these attitudinal dimensions in Portugal and Hungary. In both countries, discontent is strongly associated with a propensity to vote against the incumbent party, while disaffection is equally strongly associated with low levels of political involvement. And in neither of these countries is there is close association between discontent and support for democracy: no statistically significant relationship between variables in these clusters can be found in Portugal, while in Hungary the association between discontent and our two measures of democratic support are weak (as indicated by Tau-B coefficients of -.07 and -.10).

[Table 7]

To this point, we have seen that analysis of data from Spain, Uruguay, Greece, Portugal and Hungary reveal strong relationships linking discontent with voting against the governing party, and disaffection with low levels of political involvement. But no behavioral correlates of low levels of support for democracy have been identified. In Table 8, however, some more intriguing and suggestive patterns begin to emerge. The most striking findings are that support for democracy in Bulgaria and Chile is strongly linked to votes cast for or against parties closely identified with the non-democratic predecessor regime. In contrast, support for the Socialist (former Communist) party of Hungary is not at all linked to one's attitudes regarding the legitimacy of democracy, as reflected in statistically insignificant Tau-B correlations of +.01 and -.04 with the two democratic support measures. How can we explain cross-national differences of this kind?

[Table 8]

These differing patterns, we contend, can be accounted for by the "transition effect" hypothesized by Torcal (2002a and 2002c)--that is, the strategies and behavior of prominent political elites and organizations during particularly salient stages in the democratization process may have a major impact on the political attitudes of their respective sets of followers. In both Bulgaria and Chile, the leaders of the former non-democratic regime resisted the democratization process (at least initially), and this had a lasting impact on attitudes towards democracy among supporters of their successor parties, even long after the latter had gone to great lengths to demonstrate their loyalty to the new democratic regime. In the other countries, in contrast, figures prominently associated with the former dictatorships either became completely irrelevant to the conduct of partisan politics in the democratic era (e.g., the military officers who dominated the Uruguayan junta), or actively collaborated with the transition to and construction of the new democracy (e.g, political elites of the authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain who became leaders of democratic conservative parties and did loyally participate in the new democratic system).

The decision to vote for or against the Bulgarian Socialist (former Communist) Party is more

strongly associated with support for democracy than it is with any of the three items in the discontent cluster. One interpretation of this finding is that the anti-democratic stance of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and that party's extremely late democratic transformation have had a lasting impact on attitudes towards democracy among both its loyal supporters and its opponents. Bulgaria's pre-democratic regime remained harshly authoritarian (more precisely, post-totalitarian, in the terminology of Linz and Stepan [1996, ch. 7]) until shortly *after* the fall of the Berlin wall. Despite pressures from below and from sectors within the Communist party itself, the government of Todor Zhivkov refused to allow significant political liberalization, even, in 1988, to the extent of purging from the Politburo several prominent proponents of the kinds of reforms introduced in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev. Indeed, no significant progress towards political liberalization or democratization occurred until after Zhivkov's ouster from power on November 8, 1989. It was only after his replacement by more moderate and reformist Communist leaders (who subsequently won Bulgaria's first democratic election) that rapid liberalization and a pacted transition to democracy could take place (see Karasimeonov 1990). What is most surprising is that the negative relationship between attitudes towards democracy and support for the former Communist party remained strong in the mid 1990s, by which time the Bulgarian Socialist Party had established a consistent record for loyal competition within and support for the democratic regime; in contrast, its principal rival, the UDF (which grew out of the anti-communist opposition), has sometimes engaged in disruptive semi-loyal behavior (Vassilev 2000). Despite the BSP's commitment to democracy, the reluctance of UDF elites to accept the legitimacy of a "formal democracy" governed by the BSP, and its semi-loyal strategies pursued during critical states of the transition to democracy appear to have had a lasting impact on the political attitudes of Bulgarians. To this must be added the legacy of post-totalitarianism and the extraordinary weakness of civil society, as well as a notable anti-political strain of attitudes among both masses and elites (see Linz and Stepan 1996, 341 and 343).

The Chilean data reveal a pattern similar to that found in Bulgaria: support for the presidential

candidate most closely associated with the regime of the Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, was strongly associated with a lack of attitudinal support for democracy. This is not surprising, given the extremely unusual trajectory of the Chilean transition to democracy, particularly in its early stages. At the time of our 1993 survey, the former authoritarian dictator was still an active player in the political life of the country, and Pinochet was successful in vetoing every policy designed by the Concertación to establish civilian supremacy over the Army and, more generally, made no secret of his skepticism about the value of democracy. From the very beginning, the transition to democracy was only reluctantly tolerated by Pinochet, who continued to cling to positions of power for nearly a decade following the 1989 election. Pinochet had never intended to liberalize the political system, and only initiated the transition to democracy inadvertently, by unexpectedly losing a plebescite that he had anticipated would further strengthen his grip on power. Even after the first democratic elections and the election of a civilian president (Patricio Aylwin), he retained control over the armed forces, which enabled him to constrain government policy decisions and crudely threaten the democratic regime from time to time--all of which led Linz and Stepan (1996, 206) to describe Chile's transition as "the most democratically 'disloyal' transfer of [any of their] Southern European and Southern Cone cases." Furthermore, upon stepping down from his military post in 1998, Pinochet hoped to continue to influence Chilean politics as self-appointed Senator-for-Life, in alliance with a bloc of non-elected Senators and those of right-wing parties. Pinochet's stubborn refusal to withdraw from politics and his occasional anti-system threats meant that Chile's transition to democracy would be protracted and would remain unconsolidated: indeed, prior to that abandonment of reserved powers over the military, Chile's regime could not be regarded as fully democratic. Moreover, throughout the first decade of Chile's restored democracy, the party system was deeply divided by a cleavage separating parties that were fully democratic in their ideologies and behavior (the parties that made up the governing Concertación alliance--including the Christian Democrats and Socialists), on the one hand, and those that were semi-loyal and (until 1999) pro-Pinochet (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). It is likely that the

extremely high salience of this political cleavage helps to explain the abnormal pattern of relationships among the attitudinal variables analyzed in Table 4, as well as the association between vote and support for democracy in Table 8. In accord with this interpretation, non-democratic rightists looked favorably on the rapid economic development of the Pinochet era, and disparaged the economic slowdown of the early 1990s (under governments of the anti-Pinochet Concertación coalition). Conversely, supporters of the incumbent Concertación parties perceived the economic and political situation more favorably. Accordingly, we contend that the stronger linkage between satisfaction with economic and political conditions, on the one hand, and support for democracy, on the other, is at least in part a product of this constellation of partisan forces.²⁷

The Chilean case is also unusual insofar as political discontent is also linked to political disaffection and levels of involvement with politics. In Table 8, the bivariate relationships between discontent, on the one hand, and disaffection and involvement, on the other (with Tau-b coefficients of .18 and -.28, respectively) are much stronger than these same bivariate relationships in other countries. And as in the case of Bulgaria, the durability of the impact of elite behavior during the transition on attitudes towards democracy is striking. By the time of the 1999/2000 election (over a decade after the first democratic elections), General Pinochet was under house arrest in London and under indictment for human rights abuses, and the presidential candidate of the conservative party, Joaquín Levín, had taken great strides towards moderating his party's ideology, programs and public image, as well as to distance himself from Pinochet as much as possible.²⁸ And yet, as we shall see later in this chapter, the strong association between partisan preference and support for democracy remained a distinguishing characteristic of Chilean electoral behavior.

