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A Synthetic Analysis of Sources of Democratic  
Legitimacy

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# A Synthetic Analysis of Sources of Democratic Legitimacy

## I. Introduction

This paper explores the explanatory sources of popular orientation toward democracy and its authoritarian alternatives. While both are indispensable for the development of a robust attitudinal foundation for democracy, these two sets of orientation are conceptually and empirically distinguishable. Furthermore, we contend that in most third-wave East Asian democracies, factors that shape people's positive orientation toward democracy are not the same as those molding people's attitudes toward authoritarian alternatives. The former is more likely to be heavily influenced by people's experience living under a real-life democratic regime while the latter is more susceptible to the influences of entrenched political values and beliefs, which are shaped by long-term macro socio-political processes such as regime evolution and cultural shift.

We examine our thesis within a synthetic explanatory framework that takes into account most of existing relevant hypotheses about what causes citizens in emerging democracy to support democracy or reject authoritarian alternatives. These relevant hypotheses can be grouped into four theoretical perspectives: *modernization/postmodernization, institution, rationality, and political culture*. We apply multivariate analysis to a cross-national data set made available by the second-wave Asian Barometer Survey. The survey has so far covered all six third-wave East Asian democracies, namely Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Mongolia, Indonesia and Thailand (before summer 2006). We also include Singapore, a semi-democratic regime, in our analysis for comparative purposes.

## II. The Importance of Democratic Legitimacy in East Asian Context

There are many forces affecting the survival of democracy – elite transactions, economic development, the international environment etc. But democratic legitimacy is one but crucial factor. Beliefs and perceptions about regime legitimacy have long been recognized as critical factors in regime change, bearing particularly on the persistence or breakdown of democracy.

Without question, elite political culture is crucial to democratic consolidation. Unless elites accept the rules and limits of the constitutional system and the

legitimacy of opposing actors who similarly commit themselves, democracy cannot work. But this is not the whole story. Ultimately if democracy is to become stable and effective, the bulk of the citizenry must develop a deep and resilient commitment to it. A necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy is met when an overwhelming proportion of citizens believe that “the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine” (Diamond 1999: 65).

There are strong reasons to believe that this meeting this necessary condition remains a daunting challenge for most East Asian third-wave democracies. Authoritarianism remains a fierce competitor to democracy in East Asia. The region has defied the global movement toward democracy in many important ways. First, there was hardly a region-wide movement toward democratic changes. Twenty-five years after the start of the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991), the bulk of the region still is still governed by various forms of authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes. In 2006, measured in term of political rights and civil liberty developed by the Freedom House, among the eighteen sovereign states and autonomous territories, only seven are ranked “free”. Among the seven, only five, namely the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia and Thailand, became democratized within the time span typically referred to as the third wave of democratization.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, there is no imminent new candidate for entering the rank of liberal democracy at present. The democratic transition in Indonesia is still fraught with uncertainty. Most of the region’s non-democratic regimes, while all have the potential to make a transition to more democratic systems in the long run, are well-positioned to hang on for a while and they appear no more fragile than many of their newly democratized neighbors (Chu 2006). More worrisome is the recent trend of democratic backsliding epitomized in the recent military coup in Thailand. And Thailand is hardly unique. Only months after the Thai military made its move last September, the armed forces in Bangladesh and Fiji also grabbed power. Meanwhile, rulers in Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Pakistan and the Philippines have taken steps to further stymie democratic reform (Kurlantzick 2007).

Second, in the ideological arena, East Asia and Islamic World remain the two notable exceptions to the general observation that “the democratic ideal has become the ‘spirit of the times’ (*zeitgeist*)” (Linz and Stepan 1993: 77-81). Liberal democracy has yet established itself as “the only game in town”, i.e., the predominant mode of legitimation, in the region. The ideological contestants to liberal democracy in the region come from many different social corners and pose serious challenge to some

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<sup>1</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 2005-2006 (New York: Freedom House, 2006)

fundamental principles of liberal democracy from the universality of human rights norms to the conception of rule of law. While the most widely publicized justification for the curtailment of “Western-style” civil and political freedoms in the name of economic development and social harmony in the Western media has been the pronouncements of senior Asian leaders, notably Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, and their supporters, the sustained interest in the Asian values debate among scholars, political activists, leaders of NGOs and social movements in the region suggest that this is no passing intellectual fad nor simply propaganda warfare waged by the region’s autocratic rulers to ward off international scrutiny on their human rights record. The debate involves the criticism that liberal orientation privileges individual autonomy and rights over duties and obligations to others, the interests of society, and social solidarity and harmony. It involves the neo-authoritarian discourse (that once flourished in China’s intellectual circle) over whether democratic or authoritarian regimes are more likely to ensure social stability and economic growth (Edward 2003). It also taps into post-colonial discourses and conflicts between developed and developing states, and within states between the haves and have-nots over issues of distributive justice (Peerenboom 2003).<sup>2</sup>

One should not underestimate the persuasive power of these intellectual (counter) currents because some of the region’s past and present authoritarian regimes did enjoy (at least in the eyes of their citizens) an impressive track record in providing social order and economic security, maintaining the core commitment of the state as a self-conscious institutional actor for articulating and pursuing the public interests, delivering extensive social and economic empowerment, and upholding (limited) rule of law, while some East Asian new democracies are fraught with lingering political malaise. The authoritarian eras under Park Chung Hee of South Korea and that under Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan were still cherished by many. This means some new democracies in East Asian tigers are burdened with authoritarian nostalgia, generating unreasonable high expectation about the performance of new democratic regimes (Chang, Chu and Park 2007). The deplorable contrast between pro-development and efficacious non-democratic states, notably Singapore, Malaysia, and China, and struggling democracies (the Philippines and Indonesia in particular) simply makes the argument that democracy is always preferable under all circumstances less appealing in the eyes of many East Asian citizens.

The adaptability as well as resiliency of China’s communist regime has also made the region’s overall environment much more hospitable for non-democratic

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<sup>2</sup> Most empiricist political scientists are ignorant of the fact these claims have been met by receptive audiences throughout the region and already begun to have profound impact on the international human rights discourse, notably in the areas of group rights, and economic, social and cultural rights (Bauer and Bell 1999: 4-6; Barr 2002: 56-59).

regimes. Over the last two decades, China has exemplified a viable path for growing out of plan economy and has proved (thus far) sequencing political and economic change is possible for transition from communism (Nathan 2003). In East Asia, China's model was widely viewed as superior to the shock treatment that Russia experimented under Yeltsin and carefully studied by its socialist siblings such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and to some extent, North Korea. Thus, in much the same way that China had exported its revolutionary ideas and model to its neighbors during the Cold War, since the early 1980s China initiated its own wave of decommunization in the region and facilitated its neighbors to make a smooth transition from a revolutionary regime to a reconstituted authoritarian regime.

### III. Measuring Democratic Legitimacy

Public opinion plays a crucial role in the study of legitimacy. Regardless of how international donors or academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will be consolidated only when the bulk of the public believes that democracy actually is better for their society and that democracy of an acceptable quality is being supplied. In a nutshell, the citizens are the final judges of the legitimacy as well as the characteristics of their democracy. Public opinion surveys such as Asian Barometer<sup>3</sup> offers a valuable vantage point on whether the citizenry considers that political institutions produce an acceptable degree of democracy and deliver an acceptable level of good governance. In particular, it enables an empirical assessment of the extent of normative commitment to democracy among the public at large and thus tells us much about how far the political system has really traveled toward democratic consolidation.

For many years, students of democracies have relied heavily on a single item for measuring popular support for democracy as a preferred political system. Typically, respondents were asked to choose among three statements: "Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government," "Under some circumstances, an

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<sup>3</sup> The Asian Barometer survey (ABS) represents the region's first collaborative initiative to develop a regional network of democracy studies based on surveying ordinary citizens. Between June 2001 and February 2003, the ABS implemented its first-round comparative survey in eight East Asian countries and territories, namely Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong and China. The ABS launched its second-round survey in October 2005 and its geographical scope was enlarged to cover five more countries in the region. By July 2007 the fieldwork in South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan was completed and the survey in China, Hong Kong, Cambodia and Malaysia are still underway. The ABS survey in Thailand was conducted in June and July of 2006, just two months before the military coup. All ABS data were collected through face-to-face interviews of randomly selected eligible voters in each participating country. Interested readers are welcome to browse the project's website ([www.asianbarometer.org](http://www.asianbarometer.org)) for methodological details.

authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,” and “For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime.” It has been the most widely used item not only for its face validity but also for its availability. But a single-item measurement always suffers from a lack of conceptual breadth and depth, not to mention the familiar problem of yielding lower reliability as compared to multiple indicators.

Like any other complex concept, normative commitment to democracy consists of many attitudinal dimensions. More recently, Richard Rose and Doh Shin and their colleagues have respectively brought our attention to four other important aspects of democratic legitimacy, namely the desire for democracy, the suitability of democracy, the efficacy of Democracy, and the priority of democracy. The desire for democracy refers to the level of democracy where citizens want their current political regime to be. Suitability of democracy refers to the degree of which citizens feel that democracy is appropriate for their country. Efficacy of democracy dwells on the effectiveness of democratic regime in dealing with the country's major problems. Priority of democracy focuses on how important democracy is as compared with other desirable societal objectives. ABS has designed specific items for measuring the four additional dimensions mentioned above and made available a five-item battery for gauging popular support for democracy.

Next, a robust popular base of legitimation entails both widespread and strongly felt attachment to a democratic regime and dwindling support for non-democratic alternatives. Richard Rose and his colleagues have put forward an argument about the competitive justification of democratic regimes. Referring to Winston Churchill's famous line ‘Democracy is the worst form of government except all those forms that have been tried from time to time’, they argued many democracies survive not because a majority of people believes in its intrinsic legitimacy but because there are simply no preferable alternatives. This suggests that authoritarian detachment is as important as attachment to democracy in sustaining a democratic regime. To tap into East Asian citizens' antipathy for non-democratic alternatives in a more systematic way, ABS asked respondents a set of three questions, exploring whether or not they would favor the return to any of the three conceivable authoritarian alternatives: strongman rule, single-party rule, and military rule.<sup>4</sup>

#### IV. Exploring the Sources of Democratic Legitimacy

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<sup>4</sup> The three-item battery was preceded with the following opening statement: "As you know, there are some people in our country who would like to change the way in which our country is governed. We would like to know what you think of their views. For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree." Please see Appendix B for details.

