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**Interpersonal Trust and Democracy in China**

**Presenter**

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# **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

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Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Chicago, 1990  
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## Interpersonal Trust and Democracy in China

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### The Puzzle

In *the Civic Culture* (1963), Almond and Verba pioneered the study of interpersonal trust and democracy by using public opinion survey data from the U.S., UK, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. They found that interpersonal trust lead to a sense of cooperation which in turn, created stable democracy. In their 1959 5-country survey, people in the US and UK consistently showed higher levels of trust than in Germany, Italy and Mexico. This was why, according to the authors, historically democracy worked well in the US and UK but failed in Germany, Italy and Mexico (Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 1999). The origin of interpersonal trust, according to Almond and Verba, is derived from group membership in civic organizations. Putnam (1993) revived the study of civic culture by his study of civic traditions in modern Italy. He found that in Italy, regions with more citizen associational group activities tended to have more stable democracy. Inglehart made the most serious empirical attempt to establish the linkage between trust and democracy by the multi-national World Values Surveys. He found that there was a statistically significant positive relationship between trust and freedom in 60 societies (1999).

Yet this theory of interpersonal and democracy becomes problematic when China is included. Among the 81 countries in the 2000 World Values Survey, interpersonal trust had a positive impact on the Freedom House Rating. One of the most striking outliers was China, where an exceptionally high level of interpersonal trust was associated with an exceptionally low level of freedom. In fact,

China had one of the highest levels of interpersonal trust and one of the lowest freedom scores (fig. 1).

### Figure 1 Freedom by trust

According to the civic culture literature, there are a number of reasons to believe that China should have less trust. First, modernization leads to trust (Inglehart 1999 and Putnam 1993). China is an underdeveloped country and thus should have less trust than industrial societies. Second, trust is closely associated with democratic institutions (Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 1999). Given the lack of democratic institutions, China again should have less trust. Third, post-socialist societies all had low levels of trust due to previous bureaucratic control (Inglehart 1999). Again, China would be a victim of socialism (Fukuyama 1995). Inglehart attributed the high level of trust in China to Confucianism (1999). Yet it is unclear why and how Confucianism would increase trust. Even if we accept that it does increase trust, more than five decades of communist rule would have reduced the Confucian influence. Further, other Confucian societies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all had lower levels of trust than China (fig.1 ). Thus, the extent to which Confucianism creates trust in China needs further scrutiny.

This paper attempts to address the puzzle why China is so high in interpersonal trust but has little democracy. It will explore the meaning of trust and its social and political origins. The second goal this study is to examine the impact of trust on a wider range of political values and behavior in addition to promoting cooperation, such as regime support, social tolerance, political efficacy, and participation in conflict resolution. These intermediate values and behavior can serve as a linkage between trust and political institutions.

## Trust and Democracy

On the surface, the civic culture literature only claims that trust can stabilize but not create democracy. For example, although Inglehart (1999) finds a strong relationship between trust and democracy, he is cautious and tries not to claim that trust is able to create democratic institutions. Yet a closer reading suggests that Inglehart strongly implies in several different ways that trust does more than simply stabilizing democracy. First, in his statistical analysis, trust is used as an independent variable against both democratic stability and the level of democracy. The latter is measured by the Freedom House Rating which is an index of institutional political rights and civil liberties in different societies.<sup>1</sup> Methodologically, Inglehart shows us an effect of trust in increasing institutional democracy. Second, Inglehart argues that “economic development is conducive to democracy ... because it encourages supportive cultural orientations [trust]” (Inglehart 1999, p. 97). In this statement, trust seems to be the catalyst of democratization under modernization. Third, Inglehart carefully separates elite-initiated democratization from the successful functioning of democratic institutions. He seems to say that the latter requires trust and the former does not. Yet he agrees that democratic elections will not be possibly initiated if the elite do not believe in cooperation and loyal opposition. Again, this connection between elite and trust suggests that trust is conducive to the rise of democracy.

Inglehart is also careful in asserting that democracy creates trust. Instead, he makes a distinction between protestant and Confucian societies on one hand and Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic societies on the other. The former group is associated with high trust and the latter with low trust. But in other places, he implies that political system matters. One example is the lack of trust

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<sup>1</sup> See (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm>).

in post-socialist countries due to their previous bureaucratic authoritarian political systems. The other example of Inglehart's belief in democracy promoting trust is the explicit statement that "democracy makes people happy and trusting" (Inglehart 1999, p. 118).

Empirically, the lack of democracy in some high-trust societies such as China and the lack of trust in some democratic societies (fig. 1) cast serious doubts on the supposedly close tie between trust and democracy and on the ability of trust to create democracy (also see Seligson 2002). Although Inglehart claims that his findings about the close relationship between trust and democracy is based on more than 70% of the world population, this empirical foundations is shaken if China's 20% of the world population is excluded. Based on only half of the world's population, the likelihood of a positive relationship between trust and democracy is about half and half.