The behavior of key political elites and parties in the other countries surveyed here was quite different.²⁹ The Hungarian Communist Party, for example, played a role greatly different from its Bulgarian counterpart both prior to and during the transition to democracy. In Hungary, economic reforms had been introduced by the Communist party decades before the abrupt collapse of Eastern

European communism in 1989, and even prior to the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev in Russia the Communist government of Hungary allowed for more civil liberties and organized pluralism than was to be found elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc (except, perhaps, for Poland at certain times). The pace of reform accelerated in the 1980s, culminating in a series of roundtable negotiations with representatives of the non-Communist opposition in 1989 (prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall) that paved the way for free democratic elections (see Linz and Stepan 1996, 296-316). Thus, in contrast with the Bulgarian Communist Party, which remained a conservative force firmly opposed to democratization until the collapse of Eastern European communism appeared inevitable, the Communist party of Hungary had initiated significant economic, social and political reforms, and played an active and positive role in the transition to democracy (see Elster 1996; Tökés 1997). Hence, it is not surprising to see that supporters of its successor Socialist party are no less committed to democracy than are those who cast ballots for rival parties.³⁰ This stands in sharp contrast with the political legacy of the Communist party under Bulgaria's pre-democratic regime, and it is noteworthy that the electorates of these parties continued to reflect these differences years after the end of the transition to democracy (see Kitschelt et al 1999, ch.8).

Similarly, in Spain and Greece the principal parties of the right played leading roles in the dismantling of right-wing dictatorships and the founding of new democratic regimes. This was particularly noteworthy in Spain, since the leaders of the major conservative parties (Adolfo Suárez of the center-right Unión de Centro Democrático and Manuel Fraga of Alianza Popular, which transformed itself into the Partido Popular in 1989) had both served as high-ranking officials under the Franco regime. They and their parties were, nonetheless, unstinting in their support for democracy throughout the transition, and Suárez served as the principal orchestrator of the democratization process. In Greece, as well, Constantine Karamanlis played an overwhelmingly dominant role in liquidating the Colonels' right-wing regime and establishing a fully democratic system. In both cases, the parties of the right, which had traditionally been skeptical or downright hostile to democracy,

established reputations as fully loyal democratic competitors at earlier stages in the transition, and their most prominent leaders as the founding fathers of new democracies.³¹ And in Portugal, individuals who had been involved with Marcelo Caetano's half-hearted regime liberalization (such as Francisco Sá Carneiro and Francisco Pinto Balsemão) reemerged during the revolutionary period as opponents of the left-wing junta which had seized power following the collapse of the Salazar/Caetano regime, and played key roles in establishing a new democratic regime in the course of Portugal's "second transition." In short, in these countries political leaders with roots in the predecessor authoritarian regime were able to lead democratic parties and to become staunch supporters of the democratization process. As a result, the parties which they founded or joined could not be regarded as "anti-system" or "semi-loyal" in their commitment to democracy.

The "transition effect" hypothesis receives additional confirmation through analysis of mass-level behavioral measures, such as vote for anti-system or semi-loyal parties. In most established democracies, testing these relationships is difficult if not impossible: support for democracy is so widespread as to be taken for granted, the democratic regime is not under any real threat, and support for anti-system parties is so low as to preclude analysis using survey data based upon samples of 1,000 to 1,500 respondents. Fortunately (from a purely methodological standpoint, that is!), two of the countries we have examined above are faced with or have confronted serious challenges to their survival.

One of these CNEP countries is Spain, whose new democracy was not fully consolidated until about 1982 (more than five years after coming into existence). In the general election of 1979, a coalition of extreme right-wing anti-system parties received sufficient electoral support to send one of their own (the die-hard *falangista* Blas Piñar) to the Congress of Deputies. Just two years later, moreover, a coup attempt came frighteningly close to seriously interrupting the consolidation process and perhaps terminating Spain's democratic regime. As can be seen in Table 9, a substantial plurality of those who voted for ultra-right-wing parties or coalitions in the 1979 Spanish election (Unión

Nacional, Fuerza Nueva, the Falange Española, etc.) explicitly rejected the statement that "democracy is the best form of government for a country like ours," while less than a quarter of those extreme-right-wing voters endorsed democracy. This was very substantially divergent from the pro-democracy stance of the overwhelming majority of voters (see Morlino and Montero 1995, 247).³² While the overall level of support for these anti-system, extreme-right groups was quite low (reaching a peak of 2.1 percent of the vote in 1979 and virtually disappearing in subsequent elections), the mix of attitudes held by the largest party on the right, Alianza Popular, also seemed to pose a potential challenge to the legitimacy of Spanish democracy, particularly since the AP surged in its share of the vote from 6.1 percent in 1979 to 26.5 percent just three years later, becoming the second largest party in Spain. In the late 1970s, 69 percent of Spanish voters regarded the AP as *franquista*, and another 47 percent believed that it was not a democratic party (Linz et al 1981, 472; Montero 1993). In a 1979 survey, the mean "feeling thermometer" evaluation of Franco among AP voters was a strongly favorable 7.5 (as compared with a hostile 1.9 among PSOE voters), and even as late as 1982, it was 6.7. Finally, its levels of support for democracy in their responses to the DemAuth item were a relatively low 48 percent of its voters in both the 1979 and 1986 elections.³³ Over time, however, these potentially anti-system attitudes progressively declined, such that by the time of our 1993 survey, those who cast ballots for the Partido Popular (following the "refounding" of the AP as the PP) held attitudes that were almost indistinguishable from those of the PSOE's electorate (Gunther and Montero 2001). This evolution of opinion provides strong evidence of the importance of elite strategies and behavior of party elites, and was due, in this specific case, to a substantial ideological moderation and explicit embrace of democracy on the part of the leaders of the AP/PP (see Alexander 2002, ch. 5).

[Table 9]

The case of Chile provides further clear evidence of the strong relationship between democratic support and preferences for parties and candidates who played sharply contrasting roles in democratic transition processes. As can be seen in Table 9, only 35 percent of CNEP survey respondents who

claimed to have voted in the 1989 presidential election for Hernán Büchi, General Pinochet's former finance minister, while fully 53 percent of pro-Pinochet voters openly embraced the notion that "under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system." In sharp contrast, Chileans who voted for other candidates were about as supportive of democracy as citizens in fully consolidated democratic regimes, as can be seen in Table 1. What is most intriguing about support for democracy in Chile is that there has not been much of an increase in aggregate levels over the course of the first decade of democratic rule (see Table 1), and there remains a sizable bloc of "undemocratic" voters on the right.³⁴ This unusual pattern, we contend, was a product of Chile's unusual political trajectory throughout this period, particularly insofar as the former dictator did not unequivocally relinquish power and vanish from the scene following the convening of the first democratic elections. Instead, he remained a highly visible, polarizing political figure over the following decade, and used his position at the pinnacle of the armed forces hierarchy as a platform from which to issue menacing threats against the new democracy and its government. Given his anti-system stance and the continuing loyalty of a substantial segment of the Chilean electorate, the widespread lack of democratic support among voters on the right remained an important feature of Chilean political culture until at least as recently as the 1999/2000 presidential election. Despite the fact that Joaquín Lavín went to great lengths in the course of his presidential campaign to distance himself from Pinochet (who, at this time, was being held under house arrest in Britain following a Spanish indictment accusing him of "crimes against humanity"), he was unable to dissociate himself from that authoritarian legacy. Accordingly, an extraordinarily low percentage of voters supporting him unequivocally supported democracy.

