

ASIAN  BAROMETER

A Comparative Survey of  
*DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT*

Working Paper Series: No. 113

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The Individual-level Implications of Social  
Capital for Democracy in East Asia

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## **Asian Barometer**

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# **Working Paper Series**

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**Globalbarometer**

The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied research program on public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance around the region. The regional network encompasses research teams from thirteen East Asian political systems (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). Together, this regional survey network covers virtually all major political systems in the region, systems that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

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**The Individual-level Implications of Social Capital for Democracy in East Asia**

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## **Abstract**

### **The Individual-level Implications of Social Capital for Democracy in East Asia**

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This paper attempts to explore the implications of social capital in East Asia for the citizens' attitudes toward political engagement and the quality of governance using the fourth wave of Asian Barometer Survey. Using multilevel analysis, it attempts to disentangle individual level and country level factors in explaining generalized trust and other political involvement variables. In doing so, it aims to enrich the theory of social capital based on the experience and evidence from East Asia. The analysis finds that formal membership tends to decrease generalized trust, which independently increases political involvement. It also finds that Confucianism at the country level tends to dampen political engagement. It suggests that most formal group in this region might be characterized as bonding and the citizens in Confucian culture might still be characterized as allegiant rather than assertive citizens.

## The Individual-level Implications of Social Capital for Democracy in East Asia\*

### Civic Culture, Social Capital, and Democracy

What makes political regimes and democracy in particular stable? This is one of the most important questions that empirically minded students of political culture have tackled with since Almond and Verba's seminal study (1963). Based on comparative surveys from five nations, it concludes the civic culture, a mixture of more traditional cultures such as subject and parochial ones with more modern, rational, participatory culture, is "particularly appropriate for" and "most congruent with" democratic political system.<sup>1</sup> Eckstein concurs and elaborates on this "congruence theory." He expects that government performance be enhanced if their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of society. Moreover, he advocates "balanced disparities" or combinations of democratic and non-democratic traits as a condition for effective democracy (Eckstein 1969). In fact, Almond attributes civic culture as the prescription to democracy to this blending of apparent contradictions by Eckstein (Almond 2002, 198).

Inglehart, who reignited the study of political culture in the 1980s, reinterprets civic culture as "a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order" (1988, 1203) and finds that high level of civic culture was strongly correlated with economic development as well as with stable democratic institutions (1988 and 1990). Armed with comprehensive evidence measured at multiple waves from the World Values Survey (WVS), Inglehart could make a stronger case for confirming the congruence theory.

Putnam has distinguished himself by focusing on conditions not only for stable democracy but also for *good* or successful one, that is, "strong, responsive, effective representative institutions" (1993, 6). Putnam's approach is also ingenious in that he focused on cultural variations within a single country – in one study, Italy (1993) and in the other, the United States (2000). His answers, however, are not something completely new: culture, civic culture in particular, matters. Based on a multi-method, comparative study of Italy's regional governments, Putnam demonstrates that the stock of social capital, defined as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions," (1993, 67) is positively correlated with the performance of regional and local governments. He is not the one who first used or defined social capital but most scholars agreed that he made the term and its implications for such issues as collective action, economic development, and democratic governance especially salient (Woolcock 2010). Putnam (2001) basically replicates this finding utilizing the extensive data about the performance of state governments of the United States and reaches similar conclusions. In other words, the states with high stock of social capital tend to perform better in such areas as education, child welfare, economy, health, crime rate, and so on.

Utilizing the five waves of the World Values Survey spanning from 1981 to 2008, Dalton and Welzel (2014) propose a revised version of civic culture that would enable stable democracy and good governance in particular. They conclude that the assertive culture is beneficial for accountable governance while the allegiant

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<sup>1</sup> Almond (1980) traced the origin of the idea of civic culture to Aristotle's conception of mixed government that is organized on both oligarchic and democratic principles with a predominant middle class.

culture is conducive to effective governance and “the allegiance-assertion combination, then, would be the best of all worlds, and could be seen as the “healthy mixture” that shapes Almond and Verba’s civic culture” (304). According to these authors, allegiant orientation consists of institutional confidence, philanthropic faith, and norm compliance, whereas assertive one consists of individual liberties, equal opportunities, and people’s voice.<sup>2</sup>

In summary, interpersonal trust, trust in government, and civic engagement have been suggested with empirical evidence as factors of political culture that are conducive to stable democracy and good or effective and accountable governance.

What about the evidence from East Asia, which can be dichotomized into Confucian countries of Taiwan, mainland China and Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam and non-Confucian ones of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand? It seems that the evidence from this region does not support the conclusions from civic culture literature or does so partially at best.