Based on the most widely used single-item measure, the second-round Asian Barometer survey found that the level of popular commitment to democracy in some East Asian newly democratized countries are surprisingly low, as compared with other third wave democracies (Diamond, Chu and Shin 2001; Chang, Chu and Huang 2006). In Spain, Portugal, and Greece more than three-quarters of the mass public say democracy is always preferable under all circumstances, and these overwhelming levels of public support are sustained in survey after survey. In East Asian, only Thailand has reached that level (81.9%). In stark contrast, during the second-round Asian Barometer survey (2005-2007) only 47.9 percent of the public in South Korea and 50.9% in Taiwan thought that democracy is the best form of government, whatever the circumstance, while more than half of the disenchanted citizens in the two socio-economically highly developed countries either support for a possible authoritarian option or indicate difference to democratic vs. non-democratic form of government (see Chart 1). The extraordinary large number of general public who embraced a possible authoritarian option pushed up the region's average among emerging democracies to 36.6 percent, significantly above the averages of three other clusters of third wave democracy (in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa respectively).

[Chart 1 about here]

Based on the battery for measuring detachment from authoritarianism, our survey found that on average, a vast majority (74.4%) of East Asian citizens expressed opposition to civilian dictatorship, disagreeing with the statement, "We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things." A larger majority (84.7%) rejected the option to restore military rule, disagreeing with the statement, "The military should come in to govern the country." More than two-third majority (83.4%) turned down the option of single-party dictatorship, disagreeing with the statement, "No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power." So, one might argue that, on the whole, the new democratic regimes in East Asia are not deemed vulnerable to collapse.

However, the distribution of support for non-democratic alternatives varies significant among items and across countries. In Mongolia, the yearning for a return to strongman rule remains quite strong with only 35.7% of the respondents opposing civilian dictatorship. In the Philippines, antipathy for political intervention by the military remains formidable with less than two third (66.1%) of the people rejecting this alternative. Also, there are considerable potential supporters for military rule in



Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand.

When all three measures are considered jointly, the picture is not very assuring. As Table 1 indicates, in some East Asian countries, less than half of the people rejected all three alternatives. In both Mongolia and the Philippines, the figure is alarmingly low, specifically the former 30.9% and the latter 40.8%. While the seven-country average (63.4%) is slightly higher than the comparable figure (48%) reported by the New Europe Barometer that covered nine Central and Eastern European new democracies (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1999: 116), this is not a very reassuring sign given the fact that most post-Communist countries have suffered much more severe and more protracted economic turmoil.

[Table 1 about here]

This suggests that a systematic understanding of the sources of democratic legitimacy is of critical importance to the understanding the prospect of democratic consolidation in East Asia. We are especially keen in understanding the explanatory sources for detachment from authoritarianism for two reasons. First, authoritarianism remains a fierce competitor to democracy. In many Asian countries, democracy won't be consolidated if a plurality of non-democratic alternatives is yet fully discredited. Second, the existing literature tell us much less about what cause people to detach themselves from authoritarian options than what induce people to develop favorable orientations toward democracy.

Most of the recent theoretical and comparative contributions were devoted to identifying the levels and determinants of favorable orientations toward democratic regime. Also, there are burgeoning efforts to apply sophisticated statistical model to cross-national survey data for winnowing out competing explanatory sources for the acquisition of overtly favorable orientations toward democracy (Rose and Mishler 2003; Bratton and Mattes 2007). Despite of the exemplified works by Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer (1998), students of democratization have not pursued the issue of authoritarian detachment with the same degree of intellectual vigilance as the detachment to democratic regime.

It is open to question that what we have learned so far about what cause (and what inhibit) the growth in overt support for democracy is readily transferable to the question of what cause people to detach themselves from authoritarian arrangements. The two approaches to popular commitment to democratic legitimacy are conceptually distinguishable. Empirically, they do not correlate with each other in many cases (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Shin and Shyu 1997). As Doh Chull Shin explicated the issue in the Korean context, to citizens with little

experience and limited sophistication in democratic politics either democracy or dictatorship may fail to provide satisfying solutions to the many problems facing the people. Confronting such uncertainty, citizens with little democratic experience, more often than not, embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently. Therefore, growth in their pro-democratic orientations does not necessarily bring about a corresponding decline in their antiauthoritarian orientations (Shin and Park 2003).

The second-round Asian Barometer survey simply confirms this observation. In Chart 1, we juxtapose a summary measure of rejecting authoritarian options with one of the most widely-used question for measuring the preferability of democratic regime. The level of unconditional support for democracy, i.e., agreeing with the statement, “Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government” is a poor predictor of the proportion of the people rejecting all three authoritarian options, and vice versa. As a matter of fact, in most cases the two measures move in opposite directions. While Thailand registers the highest level of unconditional support for democracy (81.9%), its comparatively low level of authoritarian detachment (62.5%) made its citizens’ extraordinarily strong overt commitment to democracy look very shallow. However, a stark contrast can be found in other countries; for example, Korean, Taiwanese, and Singaporean respondents registered a very high level of rejecting all non-democratic options (83.4%, 76.7%, and 86.5%) but they didn’t show strong preferability over democracy (only 47.9%, 50.9%, and 63.7%). This perplexing misalignment suggests that both the dynamics of the two orientations and their determinants might be substantially different.

In their initial efforts to tackle the question why people differ in their orientations toward non-democratic alternatives, Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer identified two competing theoretical perspective: performance theories vs. socialization theories (1998: 116-119). According to Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, socialization theories stress fundamental political values and beliefs formed through a lengthy process of socialization begun in childhood (Almond and Verba, 1963). Performance theories by contrast (Rogowski 1974) hypothesize that individuals will support a form of government if they believe that they deliver more satisfactory outcomes than others. The performance criteria are oftentimes defined in materialist terms, e.g., the ability to distribute economic benefits. Yet, performance can also refer to the delivery of political goods, such as absence of political oppression, equal treatment, protection of political rights, and the responsiveness of the leaders. They cautioned us, however, the distinction between the two theoretical perspectives can be overdrawn. Both approaches conceive support for democracy vs. non-democratic forms of government as a product of experience. They differ principally in the

time-frames and in the types of experiences that they regard as most relevant.

They used multiple regression analysis to determine the influence of social structure (as a surrogate measure of the influence of socialization) on detachment from authoritarian alternatives (1998: 138-139). They found out that notwithstanding a plenitude of social structural explanation of political orientations, the six variables -- education, age, gender, embracing national tradition, churchgoing and urbanization -- explain only 5.4% of the total variance in the support for nondemocratic alternatives in the nine post-Communist countries.<sup>5</sup> The one social structural variable with consistently significant influence is education. In contrast, the performance theories demonstrate a much powerful explanatory strength. For rejection of authoritarian alternatives, a set of nine objective and subjective economic measures by themselves accounted for about 14.3% of the variance. A battery of eight political evaluations or affiliations in block-wise regression analysis explains substantially more (19.3%). When this measure of authoritarian detachment is regressed on all these 17 measures simultaneously, five of the political variables and four of the economic prove significant. The two most powerful determinants of support for democracy are political: first, a negative evaluation of the former Communist regime, and next the perception of greater political freedom in the current regime. A third political variable, patience, has about as strong an effect as any economic variable. The patient, who believe it will take years for government to deal with the problems inherited from communist rule, are twice as likely to support democracy as those who are definitely impatient. This pattern of causation holds when objective measures of a country's political context as well as social structure variables are included in a single cross-level regression with 27 variables. Political variables remain the most powerful factors (accounting altogether for more than half of the total variance explained), and of the four objective country variables, the three political measures are each more powerful than the economic one (change in GDP). Social structure shows limited importance. Education and urbanization and two other measures do have a significant impact on the rejection of authoritarian alternatives. However, they argued, the total educative effect of contextual influences, such as experiencing a big increase in freedom with collapse of Communism, is greater than what is learned in school.

Mattes and Bratton (2007) also conducted a systematic investigation into what explains people's detachment from authoritarianism. They tried to advance a learning hypothesis to counter-balance some conventional views of African politics that emphasize the explanatory power of enduring cultural values or people's positions in the social structure. Essentially they argued that Africans form attitudes to democracy

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<sup>5</sup> This summary measure is scaled from +8 to -8 registering strength of reject of or support for four nondemocratic alternatives – abolish parliament, return to Communist rule, army takeover, strong-man rule. See Rose, Mishler, Haerpfer (1998: Appendix A) for details.

based upon what they learn about what it is and does. This learning hypothesis is tested against competing cultural, institutional, and structural theories to explain citizens' demand for democracy with data from 12 Afrobarometer attitude surveys conducted between 1999 and 2001.<sup>6</sup> They employed a multilevel model that specifies and estimates the impacts of both individual- and national-level factors provides evidence of learning from different sources. The single most important individual-level determinant of whether Africans reject non-democratic alternative is the extent to which respondents see a set of political procedures (a scale consisting of majority rule, free speech, regular elections, and multiparty competition) as "essential" elements of democracy. It seems that viewing democracy through a procedural lens sensitizes people to the rights and freedoms they can expect and increases the probability they will reject those regimes that cannot provide such guarantees. They also found that cognitively aware citizens are less likely to defect from democracy

Notwithstanding of the heuristic value of the aforementioned efforts for a systematic understanding of the sources for support for non-democratic alternatives, their respective findings may not be readily transportable to Asian contexts. As a matter of fact, a casual glance at the juxtaposition of a widely-used measure of satisfaction with the way democracy works with the rejection of four authoritarian alternatives makes one wonder to what extent their findings that regime performance exerted much stronger influence than socialization holds up in the East Asian context. As Chart 2 indicates, across the seven cases the two measures hardly correspond to each other. In the cases of Thailand and Mongolia, relative high levels of satisfaction with democracy co-exist with comparatively low level of popular detachment from authoritarianism. In the case of Taiwan and Korea, a depressingly low level of satisfaction with democracy does not seem to have much attenuating influence on the level of popular rejection of authoritarian alternative.