Finally, the Italian case provides further corroboration of this pattern. While the 1996 Italian CNEP survey included too few of the "discontent" and "disaffection" variables as to have allowed for a parallel factor analysis, both that survey and one conducted in the mid 1980s did include the *DemAuth* item. Thus, we can explore the principal behavioral correlate of democratic support in a political

system in which an explicitly anti-system party had received a sizable (and therefore analyzable) number of votes.³⁵ The 1983 Italian election was held in the aftermath of a very turbulent period in the history of Italy's postwar democracy, in which the country's former prime minister, Aldo Moro, was kidnapped and murdered by anti-system terrorists of the left, and terrorist bombings by an anti-system faction on the right had killed or injured scores of Italian citizens. And at that time, the neo-fascist MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano), which received 12.4 percent of the vote (making it the third-largest party, behind only the Christian Democratic DC and the Communist PCI) was explicitly anti-system in its stance. The data in Table 9 show clearly that a substantial majority of MSI voters endorsed the proposition that "under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system," while fewer than one third selected the pro-democratic response option, in sharp contrast with over three quarters of those who supported other parties. Thus, the case of Italy in the early 1980s corroborates our findings from Spain and Chile that a lack of support for democracy is closely associated with electoral support for anti-system parties.

An examination of CNEP data from Italy over a decade later provides even clearer evidence consistent with this argument. By 1996, the MSI had been converted into a loyal democratic party, Alleanza Nazionale, provoking a schism in which hard-core neofascists departed to form the tiny Fiamma Tricolore-MSI. In large measure, this conversion was motivated by a realization that, in the aftermath of the breakdown of the long-standing party system following the election of 1994, and within the context of a consolidated democracy, an antisystem stance will alienate most voters and consign a party to permanent and powerless opposition status. Accordingly, the AN's leaders markedly altered their language and image, as well as the programmatic stands of the party, to cast themselves in the role of loyal democratic competitor. This strategy was remarkably successful: in 1992, the old MSI received just 5.4 percent of the vote; but in the 1994 election, the new Alleanza Nazionale increased its share of the vote to 13.5 percent (subsequently rising to 15.7 percent two years later), and was included in a coalition government for the first time in postwar Italian history (see Ignazi 1993;

and Tarchi 1997; and Caciagli and Corbetta 2002). It is most important to note that the percentage of its supporters explicitly endorsing democracy (in response to an identical survey item) increased from 30 percent of MSI voters in 1983 to 73 percent of AN supporters in 1996. Again, it is not at all clear whether the respondent's fundamental attitude towards democracy affects or determines his/her voting choice, or if loyalty to a particular party induces respondents to learn and internalize new or different attitudes in accord with messages disseminated from above. But these data certainly indicate that there is a strong statistical association between the holding of antidemocratic attitudes and the casting of ballots for antisystem parties. Moreover, the marked change in attitudes towards democracy of supporters of the MSI/AN further suggests that political elites have some ability not only to modify their images and electoral appeals, but also to modify the attitudinal orientations of their supporters (see Slomczynski and Shabad 1999).

The Behavioral Consequences of Disaffection

To this point, we have focused our attention on the behavioral consequences of political discontent (i.e., voting against the incumbent party) and low levels of basic support for democracy (electoral support for anti-system parties). We now turn our attention to the correlates of disaffection, operationalized by constructing a scale out of responses to the PolComp, NoInflu and DontCare items whose interrelationships with the other types of attitudes towards democracy have been analyzed earlier in this chapter. In Tables 6, 7 and 8 we saw that disaffection was generally associated with a low level of "involvement" with politics. However, since further analysis revealed some extremely interesting variations from one manifestation of involvement to another--including exposure to information flows through the three intermediation channels that are the principal focus of this book--we shall examine this relationship in much greater detail.

The first column of figures presented in Table 10 clearly reveal that political disaffection is strongly (with the partial exception of Bulgaria) correlated with low levels of interest in politics, as

measured by the respondent's self report. This lack of interest is reflected in a strong propensity of the disaffected in all of these countries to read about politics in the newspapers less frequently (column 2). The same tendency is also reflected in exposure to news about politics through radio broadcasts (column 3), although the relationship is significantly stronger in some countries than in others. A much weaker and more variable association between disaffection and exposure to political news can be seen in the data presented in column 4: with the single exception of Hungary, the Tau-B measuring the association between disaffection and an item measuring the frequency with which respondents follow political news on television is much weaker than is the case with regard to newspaper reading (Spain and Chile), or is not even statistically significant (Uruguay, Greece and Bulgaria). In short, the disaffected are much less likely to regularly follow politics through newspaper reading than are other citizens, but in most countries are not so averse to television coverage of politics.

[Table 10]

Given their lack of interest in politics and less frequent exposure to it through the newspapers, the disaffected are substantially less informed about politics than are other citizens. In all of the countries analyzed in this study, the disaffected were less likely to correctly identify prominent political figures in a 4-item "information test" that was embedded in the CNEP questionnaires (see the data in column 5 of Table 10). This finding, in conjunction with those concerning exposure to specific sources of political information presented in columns two through four of this table, is consistent with an argument frequently set forth in the literature on the media and politics: as Ranney (1983), Sartori (1998), and Gunther and Mughan (2000) have argued, television does a much poorer job than newspapers in conveying a large volume of policy-relevant information to citizens (with few exceptions, such as Great Britain). Thus, even though the disaffected are not much less likely to watch the news on television than other citizens, this exposure is insufficient to offset the "information deficit" that results from their markedly less frequent newspaper readership.

Political disaffection is also consistently associated with a propensity to avoid involvement in

discussions of politics, and are less likely to try to convince others to agree with their political views and support their preferred candidates (see the first two columns of Table 11). Thus, exposure to political stimuli through primary, face-to-face interpersonal networks is significantly lower among the disaffected. So, too, is the propensity to belong to one or more secondary associations (political or not). The Tau-B statistics presented in column 3 of Table 11 indicate that this relationship holds up in all of these countries, although it is weaker in Chile, Portugal, and Spain. Not surprisingly, the disaffected are less likely in all countries to have attended a political rally during the election campaign and to have engaged in volunteer work on behalf of a party or candidate.

[Table 11]

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the disaffected (except in Hungary and Portugal) are no less likely to participate in elections than are other citizens, and in Uruguay they actually vote with **greater** regularity. The consistent finding, across all countries, that the disaffected are less interested, less exposed to and informed about political news, less engaged in face-to-face discussions of politics and less likely to belong to a secondary association of any kind, while at the same time (except in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Portugal) they vote regularly in elections raises interesting questions about the *quality of democracy* in those countries where political disaffection is high. Electoral participation by the disaffected is, from an intermediation and information perspective, participation by defective citizens: while they cast ballots, they do so on the basis of less knowledge of and involvement with politics.