Conceptually, it is strange to think that trust is only an asset for democratic regimes. Why can't it be good for any regime? For an authoritarian regime, more trust of the state reduces the need for coercion and thus, increases regime legitimacy. If anything, too much trust may not be good for democracy, since trust may discourage citizens from directly challenging the state. One of the civic culture school's findings is that trust is based on subjective well-being which is created by democracy (1999). Yet there is no reason to believe that subjective well-being and trust only exists in a democracy. Trust may nurture both democratic and authoritarian regimes as it may courage certain values and behavior that serve as lubricants in state-society relations.

In this paper, I argue that neither is trust caused by democracy nor would it necessarily lead to democracy. In stead, trust is a product of regime stability and solidarity.

#### Origins of trust

One goal of this paper is to further clarify trust. Early research defined trust in China as “traditional” trust (Inglehart 1999 and Tang 2005). This definition of traditional trust requires further clarification. Does tradition mean Confucianism or socialism? Could modern trust develop in China under rapid industrialization and marketization? Does the gradual decline of trust in the 1990s<sup>2</sup> mean the beginning of the collapse of traditional trust under modernization? Or does it mean a shift of the origin of trust from tradition to modernity. In other words, the trust we see in China today may be based on new meanings comparing with the trust in earlier studies.

At least three factors are related to trust. First is tradition. Evidence shows that tradition promoted interpersonal trust in the early years. Trust at that time was based on traditional ties. There is a strong sense of family and kinship based social structure in China. There is a clear distinction between insiders and outsiders. Lieberthal (2004) vividly illustrates this distinction. According to him, a Chinese family would ignore a starving beggar but take any distant relative who shows up at the door. Chinese visitors to the U.S. in the 1980s had to be specifically instructed not to stand and laugh but help some one injured in an accident (p. 16). One objective of this study is to examine current level of kinship trust and how it is related to the overall interpersonal trust.

The second important component of Chinese social life is the legacy of socialism. The communist party attempted to replace traditional economic and social values and activities with a socialist system in which public ownership, central production plans, and centrally controlled wealth distribution were put in place to eliminate individual and family interests and promote political loyalty to the collective. As a result, society is organized into communities such as the people’s communes and work units and interpersonal relationship is shaped in a corporate framework. Studies indicate that this corporate culture continued to exist under market reform. For

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<sup>2</sup> For example, 60% respondents showed trust in the 1990 World Values Survey and in the 1992 40-city Chinese Urban Survey. In the 2000 World Values Survey, that number dropped to 55%. In the 2004 Chinese Values and Ethics Survey, it was 49%. See Tang 2005, figure 5.1.

example, although income stratification rose rapidly in the 1990s, most of the inequality can be explained by between group difference than by within group difference (Wang and Wang 2004), suggesting a persistent group coherence. The question is whether this corporate environment encourages or discourages interpersonal trust. The pessimist sees a dark picture. The monolithic control by the party in distribution of wealth and services and planned production based on societal need would create alienation and distrust. The optimist sees a positive impact of the corporate environment in interpersonal relations (Whyte and Parish 1984, Bryant 2004). Job security, income equality and the priority of group interest discourage individual competition and promote the feeling of solidarity. In this view, interpersonal trust should be high in a corporatist culture.

The third important component of Chinese life is economic growth and marketization. Marketization brings back individual interest and intensified interpersonal competition. Trust would decline. On the other hand, market economy leads to social diversification and cooperation. Interpersonal trust would seem to grow. The impact of economic growth and rapid improvement of living standard on trust is also unclear. On one hand, modernization would seem to discourage group-based social interaction and increase the sense of privacy as more and more people are moving into guarded residential areas. After all, many developed societies showed lower levels of trust than China (fig. 1). Yet economic modernization increases education and income. These factors will increase individual citizens' involvement in civic activities such as membership in associational groups and other types of civic participation. If one believes the civic culture literature, interpersonal trust should improve in a modern society (Inglehart 1999, Putnam 1993).

This paper will examine the roles of the above factors in interpersonal trust. It will address the question why trust is so high in China and what is its exact meaning. With newly available survey



data, it will also examine the impact of different types of trust on other political attitudes and conflict resolution behavior.

Most of the data in this paper are drawn from a 2004 Chinese Values and Ethics Survey (*Zhongguo Gongmin Sixiang Daode Guannian Zhuangkuang Diaocha*) conducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University. This survey is the product of a joint project sponsored by the Ford Foundation, Peking University and the University of Pittsburgh.<sup>3</sup> The survey consists of 7714 respondents in 200 townships and districts from 100 counties and cities. The random sample is based on a pioneer spatial sampling technique, effectively including the migrant workers that can take as high as a third of the urban population (Landry 2003). This group of people was difficult to capture by traditional samples based on household registration. Another advantage of the 2004 survey is that it includes both rural and urban residents. Earlier studies on trust only included urban residents.<sup>4</sup>

#### Findings I: Classification of trust

This section will explore the meaning of trust with survey data. The 2004 survey contains the same interpersonal trust question “can most people be trusted?” as in the 2000 World Values Survey. 49% (weighted) of the 2004 respondents answered “yes”, indicating a continuous high level of interpersonal trust in China.

