

Follow the Leader? Soft Power of China and the US Compared

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Abstract: This paper uses the recent third wave of the Asia Barometer Survey (ABS) to compare the soft power of the United States and China in East Asia. We find increasing competition between the US and China over soft power and considerable variation among countries in the region. Despite this competition, the United States remains the overwhelming model of choice for the majority of East Asian countries. Using the ABS survey data we explore the reasons for our results by comparing the different factors that underscore varied assessments of soft power in twelve East Asian countries. Our findings suggest that both country-level and individual level factors help us understand the regional variation of assessments of soft power, particularly security relations, promotion of a development model of a country, and political values. The diversity in values and complexity of the underlying explanations points to likely changes in soft power over time. The competition over soft power in East Asia is thus likely to continue to remain intense, with variation among countries the regional norm.

Introduction

The 2008 Beijing Olympics was arguably the event in recent history that brought to the fore China's soft power. The spectacle showcased China's rise on the international stage beyond its military prowess and impressive economic growth. It also coincided with greater scholarly and practitioner attention to China's rise and the different tools it has adopted to achieve this prominence. In Southeast Asia scholars were pointing to China's 'charm offensive', while in Africa focus was on investment and international aid, and in the US the introduction of Confucian Institutes were promoting Chinese culture. Since then, the area of soft power as part of China's foreign policy, especially compared to that of the US, has taken off with debates on its form, levels, and effects. This paper aims to add to these discussions by presenting the results of recent survey data conducted in twelve East Asian countries. It uses one of the survey questions, which country is chosen as a model for your country, as a measurement of the attractiveness of the chosen country, its soft power. The levels and underlying explanations of the responses are examined. While this is a narrow and imperfect measure of the complex reality of soft power in East Asia, the aim of the discussion is modest in scope; we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the diversity and underlying reasons for views of US' and China's soft power by East Asian publics. We present the findings and analysis of the data to generate discussion and feedback.

The two questions that underscore this analysis are:

- 1) What are the different levels of soft power of the United States and China in East Asia? &
- 2) What accounts for the variation in levels of soft power?

The goal is to understand how East Asian publics view the rivalry between China and the United States in East Asia and what are the likely factors that may contribute to changes in attitudes toward these global powers.

Challenges in Understanding soft power Competition in East Asia:

When Joseph Nye (1990) first coined the term ‘soft power’ he defined this concept as the ability of countries to attract others, pointing to its culture, values and foreign policy. Since his original idea, soft power has morphed to include a variety of dimensions, from economic investment to media and perceptions of military strength. The components of soft power continue to be debated, especially with regard to China. A recent article by Jean-Marc Blanchard and Fujia Lu (2012), for example, concentrates on dissecting different conceptualizations of China’s soft power. A distinguishing element often highlighted is the central role of Chinese culture as part of China’s soft power, and the promotion of this culture. Scholars in East Asia have shown that in East Asia cultural exchanges go well beyond investment in Confucian Institutes. They tap into diaspora relations and the mode of transmission of culture extends beyond education to the use of new media and export of traditional media sources such as CCTV abroad. Others continue to hone in on China’s diplomacy. Stronger ASEAN-US links since the 1990s and more recently the appointment of special envoys highlight the importance of quiet diplomatic exchanges. Chinese officials visit East Asian countries, especially Southeast Asian countries, with greater frequency than their US counterparts. Yet, others point to economic integration and relations as the fundamental core of China’s soft power. These economic ties extend from trade and investment to business networks and, in some cases such as Indonesia and Cambodia, development loans and aid. What comes out from these discussions is the reality that there is little consensus both outside and within China on the elements of soft power. These analyses reflect a broader debate in the literature over soft power, dispute over its elements and the importance of different factors.

Another difficulty in the analysis of soft power is the relationship between soft and hard power. This is particularly acute in assessing the soft power of both the United States and China in East Asia in that security issues are often in the foreground. Since 2008, China has been seen to be adopting a more aggressive position toward territory in the region, played out in areas such as the Scarborough Shoal and Senkaku Islands. At the same time, the US’ policy toward the region, the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ which has been portrayed as greater engagement of the US with the region, is perceived as an attempt to contain China’s rise. For China, the Obama administration’s initiatives have been seen as aggressive as well. How much public perceptions of these countries are shaped by security clashes or other elements of hard power is really unknown. From afar, security clashes are viewed as catalytic events impacting public attitudes.