Theoretical and Substantive Implications

The findings of this comparative analysis provide powerful and consistent evidence that fundamental support for democracy, satisfaction with the performance of the system, and attitudes and behavioral patterns reflecting disaffection from politics make up attitudinal domains that are both conceptually and empirically distinct from one another. Only in the case of Chile did we encounter evidence of a substantial overlap between items otherwise falling into the separate democratic support

and discontent dimensions. But this statistical association, we argued, was an artifact of the particular alignment of partisan forces in Chile throughout all of the elections examined in this study, with the anti-system party serving as the principal party of opposition. Indeed, we predict that if electoral turnover were to occur in Chile, bringing the post-pro-Pinochet party to power, there would be a "sign reversal" with regard to the relationship between support for democracy and the discontent items. With regard to all other countries, the relationship between measures of satisfaction, on the one hand, and support for democracy, on the other, were very weak. With the exception of Chile, the Tau-b measures linking dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country (or, in the Hungarian case, low confidence in the future course of the economy) and our measures of democratic support ranged between .00 and -.08.³⁶ Measures of association between democratic support and dissatisfaction with the political situation of the country were almost equally weak, ranging between +.01 and -.11, except in Chile (where it reached -.19). The link between dissatisfaction with "how democracy works" in the respondent's country (which factor analyses indicated is associated with the economic and political satisfaction items in every country examined here) and measures of democratic legitimacy is more substantial, with Tau-b measures of association ranging between -.09 and -.24. Still, the strength of these bivariate relationships is surprisingly modest given the logical overlap between the "face content" of the two items. It is clear that support for democracy is not strongly linked to discontent in anything remotely approaching a deterministic relationship. Even in those countries where the relationship between legitimacy and performance satisfaction is strongest, the great bulk of the variance in our measures of support for democracy must be explained by other factors.

Our aggregate measure of discontent was much more strongly linked in most countries to a form of behavior that is perfectly in keeping with the ground-rules and the spirit of democracy. Excluding the aberrant cases of Bulgaria and Chile, Tau-b statistics measuring the association between the discontent scale and a vote against the incumbent party ranged from .24 to .36. In short, in Spain, Uruguay, Greece, Portugal and Hungary, those who are dissatisfied tend to do what democratic theory

suggests they should do--they cast ballots to oust the incumbent party from power and replace it with an alternative government. This pattern was corroborated by the factor analyses of these data, which clearly located the variable measuring *Vote* in the satisfaction cluster in these four countries.

Without exception, the principal behavioral correlate of the three items making up the disaffection scale was a low level of involvement in politics (Torcal 2001a). The construct validity of our concept of political disaffection is substantially reinforced by this finding. So, too, is the autonomy of that attitudinal dimension. The Tau-b measures of association between the disaffection scale and the DemBest measure of support democracy range between statistically insignificant coefficients of +.04 and -.04 in Spain, Uruguay, Greece, Portugal and Chile, and is statistically significant at the .001 or better only in Bulgaria (Tau-b = -.10). The relationship between disaffection and the DemAuth item is stronger in Greece (-.10), and is of moderate strength only in Hungary (-.19). In no country does the factor analysis of these data place disaffection in the same attitudinal domain as either of our measures of support for democracy. Similarly, the disaffection cluster is empirically distinct from the indicators of dissatisfaction. Factor analysis in for every country placed these two scales on different attitudinal dimensions, and the bivariate measures of association between these two scales ranged between -.01 and +.11 in Spain, Uruguay, Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria. Only in Greece (+.20) and Chile (+.18) was the link between these two attitudinal dimensions moderately strong, but even in these cases the correlations between these two latent factors in the confirmatory factor analysis were just .11 and -.08.

What, then, are the correlates of support for democracy or its absence? In the cases of Chile, Spain in 1979, and Italy in 1983, it is clear that a disproportionate number of those lacking in attitudinal support for democracy cast their votes for antisystem parties. Similarly, in the cases of Bulgaria and Chile, even though at the time of the election the party in question had shifted towards support for democracy and conformity with its behavioral norms, those parties that had served as symbols of authoritarian rule during the early stages of the transition to democracy continued to attract the support of those who were low in their attitudinal commitment to democracy. We are thus

presented with a mixed picture concerning the ability of political elites to alter their political images and, accordingly, their electoral fortunes: to some considerable degree (as in Spain and Italy), elites have been able to divorce themselves and their parties from antidemocratic stands with which they had previously been associated; however, the inability of comparable parties and elites in Bulgaria and Chile to distance themselves from the authoritarian past also suggests that these historical legacies may be difficult to erase from the minds of voters, despite their considerable efforts to embrace democracy.

These findings suggest that the manner in which democratic consolidation has been conceptualized in previous work is consistent with political reality, and holds together as a coherent and politically meaningful concept. In that work (see, for example, Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkl 1998; Morlino 1998, ch.2; Diamond 1999, ch.3), it is argued that the concept of democratic consolidation is multidimensional, and has at its core the widespread acknowledgement of the legitimacy of democratic institutions at both the elite and mass levels. It was also asserted that the absence of significant support for anti-system parties could be used as one of several possible operational indicators of consolidation. Some critics have subsequently attacked the notion that the presence or absence of significant anti-system parties can or should be used in this manner (e.g., Encarnación 2000, 489). In this empirical study of support for democracy at the mass level in several new democratic systems, however, we have shown that support for anti-system parties and a lack of attitudinal support for democracy are closely interrelated. Thus, the empirical findings presented in this paper reaffirm our initial conceptualization of democratic consolidation. They also suggest that the development of support for democracy at the mass level is an important task facing political elites and party leaders in new democracies. While the absence of fundamental support for democracy among large numbers of citizens may not, by itself, be sufficient to place the survival of a new democracy in doubt, the growth of an organized political group under the leadership of political entrepreneurs with an anti-system political agenda may pose a real threat to the regime. As we have seen, the absence of support for democracy at the mass level may be a prerequisite or facilitating

condition for the development of an organized anti-system party with the capacity to pose a threat to the stability or even survival of a new democratic regime.

These findings provide reassuring evidence that voters, and citizens in democratic systems more generally, are more sophisticated than some one-dimensional approaches to the study of politics would suggest. They suggest that economic-reductionist arguments about individual behavior and regime survival may be predicated upon excessively simplistic models of human behavior. By positing, for example, that dissatisfaction with the current state of the economy or with the performance of the incumbent government will undermine support for democracy, *per se*, they do an injustice to the somewhat more sophisticated responses that are reflected in these data. In accord with democratic theory, discontent leads citizens to cast ballots in a manner intended to replace the incumbent government with a new set of elected officials. But there is little evidence here that dissatisfaction with economic performance, with the performance of the incumbent, with the political situation of the country, or even with the way democracy is working at that particular time leads citizens to withdraw their support for democratic forms of governance in general or for the current democratic regime, in particular. In short, most citizens who are angry about how the current government is running the country tend to respond by voting to "throw the bums out," rather than by rooting for the colonels and their tanks to overturn democracy and replace it with an authoritarian regime. Citizens, in these democratic systems at least, are not that simplistic and illogical.