One set of questions in the 2004 survey is about how much each respondent trusts each of 14 groups of people. Each group has a trust thermometer from 0 (no trust) to 100 (most trust) based on the 7714 respondents’ ratings (fig 2). The most trusted groups are family members (95) and

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<sup>3</sup> Co-principal investigators include Mingming Shen and Ming Yang (Peking University), Yanqi Tong (University of Utah, Pierre Landry (Yale University), Jinyun Liu (University of Michigan) and Wenfang Tang (University of Pittsburgh).

<sup>4</sup> For example, Tang’s earlier study was based on an urban survey of 6 largest cities (Tang 2005).

relatives (78), followed by friends (72), neighbors (66), schoolmates (66), rural residents (64), people from the same geographic origin (tongxiang, 61), colleagues (61) and one's supervisors (60). At even lower levels are urbanites (48), businessmen (35), out-of-towners (33), foreigners (29) and strangers (23). Overall, trust seems to decrease as the distance between one's immediate family and a given group increases.

fig. 2 Trust thermometers

A visual display of the trust ratings (fig. 2) indicates that the 14 groups fall into three clusters. Family and relatives are in the first group with the highest trust ratings. Friends, neighbors, schoolmates, rural residents, people with the same geographic origin, coworkers and supervisors are in the second group with the second highest ratings. Urbanites, businessmen, out-of-towners, foreigner and strangers are in the third group with the lowest ratings. This classification is confirmed by a factor analysis which nicely categorizes the 14 groups under three factors (table 1). The factor analysis results indicate that family and relatives are more closely related to each other and fall in the same category. This category is based on traditional kinship ties which are the closest to one's immediate self and can be described as *parochial trust*. Friends, neighbors, schoolmates, rural residents, same geographic origin, coworkers and supervisors are more related to each other than to other groups and thus, belong to another category. This category is about one's immediate social and economic environment. Given the authoritarian nature of China's political system, this environment is still closely monitored by the state. Trust developed in this environment can be described as *corporate trust*. It is no surprise that the factor analysis puts rural residents in this category, since rural life still creates greater community solidarity than urban life.

The third category of related groups contains urbanites, businessmen, out-of-towners, foreigners and strangers. This category is in the third zone away from one's immediate self. It is the most abstract type of trust based on one's civicness and can be defined as *civic trust*. For the same reason of putting rural residents in corporate trust, it is no surprise that urbanites are defined as part of civic trust, since urbanites may represent the modern lifestyle that creates less corporatist community solidarity but more technologically defined civic communities.

#### table 1 classificatio of trust

To further examine the meaning of trust, we need to look at the impact of individual and environmental characteristics on different types of trust, including age, gender, education, income, ethnicity, party membership and regional living standard. Age ranges from 18 to 66 in the 2004 survey. It is divided by 10 in order to enlarge the impact of each year of age on trust by 10 times, making the regression coefficient more visible. Female is coded 1 and male 0. Education is measured by the respondent's total years of formal education, ranging from 0 to 23 in the sample. Income is the respondent's total family income in 2003. The original income scale is from 1 to 16, representing 16 income levels. This scale is converted into a 0-1 scale  $[(\text{family income}-1)/15]$  in order to make the income impact easier to interpret. About 6.4% of the sample consists of ethnic minorities with Mongolian, Zhuang, Korean, Muslim, Tibetan, Uygur, Mandarin, Tujia, Yi, Xibo and other origins. Since the number of respondents in each ethnic group is too small to carry out separate analysis of each group, all these groups are combined into the non-Han group and coded as 0. All Han Chinese are coded as 1. The 6.9% of communist party members in the sample are coded as 1 and non-members as 0. Regional living standard is measured by the 2002 average

household consumption in each province. Ideally, consumption should be measured at the township and urban district levels in order to better understand the respondent's attitudes. But this information is not available at the time of writing. The three types of trust are indices derived from the factor analysis results (table 1). Each type of trust is converted into a 0-1 scale so that the change of trust score can be interpreted as percentage change. Each of the three types is then examined against age/10, female, years of education, family income (0-1), han Chinese, party membership and the 2002 average provincial household consumption (fig 3).

Figure 3 Trust type by individual and environmental characteristics

Age has a positive impact in all three types of trust. Expectedly, older respondents have a higher level of parochial trust than younger generations, perhaps due to more exposure to traditional influence. Older respondents also show more corporate trust. The oldest respondents in the 2004 survey were 66. These people were only 11 when the communist regime was founded in 1949 and completed their political socialization mostly under early socialism. The fact that the younger generations have less corporate trust indicates a gradual decline of the corporatist culture during market reform. Interestingly, older generations also have more civic trust than the younger ones.