Park (2011), for example, concludes, based on the analysis of the second wave (2005-2007) of selected countries from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), that “there may be no essential connection between the density of social networks and the quality of democratic citizenship across Southeast Asia” that includes Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. He, however, recognizes the role of associations as schools of democracy in this region and suggested that they may have benefited democracy not by cultivating civic norms and democratic orientations but by mobilizing political activity and nurturing politically active citizens. Shin (2012) also finds, utilizing the same ABS dataset but focusing on Confucian countries, that there is no clear pattern of relationship between levels of attachment to Confucian group life and associational activism while there is a clear positive relationship between attachments to the norms Confucian communal life and the bonding type of activism, which has been suggested not to engender generalized trust. In addition, He presents that in all four developed Confucian countries – Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore – only about one-third agreed with the statement that most people in their country were trustworthy while about 60% did so in the two less developed, communist Confucian countries, that is, China and Vietnam. Moreover, it is interesting to note that in all three democracies of Confucian heritage, only a minority trusts government officials while large majorities in non-democracies of the same heritage such as Singapore and Vietnam trust these officials, the divergence of which was not discovered in non-Confucian Asia. In a sense, only democracies in Confucian Asia seem to motivate critical or assertive citizens, the reason of which Shin was not able to determine with the data at hand.

Park and Shin (2005) present similar findings although they take advantage of only Korean data of the ABS first wave, collected in 2003. In Korea, associational membership has no role in promoting support for democratic principles and institutions, only to lead more political activism but social trust enhances support for democracy, which is consistent with evidence from civic culture and social capital literature. In other words, they conclude that social involvement or structural component of social capital contributes to democratic

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<sup>2</sup> Dalton and Welzel rightly distinguishes culture, which is a collective property, from orientation, which is an individual attribute. In other words, culture represents the aggregate configuration of all individual orientations and to measure its strength we need aggregate measures showing how prevalent certain orientations are in each society (292-293).

citizenship behaviorally while social trust or cultural component of social capital contributes to it attitudinally, the finding of which Park (2011) extends with Southeast Asian data, as stated above.

Drawing on these works of civic culture or social capital studies and based on the latest fourth wave data of ABS of thirteen East Asian countries including Hong Kong, this paper will explore the implications of social capital at the individual level for a series of individual level variables that have been shown to enhance the performance of democratic political system such as interpersonal or generalized trust, political trust, political engagement, and satisfaction with democracy, while accounting for the aggregate level variables such as cultural frames of individualism and Confucianism. In other words, it will examine the effects of the major cultural frame at the country level and social capital at the individual level on the components of democratic citizenship. Before embarking on empirical analysis, a brief introduction of multilevel modeling and the ABS data is in order.

### **Why We Need Multilevel Modeling<sup>3</sup>**

There are two methodological reasons why multilevel analysis is most appropriate for the empirical analysis of comparative political behavior data: First, the problem of dependent observations within the same cultural context necessitates multilevel modeling (MLM). It is reasonable to assume that political values, attitudes, and behavior of the individuals in the same country are more homogenous than others in different countries as they are raised under the same educational system and share the same historical experiences. In other words, the individuals within the same country are not truly independent. Although they do not directly address questions from cross-cultural studies, MLM experts Kreft and Leeuw concur with this assumption: “The more individuals share common experiences due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or to a certain extent, duplications of each other” (1998, 9). The fact that the observations are not independent entails serious statistical consequences. It violates the assumption that the errors are independent, which underlies the standard linear models such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Thus, if we pooled all the observations ignoring the dependence among them and apply the linear models, it will deflate the estimated standard errors and hence produce spuriously significant results, i.e., commit Type I errors.<sup>4</sup> In fact, it has been shown that a slight ICC (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient), a measure of the degree of dependence of individuals can dramatically increase the Type I error, especially when the number of observations per contextual unit is large (Kreft and Leeuw 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Bickel 2007).<sup>5</sup> Considering the fact that the minimum number of the observations per country in this analysis is greater than 1,000 (Singapore, N=1,039), the concern about Type I error is particularly valid.<sup>6</sup> In sum, MLM is appropriate for this study because it attempts to explain individual level variation with the higher level factors as well as the

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<sup>3</sup> This chapter draws on the author’s dissertation (2010).

<sup>4</sup> Steenbergen and Jones (2002), for example, showed that most predictors of EU support became significant once they ran OLS regression ignoring the multilevel structure of the Eurobarometer survey that consisted of 15 EU member states.

<sup>5</sup> It can also be called a measure of group homogeneity. Formally, it is defined as the proportion of variance in the outcome variable that is between the second-level units with data having a two-level hierarchical structure (Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 9).

<sup>6</sup> According to Kreft and Leeuw (1998, 10), a small ICC (say  $p=0.01$ ) inflates the Type I error rate from the assumed 0.05 to an observed 0.17 for groups of mere 100 observations.

same level factors, taking into account the fact that individual level observations are dependent or share variation.

Second, the empirical analysis of this paper is a response to increasing call for utilizing contextual information in comparative political behavior as well as in the psychological study of culture (Hofstede 2001; Curtice 2007; Oyserman and Uskul 2008). The typical dataset in comparative political behavior is structured hierarchically. That is, the individual level data (Level 1) are collected and organized according to a country (Level 2) as in ABS as well as in WVS. However, the empirical study of comparative political behavior have under-utilized the information from this unique data structure. Most comparative political behavior studies have done a separate analysis per each country or compared samples from only two to three countries or analyzed pooled samples from multiple countries without taking advantage of contextual information. In other words, previous research in comparative political behavior has rarely taken advantage of the contextual information, the incorporation of which into a multilevel model is likely to reduce model misspecification compared with a single level model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). In addition, MLM takes into account not only the uniqueness of each context but also what they have in common by incorporating contextual information, what Kreft and Leeuw (1998) would call “borrowing strength.”

