



A Comparative Survey of

*DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT*

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Impacts of Urban Culture on Political Behavior in  
Asian Nations

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## **Asian Barometer**

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

# **Working Paper Series**

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# **Impacts of Urban Culture on Political Behavior in Asian Nations**

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The study of urban politics has come to focus on urban policy studies rather than on the differentiating characteristics of urban areas themselves. Yet, the urban-rural cleavage is still one of the most profound sources of differentiations in political behavior, not only in the United States, but in other areas of the world. The urban-rural divide in Illinois, for example, structures politics in such a way that rural Democrats and rural Republicans make common cause, while urban Democrats and urban Republicans often unite in allocating funds toward mass transportation and away from the roads, highways, and bridges desired by rural constituents. Such cleavages also mark the politics of Asian nations in sometimes violent ways. Perhaps the best-documented urban-rural cleavage has been the political conflicts between Bangkok, Thailand, and the hinterland over whether urban elites will prevail politically over rural masses, an ongoing set of conflicts that persist to the present day.

There is a serious problem of measurement in the literature on urbanization. What actually constitutes an “urban” or even “metropolitan” area? Population estimates of various Asian cities vary dramatically across at least five different sources: The World Gazetteer, City Population, Demographia, United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, and National Official Estimates. Although estimates of Tokyo vary only from 31.7M to 37.7M across these sources, Seoul varies from 19.7M to 24.5M., Jakarta from 15.1M to 28.0M, and the Chinese cities have few official estimates. For purposes of this presentation, this study selected either the “official” estimates or the UN WUP data.

One part of the problem is that most official estimates are generated for administrative purposes. The premise of this study, however, is that metropolitan and rural areas represent fundamentally different culture streams that are significant for producing political, social, and policy outcomes from an individual and behavioral perspective. This implies that urban-rural cleavages are not strictly a function of population size or density, but a combination of cultural phenomena derived from the economic, social, and political positions that a given metropolitan area occupies in the context of the nation. These positions, however, can only be identified inductively. Table 1 presents differences that may occur between national surveys and geographic measures of what constitutes “urban” or “metropolitanization” in an Asian context:

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**Table 1: Aggregate and Individual Estimates of Metropolitan Areas\***

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<b>Country</b>	<b>Sample</b>	<b>“Urban” Areas</b>
• <b>Japan</b>	<b>31.5</b>	<b>45.0</b>
• <b>Korea</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>50.4</b>
• <b>China</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>5.2</b>
• <b>Mongolia</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>32.1</b>
• <b>Philippines</b>	<b>39.5</b>	<b>12.5</b>
• <b>Taiwan</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>29.7</b>
• <b>Thailand</b>	<b>19.1</b>	<b>10.2</b>
• <b>Indonesia</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>12.1</b>
• <b>Vietnam</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>
• <b>Cambodia</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>10.9</b>
• <b>Malaysia</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>6.9</b>

**COUNTRIES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS**

- **Japan: Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka**
  - **Korea: Seoul**
  - **China: Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shenyang, Wuhan**
  - **Mongolia: Ulan Bator**
  - **Philippines: Manila, Kalookan**
  - **Taiwan: Taipei, Kaoshiung, Taichung**
  - **Thailand: Bangkok**
  - **Indonesia: Jakarta**
  - **Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh City, Haiphong, Hanoi**
  - **Cambodia: Phnom Penh**
  - **Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur**
- 

Several cleavages occur between people in urban areas and inhabitants of the rural countryside. First, there are distinct differences in social class, expressed as income and education. More importantly, the city and the countryside are separated by strong cultural differences. Dennis McElrath (1968) has suggested that this differentiation is not only about wealth and status, but about careers linked to trade, merchandizing, and, most importantly, an urban-based bureaucracy. Encounters between urban elites and agrarian populations, he argues, are few and often structured by social, rather than economic, distance (1968, 5). Anek Laothamatas (1996) puts the Thai cleavage in sharp contrast when he argues that the most fundamental cleavage operating in Thai democracy is the sharp differences in political cultures between Bangkok and the essentially rural hinterland. Thailand is a “tale of two democracies”: one, of sophisticated urban elites (with origins or current residency in Bangkok), the other rural, often isolated, parochial interests that view political activity, especially elections, as opportunities for personal gain in a Downsian sense (Downs, 1997). Among other differences between urban and rural constituencies is that (according to the “Bangkok” view):