Alternatively, a factor score of democratic vs. authoritarian values, functioning as a key causal link between the influence of life-long socialization process and

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<sup>6</sup> They combined the same three-item battery for measuring rejection of authoritarian alternative that Asian Barometer survey used with the widely-used single-item measurement for preferability of democracy to create a composite measure of "demand for democracy". This label is a bit misleading because this composite measure is essentially measuring detachment from authoritarianism. First, its score is largely a mathematic function of the scores of the three items measuring rejection of authoritarian alternatives. Second, the extracted factor is also largely defined by the three items measuring rejection of authoritarian alternatives, which do not share much commonality with the preferability of democracy. Mattes and Bratton reported that factor analysis of the four items (Maximum Likelihood) extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.01) which explains 50.1% of the common variance with a reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha) = .66. For the three items measuring rejection of authoritarian alternatives the item loadings on the common factor are the following: reject one-man rule (.76), reject military rule (.65) and reject one-party rule (.58). But the item loading of preferability of democracy is very low (.30).

orientation toward non-democratic alternatives, turns out to be a much better predictor of the rejection of authoritarian options at least at the aggregate level (see Chart 3).

[Charts 2 and 3 about here]

Next, we compare the East Asia third-wave democracies with that of Africa over the importance of popular understanding of democracy in explaining popular rejection of authoritarian alternatives. In Chart 4, we found that level of a liberal democratic understanding of democracy<sup>7</sup> does not correspond well to level of detachment from authoritarianism. For instance, Mongolia and South Korea have comparable percentage of respondents holding liberal democratic understanding of democracy but their respective level of detachment authoritarian falls on the two polar ends (see Chart 4).

[Chart 4 about here]

While the four charts provide little direct evidence to befuddle their theoretical claims observed at the individual level, these charts at least call for a careful scrutiny of existing theoretical formulations. We should at least be open to the possibility that both the direction and strength of certain explanatory variables in explaining either the popular commitment to democracy for rejection of non-democratic alternatives may be context-dependent. What one finds in post-Communist societies as well as African societies may not be readily transportable to other regional contexts. To begin with, the causal paths to democratic outcomes in most East Asian third-wave democracies are quite different from either Eastern Europe or Africa. Few new democracies in East Asia grew out of a sudden collapse of the old regime. Instead, the process of authoritarian demise and democratic transition typically unfolded over a long period, stretching over a decade in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea. Next, the life experiences under the authoritarian regime in most East Asian countries were very different from living under either Communist rule or African life-long dictators. Most East Asian emerging democracies were preceded with a pro-growth, market-conforming soft-authoritarian regime and this means that the past authoritarian equilibrium depended mainly, in the words of Adam Przeworski, on

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<sup>7</sup> It is calculated based on a close-ended question which prompt the respondents to pick one of the following four answers as the most essential to a democracy: “opportunity to change the government through elections”, “freedom to criticize those in power”, “a small income gap between rich and poor” and “basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter etc. for everyone”. People who picked one of the first two answers are classified as holding a liberal democratic understanding of democracy.

prosperity and efficiency, rather than “lies and fears”. Also, during the authoritarian years most East Asian emerging democracies had experienced limited pluralism, allowing some forms of electoral contestation as well as the existence of the opposition. As a result, citizens in many East Asian countries may hold a much higher benchmark than citizens in either post-Communist societies or African countries for evaluating the policy performance of the new democracy while their perceived increase in the area of political rights and freedom is not likely to be as big or dramatic as what Eastern Europeans or African experienced.

Lastly, we contend that the explanatory sources for support for democracy may not be identical with that of detachment from authoritarianism. There is little reason to assume that the learning process through which people form their attitudes toward democracy is the same as their experiencing with authoritarian rules. After all, for most East Asian citizens, authoritarian forms of government are no longer present-day practices. They exist only in memory. Therefore it is likely that popular orientation toward authoritarianism is more likely to be influenced by entrenched political values and beliefs, which are shaped by long-term macro socio-political processes such as regime evolution and cultural shift. People’s positive orientation toward democracy, on the other hand, is likely to be more susceptible to their near-term experience living under a real-life democratic regime. Furthermore, from a measurement point of view, there is little empirical evidence supporting the view that the popular commitment to democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives are the two sides of the same coin. Most empirical evidences suggest otherwise (Chang, Chu and Huang 2006). The indicators for the two concepts do not converge on a single underlying construct.

## V. Toward A Synthetic Analysis

Emanating from existing literature, relevant hypotheses about what cause East Asian to support democracy and/or reject authoritarian alternatives can be grouped into at least four theoretical categories: *modernization/postmodernization*, *institution*, *rationality*, and *political culture*. In the following, we briefly review these different approaches. Then we apply block regressions on attitudes of authoritarian detachment as well as support for democracy to compare the explanatory power of the four perspectives and see whether the reasons for people to reject authoritarianism and to support democracy are significantly different. Lastly, the OLS method on the full model of the two dependent variables will be implemented respectively for the seven Asian Barometer datasets. The finding will corroborate that the reasons accounting for people rejecting authoritarianism or supporting democracy are indeed very different and it is questionable to conflate the two concepts as many of the existing literature

has done so far.

### *Modernization and Postmodernization*

Modernization theory has been developing over a century. The central claim of Modernization theory from Karl Marx, Max Weber to Daniel Bell is that economic, cultural and political change go together in coherent patterns that are changing in the world in predictable ways (Inglehart 1997: 7). Modernization theory was understood by some as a variant of structural explanation (Bratton and Mattes 2003) because many Modernization theorists emphasized social mobility and location in modern parts of the social structure as the leading cause of cultural change (Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Pye, 1990). Recent Modernization theorists such as Bell (1973) viewed changes in the structure of workforce as the key factor. He argued that the crucial milestone in the coming of “Postindustrial society” is reached when a majority of the workforce is in the tertiary sector of the economy. While there has been continuing debate over the causal linkages, many empirical findings do support the claim that socioeconomic development generates more modern attitudes and values -- greater tolerance and valuing of freedom, higher levels of political efficacy, greater capacity to participate in politics and civic life (Diamond 1999). The Postmodernization theory developed by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues agree with the Modernization theorists on their central claim but differ from most Modernization theorists on four essential points: change is not linear; economic determinism is oversimplified; the rise of the West is not the only version of Modernization; democracy is not inherent in the Modernization phase but democracy does become increasingly likely as societies move beyond the Modernization phase into Postmodernization (Inglehart 1997: 10-25). Inglehart and his colleagues have accumulated three decades of time-series data to demonstrate an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values, linked with rising levels of economic development (Inglehart 1977, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1999). As economic development brings rising levels of tolerance, trust, political activism, and greater emphasis on freedom of speech (the components of what they defined as “Self-expression values”), it leads to growing mass demands for liberalization in authoritarian societies, and to rising levels of direct mass participation in societies that are already democratic. In so far as Postmaterialists give high priority to protecting freedom of speech and to participation in making important government decisions, this trend should bring growing mass demands for democratization and dwindling demand for authoritarian order. Adherent to the Modernization/Postmodernization perspective, one would predict that intergenerational shift toward greater detachment from authoritarianism comes with fast expansion in education, vast improvement in economic wellbeing and rapid urbanization. People of different

generations have undergone radically different life conditions. In this sense, East Asia provides a fertile social soil for testing the Modernization/Postmodernization theories as most East Asian societies have undergone rapid industrialization over the last three decades and some of the more advanced economies, such as Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, are leapfrogging into post-industrial phase within a compressed time span. For an empirical testing of the Modernization/Postmodernization theses in our multivariate analyses, we focus on the impact of four socio-economic background variables, *education*, *age*, *income*, and *gender* on authoritarian detachment.

### *Institution*

A standard theoretical argument based on Neo-institutionalist perspective would posit that people develop certain orientations toward democracy as well as non-democratic regimes as a *consequence* of the organizing principles of formal and informal institutions: specifically, the incentives, disincentives and habits created by the rules embedded in differing forms of political institutions (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Muller and Seligson, 1994, Norris, 1999; Bratton and Mattes, 2003). Participation in formal procedures like voting, working for parties or candidates, attending election rallies, attending community meetings, joining with others to raise issues or contacting elected leaders can have an educative effect increasing interest and efficacy (Finkel 1987) as well as building support for democracy (Bratton et al, 1999; Finkel, Sabatine and Bevis, 2000). Also, membership in civic organizations may shape build up social capital and cooperative practices and organizational and communicative skills that individuals apply in other and larger political arenas (Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1969; Putnam 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; McDonough, Shin and Moises, 1998; Shin, 1999). The historical institutionalist perspective, in particular, emphasize the socializing effects of institutions in shaping citizens' preference or even identity over time (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). Practicing democracy over time would help citizens develop a new and longer term perspective on judging democracy, based on an appreciation of the intrinsic nature of democracy rather than its consequences.