On the ground, however, many of these instances are far from the reality of the everyday lives of citizens and arguably more distant than the influences of cultural exchanges and event economic integration. While this paper is not in a position to offer a clear answer to the symbiotic ties between hard and soft power, this issue remains a challenge in any study of soft power in the region.

A third important issue in the understanding of soft power in East Asia is how it is framed. In the scholarship of China's soft power, the image portrayed is one of catching up to that of the US and even displacing the US. The dominant paradigm is that the US and China are locked in a great power rivalry, vying for influence in which soft power plays an integral part of this competition. One can ask, however, whether soft power is something one can clearly compete over. Is soft power a choice, a zero-sum dynamic? Soft power –similar to attraction itself – is not something that is mutually exclusive. Moreover, soft power is not something that one clearly makes choices over, or even may want to do so. The reality for many in East Asia is that they would prefer not to be forced to chose between China or the United States and, in fact, would often chose both, preferring to balance and co-exist with both global powers. Also, given the complexity of the different elements of soft power itself, one can also ask whether it is possible to discern clear choices in the competition over soft power. We raise these questions to highlight the need to qualify the findings and analysis below. This paper uses the competition framework as a heuristic tool to understand soft power of the US and China in East Asia, but does so with the recognition that the framework itself may in fact be flawed.

'Country X' as a Model: The ABS Measurement and Explanatory Framework

Nevertheless, this paper works from the premise of individuals making clear choices over soft power. Using the ABS survey data this paper analyses the responses to one question – 'Which country should be the path your country should follow as a model.' The options were China, the United States, Japan, India, or their own country. This measure is used as a proxy for soft power. With one question and an ambiguous one at that, it is an imperfect measure. This said, it is an interesting marker of views in the region and a basis for cross-regional comparisons.

It also is an improvement on existing measures. The first attempt to measure soft power through a composite index was created and published by the Institute for Government and Monocle in 2007⁷. The IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index combined a range of statistical metrics and subjective panel scores to measure the soft power resources of 26 countries. The metrics were organized according to a framework of five sub-indices including culture, diplomacy, education, business/innovation, and government. The index is did not fully measure the ability to attract or measure influence. Subsequent measures have focused on different measures of 'soft power,' from culture to technology transfers. Other surveys, most

notably the Pew Survey or the C-100, have captured views of some of these elements. Many of these surveys were limited in scope in terms of the respondents and in the range of countries. What the ABS question does is that it highlights the appeal of different countries and simultaneously provides a broad range of countries to assess views. Also, given the range of questions in the ABS survey over political attitudes it offers us a tool to understand underlying reasons for different levels of attraction of the US and China.

We interpret these findings at two levels, at the country and individual levels. At the country level we explore the impact of security relationships, economic integration, model promotion and cultural affinity. On the individual level, tapping into the rich set of questions in the ABS, we look at attitudes towards democracy, Asian values, governance, China’s influence in the region and demographic variables as a means to better understand why East Asians might opt for China over the United States as a model or visa versa. We expected to find that historic security relationships (the practice of hard power) and political values at the individual level would be decisive factors shaping attitudes. The results show, however, that understanding the underlying factors of views of soft power cannot be easily simplified.

Overall Country Level Findings:

The ABS results, outlined in Table 1, show that the United States remains the leading choice among East Asian countries selected as a model of most East Asian countries. With a regional average of 27.9% of citizens in the twelve countries choosing the US, the results reveal that more than double opted for the US as a model compared to China, which averaged at 13.4%. The second choice among East Asian countries was their own model, at 26.3%, followed by Japan at 24%.


Table 1: ABS Results: 'Country X' as a Model

	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Self Model</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>India</i>
<i>Northeast Asia</i>						
<i>China</i>	38.4	27.3	27.3	9.6	22.4	1.6
<i>Japan</i>	19.4	2.1	52.0	52.0	9.9	6.1
<i>Korea</i>	39.4	8.5	10.1	24.0	16.5	1.2
<i>Mongolia</i>	26.9	10.9	29.2	19.3	8.4	1.1
<i>Taiwan</i>	15.5	4.7	22.2	32.4	24.0	0.4
<i>Southeast Asia</i>						
<i>Cambodia</i>	43.8	20.3	5.1	23.1	6.3	1.2
<i>Indonesia</i>	25.9	13.5	8.2	35.2	12.8	1.3
<i>Malaysia</i>	8.0	13.9	33.9	31.1	11.4	0.9
<i>Philippines</i>	69.1	7.3	0.0	17.2	5.8	0.7