Gender has no statistically significant effect on parochial trust. Chinese women are no more traditional than Chinese men. Women show more corporate trust but less civic trust than men. Overall, women seem to be more willing to stay in their known social and economic environment than men, while men seem to be more willing to explore the unknown.

Education and family income have no visible effect on parochial and corporate trust, but they both increase civic trust. The role of education and income is untreatable since education teaches people abstract knowledge (theory) about the unknown world and income provides more resources and freedom to explore the unknown world. These findings support the civil culture literature about modernization's positive effect on trust.

Similarly, being a han Chinese has no difference with non-hans in parochial and corporate trust, but has more civic trust than non-hans. This finding is perhaps politically incorrect. Yet the statistically significant effect does indicate such a difference. A dominant ethnic group probably feels more security than minority groups in any society and therefore, tends to develop more trust of the unknown groups.

Party membership increases both corporate trust and civic trust. It is not surprising that corporate trust is high among party members since the party is the promoter of the corporate state in China. It is interesting, however, that the party also seems to promote civic trust. One possibility is that the party nurtures a supportive and cooperative atmosphere like a civic organization described in the civic culture literature. Paradoxically, this is precisely what one is told not to expect in a communist society by the civic culture literature.

Regional average household consumption has a statistically significant effect on all three types of trust. Economic development and improvement of living standards discourage both parochial trust and civic trust but encourage corporate trust. One possible explanation is that economic activities are no longer confined within the kinship network but are still not at the level of national or international integration. Instead, they are centered at the community or corporate level. As modernization and globalization continue, higher living standard will probably lead to more civic trust.

In short, the findings in this section make an important contribution to further defining the meaning of trust. They show that trust has at least three dimensions - parochial, corporate, and civic. Parochial trust is associated with kinship-based traditional social and economic life style. Corporate trust carries the characteristics of China's authoritarian political system, as older generations with more experience of socialism, party members and people living in provinces of higher levels of regional economic development show more corporate trust. Civic trust is probably the closest to the kind of trust described in the civic culture literature. Judging by the broad scope of groups contained in it, this type of trust has the broadest scope. The fact that education and income increase civic trust further suggest that civic trust is similar to the kind of trust promoted by modernization in the civic culture literature. Finally, a "peaceful evolution" of the communist party seems to be underway as party members are developing civic trust.

### Findings II Trust and Democracy

The previous section examines what creates trust. This section looks at what trust creates. First, we want to explore what type of trust actually contributes to the high level of interpersonal trust in China. If the Confucian explanation is correct, parochial trust should be more closely related to interpersonal trust. If the modernization explanation is true, civic trust should be more closely associated with Chinese interpersonal trust. Again if the civic culture school is right, corporate trust based on bureaucratic control should not be related to interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust is measure by the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Two choices were given, "most people can be trust" (coded 1) and ""need to be very careful" (coded 0). The first choice

indicates more interpersonal trust. This is the same question used in the World Values Surveys and Almond and Verba's (1963) 1959 6-country surveys.

Second, we know that trust promotes regime support in democratic societies. The question is whether trust also promotes regime support in an authoritarian state. If so, what type of trust would do so? Following the civic culture argument (Almond and Verba 1963), both parochial trust and corporate trust should increase regime support while civic trust should not. Regime support is measured by an index of the respondent's confidence in the following organizations: consumers' association, court, people's congress, legal defense, ombudsman's office, work unit, the communist party, public prosecutor's office, government, labor union, media, women's federation, and public security. A factor analysis indicates that these items are highly correlated with each other and only one factor is generated. Therefore, the factor index based on these items is an indication of regime support. The system support index is converted into a 0-1 scale.

Third, an important prerequisite for the successful functioning of democracy is tolerance which may lead to willingness to compromise and to respect diversity. We should expect that civic trust would encourage tolerance and parochial trust would discourage tolerance. It is unclear whether corporate trust would create tolerance. If the corporate control is rigid, corporate trust should not encourage tolerance for diversity. Yet a corporate culture is significantly different from the traditional kinship network. It represents a higher level of socialization that should be more tolerant of diversity. Tolerance is measured by the following question in the 2004 survey: Can you tolerate the following people to be your neighbors? The respondent was asked to choose from 1)absolutely not, 2)difficult to tolerate, 3)possibly can tolerate, and 4)can completely tolerate for each of the following groups: criminal record holders, foreigners, extreme conservatists, drunken, radicals, mentally ill patients, other ethnicities, migrant workers, drug addicts, AIDS patients, homosexuals,

and religious fanatics. These items are combined into a factor index with a 0-1 scale. 0 indicates no tolerance and 1 is the most tolerance.