In sum, multilevel analysis is superior to traditional alternative methods that address the issue of dependent observations within contexts. For example, either we could run a single analysis based on pooled observations without correcting for dependent observations at the lower level or do a separate analysis per each country and compare the results. However, the former will be likely to entail spuriously significant results while the latter will discard the information at the contextual level, i.e., the country level in this paper. Moreover, the need for separate analyses for separate contexts contradicts the premise that countries are related to each other (Kreft and Leeuw 1998).<sup>7</sup>

### **The Asian Barometer Survey**

The empirical analysis of this paper primarily relies on the newest fourth wave of the ABS data of thirteen East Asian countries and territories. For the past fifteen years, the ABS project has collected empirical data on issues such as political values, democratic legitimacy, political participation, and the quality of democratic governance in Asian countries and provided students of comparative political behavior with rich opportunities to examine the current status and the changing nature of the quality of democratic governance from the perspectives of ordinary citizens in this dynamic region. The first wave of the ABS was conducted from 2001 to 2003 for eight East Asian countries and each wave has since been administered in approximately every four years. The second wave was conducted in 2005–2008 for twelve East Asian countries and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal) and the third wave in 2010–2012 for twelve East Asian countries. All ABS surveys are conducted in face-to-face interviews, using national probability samples of

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<sup>7</sup> Steenbergen and Jones (2002) found that the conventional approaches – e.g., dummy variable model and two-step analysis, both of which are implemented in an OLS regression analysis – in political science for multilevel data are not satisfactory: Dummy variables are only indicators of contextual differences and do not explain why the regression regimes for the subgroups are different. The two-step or “slopes as outcomes” analysis implicitly assumes that the macro-level predictors fully account for contextual differences by specifying the error components at the contextual level to be zero.



voting age population in each countries surveyed (<http://www.asianbarometer.org>). Table 1 shows the number of respondents per country and wave although this paper analyzes only the fourth wave data.

### **Empirical Analysis**

At the conceptual core, social capital consists of networks or associations and generalized trust, which constitute its structural and cultural components, respectively (Park and Shin 2005).<sup>8</sup> And social capital literature has suggested that the connection is stronger from networks or more broadly civic engagement to interpersonal trust, rather than the reverse (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Fung 2003; Park and Shin 2005; Paxton 2007). Thus, we expect that the more formal groups one joins, the greater trust one will have in strangers although we recognize the fact that prior research on the sources of interpersonal or social trust using East Asian data has produced no definite answer as discussed above (Park and Shin 2005; Park 2011; Shin 2012).

In addition, in line with previous literature on social capital, we expect civic engagement, measured by the number of formal group one belongs to, and generalized trust will lead to more political trust, political engagement, more political efficacy, and more satisfaction with democracy. In other words, citizens with higher levels of social capital are likely to trust government officials, to be interested in politics, to follow news about politics and government more often, and to discuss political matters with family members and friends more often. Moreover, citizens with higher levels of generalized trust and formal group membership are more likely to feel that they can understand political matters and that they can influence what the government does. Finally, social capital as individual attributes increases one's satisfaction with democracy.

At the country level, we expect that collectivistic culture, marked by ingroup favoritism, will lower generalized trust while individualistic culture, the opposite pole to collectivism on cultural dimension, will increase generalized trust. Based on a series of experimental studies using the US and Japanese samples, Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) and Yamagishi and his colleagues (1998) propose the “emancipation theory of trust” that emphasizes the role of generalized trust or “belief in the benevolence of human nature in general” in emancipating people from the confines of safe, but closed relationships, which characterize collectivistic culture. Gheorghiu and his colleagues (2009) extend and confirm the theory based on the multilevel analysis of European Social Survey data from 31 European countries. They find that individualism, measured by Hofstede (2001), has a significant and positive relationship with generalized social trust over and above the effect of a country's political history of communism and ethnic heterogeneity. Yoon's multilevel analysis (2010) also reaches the same conclusion using the OECD country data from the WVS. Van Hoorn's recent multilevel analysis (2015) finds that individualism is associated a broader trust radius while collectivism is associated with a narrower trust radius and concludes that trust radius, that is, the width of the circle of people among whom a certain trust level exists, might be an inherent part of the individualism-collectivism cultural syndrome.

Furthermore, we expect that Confucianism as cultural frame, marked by familism, affect trust in others negatively, consistent with Fukuyama (1995), among others.<sup>9</sup> Delhey et al. (2011) also conclude that trust

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<sup>8</sup> We agree that social capital is another “essentially contest term” in company with such concepts as culture, power, and the rule of law (Woolcock 2010). The debate on conceptual refinement, measurement strategy, and unit of analysis, for the term deserve a separate forum for research.