Since in many East Asian countries institutional channels for voting and other forms of democratic participation in a context of multi-party competition had been in place for a long while even before they became full democratized), their behavioral as well as attitudinal consequences in East Asia should be comparatively more salient than other newly democratized countries, e.g., African and post-Communist countries, where these institutional fixtures are relatively novel. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear if and to what extent the neo-institutionalist arguments about the attitudinal consequence of practicing democracy can be applied to explaining popular



detachment from authoritarianism, which empirically may not always come together with the favorable orientations toward democracy. While the inducement of democratic institutions for the development of favorable orientations toward democratic regime has been demonstrated (Bratton et al, 1999; Finkel, Sabatine and Bevis, 2000; Bratton and Mattes 2003), it remains to be seen if participation in formal procedures and civic organizations made possible by liberal democracy also exerts a visible attenuating effect on citizens' antipathy toward authoritarian regime. We would predict that its attenuating effect if exists at all won't be as strong as its augmenting effect on positive orientation toward democratic regime. For an empirical testing of the Institutionalist theses in multivariate analyses, we focus on the impact of the following variables: index of *electoral participation*, index of *non-electoral participation* (primarily citizen-initiated contact and unconventional participation), *membership in civic organizations*, and *psychological involvement in politics* (political interests and media attention) on authoritarian detachment.

### *Rationality*

Rational choice theory claims that people develop democratic norms because democracy works (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 489). Rational choice theory argues that individual behavior is purposive and based on logic of utility-maximization. People compare the costs and benefits associated with different regimes and align themselves with arrangements that best serve their interests. There are two variants of performance-based explanation for the growth of democratic legitimacy. The neo-classical rational choice theorists privilege "economic goods" while the second variant (the so-called soft-core) rational theorists identify a much broader range of performance criteria. Also, there is a distinction between theorists who emphasize short-term performance and those who highlight the importance of the cumulative experiences of comparing the performances of the political system under different regimes and over time.

### Provision of Economic Goods

Typically, rational choice theory anchored on the neo-classical assumptions defines "interests" in materialist terms, i.e., economic benefits. So, if citizens feel that elected governments fulfill campaign promises of net improvement in economic welfare, support will increase, not only for the government of the day, but also for democracy. If, however, they suffer inflation or unemployment, support will decrease (Bratton and Mattes 2003). In general, rational approaches have focused on people's short term economic evaluations, including their present, past, and future evaluations of micro and macro economic trends (Kitschelt, 1992; Dalton, 1994; Anderson, 1995;

Mattes & Christie, 1997; and Norris, 1999).

In the past, most of the above economic evaluative indicators carried little explanatory weight in the East Asian context because in most countries the distribution of these indicators was quite skewed, heavily concentrating on the optimistic end. However, the timing of our comparative survey provides us with a unique opportunity to examine the strength of popular commitment to democratic norms and procedures under crisis situation. Our survey covers some East Asian economies, e.g., South Korea and Thailand, that were worst affected by the 1997-98 regional economic crisis. It also covers economies, such as Japan and Hong Kong, which have suffered protracted economic downturn and deflation. Incidentally, our survey in Taiwan was synchronized with the island's worst recession (in 2001) in recent memory. We are positioned to examine how the impact of economic crisis felt at the personal level and the perception of the effectiveness and responsiveness of government response to the crisis affect people's overall support for democratic regime and their orientations toward non-democratic alternatives in particular. For an empirical testing of the ration-choice theses emphasizing economic goods, we focus on the impact of the following variables: evaluation of current and past (last five years) ***national economic condition*** and of current and past ***individual economic condition***, on authoritarian detachment.

#### The Provision of Political Goods

While the rational choice approach following the neo-classical tradition focuses on the materialist goods political system delivers, a variant of rational choice approach underscores that citizens in new democracies will use a broader range of performance criteria, factoring in their immediate political conditions as well. Linz and Stepan have shown with regard to Spain and then for other third wave democracies, citizens of a new democracy are able to distinguish between the political and economic dimensions of regime performance. They may come to value democracy for the political goods it produces even when its economic performance is perceived to be poor and costly in the short term (1996: 443). Part of this is owing to the fact that citizens of postcommunist Europe have proven to be more patient and realistic in their time horizons for economic improvement than many observers expected. But much of it owes as well to the real improvements they perceive in what Linz and Stepan call the political basket of goods. For an empirical testing of the utilitarian theses based on the short-term provision of political goods, we focus on the impact of the two sets of variables. The first set measures people's assessment of the overall performance of democracy such as ***satisfied with the way democracy works***, and ***trust in democratic institutions***. The second measures people's evaluation of the

various aspects of “quality of democratic governance”, in particular, *rule of law*, *equality*, and *freedom, and accountability*.

### Regime Comparison

Also, as Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) suggested voters in emerging democracies will draw on a more medium-term calculation comparing relative regime performance of old and new. This is what they call the “Churchill Hypotheses”: regardless of what people think about the performance of the current democratic regime, they will support it if it performs better than its predecessor. Parallel to the earlier discussion of the two variants of rational choice perspective, when people compare regimes they might have different baskets of goods in mind. Some people might compare the performance of the current regime with that of the old regime on the basis of public policy output, such as economic development, law and order, and narrowing the gap between rich and poor. Others might do this on the basis of the provision of political goods, such as responsiveness of government officials, opportunities for political participation, freedom of speech, association and religion, etc. For an empirical testing of the utilitarian theses based on the medium-term comparison of regime performances, we focus on the impact of the following variable: *perceived democratic progress between now and the old regime* on authoritarian detachment.

### *Political Culture*

With the surge in the 1990s of theoretical and empirical attention to the process of democratic consolidation -- and to the growth of mass belief in democratic legitimacy as the core element of this process -- political culture has recovered a central place in the comparative study of democracy (Diamond 1999: 161-162). Like its predecessor of the 1960s, the new generation of political culture approach treats *political culture* as: “a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their country, and the role of the self in that system.” These components of political culture - which may be summarized simply as distinctive predispositions or "orientations to action" (Eckstein 1988; Diamond 1993) -- have been classified into three types of orientations: a *cognitive* orientation, involving knowledge of and beliefs about the political system; an *affective* orientation, consisting of identification with and feelings about the political system; and an *evaluational* orientation, including commitments to political values and judgments (making use of information and feelings) about the legitimacy and performance of the political system relative to those values (Almond and Verba 1963: 15).

However, the new generation of political culture approach differs from some earlier culturalists on two essential points: First, it does away with the notion of “national character”. It does not assume that all social groups in a political system share the same political culture, or that values and beliefs are evenly distributed throughout the population. Elites typically have distinctive values and norms (and invariably, more information about the system), and they often lead the way in large-scale value change. In addition, distinctive types of beliefs and norms may prevail in different institutional settings and different social, regional and ethnic groups within a single country might have different value systems and worldviews. The existence of these *political subcultures* compels us to disaggregate, and to tread with great caution in speaking of *the* political culture of a nation, except as a distinctive mixture or balance of orientations within a country (Diamond 1999: 163). Second, it does away with cultural determinism which suggests that political culture more or less predetermines both political structures and political behavior, and that the elements of political culture are resistant to change over time.<sup>8</sup> The new generation of political approach argues that the degree of culture plasticity is an empirical question.

In the context of rapid socio-economic changes, cognitive, attitudinal, and evaluational dimensions of political culture could be fairly "plastic" and can change quite dramatically in response to regime performance, historical experience, and political socialization. Deeper value and normative commitments have been shown to be more enduring and to change only slowly, in response to profound historical experiences and institutional changes. In the face of enduring shifts in socio-economic conditions, even central parts of culture may be transformed, but they are more likely to change through intergenerational population replacement than by the conversion of already socialized adults (Inglehart 1997: 15).

Thus, the causal linkage among political institution, socio-economic structure and culture should be conceived as reciprocal. Political culture shapes citizens' orientations toward political objects and constraints the way political institutions function. But political culture, in turn, can be shaped and reshaped by a variety of factors over time, including not only political learning from historical experience, institutional change, political socialization but also by broad changes in economic and social structure, international factors (including colonialism and cultural diffusion), and, of course, the functioning and habitual practice of the political system itself. In this sense, the new generation of political culture approach has a strong affinity with the Postmodernization perspective mentioned before and its views on the mechanism of value changes are compatible with historical institutionalism (Steinmo, Thelen and

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<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that Gabriel Almond argues that the cultural determinism stereotype is a distortion of his and other theories about the relationship between political culture and democracy (1983).

Longstreth 1992) as well as what Mike Bratton and Bob Mattes characterized as “political learning approach” (2003).

The new generation of political culture approach has advanced our understanding of how political culture change and democratic development relate to one another. At the macro-level, Inglehart showed that life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and rejection of revolutionary change are highly correlated not only with economic development but with stable democracy, and that "political culture may be a crucial link between economic development and democracy." (2003) At the individual level, internalized political and social values may be the key causal link between structural and institutional changes on the one hand and the formation of particular evaluative judgment on the legitimacy, characters and performance of political regime on the other.

Students of democracy have long identified certain elements of political culture that were conceived necessary, at least highly functional, for the development and maintenance of democracy. It was argued that democracy requires a distinctive set of political values and dispositions from its citizens and in particular political elites: *moderation, tolerance, civility, bargaining, accommodation* and an *overriding commitment to democratic proceduralism*. These values are believed necessary to cope with one of the central dilemmas of democracy, to balance cleavage and conflict with the need for consensus (Almond and Verba 1963: 489-493; Diamond 1990: 56-58). Also essential to a working democracy are an individualist as well as equalitarian disposition toward fellow members of the political community believing in the inalienable rights and "intrinsic worth or dignity" of “every individual,” and a disposition toward authority that is neither "blindly submissive" nor "hostilely rejecting" but rather "responsible... even though always watchful." (Inkeles 1961: 198) An intelligent distrust of its leadership places great emphasis on the need for institutional constraints on the exercise of power, in particular the mechanisms of vertical (popular) and horizontal accountability (separation of power).

In the Asian context, Lucian Pye sees traditional Asian political cultures as generally lacking these orientations of individualism and suspicion of authority. Pye identifies (within the considerable political cultural variation in Asia) common tendencies to emphasize loyalty to the collectivity over individual freedom and needs; to favor paternalistic authority relations and to personalize political power, shun adversary relations, favor order over conflict, mute criticism of authority, and neglect institutional constraints on the exercise of power (1985: 18-19, 22-29, and 326-341). Therefore he views the prospects for liberal, competitive democracy in Asia as limited. While Pye may impute more staying power to political culture orientations than is warranted, he offers a particularly lucid theoretical expression of the compatibility

between democracy and core elements of political culture, and of the way institutional forms like democracy may operate differently in different cultural contexts (Diamond 1999).