<i>Singapore</i>	22.9	14.1	40.0	15.5	40.0	1.9
<i>Thailand</i>	15.5	16.2	46.0	12.4	8.4	0.3
<i>Vietnam</i>	9.4	22.0	41.5	15.7	10.1	0.7
Average	27.9	13.4	26.3	24.0	14.7	1.4

These average results, however, obscure some important differences among countries in East Asia. The United States and China clearly attract different countries at different levels. Chart 1 compares the share of responses that chose the US with China, ranking them with the lowest to highest selection of the US. Nine of the twelve countries chose the US more often than that of China, with the largest difference in the Philippines where 69.1% chose the US compared to 7.3% opted for China as a model. Another striking difference was the results for Japan, where only 2.1% opted for China as a model, compared to 19.4% for the United States. Even in China itself, more Chinese opted for the US as a model than China, 38.4% compared to 27.3%. The countries that did not conform to this pattern were Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. In the latter, the difference was quite sharp, as more than double the number of Vietnamese opted to follow China compared to the US.

Chart 1: US versus China as a Model Compared



Country-Level Interpretations: War, Dependence, Promotion or Cultural Affinity

These variations need to be analyzed further. What are the differences in results telling us and why?

Below we sketch out four alternative explanations at the country-level that might account for the varied responses.

1. Security Relations and Alliances: Scholars have long debated the relationship between soft and hard power, with many pointing to an interrelationship between the two. For the purposes of this paper we distinguish between historical tensions and security alliances to assess whether these factors could shape the overall findings. As Table 2 shows, five of the countries in the region have reported historical tense security relations with China. Of these five countries, all except Vietnam show sharp differences in their views of China as a model compared to the US. In fact of the four countries except Vietnam that have had tense security relations with China – Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Philippines, in all of them reveal that less than 10% of their citizens chose China as a model. Overall, security relations can be seen to be associated with a broad pattern of soft pattern in East Asia, with Vietnam as the notable exceptions. War and the use of military power by China serves as a push factor shaping public perceptions of soft power, as the results suggest hard power is indeed intertwined with soft power in East Asia.

Table 2: Overview of Security Relationships with US and China

	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Tensions in the Security Relationship with China</i>	<i>Security Alliance with US</i>
<i>Northeast Asia</i>				
<i>China</i>	38.4	27.3	N/A	No
<i>Japan</i>	19.4	2.1	High	Yes
<i>Korea</i>	39.4	8.5	Moderate	Yes
<i>Mongolia</i>	26.9	10.9	Low	No
<i>Taiwan</i>	15.5	4.7	Moderate	Yes
<i>Southeast Asia</i>				
<i>Cambodia</i>	43.8	20.3	Low	No
<i>Indonesia</i>	25.9	13.5	Low	No
<i>Malaysia</i>	8.0	13.9	Low	No
<i>Philippines</i>	69.1	7.3	Moderate	Yes
<i>Singapore</i>	22.9	14.1	Low	Yes
<i>Thailand</i>	15.5	16.2	Low	Yes
<i>Vietnam</i>	9.4	22.0	Moderate	No

The other side of security relationship, the pull factors in a security alliance, however is not as strong an explanation. Six of the countries in the region have a security relationship with the United States in the form of a security treaty. Of these, however, only one has extremely high selection of the US as a model, the Philippines. Arguably, Korea also has a significant share of its population selecting the US as a model as well, followed by Singapore and Japan. Given the scope of the security ties, these numbers are not that high, A number of these countries, Japan and Singapore, prefer their own model as a path to follow. The countries that are not attracted to the US as a model are Taiwan and Thailand despite their security alliances with the US. Pull factors toward the US do not appear to correspond to high levels of selection for the US as much as push factors contribute to lower levels of selection of China as a model.

2. Economic Interdependence: What about economic ties? Are there discernable patterns with regard to investment, trade, economic integration and international aid? More detail is needed to review the specific dimensions of economic ties, but the broad overview suggests that economic links are not a strong and consistent underlying factor explaining levels and variation of soft power.

Consider a few examples: Overall, the amount of economic integration and investment is larger in Northeast Asia compared to Southeast Asia. But geography and economic ties associated with this proximity to China do not translate into higher attractiveness of China. The average selection of China as a model in Northeast Asia is a mere 6.6%, while it is nearly triple that in the less economically integrated Southeast Asia, 15.3%. In fact, the less economic integration, the more likely citizens in East Asia are to choose China as a model.