Fourth, another important prerequisite of a successful democracy is the feeling of political efficacy. Political efficacy can assure citizens' active participation in government decision making. Again, we expect that political efficacy should be encouraged by civic trust but discouraged by parochial trust. If the consequence of bureaucratic control is alienation, corporate trust should not promote political efficacy. Efficacy is measured by 9 questions in the 2004 survey: 1) hiring a lawyer can win a lawsuit more easily; 2) people like myself can affect government decision making; 3) local people's congresses listen to the opinion of people like myself; 4) people are capable of expressing their opinions on the complex issues in a modern society; 5) in most times the government can solve the problems for people like myself; 6) government should not decide whether an idea can be circulated in a society; 7) in most times the police can solve problems for people like myself; 8) ordinary people should question the government; and 9) one should not simply obey the government. For each question, strongly agree indicates more efficacy, agree shows some efficacy, disagree means less efficacy and strongly disagree is equal to no efficacy. These 9 questions are combined into a single factor index with a 0-1 scale where 0 means no efficacy and 1 is maximum efficacy.

Finally, conflict resolution is another important aspect of political life in which trust is likely to play a role. Trust is expected to discourage solving problems by violence and encourage civic solutions. The 2004 survey contains questions regarding the channels that the respondent would go through in order to solve a potential civil, economic, or administrative dispute. These include traditional channels such as mediation by relatives, friends, local celebrities, village or work unit leaders and government mediators, visiting governmental bureaus and the ombudsman offices, the



government-controlled court, and direct negotiation with the other party. The second group includes “civic” channels such as visiting the elected officials in the People’s Congress, reporting to the media and even protest and demonstration. The third group consists of resolution by force or other individual means. A factor analysis suggests that these channels can be grouped in three categories, traditional solution, civic solution and taking the law in own hand (appendix 2). Each solution is measured by a 0-1 factor index consisting of the channels in that category. The value 1 indicates the most willingness to adopt that solution and 0 means no desire to use that solution.

OLS regression is used to examine the role of each type of trust on the above-mentioned values and behavior: interpersonal trust, regime support, tolerance, political efficacy, and conflict resolution (fig. 4).

#### Figure 4 Impact of trust type on attitudes and behavior

As expected, civic trust plays a significant role in promoting interpersonal trust, tolerance and political efficacy. It also discourages system support, traditional conflict resolution and dispute resolution by force. According to the civic culture school, these are all desirable attitudes and behavior for creating democracy. Somewhat unexpected is the negative impact of civic trust on adopting civic solution. One possibility is that civic trust is associated with the desire to create a new set of civic institutions and to boycott the existing single-party controlled people’s congresses and media.

Parochial trust does not seem to promote democracy and participation. It does not encourage any type of citizen-initiated conflict resolution and decreases tolerance and political efficacy. It

strengthens passive regime support and has no effect on interpersonal trust. This last finding does not support the Confucian explanation of China's high level of interpersonal trust.

Perhaps the most interesting and ambivalent is corporate trust. On the one hand, it strengthens regime legitimacy of the authoritarian state by encouraging regime support and traditional conflict resolution and by discouraging violent behavior. On the other hand, corporate trust plays a strong role in promoting democratic values and behavior including interpersonal trust, tolerance, political efficacy and civic conflict resolution. In other words, corporate trust serves a dual function, promoting limited democracy while preserving political order and regime solidarity.

### Summary

Now let us return to the questions proposed earlier in this study: why trust is so high in China and whether trust creates democracy. Although parochial trust is the highest in China, it fails to nurture interpersonal trust. Instead, interpersonal trust in China is derived from the same "civicness" as in democratic societies. Another unlikely source of interpersonal trust is China's bureaucratic-corporate political environment. Together with civic trust, corporate trust contributes just as much to China's high level of interpersonal trust. The findings in this study support the prediction by the civic culture school about the positive relationship between civic trust and interpersonal trust. They provide no proof, however, of the predictions derived from the civic culture literature that civic culture can only grow in a democratic society, that authoritarian societies discourage trust, and that Confucianism supports civic culture.

Similarly, the findings about the sources of trust also address the second question of whether trust creates democracy. The finding about how civic trust promotes democracy seems to support the assertion that trust is closely associated with democracy. But the question is why an

authoritarian society like China can develop civic trust in the first place. Clearly, democracy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for trust. The strong effect of corporate trust on both democratic values and behavior and on the stability and smooth functioning of China's authoritarian regime further weakens the association between civic culture and democracy. Thus, a trust-based civic culture can grow in both democratic societies and non-democratic societies and can serve to improve regime stability in any political system, not only in democracy. For the time being, there does not seem to be a clear relationship between trust and democracy. In the long run, whether trust will bring democratization or regime stability depends on whether it is based on civic trust or corporate trust.