Identifying five key dimensions of authoritarian (or anti-democratic) dispositions toward fellow citizens and authority, Fu Hu, Yun-han Chu, Huo-yan Shyu and their colleagues has tracked down the evolution of political culture over more than two decades, covering the entire span of Taiwan's regime transition, from the weakening of authoritarianism to the completion of democratic transition (Hu and Chu 1994; Shin and Shyu 1998; Chu and Chang 2002). They found that the acquisition of pro-democratic value orientations along the five dimensions – *political equality, popular accountability (or popular sovereignty), political liberalism, political pluralism and separation of power (or horizontal accountability)* -- has been uneven suggesting the lingering influence of traditional values. Support for political equality was high from the beginning, and endorsement of popular sovereignty rose dramatically from 1984 to 1993 (as did belief in political pluralism, even though it remained rather low). Their data also show that by late 1990s substantial segments of Taiwan's public still manifest the fear of disorder and the preference for communal harmony over individual freedom that Pye takes to be generally characteristic of Asian attitudes toward power and authority. Yet, they also note that the generally steady increase since democratization began in the mid-1980s in the proportions of the public expressing pro-democratic value orientations - and rejecting the paternalistic, collectivist, illiberal norms associated with the Asian values perspective.

Doh Shin applied a smaller set of the same battery of authoritarian vs. democratic values. He also found positive signs of democratic value change in Korea. At the same time, the ambivalence in Koreans' support for democracy is underscored by their responses to several questions to assess public attitudes toward political pluralism and horizontal accountability (Shin 1999; Shin and Shyu 1998). Overall speaking, their research confirm that in Taiwan and South Korea the steady growth, albeit unevenly, in liberal democratic value orientations – was driven over time both by modernization and by political liberalization. Their findings contradict earlier culturalist notions of a stable political culture rooted in traditional values and reproduced through early socialization experience.

If social and political values do function as the crucial causal link between structural and institutional changes on the one hand and the citizens' orientation toward authoritarian alternatives on the other, we would expect that the observed effects of demographical variables on the rejection of authoritarian alternatives would attenuate if not disappear once we control for social and political values. For an empirical testing the political culture theses, we designed two sets of battery

measuring *traditionalism* and *democratic orientation* respectively. The first battery tapping into the prevailing traditional social values in East Asia societies that stressed filial piety, familism, gender-based deference, avoidance of open conflict and conformity with group norms. The EAB battery for measuring democratic vs. authoritarian value orientation is based on Fu Hu's original formulation of the five dimensions. For the sake of space, we elaborate the conceptual formulation of the five dimensions in *Appendix A*. In additions, we add two extra items to measuring people's *belief in procedural norms of liberal democracy*, and the attitude toward *priority of democracy over economic development*, both of which are believed to be necessary or conducive to democracy.

## VI. Determinants of Popular Attitudes toward Democracy and Its Authoritarian Alternatives

Based on the foregoing discussion, we identify a cluster of indicators that correspond to the key concepts identified by each of four theoretical perspectives. In most cases, we calculate the arithmetic sum of component indicators to create multi-item indices based on the simple rule of equal weight. Please refer to *Appendix B* for details.

In order to confirm the explanatory power of the four competing perspectives on authoritarian detachment as well as support for democracy, we perform the multivariate analysis in four steps. As the first step, we regressed the level of objection to authoritarian alternatives and support for democracy on different clusters of explanatory variables using block-wise ordinary least squared multiple regression. We did this for each of the seven countries under investigation.<sup>9</sup> Table 2 and 3 reports cumulative R-square for the block of variables representing each theoretical approach. From these two tables, we can draw five quick conclusions: First, the groups of variables having strongest impact on authoritarian detachment is political culture (R-square is 0.079 on average) while rationality, specifically performance of democratic regime, have the most explanatory power on support for democracy (R-square is 0.046 on average). Second, among the four theoretical explanations institution have significantly weaker explanatory power than the other three set of

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<sup>9</sup> It should be noted here that the cumulative effects of the large number of variables and significant proportions of "don't know" responses across most attitudinal questions meant that typical list wise deletion methods would result in loss of an unacceptably large number of cases from the analysis. Moreover, recent analyses have demonstrated that such procedures produce biased estimates (King et al, 2001). In general, we recoded "don't know" and other not applicable answers as "missing" and use Mplus 4.2 to conduct scaling or regressions with missing-value function (specifically the syntax: TYPE =GENERAL MISSING). For the details of Mplus program's methodology, please consult the Mplus website at <http://www.statmodel.com/ugexcerpts.shtml>.

variables on both authoritarian detachment and support for democracy.

Third, the most consistent explanatory variables on authoritarian detachment across seven countries are education, perceived democratic progress, the quality of democratic governance (especially the dimension of rule of law), detachment from traditionalism, and democratic orientation. But a very different combination emerges when the same model applies to explain support for democracy with psychological involvement in politics, overall satisfaction with democratic regime, rule of law, personal economic condition-past five years, perceived democratic progress, and priority of democracy over economic development become major predictors.

Fourth, while rationality accounts for both of authoritarian detachment and support for democracy, quality of governance, which refers to provision of political goods that democracy promises, plays a more important role to explain why people detach from authoritarianism; however, it is the provision of the short-term political goods, the overall performance of democratic regime, having strongest explanatory power on support for democracy. Finally, provision of economic goods only has very marginal effects on both dependent variables.<sup>10</sup> This finding further narrows down the composition of the rationality explanations as people reject authoritarianism or embrace democracy more for its perceived capacity in delivering desired political goods rather than economic ones.

[Table 2 about here]

[Table 3 about here]

It is somewhat surprising that democratic practices (participation) or social engagements, evaluations of government performance, and national or personal economic conditions have only a slight impact on our dependent variable across all seven samples. Detachment from authoritarianism appears to be best accounted for by social and political values. In our seven samples, social and political values explain 5.3 to 13.8 percent of the variance in authoritarian detachment. These findings are very different from studies of Eastern Europe and Africa (Bratton and Mattes, 2003; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Whitefield and Evans, 1999). They found political culture a weaker predictor for the demand for democracy. However, the puzzle is soon clarified when we apply a fully-specified model which indicates that support for democracy depend more on performance-based variables than political or social values.

Table 4 and 5 reports the result of the regression analysis including all blocks of

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<sup>10</sup> While the variable “personal economic condition-past five years might” does have significant explanatory power on support for democracy in five of the countries samples, the standardized beta coefficient is relatively smaller than other significant predictors and the sign of the coefficients is not consistent, either. It is the most marginal variables of the six that do account for support for democracy.



variables.<sup>11</sup> First, there are considerable differences in how well the model fits each sample. With regard to authoritarian detachment, our model fits well in Mongolia (R-square is 0.176) and Taiwan (R-square is 0.181). In Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore, the fit is reasonably good that the explained variance is between 0.112 and 0.140. However, in Korea and Thailand the fit is less than ideal (R-square is 0.081, and 0.087, respectively). As to support of democracy, the explained variance is between 0.113 and 0.163 and it does not vary much among the seven country samples except for the case of Philippines in which the R-square is only 0.081.

Second, we can also see that dependent variables have different causal roots. To explain the rejection of authoritarian alternatives, the most powerful predictor is democratic orientation in Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore (Beta=0.187, 0.225, 0.182, and 0.199, respectively), but it is detachment from traditionalism in Mongolia, Philippines, and Thailand (Beta=0.198, 0.106, and 0.162, respectively). This finding indicates that political culture is indeed the most powerful explanation since both predictors are related to social and political values.

If we replace the dependent variable with support for democracy, the most powerful predictors are no longer related to political culture but related to rationality explanation as follows: it is overall satisfaction with democratic regime in Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia (Beta=0.185, 0.180, and 0.159), it is perceived democratic progress in Mongolia and Thailand (Beta=0.168 and 0.184), and it is perceived quality on “rule of law” dimension in Philippines, and Singapore (Beta=0.119 and 0.142). People’s experiencing with the real-life democracy instead of political culture can better explain why people support democracy.

In the context of multivariate analysis, a perplexing result is that no consistent relationship can be concluded for the causal linkage of rationality predictors and authoritarian detachment. Across the seven East Asian countries, respondents who judge policy performance to have improved are not necessarily object or tolerate authoritarian alternatives. For example, those who think the government is doing a good job to maintain the rule of law are more likely to reject authoritarian politics in Korea and Singapore, but their counterparts in Mongolia are more likely to tolerate authoritarianism. A similar result happened when we focus on the relationship between accountability and authoritarian detachment in Thailand and Indonesia. People who believe they have power to change the government they don’t like are more likely to reject authoritarianism in Thailand but they are more likely to accommodate authoritarianism in Indonesia. Overall, there is no strong and consistent

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<sup>11</sup> In additions to the results we reported in Table 4 and 5. We conduct other analyses to include the variable “understanding of democracy” as the controlled variable. The results indicate that understanding of democracy consistently do not have explanatory power in most of the countries. For the sake of simplicity, we do not report these results.

explanatory variable except predictors of political culture that can account for detachment from authoritarianism.

It is very intriguing to compare the multivariate analysis of support for democracy with the finding above-mentioned. If we carefully examine the relationship between rationality predictors and support for democracy, the beta coefficients are much bigger and more consistent in terms of significance level. At least four predictors significantly have positive relationships in five or above East Asian countries: overall satisfaction with democratic regime, trust in democratic institution, perceived democratic progress, and rule of law. The only non-rationality predictor having a significant beta-coefficient in five countries is psychological involvement in politics, which indicates people who are interested in politics are usually more supportive of democracy. Other than that, no consistent predictor except predictors of rationality can explain support for democracy.