<sup>9</sup> Familism has also been suggested as a form of collectivism and found to be negatively correlated with social capital (Realo et al. 2008). Brewer and Venaik (2011) suggest that GLOBE's in-group collectivism, another

radius is substantially narrower in Confucian countries but wider in wealthy countries, which necessitate a control for the wealth of a country.

### **Theoretical Hypothesis**

Based on previous research on social capital and democratic citizenship in general and its application to East Asian countries, we formulate a series of theoretical hypotheses as follows:

1. Civic engagement and generalized trust

H1: Civic engagement increases generalized trust. The culture of individualism increases generalized trust while Confucianism decreases it.

2. Social capital and political trust

H2: Social capital increases political trust. The culture of individualism increases political trust while Confucianism decreases it.

3. Social capital and political engagement

H3-1: Social capital increases political interest. The culture of individualism increases political interest while Confucianism decreases it.

H3-2: Social capital increases political news consumption. The culture of individualism increases political news consumption while Confucianism decreases it.

H3-3: Social capital increases political discussion. The culture of individualism increases political discussion while Confucianism decreases it.

4. Social capital and political efficacy

H4-1: Social capital increases internal efficacy. The culture of individualism increases internal efficacy while Confucianism decreases it.

H4-2: Social capital increases external efficacy. The culture of individualism increases external efficacy while Confucianism decreases it.

5. Social capital and satisfaction with democracy

H5: Social capital increases satisfaction with democracy. The culture of individualism increases satisfaction with democracy while Confucianism decreases it.

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empirically driven concept for collectivism be relabeled “family collectivism” while Hofstede’s collectivism as “work-orientation.”

### Multilevel Model of Social Capital

To test a series of hypotheses laid out above, I construct multilevel models as follows<sup>10</sup>:

Level 1: Individual

Generalized Trust/ Political Trust/ Engagement/ Efficacy/ Satisfaction with Democracy  
=  $B_0 + B_1 \text{Female} + B_2 \text{Age} + B_3 \text{Education} + B_4 \text{Income} + B_5 \text{Social Capital} + r_{ij}$

Level 2: Country

$B_0 = G_{00} + G_{01} \text{Individualism} + G_{02} \text{Confucianism} + G_{03} \text{Population} + G_{04} \text{Industrialization} + G_{05} \text{Democracy} + u_{0j}$

Mixed Model

Generalized Trust/ Political Trust/ Engagement/ Efficacy/ Satisfaction with Democracy  
=  $G_{00} + B_1 \text{Female} + B_2 \text{Age} + B_3 \text{Education} + B_4 \text{Income} + B_5 \text{Social Capital} + G_{01} \text{Individualism} + G_{02} \text{Confucianism} + G_{03} \text{Population} + G_{04} \text{Industrialization} + G_{05} \text{Democracy} + r_{ij} + u_{0j}$

A mixed model with random intercept is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models.  $B$  represents the fixed effect at the individual level except for the intercept ( $B_0$ ) which is random, that is, vary over countries.  $G_{st}$  is the effect of the macro variable  $t$  (i.e., macro-level intercept, Individualism, Confucianism, Population, Industrialization and Democracy) on the regression coefficient of micro variable  $s$  (i.e., micro-level intercept). It represents the fixed effect at the country level.  $r$  refers to level 1 error and  $u$  level 2 error. The subscript  $i$  indexes respondent and  $j$  country.

Except for the models with “Generalized Trust” as dependent variable, “Social Capital,” the independent variable at the individual level, consists of “Generalized Trust” and “Membership.” “Social Capital” refers to civic engagement or formal group membership in the models with “Generalized Trust” as dependent variable. “Individualism” and “Confucianism” are accounted for, in turn, to compare independent effects of each cultural level variable. Every model accounts for gender, age, education, and income as controls at the individual level and each model includes, in turn, population, industrialization, and democracy as controls at the country level.

The analysis used Stata software and the maximum likelihood (ML) method to estimate parameters. “Generalized Trust” in Table 2 is the only binary variable and the estimation is based on multilevel mixed-effect probit regression analysis and the other models are estimated based on multilevel mixed effect ordered probit regression analysis considering the ordinal measures of 4-scale generalized trust, political trust, political engagement, political efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy. All continuous variables at the individual level are group-mean or country-mean centered and those at the country level are grand-mean centered in line with recent development in the multilevel literature (Enders and Tofghi 2007; Sumino 2014)

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<sup>10</sup> All the variables and their measures used in the analysis are described in the Appendix.

## Results

First, throughout all the empty models in which no independent variables are included (Model 1 in every tables), the between-country variance for the dependent variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that individuals within a particular country are more homogenous than ones in other countries and affected by different initial conditions. Yet, as models with more country level variables tend to make the estimate statistically not significant, it is worthy of further research as to whether variations in social and political trust and other political engagement attitudes of citizens in East Asia could be explained in a single fixed model.