Voting in farming areas is not guided by political principles, policy issues, or what is perceived to be in the national interest, all of which is (regarded as) the only legitimate rationale for citizens casting their ballots in a democratic election. The ideal candidates for rural voters are those who visit them often, address their immediate grievances effectively, and bring numerous public works to their communities (202).

The ability of rural constituencies to acquire substantial political power in the parliament under conditions of electoral democracy often leads to doubts among members of the middle class who view the traditional order as threatened, along with the upper class, the mass media, and even academics – many, if not most of whom are deeply committed philosophically and otherwise to an elitist view - as to the efficacy of the democratic process. For these groups, “democracy turns out to be the rule of the corrupt and incompetent” (Laothamatas, 208). This puts them in a dilemma: although they oppose authoritarian rule in principle, they hold representatives from rural constituencies in contempt, regarding them as “parochial in outlook, boorish in manner, and too uneducated to be competent lawmakers or cabinet members” (Laothamatas, 208).

The problem is that urban, educated, cosmopolitan candidates, who are skilled policy experts, are often held in equal contempt by villagers. They are often regarded as being alien to rural electorates in terms of taste, culture, and outlook, who “fail to stay close to the voters in both a physical and cultural sense” (Laothamatas, 208). Veiled contempt for rural-dwellers by sophisticated Bangkok elites posed no problem under authoritarian regimes. Once democratic elections tipped the balance in favor of rural areas, however, significant gaps in perceptions of and commitments to democracy have developed.

These cleavages have, over the past decade, produced considerable political conflict that until recently seemed to be abating. Laothamatas argues that this fundamental conflict cannot be resolved until the Bangkok middle class accepts alternative versions of democracy that make room for understandings and aspirations of rural voters, especially the need for the rural poor to draw benefits away from the center and distribute them toward rural areas. “Ideally, patron-client ties might be replaced by a more responsive and effective system of local government. On top of that, voters are to be convinced that principle or policy-oriented voting brings them greater benefits than what they may get from local patrons” (Laothamatas, 223).

There is growing evidence, also, that, while the Bangkok middle class opposes authoritarian forms of government that restrict individual freedoms and exercise a heavy hand over commerce, the uncertainty of changes in government, even by democratic processes, is often viewed as destabilizing the economic environment on which entrepreneurs depend. The possibility that government may be seized by politicians with “populist” agendas poses an even greater threat to the interests of a class that stands significantly above the average voter in Thai elections.

### **Demographic Cleavages**

The literature on urban-rural comparisons identifies several dimensions of variation located in the demographics of urban versus rural communities. Migration into cities has attracted specifically younger populations that possess characteristics of independence, competition, achievement, globalization and other aspects of a modernizing culture. In

general, these same populations will be more affluent and, especially, more highly educated. They hold more “modern” outlooks about themselves and their lifestyles, all of which make for very different perceptions and values related to the political world. Although the traditional characteristics of “modernization” are useful for comparing nations, these aggregate approaches tend to obscure the dynamics of urban cultures that operate independently of modernizing factors such as education and income, but all of these factors, including urbanization, are purported to be significant for advancing or consolidating democracy.

One problem for analysis is that individual countries do not always fit expected profiles that characterize a region, such as East Asia. The issue becomes clear when one examines any particular variable such as “age.” Table 2 demonstrates that although there is considerable differentiation by age in the overall context, not all countries fit the profile suggested by aggregation of the data, in the sense that in some countries more rural populations tend toward greater longevity, while in others ( Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, for example) persons in cities seem to have longer life prospects.