We can easily conclude the above finding that the reason behind people's rejection of authoritarianism and support of democracy are quite different and the major difference is that authoritarian detachment is largely driven by the persistence as well as change in political culture, but support of democracy depend much more people's experiencing with the various aspects of regime performance and its capacity in delivering desired political goods. While there is no denying that this conclusion oversimplifies the richness of the particularistic findings in each country sample, it is remarkable to corroborate the argument that rejection of authoritarianism doesn't automatically assume a semantic identity to support for democracy. In fact, it is much easier to support democracy than to stand firm on rejecting authoritarian alternatives since the former can be driven by relatively short-term factors of government performance but the latter needs a long time to cultivate a mature social and political value system.<sup>12</sup>

## VI. Conclusion

Popular support for democracy in emerging democracies depends on a majority of their citizenry who not only accept it but also reject its authoritarian and other non-democratic alternatives. The extraordinary large number of general public who embraced a possible authoritarian option in some East Asian new democracy suggests

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<sup>12</sup> In this paper, we focus on finding systematical explanations of detachment from authoritarianism and support for democracy and then compare the similarity and difference of the general explanatory patterns. We fully acknowledge that in so doing we might cause the problem of oversimplification and leave out the richness of the findings in individual countries. The task of sorting out why each country has different explanatory patterns will be fulfilled in another future paper.

that authoritarianism remains a fierce competitor to democracy in the region. A systematic understanding of the sources of authoritarian detachment is of critical importance to the understanding the prospect of democratic consolidation. This is probably true everywhere but more so in East Asia. Democracy persists when and only when there is no viable authoritarian option.

The transformation of both orientations was driven over time both by modernization and by political liberalization. But what we have learned so far about what cause (and what inhibit) the growth in overt support for democracy is not readily transferable to the question of what cause people to detach themselves from authoritarian arrangements. Growth in their pro-democratic orientations does not necessarily bring about a corresponding decline in their antiauthoritarian orientations. The determinants favorable orientations toward democratic regime are not identical with the explanatory sources of authoritarian detachment. While our analysis does not support the earlier culturalist notions of a stable political culture rooted in traditional values and reproduced through early socialization experience, it does lent support to the theoretical claims made by the new generation of political culture theorists.

However, the cultural variables do not exert as much impact on popular support for democracy as trust in democratic institutions and people's assessment of quality of democracy. This means that the lesson is not that East Asian cultures preclude liberal democracy from taking roots but that their young democracies must win citizens' support through better performance. If most East Asia's democracies are still wrestling with a fragile and fluid foundation of popular support, it is primarily because people's disenchantment with the gap between the promises and the realities of democracy is growing.

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
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
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*Tables and Charts*

**Chart 1 Perferability of Democracy vs. Detachment from Authoritarianism**




**Chart 2 Satisfaction with Democracy and Detachment from Authoritarianism**






**Chart 3 Democratic Orientation and Detachment from Authoritarianism**



**Chart 4 Understanding of Democracy and Detachment from Authoritarianism**



## *Appendix A*

According to Fu Hu's original formulation (1998), the organizing principle of a political regime consists of three basic dimensions: 1) The legitimate power relationship among members of the political community. 2) The legitimate power relationship between the authorities and citizens. 3) The legitimate power relationship among the government authorities themselves. The value orientation toward ***political equality*** corresponds to the first dimension. It is a set of belief that all member of the political community should be equal and entitled to the same citizen rights regardless race, gender, education, religion, class, social-economic background, political affiliation, and etc. In contrast, in some society a majority of people believe in a hierarchical and/or exclusionary order than an equalitarian/inclusionary political order, and it is widely accepted as legitimate that certain groups are privileged and others should and can be disfranchised or discriminated against. The value orientation toward ***separation of power*** corresponds to the third dimension. It is a set of belief that governing authority should be divided among various branches of government and a good-order polity is achieved through a design of check-and-balance (horizontal accountability). In contrast, in many societies people may believe in the necessity and the desirability of the supremacy of executive power or the fusion of legislative, executive and judicial authority. The value orientation toward ***political liberty, pluralism*** and ***popular sovereignty*** corresponds to the second dimension. The second dimension should be tapped by more than one set of belief because conceptually it can be subdivided into three subdimensions: 1) The value orientation toward political liberty is a set of belief that there are certain legitimate realm of individual liberty which should be free from state intrusion and regulation; 2) The value orientation toward pluralism is a set of belief that there should be a legitimate realm of civil society in which the civic organizations can freely constitute and congregate themselves in an ensemble of arrangements for expressing themselves and advancing their interests without state interference, and lastly, 3) The value orientation toward popular accountability refers to a set belief that government authority should be accountable to the people and that there should be some effective means for popular control and consent. In contrast, in some societies people might belief that the realm of individual liberty should be suppressed to the minimum, civil society must be subject to state guidance and control, and the assertion of popular control over authority is unacceptable and even dangerous. Thus, we build our measures of legitimacy orientation toward regime around five essential elements of democratic norms, in Professor Hu Fu's original formulation (1998) the five dimensions of

democratic value-orientation towards power<sup>13</sup>:

1. Political equality
2. Popular accountability
3. Political liberty
4. Political pluralism
5. Separation of power (horizontal accountability)

What distinguish our approach from others (Booth and Seligson, 1986; Dalton, 1991) is that we don't think the best measurement strategy is to state these principles in an abstract and straight-forward way. Because indicators constructed this way won't be very discerning, and one tends to get uniform positive answer. In this sense, legitimacy orientation is not a set of political ideals, and the belief in democratic legitimacy becomes conceptually separable from support for democratic ideal.

We recognize that most modern authoritarian regimes don't challenge (or repudiate) these democratic norms in principle; rather, the lines of defense for an authoritarian arrangement (or the lines of subtle offense against democratic norms) typically fall into one of the two camps:

1) The *Desirability Argument*. The country should develops a different form of democracy (people's democracy, Chinese democracy, socialist democracy, guided democracy) which best suits herself and which might be superior to Western democracy.

2) The *Feasibility Argument*. The country is not ready for a full democracy (because lack of a civic culture; low level of socio-economic modernization; in conflict with other national development priorities, and/or imminent external threat). If the country had acquired Western democracy before its time, the society would pay a high price in terms of inefficiency, insecurity, and disorder.

To construct a valid scale, essentially we combine two analytical tasks in one. Our scale enables us not only to measure the popular commitment to democratic norms but to identify a cluster of mass belief and attitudes that are typically nurtured under authoritarian or anti-democratic regimes. They are more compatible with the authoritarian arrangements and are inimical to the development of democratic values and institutions. In short, it serves as a multi-dimensional scale for the measurement of pro-authoritarian legitimacy orientations and conversely pro-democratic values at the same time.

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<sup>13</sup> The principle of majority rule is not explicitly included in our conceptual formulation. If Arend Lijphart (1984) is correct, then the majoritarian rule is not a first-order principle of Western democracy, or at least it is always qualified by the respect for minority and requirement of consensus.

## Appendix B

Variables	Questionnaire	Items
<b>1.Socio-Economic Background</b>		
	se002	Gender
	se003a	Age
	se005	Education
	seII9a	Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs?
<b>2.Institution Influences</b>		
<b>Electoral participation</b>		<i><b>Index is the sum of q038, q040, and q041. Values range from 0 (no participation) to +3 (full participation)</b></i>
	q038	Have you voted in the last election?
	q040	Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally
	q041	Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?
<b>Non-electoral participation</b>		<i><b>Index is the sum of q079, q081, and q082. Values range from 0 (no participation) to +3 (full participation)</b></i>
	q079	Have you contacted any government official
	q081	Have you contacted elected legislative representatives
	q082	Have you contacted political parties
<b>Membership in organizations</b>	Recoded from q20~22	Are you a member of any organization or formal groups?
<b>Psychological involvement in politics</b>		<i><b>Index is the average of q056 and q057. Values range from +1 (not involved) to +4 (very involved)</b></i>

	q056	How interested would you say you are in politics?
	q057	How often do you follow news about politics? (Taiwan and Hong Kong use q057a)
<b>3.Performance of Democratic Regime</b>		
<b>Overall satisfaction with democratic regime</b>	q098	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country. Are you ...?
<b>Trust in democratic institutions</b>		<b><i>Index is the factor score of q008, q009, q010, q014, and q016. Values range from -0.949 (distrust) to +0.864 (trust)</i></b>
	q008	How much trust you have in the national government [in capital city]?
	q009	How much trust you have in political parties [not any specific party]?
	q010	How much trust you have in parliament?
	q014	How much trust you have in local government?
	q016	How much trust you have in television?
<b>4.Quality of Governance</b>		
<b>Rule of law</b>		<b><i>Index is the factor score of q104, q113, q115, q120, q43, q114, q112, q107, q115, and q116. Values range from -0.804 (do not have the rule of law) to +0.864 (have the rule of law)</i></b>
	q104	Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.
	q113	How often do national government officials abide by the law?
	q115	How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?
	q120	In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?
	q43	On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?
	q114	How often do your think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different

		parties/candidates?
	q112	How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?
	q107	When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.
	q115	To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?
	q116	How well do you think the government responds to what people want?
<b>Equality</b>		<b><i>Index is the average of q108 and q109.</i></b> <b><i>Values range from +1 (do not have equality) to +4 (do have equality)</i></b>
	q108	Everyone is treated equally by the government
	q109	People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter
<b>Freedom</b>		<b><i>Index is the average of q110 and q111.</i></b> <b><i>Values range from +1 (do not have freedom) to +4 (do have freedom)</i></b>
	q110	Everyone is free to say what they think./ People are free to speak what they think without fear
	q111	People can join any organization they like without fear
<b>Accountability</b>	q103	People have the power to change a government they don't like
<b>5.Economic Conditions</b>		
<b>National economic condition-today</b>	q001	How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?
<b>National economic condition–past five years</b>	q002	How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the past five years?
<b>Personal economic condition-today</b>	q004	As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?
<b>Personal economic condition–past five years</b>	q005	How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was five years ago?
<b>6.Regime Comparison</b>		