Economic integration also does not seem to capture developments in individual countries in Southeast Asia as well. The economic relationship between China and Cambodia is very robust, with an estimated \$300 million of Chinese investment in Cambodia. China is the largest investor in Cambodia and provider of international aid, but more than double of Cambodians opt for the US as a model, 43.8%, compared to that of China at 20.3%. Some would argue that this is being shaped by the nature of the Chinese investments in Cambodia, involving land grabbing and environmental damage, for example. Yet, the pattern of limited explanatory power of economic power holds for the US as well. In Malaysia, the US has been the leading economic investor since the 1980s. While in some years other countries such as Taiwan and Japan have exceeded the US at the top of the list, the US has consistently been among the top five investors in Malaysia for

three decades. US investment is concentrated in light manufacturing and services. Chinese investment is nowhere near the levels of the United States, The results, however, show that more Malaysians prefer China as a model than the United States, 13.9% compared to 8%. Economic ties broadly to not conform to levels of variation of soft power, at least as measured from public perceptions.

3. Elite ‘Model’ Promotion: What else could help us explain the overall findings? A third country-level explanation has to do with the role that a country’s leadership has played in promoting a particular country as a model, either as a model in terms of development or the promotion of a particular set of values, either democratic or ‘Asian values’. Does the systematic promotion of a particular model by leaders shape perceptions of soft power within East Asian countries? Table 3 summarizes an overview of the models publicly promoted as the development path to follow or admire. This is drawn from an overview of public speeches by top leaders in these countries from the 1980s.

Table 3: Overview of Model Promotion

	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Development Model</i>	<i>Democratic Values</i>
<i>Northeast Asia</i>				
<i>China</i>	38.4	27.3	China, Singapore	No
<i>Japan</i>	19.4	2.1	Japan	Yes
<i>Korea</i>	39.4	8.5	Korea, US	Yes
<i>Mongolia</i>	26.9	10.9	Mongolia, China	Yes
<i>Taiwan</i>	15.5	4.7	Taiwan, US	Yes
<i>Southeast Asia</i>				
<i>Cambodia</i>	43.8	20.3	China	Mixed
<i>Indonesia</i>	25.9	13.5	Indonesia	Mixed
<i>Malaysia</i>	8.0	13.9	Malaysia, Japan	No
<i>Philippines</i>	69.1	7.3	US	Yes
<i>Singapore</i>	22.9	14.1	Singapore	No
<i>Thailand</i>	15.5	16.2	Thailand, US, China	Mixed
<i>Vietnam</i>	9.4	22.0	Vietnam, China	No

There is a connection between the results and elite model promotion, at least in a few of the countries. One of the outliers in the discussion is Vietnam. As noted above, despite its history of poor security ties with China, it continues to chose China as a model, 22% compared to 9%. This can, in part, be seen to be related to the open discussion by Vietnamese leaders to follow China’s

economic path. We see the impact of model promotion also in Malaysia, where 31% of the population chose Japan. Former premier Mahathir Mohamad promoted a Look East policy towards Japan for decades, at the same time as he adopted an anti-American posture. The role that leaders in East Asia countries play in shaping perceptions of the US and China remains significant, given the prominent role of leaders in shaping foreign policy.

While we look more closely at the role of values at the individual level of analysis below, it is interesting to note that countries in East Asia that embraced more democratic values have higher support for the US as a model, while those that openly promoted Asian values were less favorable to the US. The exception to this is China, where 38.4% of Chinese opted for the US as a model, greater than those who selected China itself at 27.3%. The impact of leaders in framing which countries to follow as models is difficult to measure, as there are multiple influences shaping the perceptions of China and the United States. Comparatively, the elite impact in shaping perceptions of soft power is less pronounced than security factors noted above.

4. Ethnic Affinity and Difference: Are there clear patterns at a country level with regard to cultural affinity and differences? Does the China diaspora in East Asia contribute to the selection of China as a model? Do differences between the US and the Muslim world, for example, contribute to lower levels of soft power? The answer at the country level suggests that cultural affinity does not clearly correspond to lower levels of soft power.

In the two countries where there is a large Chinese diaspora, Taiwan and Singapore, there is not a marked higher selection of China as a model compared to the US. Even in a country like Malaysia, where nearly a third of the population is of Chinese heritage, the numbers opting for China do not correlate to the selection of China. The ABS data does not systematically differentiate by ethnicity, but it does do this in some of the countries. In Malaysia, for example, Chinese Malaysians were no more likely to choose China than Malays or Indian Malaysians. Ethnic affinity appears to be less of a pull factor for China than has been often implied.