Second, it seems that formal group membership, in fact, does not increase trust in strangers but dampens it according to Table 2, making H1 unsupported. When “Generalized Trust” is measured on a Likert scale as in Table 3, the coefficient estimates for formal group membership are negative in Model 2 and 3 and the estimate is statistically significant in Model 3, again making H1 not supported. The coefficients are positive in Model 4 to 6, consistent with expectation, but are not statistically significant. In addition, contrary to expectation, individualism affects generalized trust negatively in all models of Table 2 and 3 while Confucianism affects it positively in most models in the same tables.

Third, generalized trust and formal group membership, two components of social capital, appear to enhance political trust or trust in government officials independently, supporting H2. According to Table 4, all the coefficients for trust in Model 2-6 are positive and statistically significant and so are those for membership in Model 3, 5, and 6. They are positive as expected but not statistically significant in Model 2 and 4. All the coefficients for individualism except in Model 6 are positive and statistically significant, largely supporting H2.

Fourth, generalized trust seems to increase political engagement in such areas as political interest, political news consumption, and political discussion while formal group membership does not. According to Table 5, 6 and 7, the coefficient estimates for trust in others are consistently positive and statistically significant in all models. The number of formal groups one belongs to, however, have, statistically significant, negative effects on political engagement in Model 6 in political interest (Table 5), in Model 2-6 in political news consumption (Table 6), and in Model 6 in political discussion (Table 7), which, in a sense, is consistent with unexpected results in generalized trust (Table 1). Only on political news consumption individualism consistently has positive effects while Confucianism consistently has negative effects, supporting H3. In the other areas of political engagement, these cultural level variables do not exert consistent influence. In sum, the evidence supports H3 across all the areas of political engagement when it comes to generalized trust and only in political news consumption when it comes to cultural influences.

Fifth, generalized trust seems to increase political efficacy consistently, be it internal or external, and formal group membership does so to a lesser degree. Individualism does not have statistically significant effects on internal efficacy in general but does so in the opposite direction to H4. Confucianism have statistically significant and negative effect on internal efficacy in Model 6 of Table 8 and on external efficacy in Model 5 and 6 of Table 9, confirming H4. Yet it fails to reach statistical significance in other models or shows even positive, statistically significant effect in Model 4 for internal efficacy.

Lastly, consistent with prior research and with H5, generalized trust has consistently statistically significant, positive effect on satisfaction with democracy. Membership in all the models again fails to reach statistical significance. The coefficient estimate for individualism is positive and statistically significant only in Model 5

and the estimate for Confucianism is negative and statistically significant only in Model 6, which, in summary, makes H5 weakly supported.

### **Discussion**

Directly opposed to those who argue that formal, bridging group membership would enhance democratic citizenship, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) observe that joining a voluntary association is not adequate foundation for good citizenship. People tend to join homogeneous, not heterogeneous, groups and involvement in voluntary associational life or civic participation does not lead to, and may even turn people away from, political participation. Moreover, voluntary associations of homogeneous members, argue they, do not teach that democracy is messy, inefficient, and conflict-ridden, which good citizens need to learn. The results of this paper as well as in previous literature that analyzed the ABS data (Park and Shin 2005 and Park 2011, among others) seem to confirm Theiss-Morse and Hibbing's observation. Whether these results are specific to this region or can be generalized to other parts of the world is worthy of further research. If it turns out these results are only specific to East Asian countries in general or Confucian countries in particular, we need to delve further into the causal dynamic as to whether citizens in this region tend to transform formal groups including the ones of "bridging" nature into "bonding" groups or whether most formal groups in the region are inherently of bonding nature regardless of appearances.

Moreover, seemingly negative effect of individualism as cultural syndrome on generalized trust, which is directly contrary to previous research that largely draws on the evidence from advanced democracies, and its inconsistent effects across the other areas of investigation, need further elaboration. It may have to do with methodological issues including measurement and model specification or with the fact that each model has a different substantive rationale. For example, the narrower radius of trust of collectivism would enhance generalized trust as "most people" in generalized trust may only refer to ingroup members. Largely positive and statistically significant effects of Confucianism on generalized trust appear to support this line of reasoning.

Table 1. The Number of Observations for Country by Wave

Country\Wave	Wave 1 (2001-2003)	Wave 2 (2005-2008)	Wave 3 (2010-2012)	Wave 4 (2014-2016)	Total
Japan	1,418	1,067	1,880	1,081	5,446
Hong Kong	811	849	1,207	1,217	4,084
Korea	1,500	1,212	1,207	1,200	5,119
China	3,183	5,098	3,473	4,068	15,822
Mongolia	1,144	1,211	1,210	1,228	4,793
Philippines	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	4,800
Taiwan	1,415	1,587	1,592	1,657	6,251
Thailand	1,546	1,546	1,512	1,200	5,804
Indonesia		1,598	1,550	1,550	4,698
Singapore		1,012	1,000	1,039	3,051
Vietnam		1,200	1,191	1,200	3,591
Cambodia		1,000	1,200	1,200	3,400
Malaysia		1,218	1,214	1,207	3,639
Myanmar				1,620	1,620
Total	12,217	19,798	19,436	20,667	72,118