**Table 2: Urban Rural Cleavages by Age as Percent of Populations (ANOVA)**

<b>Mean Ages:</b>	<b>Capital or Megacity,</b>	<b>Regional City,</b>	<b>Small City or Town,</b>	<b>Countryside</b>
<b>**Total</b>	<b>42.23</b>	<b>43.38</b>	<b>43.68</b>	<b>45.70</b>
<b>Japan</b>	<b>54.26</b>	<b>55.23</b>	<b>54.29</b>	<b>54.52</b>
<b>* Korea</b>	<b>41.85</b>	<b>42.45</b>	<b>47.14</b>	<b>47.25</b>
<b>China</b>	<b>47.85</b>	<b>47.10</b>	<b>45.90</b>	<b>47.21</b>
<b>Mongolia</b>	<b>39.27</b>	<b>39.77</b>	<b>39.76</b>	<b>38.49</b>
<b>Philippines</b>	<b>42.19</b>	<b>42.56</b>	<b>42.62</b>	<b>43.03</b>
<b>**Taiwan</b>	<b>43.79</b>	<b>44.70</b>	<b>44.37</b>	<b>49.30</b>
<b>*Thailand</b>	<b>39.58</b>	<b>42.52</b>	<b>45.02</b>	<b>43.36</b>
<b>Vietnam</b>	<b>37.98</b>	<b>42.35</b>	<b>43.57</b>	<b>41.93</b>
<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>35.23</b>	<b>38.94</b>	<b>40.04</b>	<b>38.54</b>
<b>Malaysia</b>	<b>38.48</b>	<b>39.16</b>	<b>38.81</b>	<b>38.54</b>

**\*\* sig. at <.000; \* sig. at <.001**

Although there is little doubt that the cultures of “urban” and “rural” areas differ, this paper seeks to document attitudinal and cultural differences that exist between these geographical locations in a set of Asian nations. One purpose is to explore the inherent difficulties in investigating urban politics, as well as ways to cope with conundrums and dilemmas imbedded in conceptualizations and measurement of what is “urban.” The exploration focuses first on Asian nations represented in the Asian Barometer study, probability samples of respondents in eleven nations circa 2006.<sup>1</sup> The responses were recorded in face-to-face interviews on the basis of a sampling plan that insured true probability samples. The profiles of respondents closely represented the distribution of

<sup>1</sup> Two of the thirteen nations provide no contrast between urban and rural respondents because they are, in effect, city-states: Singapore and Hong Kong. When they are included in a single data set, of course, they add to the population of “urban” respondents. Indonesia does not record the breakdown of urban-rural populations used in Table 2.

the population according to most recent censuses in gender, age, education, and “urban-rural” distributions.

One of the problems posed by an effort to classify urban and rural populations for comparative purposes is that the surveys followed national definitions of what constitutes “urban” or “rural.” For the most part, these are often administrative definitions that do not come close to capturing the impact of urban ecology on residents of the respective designations. For example, Jakarta is the only city in Indonesia with over one million people; the same is true for Bangkok in Thailand. In contrast, the city of Wuhan in China is sometimes regarded as being relatively rural in outlook, even though its population exceeds 1.5 million. Official definitions of “urban” in the Philippines make it a nation exceeding 80 percent urban. These administrative differences pose serious problems for making survey data conform to an urban-rural measure that allows comparisons across countries. At the same time, there is virtually no consistent definition of what might constitute a “suburban” area.

The Asian Barometer coding offers a way out of this problem if the researcher is prepared to place the analysis in the context of urban culture or, as some suggest, urban ecology. This is accomplished by coding respondents across 11 Asian nations in the following categories and indicating a general distribution of the ecological base across these Asian nations:

1. Capital city or Megacity	14.3%
2. Regional Center or provincial capitals	23.9
3. Small city or town	18.5
4. Village or countryside	43.3

The notions of modernization theory tend to rely on aggregate levels of analysis that fail to tell us much about the dynamics of attitude and opinion development at the individual level. In general, what we observe as national differences may, in fact, be ecological fallacies that produce erroneous inferences about the dynamics of items of interest at the individual level.