But the preceding analysis has also shown that not all citizens are alike, and that some may take the responsibilities of voters as portrayed in "civics textbooks" more seriously than others. Those who hold attitudes reflective of political disaffection may vote regularly, but they less frequently follow political news through the media (especially through the normally more "information-dense" print media) and are much less well informed about politics. In short, disaffection may not reduce the aggregate level of voting turnout in these democratic systems, but it may contribute to a relatively low quality of democracy in which a significant segment of the electorate is made up of irresponsible voters

who have not "done their homework" to a degree that would enable them to cast informed ballots.

Notes

1. The authors would like to express their deep gratitude to Lorenzo Bursattin for his collaboration and assistance in conducting the various rounds of confirmatory factor analysis that play such a significant role in this empirical study.
2. The CNEP incorporates a sizable common core of questions into national election surveys. Its initial phase included studies of elections in Germany (1990), the United States (1992), Japan (1992), The United Kingdom (1992) and Spain (1993). The second phase of this project (CNEP II) added to this original core studies of elections in Chile (1993), Uruguay (1994), Italy (1996), Greece (1996), Bulgaria (1996), Hungary (1998), Hong Kong (1998 and 2000), and Indonesia (1999). Portugal has subsequently joined this project, but its 2002 election study did not include the full battery of CNEP core questions. CNEP II focuses primarily on new democracies, and is supported by generous grants from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Mershon Center of Ohio State University. The coordinators of CNEP II are Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero and Hans-Jürgen Puhle.
3. See Kornberg and Clarke (1992, ch. 1), Norris (1999b) and Klingemann (1999).
4. In our view, this latter claim is patently incorrect. Citizens who have recently experienced a transition from a dictatorship are able to both distinguish between authoritarian and democratic rule, and to separate their evaluations of system performance (satisfaction) from their support for the current democratic regime (legitimacy). See Morlino and Montero (1995); McDonough, Barnes and López Pina (1998, ch. 2); Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998, ch.5); and Mishler and Rose (2002).
5. Montero, Gunther and Torcal (1997); Torcal (2001 and 2002a); and Diamond (1999, ch. 5). Also see (Morlino 1998, ch3), Norris (1999b), and Klingemann (1999), which make a distinction between the first two of these dimensions (but not the third); and Rose (1997), for a discussion of a number of relevant survey measures.

6. For similar statements basing concepts of democratic support on the so-called "Churchill" notion of the lesser evil, see Rose and Mishler (1996), and Shin and Wells (2001). Also see Morlino (1998, ch. 3), and Diamond (1999, ch. 5).
7. For enlightening discussions of satisfaction with the performance of democracy and/or democratic institutions, see Schmitt (1983); Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson (1995); Remmer (1996); Anderson and Guillory (1997); Nye (1997); Anderson (1998z and 1998b); Norris (1999b); Newton and Norris (2000); Foweraker and Krznaric (2000); and Linde and Ekman (2003). For a critique of alleged analytical deficiencies in this indicator, see Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001). The October 2001 edition of the *International Political Science Review*, edited by Richard I. Hofferbert and Christopher J. Anderson, was devoted to the theme of "The Dynamics of Democratic Satisfaction."
8. For different conceptions of disaffection, see Morlino and Tarchi (1996), and Pharr and Putnam (2000), although the latter never presents an explicit definition of disaffection.
9. We also found precisely the same kinds of differences between dissatisfaction and disaffection in a recent study of anti-party attitudes (see Torcal, Gunther and Montero [2002]).
10. While similar results from analyses of survey data from other countries revealed the same close relationship between satisfaction with the performance of democracy and with the current state of the economy (e.g., Anderson 1998; Franz 1986; and Tóka 1995), other studies have demonstrated the limited effects of the political economy of attitudes linking satisfaction with democratic performance (see Clark, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996, ch.5; and McAllister 1999). Among the many other factors besides the economy that affect the evaluation of the performance of new democracies are those related to a rejection of the former regime (Morlino and Montero 1995; Mishler and Rose 1999b); respect for fundamental liberties (Diamond 1999, 192; and Hofferbert and

Klingemann 1999); some institutional features of the political system (Anderson and Guillory 1997); the levels of corruption (Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003); a public awareness of the limited capacity of governments to resolve problems or, more generally, to "deliver" (Kaase and Newton 1995, 75); the patience of citizens who realize that solving some problems may take several years (Rose and Mishler 1996; Bruszt 1998); and the timing and outcomes of elections (Nadeu, et al, 2000; Banducci and Karp 2003).

11. It should be noted that studies of the evolution of measures of satisfaction (or specific support) and legitimacy (or diffuse support) in other countries have also found the same pattern of fluctuation in the former and stability in the latter sets of survey responses (see Klingemann 1999; Finkel, Muller and Seligson 1989; Gibson 2000). For an analysis of the internal dimensionality of attitudes of satisfaction with the performance of government and with the regime, see Cusack (1999).

12. As noted above, the CNEP incorporates a sizable common core of questions into national election surveys. The 1993 post-election survey of Spain was conducted by DATA, S.A. under the direction of Richard Gunther and José Ramón Montero, with generous financial support from the Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología (CICYT). (For additional information about the Spanish survey, see Montero [1994].) The principal investigators of the other country surveys whose data are used in this project are P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Ilias Nicolopoulou (Greece), Eugenio Tironi and Felipe Agüero (Chile), Pablo Mieres and Richard Gunther (Uruguay), Georgi Karasimeonov and Richard Gunther (Bulgaria), Tibor Gazso and Richard Gunther (Hungary), and Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai (Hong Kong). Although the Portuguese team did not officially join the CNEP until 2003, and therefore did not include the full battery of CNEP core questionnaire items, the 2002 Portuguese election survey directed by André Freire, Marina Costa Lobo, Pedro Magalhães and Ana Espírito Santo (see Freire, et al [2002]) generated a substantial volume of comparable data that have been analyzed in

this chapter. Also used in a more limited manner are data from Italian surveys conducted in 1985 and 1996 as parts of the Four Nation Study (Giacomo Sani and Julián Santamaría, coordinators) and the CNEP (Paolo Bellucci, Roberto Cartocci, Piergiorgio Corbetta, Ilvo Diamanti, Aldo Di Virgilio, Marco Maraffi, Arturo Parisi, Gianfranco Pasquino, Hans Schadee, and Paolo Segatti, co-principal investigators). (For additional information about the 1996 Italian survey, see Gasperoni [1997].) For various reasons, we have not included the cases of Hong Kong and Indonesia in this comparative analysis. (For additional information about the Hong Kong study, see Hsin-chi Kuan and Siu-kai Lao [2002].)

13. The Portuguese item asked respondents about the following statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government." 33 percent of respondents strongly agreed with this statement, and another 48 percent agreed; only 4 percent and 1 percent, respectively, disagreed or strongly disagreed, while 14 percent said they did not know how to respond. In 1985, and with an identical item format, DemAuth was included in the Four Nation Study of Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy. The percentages of those survey respondents who selected the democratic alternative ranged between 61 percent in Portugal (with 23 percent not answering this question) and 87 percent in Greece, with Italy and Spain falling between these two extremes with 70 percent of those interviewed supporting democracy. (See Morlino and Montero 1995, 236.)