Table 2. Membership and Generalized Trust

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Female		-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)
Age		0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.01)
Education		-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.09+ (0.05)	0.00 (0.09)
Income		0.53*** (0.12)	0.52*** (0.11)	0.38* (0.16)	0.27* (0.11)	0.49*** (0.15)
Membership		-0.43*** (0.12)	-0.55*** (0.17)	-0.40* (0.19)	-0.50*** (0.13)	-0.91*** (0.12)
Individualism		-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Population			0.13 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)	0.17+ (0.10)	-0.06 (0.10)
Confucianism				0.25 (0.20)	0.24+ (0.13)	0.37** (0.12)
Industrialization					-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Democracy						0.02 (0.01)
Constant	-0.61*** (0.12)	-7.10*** (0.74)	-7.34*** (0.75)	-5.90*** (1.34)	-8.04*** (1.07)	-10.54*** (0.73)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.21** (0.08)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01+ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
N	19,928	15,926	15,926	15,926	15,926	14,795
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-11367.10	-9416.03	-9415.56	-9414.80	-9410.32	-8618.69
Wald Chi-square		126.56	135.56	150.51	299.33	1223.30

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 3. Membership and Generalized Trust (4-scale)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-1.54*** (0.07)	0.88 (0.58)	1.11+ (0.58)	-1.84*** (0.36)	-1.07** (0.37)	-0.81 (0.56)
cut2						
Constant	-0.27*** (0.07)	2.20*** (0.58)	2.43*** (0.58)	-0.51 (0.36)	0.25 (0.37)	0.51 (0.56)
cut3						
Constant	1.50*** (0.07)	4.05*** (0.58)	4.28*** (0.58)	1.34*** (0.36)	2.11*** (0.37)	2.33*** (0.56)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.06* (0.02)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female						
		-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Age						
		0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Education						
		-0.04+ (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.07)
Income						
		0.38*** (0.09)	0.38*** (0.09)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.11)
Membership						
		-0.12 (0.09)	-0.23+ (0.13)	0.08 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.09)
Individualism						
		-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Population						
			0.12 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Confucianism						
				0.50*** (0.05)	0.50*** (0.04)	0.48*** (0.10)
Industrialization						
					-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Democracy						
						-0.00 (0.01)
N	18,487	16,083	16,083	16,083	16,083	14,935
N-Countries	13	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-19254.80	-16112.12	-16111.46	-16098.85	-16091.66	-15146.62
Wald Chi-square		66.08	72.99	649.97	1107.76	1067.25

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001



Table 4. Social Capital and Political Trust

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-1.45*** (0.14)	-6.87*** (1.68)	-7.94*** (1.51)	-6.29* (2.79)	-9.96*** (2.66)	-0.04 (0.58)
cut2						
Constant	-0.17 (0.14)	-5.41** (1.68)	-6.49*** (1.51)	-4.84+ (2.79)	-8.51** (2.66)	1.41* (0.58)
cut3						
Constant	1.21*** (0.14)	-3.91* (1.68)	-4.98*** (1.51)	-3.33 (2.79)	-7.00** (2.66)	2.92*** (0.58)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.27** (0.10)	0.12* (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05* (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Age		-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Education		-0.11 (0.07)	-0.21** (0.08)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.39** (0.12)	0.28*** (0.07)
Income		0.49+ (0.27)	0.52* (0.23)	0.68* (0.32)	0.85** (0.27)	0.14 (0.11)
Trust		0.22*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)
Membership		0.15 (0.27)	0.66* (0.33)	0.49 (0.41)	0.66* (0.33)	0.57*** (0.10)
Individualism		0.03* (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.00)
Population			-0.57* (0.27)	-0.49+ (0.30)	-0.67** (0.25)	-0.26** (0.08)
Confucianism				-0.29 (0.41)	-0.26 (0.33)	-1.09*** (0.10)
Industrialization					0.00* (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Democracy						-0.10*** (0.01)
N	19,293	14,977	14,977	14,977	14,977	13,969
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-22070.00	-16136.23	-16134.38	-16134.14	-16131.65	-15040.99
Wald Chi-square		137.71	149.15	150.94	174.94	2705.87

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 5. Social Capital and Political Interest

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-0.87*** (0.07)	-2.56* (1.03)	-2.33* (1.07)	-0.21 (1.88)	-1.06 (2.21)	7.07*** (0.56)
cut2						
Constant	0.15* (0.07)	-1.48 (1.03)	-1.24 (1.07)	0.87 (1.88)	0.03 (2.21)	8.13*** (0.56)
cut3						
Constant	1.43*** (0.07)	-0.15 (1.03)	0.09 (1.07)	2.20 (1.88)	1.36 (2.21)	9.47*** (0.56)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.07** (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)
Age		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.01)
Education		-0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	0.56*** (0.07)
Income		-0.01 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.16)	0.20 (0.22)	0.24 (0.22)	-0.36*** (0.11)
Trust		0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Membership		0.07 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.26 (0.27)	-0.22 (0.27)	-0.28** (0.09)
Individualism		0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)	0.03+ (0.02)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Population			0.13 (0.19)	0.24 (0.20)	0.20 (0.20)	0.53*** (0.08)
Confucianism				-0.37 (0.28)	-0.36 (0.27)	-1.04*** (0.10)
Industrialization					0.00 (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Democracy						-0.08*** (0.01)
N	20,355	15,700	15,700	15,700	15,700	14,582
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-25156.56	-18966.49	-18966.28	-18965.47	-18965.23	-17666.26
Wald Chi-square		321.72	322.57	326.20	327.33	1166.93