Another interesting observation of the results involves the impact of perceived differences between the US and the Muslim world. The contrast in the results opting for the US as a model in Indonesia and Malaysia is striking, 25.9% versus 8%. Both are majority Muslim countries, but in the more democratic Indonesia there was more affinity to the US than in Malaysia. This reinforces the finding suggested above, that values do shape perceptions of soft power, which was

confirmed at the individual level of analysis developed below. Ethnicity and religion, however, does not appear to be a decisive underlying factor contributing to soft power assessments.

Of the country explanations, the factor that appears to be the most important is security relationships, notably the impact of previous or ongoing tensions, followed by the promotion of shared values and a country as a development model at the domestic level. These findings reinforce the link between hard and soft power, suggesting that the future trajectory of public perceptions of soft power will be influenced by the stance the US and China takes over security. There is another implication, however. Soft power assessments in East Asia are being shaped by domestic developments within individual countries in East Asia. The values and developmental models promoted in East Asia are linked to how China and the US are perceived. In fact, the assessment of soft power in East Asia is being in part determined by developments that have little to do with the specific actions of the US and China, but rather the actions and transformations taking place within individual countries in East Asia themselves.

Individual-Level Explanations: Values and Influence

The country-level analysis allows us to explore possible broad factors influencing soft power in East Asia. The ABS data allows us to go a step further and assess what might account for individual differences in the selection of the US or China as a model. Our findings suggest that political attitudes, especially towards freedom and Asian values, influence soft power in East Asia. Values do matter in perceptions of soft power in the region.

Table 4 below summarizes the findings of the multinomial logit regression. In this model we examine those who selected the US and China using the answers to questions of political attitudes compared to those who selected their own country as a model.¹ The list of questions is outlined in the Appendix. At the individual level we find two overall tendencies. First, there is a common pattern in East Asia among those who would opt to choose either China or the US as a model, compared to their own country. Second, there is a perceptible difference among those who opted for the US over China or vice versa.

The common pattern is as follows: Those who felt that their own government was not corrupt were less likely to opt for either the US or China. Those that were paternalistic, valued their government taking care of citizens, were less likely to opt for either China or the US. East Asians who had more social traditional values, willing to sacrifice for the national interest and conflict adverse, were less likely to

¹ We also looked at those who opted for other alternatives as well. There were few differences in the statistical findings.

select either the US or China as a model. Finally, less educated, older and women were also less likely to select the US or China as a model. The data suggests that there are shared characteristics and values that are tied to the selection of one's own country compared to alternatives.

Table 4 'US versus China as a Model' Multinomial Logit Analysis

	Model Selection	
	US	China
Equality	0.084***	-0.014
[Low→High]	(0.022)	(0.03)
Anti-corruption	-0.703***	-0.596***
[Low→High]	(0.047)	(0.062)
Freedom	0.083***	-0.021
[High→Low]	(0.031)	(0.042)
Paternalism	-0.098***	-0.202***
[High→Low]	(0.031)	(0.042)
Authoritarianism	0.029	-0.077
[High→Low]	(0.037)	(0.049)
Political Traditionalism	-0.27***	0.083
[Low→High]	(0.064)	(0.088)
Social Traditionalism	0.448***	0.724***
[Low→High]	(0.063)	(0.089)
Urban-rural	-0.064	-0.03
[Urban 1, Rural 2]	(0.067)	(0.091)
Education	-0.048***	-0.051***
[Low→High]	(0.015)	(0.02)
Age	-0.021***	-0.019***
[Low→High]	(0.002)	(0.003)
Gender	-0.112*	-0.258***
[Male 1 Female 2]	(0.06)	(0.082)
Income [Low→High]	-0.069***	0.012
	(0.025)	(0.034)
China Outlook	-0.028	0.08
[Low→High]	(0.044)	(0.061)
China Influence	0.385	0.669***
[Low→High]	(0.026)	(0.037)
Constant	1.921***	-2.346***
[Low→High]	(0.388)	(0.533)
N	6404	

For the understanding of perceptions of soft power in the region, the results highlight interesting differences between those who selected the United States as a model rather than China. These are:

- East Asians who valued equality were more likely to choose the US over China as a model.

- East Asians who valued freedom were more likely to choose the US over China as a model.
- Authoritarian attitudes of East Asians did not directly correspond to either the selection of China or the US as a model.
- Less politically traditional East Asians opted for the US over China as a model.
- Wealthier East Asians were more likely to select the US over China as a model.
- East Asians that perceived China's influence in the region positively were more likely to opt for China as a model.