14. Those items with agree/disagree response categories were recoded as follows: agreement was coded as 1, disagreement as 3, and "it depends," "neither" or "both" as 2, with a non-response coded as missing data.

15. These findings have been remarkably consistent over time; similar results were obtained from analysis of data collected in 1979 and 1982 post-election surveys, which included many of the items that were subsequently included in the CNEP surveys (see Maravall 1997, ch.5); also see Torcal

(2002a, ch.3 and 2001), which reaches the same conclusions using different data sets, variables and statistical analyses.

16. In a confirmatory factor analysis, a specific structure of clustering among variables is hypothesized and empirically tested. This approach not only generates "goodness-of-fit" statistics, but also allows for the calculation of correlations among the variables within each cluster and between these "implicit factors."

17. Factor loadings for the three items in the discontent cluster (except for the one item set initially at 1.00) ranged between .61 and .87 for Spain, .55 and .94 in Uruguay, and .51 and .80 in Greece. Factor loadings among items in the disaffection clusters ranged between .48 and .50 in Spain, .95 and .98 in Uruguay, and .98 and 1.14 in Greece.

18. The RMSEA is a goodness-of-fit statistic that is sensitive to the number of estimated parameters in the model, which is to say, its complexity. Values less than .05 indicate very good fit, values as high as .08 reflect reasonable errors of approximation, and values above .10 indicate poor fit.

19. It should be reiterated that, unlike the DemBest item used in the CNEP surveys, which provided only three possible responses (agree, disagree and "it depends") with regard to the statement that "Democracy is the best political system for a country like ours," the Portuguese 2002 election study allowed respondents to strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the proposition that "Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government."

20. Within the discontent cluster, the factor loadings for the GovPerf and DemSat variables are just .15 and .10, respectively (with EconSat set = 1.0); and within the disaffection cluster, DontCare has a factor loading of just .14 (with PolComp set = 1.0).

21. Using this alternative measure, 6 percent of respondents regarded their personal economic situation as good or very good, 26 as fair, 36 percent as bad, and 32 percent as very bad.

22. This finding is consistent with those of Mishler and Rose (2002), and Evans and Whitefield 1995. While the former study found that in seven Central and East European democracies the impact of political performance is greater than that of economic performance (and its impact is increasing), the latter study found that the combined impact of five different variables measuring current, prospective and retrospective assessments of the performance of the economy in eight post-Soviet Eastern European democracies explained less than five percent of the variance in support for democracy.

23. Among the discontent items (with PolitSit set at 1.0), EconSit's factor loading was .74, and that of DemSat was .50; among the disaffection items (with PolComp equal to 1.0), the factor loading for NoInflu was .88, and that of DontCare was .80.

24. Data presented in Tóka (1995), however, clearly reveal that this measure of "economic confidence" performs in much the same way as our measure of economic satisfaction in four post-Soviet Central European democracies, providing some reassurance that this measure might serve as an adequate surrogate for inclusion in our factor analysis.

25. The correlations among the three latent factors in the confirmatory factor analysis range from .02 to .04.

26. In the case of Hungary, EconCon and RespCon (reflecting confidence in the condition of the economy) were used instead.

27. In order to control for the partisan contamination of perceptions of the economic and political situation of the country, we re-ran these same correlation and factor analysis procedures after

controlling for partisanship. Among those who identify with a party belonging to the pro-democratic and progressive Concertación alliance, the Tau-b statistics linking DemBest to the three dissatisfaction measures was reduced to -.02, -.06 and -.18, respectively, with only the relationship with DemSat being statistically significant (@ .01). The factor analysis revealed that the three discontent measures formed one attitudinal dimension (with factor loadings ranging between .610 and .650) that was much less strongly linked to the DemBest measure of support for democracy (whose factor loading on that dimension declined to .326).

28. On the 1999/2000 campaign, see Garretón 2000; and Torcal and Mainwaring 2003.

29. Among the many studies analyzing political and parties elites in Central and Eastern Europe, see Higley et al (1998); and Higley and Lengyel (1999).

30. Indeed, respondents in our 1998 CNEP Hungarian survey who were former members of the Hungarian Communist Party were actually *more* supportive of democracy than were non-members: 78 percent of former Communists selected the democratic response to the DemAuth question, vs. just 63 percent of other respondents), and former Communists were also more supportive of democracy in their responses to the DemBest questions, with 76 percent selecting the democratic alternative (vs. 71 percent of others).

31. On the transformation of the right in Southern Europe, see Pappas (2001). For Greece, the best study of the consolidation of democracy in Greece is Karakatsanis (2001); for Portugal, see Maxwell (1995), and Costa Pinto and Freire (2003); For Spain, there is an extraordinarily large number of studies of the role of elites in the transition to democracy in Spain: e.g., Gunther 1992; Linz 1993); and for a partial but extensive list of such works, see Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (1995, 415-421). Also see Linz and Stepan (1996, chapters 6-9).

32. The Spanish data were derived from a 1979 post-election survey by DATA, S.A., under the direction of Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad. Generous financial assistance was provided by the National Science Foundation under grant No. SOC77-16451. The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed in this work, however, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. (For additional information about this survey, see Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986.) The very large national sample used in that survey (5,439 respondents) makes it possible to analyze the attitudes of the small percentage of Spaniards who supported the extreme-right Unión Nacional and other parties of the extreme right.

33. 1979 and 1982 data were from post-election surveys conducted by DATA, under the direction of Richard Gunther, Juan Linz, José Ramón Montero, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad. For further information about these surveys, see Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986, and Linz and Montero 1986.

34. This continuity is documented in many other surveys undertaken in Chile since the mid 1980s: see, e.g., Alaminos (1991) and the series of Latino barómetro surveys since 1995. In 2002, for example, just 50 percent of Chilean respondents selected the pro-democratic response to the DemAuth questionnaire item.

35. These data are from the Four Nation Study, undertaken in the spring of 1985 in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece under the coordination of Giacomo Sani and Julián Santamaría.

36. It should be noted that these findings are consistent with those from recent studies of the relationship between economic satisfaction and diffuse support for democracy in Poland and Russia (see Slomczynski and Shabad 1999; Zágorski 2001; and Gibson 2000).