One of the great strengths of the ABS data is the wealth of individual-level data that enables explorations of personal psychologies at the individual level. Specifically, without these data we are at a loss as to how theoretical interests, such as effects of class and status work to produce attitudes and opinions that determine support for democracy, as well as support for regimes throughout Asia. Furthermore, analysis within some countries (notably Thailand) indicates very different causal models from those generally associated with modernization theory. This study explores some of these associations across the 11 nations in the Second Wave of the AB surveys (2006) and points to further paths of exploration for the future.

The next few tables indicate impacts of most of the demographic indicators on selected items of interest: Support for Democracy, Liberal Democratic Values, Trust in Government, and Diffuse Regime Support. All tables produce consistent observations: 1) Level of education is associated negatively with Trust in Government, and, before the dummy variables are added, Support for Democracy, but positively with support for Liberal Democratic Values; 2) A major rival to education as an explanatory variable is the Rural-Urban cleavage that runs generally in the opposite direction; that is, rural populations show higher levels of Support for Democracy, Trust in Government, and

Diffuse Regime Support, but much stronger positive support for individualistic Liberal Democratic Values.

There are two competing explanations for these outcomes. The first is that the negative signs for government approval by those who are more highly educated, upper status respondents, represent what has come to be called “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999). That is, those who, presumably, are in a better position to evaluate outputs of government tend to be more critical of poor government performance and, thus, to hold less confidence in governments in general. But why do their opposites – the rural, less affluent, less well educated – tend toward more positive evaluations of national government? Galbraith’s concept of “countervailing power” (1952) offers an alternative explanation of the data. According to this view, electoral democracy offers the masses a means of checking concentrations of power deriving from the maldistribution of economic resources. This means that the rural poor, for example, view the national government as an ally with which to combat exploitation by urban elites and the middle class, although this ally is not necessarily associated with democracy.

**Table 3: Impacts of Demographic Indicators on Support for Democracy**

Model		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				Sig.
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.213	.019		11.126	.000
	RuralUrban	-.055	.004	-.134	-15.130	.000
	Age	.000	.000	-.009	-.992	.321
	Male	.032	.008	.033	3.980	.000
	Education	-.001	.002	-.006	-.605	.545
	Monthly Household Income	-.001	.000	-.044	-5.366	.000

a. Dependent Variable: SD scores, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**R-Square = .023**



Coefficients <sup>a</sup>					
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
	(Constant)	-.308	.024		-12.637
	RuralUrban	-.022	.004	-.054	-5.910
	Age	.001	.000	.040	4.767
	Male	.026	.007	.027	3.610
	Education	.013	.002	.062	6.510
	Monthly Household Income	.000	.000	-.016	-2.113
1	Japan Dummy	.192	.018	.102	10.749
	Jorea Dummy	.075	.017	.043	4.446
	Mongolia Dummy	.446	.017	.250	26.228
	Philippines Dummy	-.097	.017	-.055	-5.716
	Thailand Dummy	.401	.016	.252	24.648
	Malaysia Dummy	.285	.017	.163	16.846
	Cambodia Dummy	.393	.019	.204	20.800
	Vietnam Dummy	.688	.017	.387	39.972
	China Dummy	.338	.014	.302	23.722

a. Dependent Variable: SD scores, Mplus IRT factorial scale

Data in these tables show two important pieces of information. First, rural populations have stronger associations than education in support for democracy and regime trust, while education shows much stronger association with liberal democracy. This is consistent with a countervailing power interpretation of the relationships between rural-urban populations and electoral democracy. The primacy of education in explaining support for Liberal Democratic Values lends more support to a “critical citizens” interpretation, in which higher levels of education lead to higher inculcation of individualism or liberal democratic values. This conceptualization also explains skepticism concerning support for democracy (Table 3), as well as lower levels of trust in government (Table 5). Unfortunately, these findings prevent a simple explanation of the relationships between modernization values and perceptions of government.