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 6. Social Capital and Political News Consumption

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-0.94*** (0.11)	0.01 (0.65)	0.55 (0.49)	3.15*** (0.31)	2.86*** (0.36)	2.82*** (0.55)
cut2						
Constant	-0.50*** (0.11)	0.48 (0.65)	1.02* (0.49)	3.62*** (0.31)	3.33*** (0.36)	3.29*** (0.55)
cut3						
Constant	0.02 (0.11)	0.95 (0.65)	1.50** (0.49)	4.10*** (0.31)	3.81*** (0.36)	3.79*** (0.55)
cut4						
Constant	0.53*** (0.11)	1.48* (0.65)	2.03*** (0.49)	4.63*** (0.31)	4.34*** (0.36)	4.33*** (0.55)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.16** (0.06)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female						
		-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)
Age						
		0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Education						
		-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07 (0.07)
Income						
		-0.24* (0.10)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.11)
Trust						
		0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Membership						
		0.02 (0.11)	-0.24* (0.11)	-0.51*** (0.04)	-0.49*** (0.05)	-0.50*** (0.09)
Individualism						
		0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Population						
			0.29*** (0.09)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.42*** (0.08)
Confucianism						
				-0.45*** (0.04)	-0.45*** (0.04)	-0.45*** (0.09)
Industrialization						
				0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Democracy						
						0.00 (0.01)
N	20,431	15,771	1,5771	1,5771	15,771	1,4655
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-30980.54	-23595.71	-23591.89	-23574.63	-23573.50	-21905.73
Wald Chi-square		360.70	439.32	1623.83	1625.86	1630.15

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 7. Social Capital and Political Discussion

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-0.16 (0.10)	-2.97* (1.33)	-2.31+ (1.28)	-0.13 (2.29)	-2.50 (2.42)	4.92*** (0.59)
cut2						
Constant	1.55*** (0.10)	-1.20 (1.33)	-0.54 (1.28)	1.64 (2.29)	-0.74 (2.42)	6.72*** (0.60)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.14** (0.05)	0.08* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.22*** (0.02)
Age		-0.06+ (0.03)	-0.05+ (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.10*** (0.01)
Education		0.04 (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	0.17* (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	0.17* (0.07)
Income		-0.34 (0.21)	-0.35+ (0.19)	-0.14 (0.27)	-0.03 (0.24)	0.00 (0.11)
Trust		0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Membership		0.29 (0.22)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.24 (0.34)	-0.14 (0.30)	-0.75*** (0.10)
Individualism		0.02+ (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Population			0.35 (0.23)	0.47+ (0.24)	0.35 (0.22)	0.20* (0.09)
Confucianism				-0.38 (0.34)	-0.36 (0.30)	-0.52*** (0.10)
Industrialization					0.00+ (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Democracy						-0.01 (0.01)
N	20,411	15,762	15,762	15,762	15,762	14,642
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-17303.76	-13349.76	-13348.72	-13348.12	-13346.72	-12557.50
Wald Chi-square		178.71	182.46	184.94	191.87	777.47

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 8. Social Capital and Internal Efficacy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-0.88*** (0.10)	-0.19 (0.80)	0.09 (0.81)	-2.42+ (1.24)	-1.45 (1.39)	-2.04*** (0.58)
cut2						
Constant	0.64*** (0.10)	1.40+ (0.80)	1.68* (0.81)	-0.83 (1.24)	0.14 (1.39)	-0.45 (0.58)
cut3						
Constant	1.62*** (0.10)	2.43** (0.80)	2.71*** (0.81)	0.20 (1.24)	1.17 (1.39)	0.57 (0.58)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.13** (0.05)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.02)
Age		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.01)
Education		0.09** (0.03)	0.12** (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	0.64*** (0.07)
Income		-0.21 (0.13)	-0.21+ (0.12)	-0.46** (0.14)	-0.50*** (0.14)	-1.39*** (0.11)
Trust		0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Membership		0.04 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.18)	0.16 (0.18)	0.11 (0.17)	1.03*** (0.09)
Individualism		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.00)
Population			0.15 (0.15)	0.02 (0.13)	0.07 (0.13)	0.79*** (0.08)
Confucianism				0.44* (0.18)	0.43* (0.17)	-0.29** (0.10)
Industrialization					-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Democracy						-0.09*** (0.01)
N	19,320	14,936	14,936	14,936	14,936	13,870
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-21571.14	-16560.08	-16559.56	-16557.26	-16556.51	-15354.11
Wald Chi-square		110.66	112.79	124.78	129.87	599.86