<b>Perceived democratic progress</b>		<b><i>Index is the difference in perception between current regime and past regime. Values range from -9 (much worse) to +9 (much better)</i></b>
	q095	Where would you place our country on this scale during the period of [name of the most recent government under authoritarian rule], where 1 stands for complete dictatorship and 10 stands for complete democracy?
	q096	Where would you place our country under the present government?
<b>6.Social and Political Value</b>		
<b>Detachment from traditionalism</b>		<b><i>Index is the factor score of q56, q57, q65, q73. Values range from -0.913 (traditional) to +0.651 (modern)</i></b>
	q056	Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.
	q057	Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher
	q065	People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with them
	q073	The best way to deal with complicated political issues should be to leave them to the future
<b>Democratic orientation</b>		<b><i>Index is the factor score of q134 and q141. Values range from -0.729 (authoritarian) to +0.842 (democratic)</i></b>
	q134	Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.
	q135	The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.
	q136	Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.
	q137	When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch
	q138	If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

	q139	If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.
	q140	If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.
	q141	When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.
<b>Belief in procedural norms of democracy</b>	q77	The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedure.
<b>Priority of democracy over economic development</b>	q123	If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?
<b>6. Detachment from Authoritarianism</b>		
		<b><i>Index is the factor score of q124, q125, and q126. Values range from -1.094 (accept authoritarianism) to +0.223 (reject authoritarianism)</i></b>
	q124	We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things
	q125	Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office
	q126	The army should come in to govern the country
<b>7. Support for Democracy</b>		
		<b><i>Index is the factor score of q97, q98, q121, and q122. Values range from -1.385 (do not support democracy) to +0.396 (support democracy)</i></b>
	q97	To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now?
	q98	Which would you think democracy is suitable for our country?
	q121	Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government
	q122	Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society



**Table 1: Distribution of Authoritarian Detachment Across Seven East Asian Societies**

**Percentage Rejecting Authoritarian Options (%)**

Question Items **	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	Seven Country Average
<b>1. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.</b>	87.3	35.7	60.3	82.0	75.9	89.5	90.1	74.4
<b>2. The army should come in to govern the country.</b>	95.1	87.4	75.0	93.4	78.4	67.7	95.7	84.7
<b>3. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.</b>	92.5	72.7	66.1	88.1	80.5	91.4	92.2	83.4
<b>Reject all authoritarian options</b>	83.4	30.9	40.8	76.7	62.5	62.8	86.5	63.4
<b>Accept only one option</b>	10.8	42.6	29.3	13.9	20.1	26.7	7.4	21.7
<b>Reject none of above</b>	2.3	6.7	10.1	2.4	9.3	2.6	2.0	5.1
<b>Factor score (-1.094 to +223)*</b>	0.07 (0.33)	-0.35 (0.45)	-0.31 (0.50)	0.01 (0.38)	-0.11 (0.46)	-0.04 (0.36)	0.09 (0.33)	-0.09 (0.43)

\*Factor score is formulated by categorical factor analysis implemented by Mplus 4.2. Figures in Parentheses are standard deviation. Due to skewness of the responses in the three items, the minimum and maximum of the factor score is -1.094 and 0.223, respectively.

**Table 2 Explanatory Sources of Objection to Authoritarian Alternatives (Blockwise Regression)**

	Korea (Beta)	Mongolia (Beta)	Philippines (Beta)	Taiwan (Beta)	Thailand (Beta)	Indonesia (Beta)	Singapore (Beta)
<b>Socio-Economic Background</b>							
Education	0.101 **	0.191 ***	0.100 ***	0.184 ***	0.045	0.214 ***	0.080 *
Income	0.065 *	0.053	0.047	0.096 ***	-0.040	0.000	0.159 ***
Age	0.047	0.012	0.024	-0.033	-0.013	-0.049	-0.015
Gender	0.025	-0.141 ***	-0.019	-0.077 **	-0.028	-0.038	-0.005
R-Square (Average: 0.037; Single Item Average:0.009)	0.012	0.059	0.014	0.072	0.004	0.055	0.041
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Institution Influences</b>							
Electoral participation	-0.040	0.032	-0.046	-0.014	-0.064 *	-0.023	0.042
Non-electoral participation	-0.025	0.014	-0.064 *	0.007	-0.006	0.125 ***	0.055
Membership in organizations	-0.020	-0.041	0.050	0.012	0.062 *	-0.089 ***	0.006
Psychological involvement in politics	0.022	0.099 **	0.005	0.164 ***	0.047	0.061 *	0.040
R-Square (Average: 0.013; Single Item Average:0.003)	0.003	0.013	0.008	0.027	0.009	0.024	0.008
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ . Program: Mplus 4.2.

**Table 2 Cont.**

	<b>Korea</b> (Beta)	<b>Mongolia</b> (Beta)	<b>Philippines</b> (Beta)	<b>Taiwan</b> (Beta)	<b>Thailand</b> (Beta)	<b>Indonesia</b> (Beta)	<b>Singapore</b> (Beta)
<b>Performance of Democratic Regime</b>							
Overall satisfaction with democratic regime	0.081 **	0.007	-0.049	0.053 *	-0.001	0.011	-0.029
Trust in democratic institutions	-0.052	-0.073 *	-0.012	-0.160 ***	-0.021	-0.103 ***	0.037
R-Square (Average: 0.007; Single Item Average:0.004)	0.008	0.005	0.003	0.024	0.000	0.010	0.002
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Quality of Governance</b>							
Rule of law	0.091 **	-0.161 ***	-0.090 **	0.017	-0.068 *	-0.061 *	0.052
Equality	-0.052	-0.064 *	-0.166 ***	-0.176 ***	-0.027	-0.091 ***	-0.006
Freedom	-0.018	-0.032	-0.053	-0.005	-0.089 **	0.069 **	-0.144 ***
Accountability	0.008	-0.075 **	-0.045	0.056 *	0.084 **	-0.101 ***	0.051
R-Square (Average: 0.031; Single Item Average:0.008)	0.009	0.052	0.057	0.030	0.020	0.026	0.020
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Economic Conditions</b>							
National economic condition-today	-0.001	-0.154 ***	-0.129 ***	-0.025	-0.016	-0.005	-0.012
National economic condition-past five years	-0.023	0.049	-0.061	-0.089 **	-0.003	0.024	-0.009
Personal economic condition-today	0.036	0.028	0.000	0.125 ***	-0.027	0.045	0.078 *
Personal economic condition-past five years	0.052	-0.036	0.006	-0.034	-0.030	-0.020	0.029
R-Square (Average: 0.013; Single Item Average:0.003)	0.006	0.024	0.025	0.023	0.004	0.002	0.008
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ . Program: Mplus 4.2.

**Table 2 Cont.**

	<b>Korea</b> (Beta)	<b>Mongolia</b> (Beta)	<b>Philippines</b> (Beta)	<b>Taiwan</b> (Beta)	<b>Thailand</b> (Beta)	<b>Indonesia</b> (Beta)	<b>Singapore</b> (Beta)
<b>Regime Comparison</b>							
Perceived democratic progress	0.088 **	0.100 ***	-0.035	0.059 *	0.017	0.154 ***	0.102 *
R-Square (Average: 0.008; Single Item Average:0.008)	0.008	0.010	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.024	0.010
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Social and Political Values</b>							
Detachment from traditionalism	0.023	0.271 ***	0.150 ***	0.125 ***	0.170 ***	0.144 ***	0.018
Democratic orientation	0.185 ***	0.104 ***	0.132 ***	0.280 ***	0.094 **	0.209 ***	0.208 ***
Belief in procedural norms of democracy	0.083 *	-0.014	0.040	0.036	0.035	-0.033	0.051
Priority of democracy over economic development	0.034	0.090 **	-0.070 *	0.071 **	0.043	-0.049	-0.015
R-Square (Average: 0.079; Single Item Average:0.020)	0.053	0.100	0.063	0.138	0.063	0.081	0.054
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ . Program: Mplus 4.2.

**Table 3 Explanatory Sources of Support for Democracy (Blockwise Regression)**

	Korea (Beta)	Mongolia (Beta)	Philippines (Beta)	Taiwan (Beta)	Thailand (Beta)	Indonesia (Beta)	Singapore (Beta)
<b>Socio-Economic Background</b>							
Education	0.059	0.008	0.068 *	0.093 **	0.005	0.153 ***	-0.002
Income	0.044	0.065 *	-0.074 *	0.092 ***	0.010	0.013	-0.028
Age	-0.010	-0.016	0.041	0.015	-0.004	0.085 **	-0.029
Gender	0.054	-0.024	-0.002	-0.052 *	-0.095 ***	-0.005	-0.025
R-Square (Average: 0.012; Single Item Average:0.003)	0.009	0.005	0.008	0.025	0.009	0.026	0.002
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Institution Influences</b>							
Electoral participation	-0.033	-0.027	0.002	-0.006	-0.013	0.009	-0.007
Non-electoral participation	-0.019	-0.022	0.000	-0.017	-0.010	0.070 *	-0.049
Membership in organizations	-0.023	0.079 *	0.045	-0.017	0.019	-0.038	-0.015
Psychological involvement in politics	-0.027	0.067 *	0.117 ***	0.130 ***	0.134 ***	0.111 ***	0.100 **
R-Square (Average: 0.014; Single Item Average:0.003)	0.004	0.010	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.021	0.011
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ . Program: Mplus 4.2.