In these equations, what is most important is the primacy of the rural-urban location that has a generally stronger impact on the dependent variables than education, except in accounting for liberal democratic values. In the case of Support for Democracy, rural location has a stronger impact than other demographic variables, except income. It is also important to note that respondents with higher incomes have more negative attitudes toward democracy, lending support to a class cleavage interpretation over this value. The evidence seems to pit supporters of “populist” democracy against persons of

higher socioeconomic status who prefer to live in the context of liberal, individualistic democracy.

**Table 4: Impacts of Demographic Indicators on Support for Liberal Democratic Values**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	-.337	.016		-20.629	.000
	RuralUrban	-.013	.003	-.035	-4.023	.000
	Age	.002	.000	.061	7.188	.000
	Male	.035	.007	.041	5.149	.000
	Education	.044	.002	.246	26.868	.000
	Monthly Household Income	.002	.000	.086	10.682	.000

a. Dependent Variable: LDV score, Mplus IRT factorial scale

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.085	.021		4.089	.000
	RuralUrban	-.007	.003	-.018	-2.073	.038
	Age	-.001	.000	-.050	-6.071	.000
	Male	.038	.006	.045	6.193	.000
	Education	.023	.002	.129	14.042	.000
	Monthly Household Income	.000	.000	.020	2.672	.008
	Japan Dummy	.158	.015	.095	10.313	.000
	Jorea Dummy	.051	.014	.033	3.512	.000
	Mongolia Dummy	-.598	.015	-.378	-40.956	.000
	Philippines Dummy	-.231	.014	-.148	-15.932	.000
	Thailand Dummy	-.297	.014	-.212	-21.351	.000
	Malaysia Dummy	-.237	.015	-.153	-16.313	.000
	Cambodia Dummy	-.372	.016	-.219	-23.044	.000
	Vietnam Dummy	-.275	.015	-.176	-18.710	.000
	China Dummy	-.167	.012	-.172	-13.766	.000

**Table 5: Impacts of Demographic Indicators on Institutional Trust, 2006**

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	1.275	.031		41.694	.000
RuralUrban	-.226	.006	-.305	-38.300	.000
Age	-.002	.000	-.027	-3.440	.001
Male	.028	.013	.016	2.198	.028
Education	-.075	.003	-.206	-24.315	.000
Monthly Household Income	-.004	.000	-.095	-12.811	.000

a. Dependent Variable: INSTITUTAL TRUST SCORE, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**R-Square = .195**

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-.086	.035		-2.475	.013
RuralUrban	-.072	.005	-.098	-13.440	.000
Age	.002	.000	.029	4.307	.000
Male	-.008	.010	-.005	-.768	.443
Education	-.029	.003	-.080	-10.481	.000
Monthly Household Income	-.001	.000	-.017	-2.713	.007
Japan Dummy	-.069	.026	-.020	-2.672	.008
Jorea Dummy	-.299	.024	-.094	-12.288	.000
Mongolia Dummy	.316	.025	.098	12.870	.000
Philippines Dummy	-.013	.024	-.004	-.521	.602
Thailand Dummy	.435	.023	.152	18.620	.000
Malaysia Dummy	.567	.024	.179	23.218	.000
Cambodia Dummy	.510	.027	.147	18.766	.000
Vietnam Dummy	1.438	.025	.451	58.204	.000
China Dummy	1.040	.020	.530	51.111	.000

a. Dependent Variable: INSTITUTAL TRUST SCORE, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized	t	Sig.
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**Table 6: Impacts of Demographic Indicators on Diffuse Regime Support, 2006**