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


Figure 1. Freedom by Interpersonal Trust (see D:\My Documents\legal survey\trust\free trust 2.do)  
 Note: Interpersonal trust is the average percentage who said “most people can be trusted” in each country. Freedom House Ratings range from 0 (no freedom) to 1 (maximum freedom).  
 Sources: 2000 World Values Survey and 2003 Freedom House Ratings  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/>




Figure 2. Trust Thermometer ("how much do you trust each group of people", maximum=100)  
Source: 2004 Chinese Values and Ethnics Survey




Figure 3 Trust type by individual and environmental characteristics (OLS coefficients)

Note: Only statistically significant results are shown ( $p \leq .05$ ). Occupation is included in the equation but not shown (see appendix 1).

Source: 2004 Chinese Values and Ethics Survey




Figure 4. Impact of trust type on attitudes and behavior (OLS coefficients)

Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at  $p \leq .05$  except for parochial trust on interpersonal trust. Age, female, party membership, family income, education, occupation, ethnicity and provincial household consumption are included in the OLS regression equations but not shown (see appendix 3).  
Source: 2004 Chinese Values and Ethics Survey



Table 1 Factor analysis of trust (varimax-rotated factor loadings)

groups	corporate	civic	parochial
family	0.03596	-0.02452	<u>0.84683</u>
relatives	0.37363	0.05189	<u>0.70003</u>
friends	<u>0.63437</u>	0.04241	0.17743
neighbors	<u>0.62379</u>	0.07608	0.41318
schoolmates	<u>0.74892</u>	0.03844	0.04801
rural residents	<u>0.40206</u>	0.14558	0.07141
same geo origin	<u>0.78846</u>	0.07421	0.08764
coworkers	<u>0.73421</u>	0.07093	0.13847
supervisors	<u>0.57375</u>	0.10543	0.07255
urbanites	0.27484	<u>0.56909</u>	-0.06992
businessmen	0.17764	<u>0.69884</u>	-0.05246
out-of-towners	0.08381	<u>0.78888</u>	0.00539
foreigners	-0.03292	<u>0.69617</u>	0.04238
strangers	-0.02605	<u>0.73881</u>	0.08443

Source: 2004 Chinese Values and Ethnics Survey

## Appendix 1. Trust type by individual characteristics (OLS)

	Parochial trust	Corporate trust	Civic trust
Age x10	<u>0.005</u>	<u>0.011</u>	<u>0.005</u>
Female	0.000	<u>0.007</u>	<u>-0.012</u>
educyr	0.000	0.000	<u>0.004</u>
Faminc	0.003	0.011	<u>0.032</u>
Han	-0.002	-0.010	<u>0.018</u>
prov. consumption	<u>-0.019</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>-0.032</u>
Party	-0.001	<u>0.017</u>	<u>0.016</u>
Nojob	-0.002	-0.024	<u>0.030</u>
Manual	-0.013	<u>-0.017</u>	0.011
White	-0.012	<u>-0.026</u>	0.013
Service	0.005	<u>-0.034</u>	-0.008
professional	<u>-0.017</u>	<u>-0.024</u>	0.003
Adm/manager	0.006	-0.010	-0.010
Village head	<u>-0.077</u>	0.006	0.012
Private boss	-0.007	-0.006	0.019
Geti	<u>-0.017</u>	<u>-0.037</u>	<u>0.036</u>
Job_oth	-0.013	<u>-0.019</u>	0.011
Unemployed	<u>-0.032</u>	<u>-0.045</u>	0.007
Student	-0.006	-0.003	<u>0.064</u>
Migrant	<u>-0.020</u>	<u>-0.017</u>	<u>0.021</u>
Retiree	-0.034	<u>-0.089</u>	<u>-0.072</u>
farmer (comparison)			
Constant	<u>0.891</u>	<u>0.632</u>	<u>0.277</u>
Adj. R2	0.006	0.026	0.021
N	7714	7714	7714

\_: p&lt;=.10, n=7714.

Source: 2004 Chinese Values and Ethnics Survey

## Appendix 2 Factor analysis of conflict resolution

Factor Loadings				
Variable	trad. way	civic way	ownway	Uniqueness
mediate	<u>0.97389</u>	-0.15055	0.01982	0.02849
gogov	<u>0.97290</u>	-0.15624	0.01811	0.02872
gocourt	<u>0.97388</u>	-0.15010	0.01994	0.02863
talk	<u>0.56089</u>	-0.02067	-0.14155	0.66494
gonpc	0.27712	<u>0.70532</u>	-0.18328	0.39213
gomedia	0.30995	<u>0.65742</u>	-0.16037	0.44602
protest	0.07335	<u>0.49765</u>	0.21649	0.70009
force	0.08436	<u>0.27177</u>	<u>0.56797</u>	0.59644
gothor	0.07935	-0.02856	<u>0.75294</u>	0.42596

Appendix 3 Political values and behavior by trust type and other socio-economic characteristics (OLS)