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 9. Social Capital and Externa Efficacy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-0.89*** (0.09)	-2.46*** (0.58)	-2.41*** (0.61)	-0.99 (1.05)	0.63 (0.89)	0.32 (0.57)
cut2						
Constant	0.43*** (0.09)	-1.09+ (0.58)	-1.03+ (0.61)	0.38 (1.05)	2.00* (0.89)	1.68** (0.57)
cut3						
Constant	1.49*** (0.09)	0.04 (0.58)	0.10 (0.61)	1.51 (1.05)	3.13*** (0.89)	2.81*** (0.57)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.12** (0.05)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Age		-0.02+ (0.01)	-0.02+ (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Education		0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.07)
Income		-0.30** (0.09)	-0.31*** (0.09)	-0.17 (0.12)	-0.24** (0.09)	-0.82*** (0.11)
Trust		0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Membership		0.26** (0.09)	0.23+ (0.14)	0.09 (0.15)	0.01 (0.11)	0.61*** (0.09)
Individualism		-0.01+ (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Population			0.03 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)	0.19* (0.08)	0.66*** (0.08)
Confucianism				-0.25 (0.15)	-0.26* (0.11)	-0.73*** (0.10)
Industrialization					-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Democracy						-0.06*** (0.01)
N	19,331	14,937	14,937	14,937	14,937	13,865
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-22841.50	-17603.01	-17602.97	-17601.83	-17598.03	-16403.86
Wald Chi-square		42.88	43.10	50.96	91.74	534.13

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 10. Social Capital and Satisfaction with Democracy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
cut1						
Constant	-1.70*** (0.07)	-2.62** (0.98)	-3.09** (0.96)	-3.42+ (1.81)	-5.95*** (1.66)	-0.02 (0.59)
cut2						
Constant	-0.52*** (0.07)	-1.38 (0.98)	-1.85+ (0.96)	-2.18 (1.81)	-4.71** (1.66)	1.24* (0.59)
cut3						
Constant	1.27*** (0.07)	0.48 (0.98)	0.02 (0.96)	-0.31 (1.81)	-2.84+ (1.66)	3.10*** (0.59)
Variance Component						
Constant	0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Age		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.02+ (0.01)
Education		-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08+ (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.25** (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)
Income		0.33* (0.16)	0.34* (0.14)	0.31 (0.21)	0.43* (0.17)	0.09 (0.11)
Trust		0.25*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.02)
Membership		-0.16 (0.16)	0.06 (0.21)	0.09 (0.26)	0.21 (0.21)	0.07 (0.10)
Individualism		0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)
Population			-0.25 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.39* (0.15)	-0.22** (0.08)
Confucianism				0.06 (0.27)	0.08 (0.20)	-0.35*** (0.10)
Industrialization					0.00** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Democracy						-0.05*** (0.01)
N	18,998	14,723	14,723	14,723	14,723	13,726
N-Countries	14	11	11	11	11	10
Log Likelihood	-19599.52	-14594.35	-14593.41	-14593.39	-14590.47	-13539.03
Wald Chi-square		153.70	157.19	157.29	172.87	795.24

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

## **Appendix: Variables and Measures**

### **Dependent variable**

#### 1. Generalized Trust

Q23 General speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful?

Q25 General speaking, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that “most people are trustworthy”?

#### 2. Political Trust

Q129 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right?

#### 3. Political Engagement

Q44 How interested would you say you are in politics?

Q45 How often do you follow news about politics and government?

Q47 When you get together with your family members or friends, how often do you discuss political matters?

#### 4. Political Efficacy

Q127 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

Q128 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? People like me don't have any influence over what the government does.

#### 5. Satisfaction with Democracy

Q84 On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?

### **Independent Variable at the Individual Level**

#### 1. Membership

Additive measure on a scale of 0 to 3 using Q20-Q22 Which organization or formal group you belong to?

#### 2. Trust

Q23 General speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful?

### **Independent Variable at the Country Level**

1. Individualism: Hofstede IDV measure from the data “Six dimensions for website.xls,” retrieved from <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix> on July 10, 2016
2. Confucian: dummy variable for six historically Confucian countries that include Taiwan, Korea, Japan, mainland China and Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam.

### **Control Variable at the Individual Level**

1. Female (SE1)
2. Age (SE2)
3. Education (SE4A): years of formal education
4. Income (SE11): monthly household income on a quintile scale

### **Control Variable at the Country Level**



1. Population: common logged population in thousands as of 2003 from the data “Democracy\_TimeSeries\_Data\_January2009\_StataSE.dta,” retrieved from <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm> on July 10, 2016
2. Industrialization: Energy use in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita as of 2013 retried from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE>. The Taiwanese value is from the “Energy.xls” retrieved from [http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/content/ContentLink.aspx?menu\\_id=1540](http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/content/ContentLink.aspx?menu_id=1540) on July 10, 2016
3. Democracy: Polity IV score as of 2014 from the data “p4v2015d.xls” retrieved from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> on July 10, 2016

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