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	3.153	.035		90.190	.000
Gender	.007	.014	.004	.503	.615
Age	.001	.000	.024	2.818	.005
Education	-.001	.001	-.010	-1.250	.212
RuralUrban	-.137	.006	-.196	-23.388	.000
Monthly Household Income	-.003	.000	-.078	-9.366	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Diffuse Regime Support

**R-Square = .047**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	2.661	.040		66.978	.000
Gender	.016	.012	.010	1.275	.202
Age	.003	.000	.050	6.403	.000
Education	-.001	.001	-.009	-1.124	.261
RuralUrban	-.031	.006	-.044	-4.990	.000
Monthly Household Income	.000	.000	-.005	-.612	.541
Japan Dummy	-.601	.031	-.189	-19.546	.000
Jorea Dummy	-.595	.030	-.198	-20.175	.000
Mongolia Dummy	.176	.029	.059	6.008	.000
Philippines Dummy	-.148	.029	-.050	-5.123	.000
Thailand Dummy	.058	.028	.022	2.108	.035
Malaysia Dummy	.047	.029	.016	1.642	.101
Cambodia Dummy	-.009	.031	-.003	-.275	.783
Vietnam Dummy	.745	.030	.247	25.111	.000
China Dummy	.345	.024	.181	14.181	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Diffuse Regime Support

**Table 7: Effects of Demographic Cleavages on Perceived Family Conditions Relative to the Economy, 2006**

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	3.429	.035		96.902	.000
	RuralUrban	-.101	.007	-.129	-14.752	.000
	Age	-.002	.001	-.036	-4.114	.000
	Male	-.001	.015	.000	-.038	.970
	Education	.023	.004	.060	6.462	.000
	Monthly Household Income	-.002	.000	-.035	-4.361	.000

a. Dependent Variable: As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?

**R-Square = .018**

**Table 8: Effects of Demographic Cleavages on Perceived Control of Corruption at the National Level, 2006**

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	3.134	.037		84.526	.000
	RuralUrban	-.177	.007	-.245	-25.437	.000
	Age	.002	.001	.041	4.330	.000
	Male	.038	.015	.022	2.458	.014
	Education	-.025	.004	-.070	-6.939	.000
	Monthly Household Income	-.001	.000	-.016	-1.759	.079

a. Dependent Variable: Control of Corruption (National)

**Table 9: Effects of Demographic Cleavages on Traditional Social Values, 2006**

Model	Coefficients <sup>a</sup>					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.105	.010		10.253	.000
	RuralUrban	-.005	.002	-.022	-2.580	.010
	Age	.001	.000	.034	4.049	.000
	Male	.021	.004	.039	4.867	.000
	Education	-.021	.001	-.192	-20.925	.000
	Monthly Household Income	-.001	.000	-.051	-6.361	.000

a. Dependent Variable: TSV score, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**R-Square = .051**

Tables 7, 8, and 9 indicate that the Rural-Urban cleavage is generally one of the strongest determinants of economic evaluations, estimations of corruption and traditional social values, all of which are among the strongest determinants of support for democracy, liberal democratic values, institutional trust, and diffuse regime support. What is most important is that comparisons of the Beta coefficients show that Rural-Urban is frequently stronger than Education or Income, that is, than cleavages by class or socioeconomic status. Clearly, an understanding of the overall dynamics of democracy, or even modernization, requires greater attention to cultural and social cleavages represented by discontinuities between urban and rural populations, as well as application of structural equation models that incorporate demographic characteristics as primary in time for explaining the characteristics of democracy noted here.

### **Fitting Demographic Cleavages into an Analysis of Regime Type**

All of the tables examined so far show strong associations of the variables of interest with dummy indicators of the Asian states included in the analysis. Przyworski and Teune argue that thorough analysis would require identification of variables as substitutes for nations as explanations of political behavior. The AB data have been arranged into four categories to permit evaluations of relationships noted above. These are: Liberal Democratic Countries, Electoral Democratic Countries, Electoral Authoritarian Countries, and One-Party Authoritarian Countries.