	Interpersonal trust	System support	Social tolerance	Political efficacy	Traditional conflict resolution	Civic conflict resolution	Conflict resolution by own way
Parochial trust	0.068	<u>0.085</u>	<u>-0.035</u>	<u>-0.022</u>	<u>-0.081</u>	<u>-0.033</u>	<u>-0.010</u>
Corporate trust	<u>0.409</u>	<u>0.355</u>	<u>0.045</u>	<u>0.018</u>	<u>0.072</u>	<u>0.017</u>	<u>-0.010</u>
Civic trust	<u>0.346</u>	<u>-0.050</u>	<u>0.146</u>	<u>0.044</u>	<u>-0.139</u>	<u>-0.006</u>	<u>-0.009</u>
Age/10	<u>0.024</u>	<u>0.007</u>	<u>-0.004</u>	<u>-0.006</u>	<u>-0.038</u>	<u>-0.003</u>	<u>0.000</u>
Female	<u>-0.031</u>	<u>0.005</u>	<u>-0.016</u>	<u>-0.006</u>	<u>-0.054</u>	<u>-0.003</u>	<u>-0.005</u>
educyr	<u>0.001</u>	<u>-0.001</u>	<u>0.003</u>	<u>0.002</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.002</u>	<u>0.000</u>
Faminc	<u>-0.027</u>	<u>0.002</u>	<u>0.014</u>	<u>0.004</u>	<u>0.099</u>	<u>0.002</u>	<u>0.005</u>
Han prov.	<u>-0.034</u>	<u>-0.022</u>	<u>0.017</u>	<u>-0.008</u>	<u>0.042</u>	<u>-0.006</u>	<u>-0.001</u>
consumption	<u>0.165</u>	<u>0.027</u>	<u>-0.020</u>	<u>-0.010</u>	<u>-0.104</u>	<u>0.020</u>	<u>0.006</u>
Party	<u>0.006</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.009</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.095</u>	<u>0.002</u>	<u>-0.001</u>
Nojob	<u>0.076</u>	<u>-0.023</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.006</u>	<u>-0.021</u>	<u>-0.012</u>	<u>-0.001</u>
Manual	<u>-0.089</u>	<u>-0.020</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.011</u>	<u>0.162</u>	<u>0.015</u>	<u>0.007</u>
White	<u>-0.021</u>	<u>-0.007</u>	<u>0.028</u>	<u>0.024</u>	<u>0.151</u>	<u>0.017</u>	<u>0.001</u>
Service	<u>-0.094</u>	<u>0.026</u>	<u>0.028</u>	<u>0.018</u>	<u>0.161</u>	<u>0.032</u>	<u>0.012</u>
Professional	<u>-0.003</u>	<u>-0.015</u>	<u>0.036</u>	<u>0.014</u>	<u>0.149</u>	<u>0.027</u>	<u>0.002</u>
Adm/manager	<u>0.017</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.027</u>	<u>0.033</u>	<u>0.086</u>	<u>0.019</u>	<u>0.014</u>
Village head	<u>0.099</u>	<u>-0.015</u>	<u>-0.027</u>	<u>-0.007</u>	<u>-0.053</u>	<u>0.046</u>	<u>-0.006</u>
Private boss	<u>-0.116</u>	<u>-0.004</u>	<u>0.001</u>	<u>0.011</u>	<u>0.073</u>	<u>0.011</u>	<u>0.021</u>
Geti	<u>-0.023</u>	<u>0.001</u>	<u>0.007</u>	<u>0.005</u>	<u>0.082</u>	<u>0.008</u>	<u>0.004</u>
Job_oth	<u>-0.041</u>	<u>0.019</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.007</u>	<u>0.050</u>	<u>0.011</u>	<u>0.002</u>
Unemployed	<u>-0.028</u>	<u>-0.011</u>	<u>0.007</u>	<u>0.002</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.014</u>	<u>0.002</u>
Student	<u>-0.043</u>	<u>0.031</u>	<u>0.048</u>	<u>0.058</u>	<u>0.110</u>	<u>0.020</u>	<u>0.001</u>
Migrant	<u>-0.039</u>	<u>0.013</u>	<u>0.011</u>	<u>0.012</u>	<u>0.058</u>	<u>0.006</u>	<u>0.001</u>
Retiree farmer (comparison)	<u>-0.254</u>	<u>0.073</u>	<u>0.004</u>	<u>0.028</u>	<u>0.274</u>	<u>0.069</u>	<u>-0.005</u>
Constant	<u>0.003</u>	<u>0.445</u>	<u>0.279</u>	<u>0.473</u>	<u>0.699</u>	<u>0.028</u>	<u>0.024</u>
Adj. R2	<u>0.046</u>	<u>0.167</u>	<u>0.071</u>	<u>0.028</u>	<u>0.077</u>	<u>0.023</u>	<u>0.003</u>
N	<u>7105</u>	<u>7714</u>	<u>7714</u>	<u>7714</u>	<u>7714</u>	<u>7714.000</u>	<u>7714.000</u>

\_: p&lt;=.10, n=7714.