**Table 3 Cont.**

	Korea (Beta)	Mongolia (Beta)	Philippines (Beta)	Taiwan (Beta)	Thailand (Beta)	Indonesia (Beta)	Singapore (Beta)
<b>Performance of Democratic Regime</b>							
Overall satisfaction with democratic regime	0.263 ***	0.145 ***	0.068 *	0.264 ***	0.065 *	0.184 ***	0.139 ***
Trust in democratic institutions	0.028	0.062 *	0.002	0.062 *	0.220 ***	0.041	0.095 **
R-Square (Average: 0.046; Single Item Average:0.023)	0.072	0.028	0.005	0.082	0.061	0.039	0.037
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Quality of Governance</b>							
Rule of Law	0.241 ***	-0.032	0.127 ***	0.214 ***	0.213 ***	0.111 ***	0.186 ***
Equality	0.048	0.004	0.070 *	-0.003	-0.042	-0.004	-0.023
Freedom	-0.084 **	0.034	0.038	0.075 **	0.061 *	0.108 ***	-0.053
Accountability	0.060 *	0.034	0.013	0.081 **	0.063 *	0.014	0.075 *
R-Square (Average: 0.041; Single Item Average:0.010)	0.067	0.003	0.030	0.074	0.053	0.025	0.035
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Economic Conditions</b>							
National economic condition-today	0.042	0.009	0.104 **	0.104 ***	0.080 **	0.057 *	0.002
National economic condition-past five years	0.024	0.057	-0.042	0.053	-0.031	0.021	0.066
Personal economic condition-today	-0.062	0.012	0.011	0.043	0.042	-0.009	-0.062
Personal economic condition-past five years	0.101 *	0.017	-0.066 *	0.058 *	0.064 *	0.047	0.077 *
R-Square (Average: 0.014; Single Item Average:0.003)	0.011	0.005	0.012	0.032	0.018	0.008	0.011
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ . Program: Mplus 4.2.

**Table 3 Cont.**

	<b>Korea</b> (Beta)	<b>Mongolia</b> (Beta)	<b>Philippines</b> (Beta)	<b>Taiwan</b> (Beta)	<b>Thailand</b> (Beta)	<b>Indonesia</b> (Beta)	<b>Singapore</b> (Beta)
<b>Regime Comparison</b>							
Perceived democratic progress	0.171 ***	0.206 ***	0.134 ***	0.163 ***	0.227 ***	0.189 ***	0.127 ***
R-Square (Average: 0.031; Single Item Average:0.031)	0.029	0.042	0.018	0.026	0.051	0.036	0.016
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012
<b>Social and Political Values</b>							
Detachment from traditionalism	0.044	0.079 *	0.053	0.054	-.048	0.057 *	0.003
Democratic Orientation	0.131 ***	0.065 *	-0.066 *	0.049	-0.143 ***	0.021	0.019
Belief in procedural norms of Democracy	-0.013	-0.023	-0.024	-0.080 **	-0.025	0.038	-0.031
Priority of democracy over economic development	0.083 **	0.195 ***	0.016	0.157 ***	0.081 **	0.068 *	0.113 **
R-Square (Average: 0.026; Single Item Average:0.006)	0.030	0.051	0.006	0.035	0.032	0.012	0.014
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ . Program: Mplus 4.2.

**Table 4 OLS Estimates of Explanatory Sources of Objection to Authoritarian Alternatives**

	Korea (Beta)	Mongolia (Beta)	Philippines (Beta)	Taiwan (Beta)	Thailand (Beta)	Indonesia (Beta)	Singapore (Beta)	Seven Countries (Beta)
<b>Socio-Economic Background</b>								
Education	0.047	0.131 ***	0.075 *	0.063 *	0.027	0.128 ***	0.024	0.078 ***
Income	0.043	0.038	0.041	0.044	-0.026	0.008	0.137 ***	0.106 ***
Age	0.059	0.033	0.022	0.001	-0.013	-0.032	-0.013	0.031 **
Gender	0.012	-0.127 ***	-0.011	-0.061 *	-0.028	-0.008	0.015	-0.042 ***
<b>Institution Influences</b>								
Electoral participation	-0.019	0.065 *	-0.019	0.001	-0.029	0.002	0.012	-0.056 ***
Non-electoral participation	-0.017	-0.022	-0.051	-0.030	-0.021	0.066 *	0.046	0.000
Membership in organizations	-0.036	-0.053	0.040	0.034	0.071 **	-0.108 ***	0.013	-0.014
Psychological involvement in politics	0.001	0.051	0.015	0.072 **	0.015	-0.016	0.050	0.009
<b>Performance of Democratic Regime</b>								
Overall satisfaction with democratic regime	0.034	0.023	0.015	0.057 *	0.044	0.022	-0.016	0.068 ***
Trust in democratic institutions	-0.030	0.027	0.070 *	-0.038	0.057 *	-0.011	0.084 *	0.049 ***
<b>Quality of Governance</b>								
Rule of Law	0.085 **	-0.088 **	-0.051	0.055	-0.036	-0.019	0.111 **	-0.053 ***
Equality	-0.033	-0.040	-0.133 ***	-0.068 *	-0.015	-0.053 *	-0.004	-0.023 *
Freedom	-0.022	-0.004	-0.041	-0.025	-0.071 **	0.025	-0.083 *	-0.085 ***
Accountability	0.017	-0.051	-0.040	0.017	0.073 **	-0.076 **	0.014	0.096 ***
<b>Economic Conditions</b>								
National economic condition-today	-0.017	-0.080 **	-0.092 **	-0.029	-0.023	0.030	-0.045	-0.047 ***
National economic condition-past five years	-0.029	0.046	-0.055	-0.046	-0.005	0.032	0.016	-0.033 **
Personal economic condition-today	0.014	0.010	-0.019	0.015	-0.014	-0.003	0.004	-0.021
Personal economic condition-past five years	0.051	-0.034	0.018	-0.037	-0.006	-0.034	-0.011	-0.022
<b>Regime Comparison</b>								
Perceived democratic progress	0.055	0.086 **	0.014	0.062 *	0.049	0.089 ***	0.062	0.052 ***
<b>Social and Political Values</b>								
Detachment from traditionalism	0.006	0.198 ***	0.106 **	0.092 ***	0.162 ***	0.095 ***	0.062	0.123 ***
Democratic orientation	0.187 ***	0.077 **	0.101 ***	0.225 ***	0.101 ***	0.182 ***	0.199 ***	0.185 ***
Belief in procedural norms of democracy	0.097 **	-0.011	0.037	0.051	0.019	-0.039	0.045	0.049 ***
Priority of democracy over economic development	0.029	0.072 **	-0.063 *	0.042	0.050	-0.053 *	-0.017	-0.006
R Square	0.081	0.176	0.124	0.181	0.087	0.140	0.112	0.163
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ .



**Table 5 OLS Estimates of Explanatory Sources of Support for Democracy**

	Korea (Beta)	Mongolia (Beta)	Philippines (Beta)	Taiwan (Beta)	Thailand (Beta)	Indonesia (Beta)	Singapore (Beta)	Seven Countries (Beta)
<b>Socio-Economic Background</b>								
Education	0.040	0.005	0.066 *	0.082 **	0.027	0.109 ***	-0.026	0.037 **
Income	0.028	0.029	-0.080 **	0.046	0.003	-0.010	-0.076 *	-0.016
Age	0.014	-0.003	0.022	0.017	-0.003	0.090 ***	-0.030	-0.012
Gender	0.055	-0.008	-0.003	-0.020	-0.072 **	0.025	-0.026	-0.006
<b>Institution Influences</b>								
Electoral participation	-0.031	-0.034	-0.006	-0.004	-0.031	0.021	-0.008	-0.006
Non-electoral participation	-0.003	-0.012	-0.008	-0.004	-0.024	0.027	-0.020	0.024 *
Membership in organizations	-0.013	0.082 **	0.028	-0.020	-0.027	-0.059 *	-0.021	-0.005
Psychological involvement in politics	-0.031	0.051	0.101 ***	0.071 **	0.080 **	0.067 *	0.106 **	0.068 ***
<b>Performance of Democratic Regime</b>								
Overall satisfaction with democratic regime	0.185 ***	0.096 ***	0.027	0.180 ***	0.021	0.159 ***	0.123 ***	0.161 ***
Trust in democratic institutions	0.024	0.070 *	-0.013	0.055 *	0.175 ***	0.087 **	0.094 **	0.088 ***
<b>Quality of Governance</b>								
Rule of law	0.181 ***	-0.040	0.119 ***	0.124 ***	0.108 ***	0.057 *	0.142 ***	0.045 ***
Equality	0.042	-0.005	0.061 *	0.039	-0.090 **	0.026	-0.017	0.016
Freedom	-0.041	0.037	0.031	0.046	0.026	0.050 *	-0.036	0.021
Accountability	0.063 *	0.051	0.015	0.050 *	0.046	0.035	0.049	0.139 ***
<b>Economic Conditions</b>								
National economic condition-today	-0.005	-0.001	0.082 *	0.005	0.014	0.029	-0.025	0.007
National economic condition-past five years	-0.016	0.037	-0.039	0.023	-0.075 **	-0.008	0.049	0.010
Personal economic condition-today	-0.112 **	-0.012	-0.002	-0.040	0.020	-0.055	-0.057	-0.076 ***
Personal economic condition-past five years	0.101 **	0.018	-0.068 *	0.030	0.002	0.024	0.047	0.040 **
<b>Regime Comparison</b>								
Perceived democratic progress	0.094 ***	0.168 ***	0.116 ***	0.050	0.184 ***	0.145 ***	0.112 ***	0.146 ***
<b>Social and Political Values</b>								
Detachment from traditionalism	0.026	0.096 **	0.105 **	0.079 **	-0.025	0.087 **	0.036	0.075 ***
Democratic orientation	0.142 ***	0.055	-0.028	0.065 *	-0.082 **	0.019	0.118 **	0.052 ***
Belief in procedural norms of democracy	0.002	-0.019	-0.030	-0.019	0.006	0.041	-0.009	0.012
Priority of democracy over economic development	0.052	0.163 ***	0.016	0.079 **	0.081 **	0.050 *	0.132 ***	0.072 ***
R Square	0.159	0.118	0.081	0.163	0.144	0.126	0.113	0.141
<b>N</b>	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

Note : Entry is standardized beta coefficient. \* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.001$ .

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# Asian Barometer

## A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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