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TABLE 1

Support for Democracy in CNEP Democracies, in Comparative Perspective: 1993-2000**DemBest:** "Democracy is the best form of Government for a country like ours"

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't Know/ It depends</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Uruguay (1994)	88%	7%	4%
Greece (1996)	87	9	4
Spain (1993)	79	14	7
Chile (1993)	79	11	10
Hungary (1998)	72	18	10
Bulgaria (1996)	57	24	19
Hong Kong (1998)	62	14	24

DemAuth: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government"

	<u>Dem.Always Preferable</u>	<u>They're All the same</u>	<u>Sometimes Auth. Regime Best</u>	<u>Don't Know, No Answer</u>
Denmark	93%	2%	5%	1%
Norway	88	2	5	5
Greece	85	3	11	1
Portugal	83	4	10	4
West Germany	84	5	8	3
The Netherlands	82	5	9	5
Spain	81	7	8	4
Italy	81	10	7	2
Uruguay	80	8	6	8
France	77	11	7	5
Great Britain	76	11	7	6
Argentina	71	11	15	3
Belgium	70	10	10	10
Bolivia	64	15	17	4
Chile (2000)	64	16	17	3
Ireland	63	21	11	6
Peru	63	14	13	10
Venezuela	62	13	19	6
Colombia	60	18	20	2
Bulgaria	59	14	25	2
Hungary	58	25	7	10
Chile	54	23	19	4
Mexico	53	17	23	7
Ecuador	52	23	18	7
Brazil	50	21	24	5

Sources: For DemBest in Bulgaria, Chile, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Uruguay, as well as DemAuth in Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary CNEP surveys; and for DemAuth in Latin American and European countries, Lagos (1997) and *Eurobarometer 37*, 1995.

TABLE 2

The Dimensionality of Attitudes Towards Democracy: Factor Analysis and Tau-b Correlations**Spain 1993**

	<u>Econ Sit</u>	<u>Polit Sit</u>	<u>Dem Sat</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>No Influ</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>
EconSit	--						.762	-.035
PolitSit	.43**	--					.802	-.016
DemSat	.28**	.31**	--				.687	-.125
DemBest	-.06*	-.10**	-.14**	--			.306	.348
PolComp	.00	.01	.05	.00	--		.021	.639
NoInflu	.06*	.06	.08*	.04	.17**	--	-.056	.651
DontCare	.14**	.13**	.21**	.08*	.25**	.28**	-.247	.728

Uruguay 1994

	<u>Econ Sit</u>	<u>Polit Sit</u>	<u>Dem Sat</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>No Influ</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
EconSit	--						.811	.076	-.126
PolitSit	.36**	--					.767	-.108	.014
DemSat	.25**	.21**	--				.609	-.018	.359
DemBest	.00	-.07	-.14**	--			.028	.050	.934
PolComp	.08*	-.01	.00	.03	--		.106	.752	-.092
NoInflu	.01	.06	.00	.04	.19**	--	-.052	.615	.186
DontCare	.04	.11**	.03	.00	.32**	.22**	-.100	.760	-.028

Greece 1996

	<u>Econ Sit</u>	<u>Polit Sit</u>	<u>Dem Sat</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Dem Auth</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>No Influ</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
EconSit	--							.823	-.094	.009
PolitSit	.47**	--						.849	-.072	.021
DemSat	.29**	.34**	--					.612	-.217	.314
DemBest	-.08*	-.11**	-.22**	--				.130	.032	.788
DemAuth	-.08	-.09*	-.19**	.29*	--			.025	-.090	.802
PolComp	.13**	.08*	.16**	-.01	-.08			-.040	.730	-.052
NoInflu	.12**	.12**	.15**	-.02	-.08	.22	--	-.090	.677	-.011
DontCare	.19**	.17**	.21**	-.05	-.08	.32**	.28**	-.173	.729	-.027

* Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .01; ** Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .001 or better

All factor loadings from a Varimax rotation of the Principal Component solution.

TABLE 3

The Dimensionality of Attitudes Towards Democracy: Factor Analysis and Tau-b Correlations**Portugal 2002**

	<u>Econ Sit</u>	<u>Gov Perf</u>	<u>Dem Sat</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
EconSit	--					.767	.037	.117
GovPerf	.30**	--				.741	.005	.012
DemSat	.17**	.19**	--			.588	.015	-.342
DemBest	.01	-.02	-.09*	--		.002	-.004	.947
PolComp	.00	-.03	.00	-.02	--	-.101	.812	-.081
DontCare	.08**	.07**	.03	-.01	.27*	.148	.791	.075

Bulgaria 1996

	<u>Econ Sit</u>	<u>Polit Sit</u>	<u>Dem Sat</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Dem Auth</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>No Influ</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
EconSit	--							-.035	.799	-.071
PolitSit	.39**	--						-.019	.790	-.005
DemSat	.20**	.18**	--					.526	.480	.001
DemBest	.05	.03	-.21**	--				.822	-.087	-.073
DemAuth	.01	.01	-.24**	.47*	--			.822	-.008	-.022
PolComp	-.05	-.02	.03	-.17**	-.10**			-.199	.187	.578
NoInflu	.10**	.08*	.02	.01	-.05	.14	--	.036	-.105	.731
DontCare	.11**	.04	.04	-.01	.01	.13**	.34*	.031	-.125	.737

Hungary 1998

	<u>Econ Con</u>	<u>Resp Con</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Dem Auth</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>No Influ</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
EconCon	--						.889	.024	-.062
RespCon	.60**	--					.884	.071	-.041
DemBest	-.05	-.07	--				-.047	-.004	.769
DemAuth	-.08*	-.09*	.21**	--			-.043	-.100	.752
PolComp	-.02	.02	-.05	-.20**	--		-.100	.738	-.139
NoInflu	.07*	.10**	-.05	-.05*	.27**	--	.103	.699	.130
DontCare	.09*	.10**	-.09*	-.15*	.30**	.24**	.101	.690	-.131

* Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .01; ** Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .001 or better

All factor loadings from a Varimax rotation of the Principal Component solution.

TABLE 4

**The Dimensionality of Attitudes Towards Democracy:
Factor Analyses and Tau-b Correlations**

Chile 1993

	<u>Econ Sit</u>	<u>Polit Sit</u>	<u>Dem Sat</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Pol Comp</u>	<u>No Influ</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>
EconSit	--						<u>.642</u>	-0.250
PolitSit	.39**	--					<u>.718</u>	-0.220
DemSat	.27**	.34**	--				<u>.736</u>	-0.024
DemBest	-.12*	-.19**	-.24**	--			<u>.604</u>	.190

PolComp	.16**	.15**	.10*	-.02	--		-.119	<u>.696</u>
NoInflu	.10**	.11**	.04	.01	.20**	--	.005	<u>.629</u>
DontCare	.17**	.16**	.09**	.01	.33**	.26**	-.071	<u>.759</u>

* Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .01; ** Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .001 or better
All factor loadings from a Varimax rotation of the Principal Component solution.

TABLE 5

Correlations Among Latent Factors and RMSEA Statistics from Confirmatory Factor Analysis

	Discontent/ Dem.Support	Dem.Support/ Disaffection	Discontent/ Disaffection	RMSEA Statistics
Spain	.07	.02	-.12	.055
Uruguay	.04	.19	.00	.067
Greece	.07	-.02	-.11	.054
Portugal	.01	-.01	.00	.090
Bulgaria	.02	-.03	-.01	.081
Hungary	.02	.04	-.02	.044
Chile	.10	.04	-.08	.031

*The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a goodness-of-fit statistic that is sensitive to the complexity (i.e., the number of estimated parameters) in the model. Values less than .05 indicate very good fit, values as high as .08 reflect reasonable errors of approximation, and values above .10 indicate poor fit.