Source: 2004 Chinese Values and Ethnics Survey

## Appendix 4 variables used in factor analyses and OLS regression analyses

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
parochial	7714	.8837032	.1323434	0	1
trustfam	7714	.9484433	.1311981	0	1
trustrel	7714	.7810841	.2079614	0	1
coporate	7714	.649861	.1438107	0	1
trustfrn	7714	.7282589	.1975205	0	1
trustnei	7714	.6691809	.2097007	0	1
trustsch	7714	.6633525	.1827108	0	1
trustrul	7714	.6500632	.2024694	0	1
trustvil	7714	.6184364	.2034377	0	1
trustcol	7714	.6194338	.1985596	0	1
trustsup	7714	.6108559	.2512928	0	1
civic	7714	.3261713	.1503958	0	1
trusturb	7714	.477602	.2113429	0	1
trustbiz	7714	.3471625	.2115482	0	1
trustout	7714	.3272966	.211278	0	1
trustnew	7714	.2276524	.2065654	0	1
trustalien	7714	.2865371	.2070756	0	1
age/10	7714	4.100104	1.182189	1.8	6.6
female	7714	.5002593	.5000323	0	1
ccp	7714	.0693544	.2540723	0	1
eduyr	7714	6.755858	3.976785	0	23
faminc	7714	.3055087	.2266225	0	1
han	7714	.9312938	.2529703	0	1
prov famspent	7714	.5324945	.2277455	0	1
nojob	7714	.009204	.0955014	0	1
blue	7714	.033316	.1794722	0	1
white	7714	.0330568	.1787965	0	1
servsale	7714	.0111486	.1050033	0	1
prof	7714	.0391496	.1939634	0	1
admang	7714	.0050557	.0709284	0	1
vilhead	7714	.0010371	.032189	0	1
prvboss	7714	.0032409	.0568399	0	1
geti	7714	.0480944	.2139795	0	1
joboth	7714	.0352606	.1844496	0	1
unemployed	7714	.0736324	.2611886	0	1
student	7714	.0198341	.1394389	0	1
migrant	7714	.0506871	.2193721	0	1
retiree	7714	.0020742	.0454985	0	1
farmer	7714	.6139487	.4868741	0	1
interpersonal trust	7105	.5064039	.4999942	0	1
tolerance	7714	.3488856	.1238817	0	1
alienok	7714	.5168013	.2539015	0	1
conservok	7714	.5099525	.2411138	0	1
drinkok	7714	.3245483	.260119	0	1
radicalok	7714	.4235924	.2528087	0	1
psychok	7714	.3105756	.2643069	0	1
ethnicok	7714	.6883759	.25277	0	1

migrantok		7714	.6286379	.2553623	0	1
drugok		7714	.0871024	.1760639	0	1
aidsok		7714	.1137593	.208295	0	1
gayok		7714	.0997504	.183682	0	1
fanaticok		7714	.1346457	.2044248	0	1
efficacy		7714	.4771216	.1055895	0	1
uselawyer		7714	.5842697	.2534555	0	1
dm		7714	.35184	.2252062	0	1
legislate		7714	.4312377	.2432392	0	1
issue		7714	.4455381	.2272626	0	1
gvmthelp		7714	.5094197	.2538448	0	1
idea		7714	.4905803	.2538448	0	1
police		7714	.621371	.240174	0	1
autonomy		7714	.5330454	.3037742	0	1
checkgvmt		7714	.372549	.2799773	0	1
faithstate		7714	.7298261	.1450845	0	1
xiaoxie		7714	.6795448	.1952625	0	1
fayuan		7714	.7534555	.2190854	0	1
renda		7714	.7895444	.2064116	0	1
lvshi		7714	.7016363	.2084221	0	1
xinfang		7714	.6837522	.2055916	0	1
danwei		7714	.669056	.2486728	0	1
gongdang		7714	.853676	.2015602	0	1
jiancha		7714	.7567411	.2088655	0	1
zhengfu		7714	.7259067	.2274282	0	1
gonghui		7714	.6910613	.1956107	0	1
xinwen		7714	.7073745	.2210795	0	1
fulian		7714	.7283388	.1950912	0	1
gongan		7714	.7243537	.2329506	0	1
trad. resolution		7714	.6951456	.3608776	0	1
mediate		7714	.6969579	.3617734	0	1
gogov		7714	.6948838	.3616624	0	1
gocourt		7714	.6953159	.362305	0	1
talk		7714	.2810042	.3719358	0	1
civic resolution		7714	.0259109	.0769412	0	1
gonpc		7714	.0409213	.1631944	0	1
gomedia		7714	.0603232	.1977067	0	1
protest		7714	.002852	.0362931	0	1
ownway		7714	.0093111	.057595	0	1
force		7714	.0063089	.0551635	0	1
gother		7714	.0058335	.0501575	0	1