At the individual level, values, especially democratic attitudes of governance emerged as important. The US attracted those who share her attitudes of freedom and equality and those less hierarchical in political outlooks. While questions about authoritarianism did not emerge as significant in the model selection, suggestion that authoritarianism neither pulled people toward China or away from the US, the pull of democracy was important for soft power.

At the same time, the analysis highlights that perceptions of China's role in East Asia is tied to soft power, as those who see China as engaging positively with East Asia are more likely to opt for China as a model to follow. Efforts by China to promote a positive image in East Asia can yield results.

By Way of a Conclusion

Levels of soft power of China and the US in East Asia are varied and will likely continue to be so, as history and differences in values and experience persist. It is important to appreciate that any study of soft power in Asia needs to take account of the specific experience of bilateral ties between the East Asian countries and the US or China. Generally, China's soft power is greater in Southeast Asia than in Northeast Asia. Throughout the region, the US' soft power remains considerably higher than that of China, despite China's rising influence in the region.

We find common underlying explanations of the variation in levels of soft power. Security relations, model promotion, democratic values and positive views of China emerged as significant underlying factors shaping different views of China and the US. At the country level of analysis, tensions with China were closely associated with lower levels of soft power, with Vietnam the exception. The promotion of the US or China as a model also was salient for many countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam. Among East Asians individually, democratic values of equality and freedom led to attraction to the US as a model, while those who held China to be a positive influence in the region were attracted to China as a model.

The preliminary implications of these findings are two-fold. China's actions in East Asia do shape its views of soft power. Cultural promotion and economic ties appears to be not as important as what it does in the realm of security. Further tensions with countries in East Asia over territory and clashes are likely to have a negative impact on China's soft power. Efforts to enhance China as a positive influence in East Asia will positively yield dividends for greater soft power for China. Money invested in cultural promotion is less likely to have an impact than responsible actions that show how China is promoting the shared prosperity and security of East Asians.

For the United States, it continues to attract East Asians who are more democratic in outlook. The US also attracts wealthier East Asians. The trajectory of soft power for the US will lie with the changes taking place in East Asia. Increasing prosperity and greater democratization is likely to see the persistence of high US soft power. Forces that undermine these trends, economic crisis, rising inequalities and greater authoritarianism will erode US's soft power. The results for Thailand are telling in this regard. The impact of the 1997-1998 crisis has apparently left an imprint on the soft power of the US, as despite being a security ally for decades and democratization, only a small share of Thais see the US as a model to follow. The scars of the US not assisting in the economic crisis and increase in authoritarian views as a result of political polarization in Thailand over the last few years have pushed many Thais away from the US. Drivers of soft power perceptions in East Asia have are shaped not just by foreign policy, but also domestic conditions within East Asia. Greater democracy and rising prosperity in East Asia is likely to underscore greater US soft power.

It is fitting, however, to conclude this analysis with words of caution. Empirically, this analysis has rested on one question. Further measures and analysis is necessary to enhance our understanding of the variation in forms, levels and character of soft power in East Asia. This analysis has only touched the surface of a complex issue. For now, however, soft power in East Asia is fundamentally a matter of competition, but rather a reflection of the evolution of the character of China's engagement with East Asia and the drivers of democratic change within East Asia.

Appendix: Technical Notes and the Multinomial Logit Model Analysis

Equality If you had to choose between reducing economic inequality and protecting political freedom, which would you say is more important?

Anti-Corruption How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?; How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital city]?; In your opinion, is the government working to crack down on corruption and root out bribery?

Freedom Statement 1. The media should have the right to publish news and ideas without government control. Statement 2. The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that might be politically destabilizing.

Paternalism Statement 1. People should look after themselves and be primarily responsible for their own success in life. Statement 2. The government should bear the main responsibility for taking care of the wellbeing of the people.

Authoritarianism We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.

Political Traditionalism Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

Social Traditionalism In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group's collective interest. For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed. When dealing with others, developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one's immediate interest. When dealing with others, one should not only focus on immediate interest but also plan for future. In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group. Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict.

<u>Urban/Rural</u>	Levels of urbanization
<u>Education</u>	Levels of Education
<u>Age</u>	Age Levels
<u>Gender</u>	Male/Female
<u>Income</u>	Income Levels
<u>China Influence</u>	How much influence does China have on our country?
<u>China Outlook</u>	General speaking, the influence China has on our country is?

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