TABLE 6

Behavioral Correlates of Attitudes Towards Democracy: Factor Analysis and Tau-b Correlations**Spain 1993**

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
Discontent	--				.814	-.163	.188
Vote	.36**	--			.844	.114	-.130
DemBest	-.12**	.02	--		.049	-.016	.952
Disaffect.	.11**	.08*	.04	--	-.217	.815	.219
Involve	.01	.14*	.12*	-.24**	.177	.795	-.276

Uruguay 1993

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
Discontent	--				-.029	.779	.259
Vote	.27**	--			-.048	-.834	.164
DemBest	.05	-.04	--		.025	.045	.959
Disaffect.	-.01	.01	.04	--	.813	-.051	.136
Involve	.04	-.07	-.01	-.27**	.819	.071	-.108

Greece 1996

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Dem Auth</u>	<u>Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
Discontent	--					.714	-.413	.132
Vote	.33**	--				.900	.096	.074
DemBest	-.16**	-.13**	--			.099	-.079	.799
DemAuth	-.13**	-.16**	.29**	--		.061	-.079	.795
Disaffect.	.20**	.04	-.04	-.10**	--	-.111	.756	-.021
Involve	-.17**	-.04	.06	.08*	-.18**	-.003	.758	-.066

* Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .01; ** Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .001 or better
All factor loadings from a Varimax rotation of the Principal Component solution.

TABLE 7

Behavioral Correlates of Attitudes Towards Democracy: Factor Analysis and Tau-b Correlations**Portugal 2002**

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
Discontent	--				<u>.786</u>	-.148	-.088
Vote	.24**	--			<u>.774</u>	.138	.113
DemBest	-.04	.01	--		.045	<u>.860</u>	.125
Disaffect.	.04	-.01	.00	--	-.003	.005	<u>.919</u>
Involve	-.09**	.00	.15**	-.24**	-.084	<u>.616</u>	<u>-.443</u>

Hungary 1998

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Dem Auth</u>	<u>Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
Discontent	--					<u>.789</u>	-.122	.041
Vote	.27**	--				<u>.826</u>	.075	-.015
DemBest	-.07*	-.04	--			.000	<u>.817</u>	.087
DemAuth	-.10**	.01	.20**	--		-.044	<u>.717</u>	-.168
Disaffect	.07*	-.07	-.08*	-.19**	--	.154	-.180	<u>.687</u>
Involve	-.01	-.07	.02	.18**	-.23**	-.128	.093	<u>.813</u>

* Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .01; ** Denotes significance (2-tailed) at .001 or better
All factor loadings from a Varimax rotation of the Principal Component solution.

TABLE 8

**Behavioral Correlates of Attitudes Towards Democracy in Bulgaria and Chile:
Factor Analysis and Tau-b Correlations**

Bulgaria 1996

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Best</u>	<u>Dem Auth</u>	<u>Dem Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>	<u>Factor3 Loading</u>
Discontent	--					.052	-.032	<u>.923</u>
Vote	.00	--				<u>-.713</u>	-.305	.021
DemBest	-.06*	.28**	--			<u>.785</u>	-.253	-.036
DemAuth	-.09**	.29**	.47**	--		<u>.794</u>	-.112	.088
Disaffect.	.06*	.02	-.10**	-.07*	--	.009	<u>.780</u>	-.199
Involve	.05	-.07	.20**	.11**	-.17**	-.111	<u>.684</u>	<u>.426</u>

Chile 1993

	<u>Discon</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Dem Best</u>	<u>Disaf</u>	<u>Factor1 Loading</u>	<u>Factor2 Loading</u>
Discontent	--				<u>.584</u>	<u>.561</u>
Vote	.12**	--			.299	<u>.723</u>
DemBest	-.23**	-.17**	--		-.155	<u>.711</u>
Disaffect.	.18**	-.05	.02	--	<u>.683</u>	.058
Involve	-.28**	.15*	.07*	-.25**	<u>.828</u>	-.019

** Significant (2-tailed) at .01 or better.

TABLE 9

**Relationship Between Support for Democracy and
Vote for Anti-System Party**

SPAIN 1979, DemBest: "Democracy is the best form of Government for a country like ours."

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>It depends</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>N</u>
Vote for FN, UN, Falange, etc.	24%	33%	44%	46
Vote for other parties	68	24	9	4,940

CHILE 1989 (2000 survey), DemAuth: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of Government."

	<u>Democracy Preferable</u>	<u>They're All the Same</u>	<u>Sometimes Auth- oritarian Best</u>	<u>N</u>
Vote for Hernán Büchi	35%	12%	53%	97
Vote for Other Candidates	78	14	8	392

CHILE 1999 (vote in first round), DemAuth: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of Government."

	<u>Democracy Preferable</u>	<u>They're All the Same</u>	<u>Sometimes Auth- oritarian Best</u>	<u>N</u>
Vote for Joaquín Lavín	44%	16%	40%	201
Vote for Other Candidates	84	11	5	302

ITALY 1983 (1985 survey), DemAuth: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of Government."

	<u>Democracy Preferable</u>	<u>They're All the Same</u>	<u>Sometimes Auth- oritarian Best</u>	<u>N</u>
Vote for MSI	30%	13%	57%	53
Vote for Other Parties	78	9	13	1,344

ITALY 1996, DemAuth: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of Government."

	<u>Democracy Preferable</u>	<u>They're All the Same</u>	<u>Sometimes Auth- oritarian Best</u>	<u>N</u>
Vote for Alleanza Nazionale	73%	5%	22%	306
Vote for Other Parties	87	5	8	1,668

Sources: For Spain in 1979, DATA 1979 post-election survey; for Italy in 1985, The Four Nation Study; and for Italy in 1996 and Chile, CNEP Surveys.

TABLE 10

Correlations (Tau-B) of Disaffection Scale with...

	Interest in Politics	Newspaper Reading	Listen to Radio News	Watch News on Television	Political Information
Spain	-.27***	-.18***	-.13***	-.09***	-.18***
Uruguay	-.28***	-.15***	-.05	.00	-.20***
Greece	-.19***	-.19***	-.08**	-.01	-.17***
Portugal	-.28***	-.20***	-.18***	MD	-.10***
Hungary	-.28***	-.17***	-.11***	-.17***	-.19***
Bulgaria	-.10***	-.17***	-.03	-.03	-.10***
Chile	-.24***	-.18***	-.06**	-.11***	-.22***

*** Significant at .001 level or better

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

(No asterisk, not statistically significant)

TABLE 11

Behavioral Correlates (Tau-B) of Disaffection

	Discuss Politics	Convince Others	Organizationa Membership	Attend Rallies	Work in Campaign	Vote
Spain	-.25***	-.17***	-.05*	-.06*	-.06*	-.02
Uruguay	-.25***	-.15***	-.15***	-.13***	-.11***	+.09**
Greece	-.16***	-.11***	-.16***	-.04	-.10**	-.02
Bulgaria	MD	-.13***	-.12***	-.17***	-.16***	-.04
Hungary	MD	-.25***	-.13***	-.11***	-.08**	-.16***
Portugal	-.25***	-.11***	-.06*	MD	-.13***	-.08**
Chile	-.23***	-.18***	-.04	-.09**	-.07*	-.02

*** Significant at .001 level or better

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

(No asterisk, not statistically significant)