# LDC

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-.520	.051		-10.273	.000
RuralUrban	-.018	.007	-.043	-2.639	.008
Age	.003	.001	.104	5.546	.000
Male	.030	.015	.033	2.030	.042
Education	.041	.004	.195	10.243	.000
Monthly Household Income	-2.740E-006	.000	.000	-.012	.990

a. Dependent Variable: SD scores, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-.182	.040		-4.590	.000
RuralUrban	-.003	.005	-.007	-.468	.640
Age	.001	.000	.034	1.901	.057
Male	.048	.012	.064	4.117	.000
Education	.055	.003	.321	17.387	.000
Monthly Household Income	.000	.000	.015	.985	.325

a. Dependent Variable: LDV score, Mplus IRT factorial scale

# EDC

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-.049	.042		-1.163	.245
RuralUrban	-.018	.008	-.040	-2.297	.022
Age	.001	.001	.020	1.198	.231
Male	.027	.017	.025	1.536	.125
Education	.013	.004	.059	3.250	.001
Monthly Household Income	.001	.000	.020	1.247	.212

a. Dependent Variable: SD scores, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	.030	.036		.832	.406
RuralUrban	-.065	.007	-.165	-9.593	.000
Age	-.002	.001	-.066	-3.940	.000
Male	.028	.015	.030	1.893	.058
Education	.004	.003	.022	1.202	.230
Monthly Household Income	.002	.000	.084	5.253	.000

a. Dependent Variable: LDV score, Mplus IRT factorial scale



# EAC

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	.110	.086		1.278	.202
RuralUrban	-.113	.018	-.180	-6.195	.000
Age	.004	.001	.112	3.430	.001
Male	-.018	.028	-.018	-.629	.529
Education	.029	.008	.129	3.883	.000
Monthly Household Income	-.002	.001	-.045	-1.582	.114

a. Dependent Variable: SD scores, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-.463	.068		-6.775	.000
RuralUrban	.027	.014	.055	1.891	.059
Age	.002	.001	.083	2.546	.011
Male	.062	.023	.078	2.743	.006
Education	.031	.006	.172	5.169	.000
Monthly Household Income	.002	.001	.065	2.288	.022

a. Dependent Variable: LDV score, Mplus IRT factorial scale

# OPC

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.100	.026		3.845	.000
	RuralUrban	-.018	.005	-.046	-3.423	.001
	Age	.001	.000	.042	3.002	.003
	Male	.011	.011	.013	.973	.330
	Education	.010	.003	.049	3.419	.001
	Monthly Household Income	.007	.001	.070	5.242	.000

a. Dependent Variable: SD scores, Mplus IRT factorial scale

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	-.184	.021		-8.647	.000
	RuralUrban	-.020	.004	-.061	-4.623	.000
	Age	.000	.000	.009	.636	.525
	Male	.022	.009	.032	2.462	.014
	Education	.028	.002	.164	11.680	.000
	Monthly Household Income	.001	.001	.012	.895	.371

a. Dependent Variable: LDV score, Mplus IRT factorial scale

The patterns revealed in each of the tables above indicate some consistency, regardless of regime type. Regardless of regime type, Education is consistently most supportive of Liberal Democratic Values. Equally consistently, urban populations are less supportive of electoral democracy, regardless of regime type. As urbanization is often offered as an important indicator of “modernization,” the analysis presents a somewhat ambiguous picture of the role of this component. One interpretation of this finding is that it represents a fundamental cleavage characterizing political struggles within countries. It is not feasible to understand differences of views unless the sociological origins of these views are taken into account.

Clearly, regime type is an important component of the analysis. The data do indicate, however, that when the rural-urban cleavage represents serious unequal allocation of resources, it poses serious problems both for consolidation of democracy and the advancement of liberal democratic values. In liberal democratic states, we find no significant cleavages between the rural and urban sectors.

## **Observations**

Examination of these relationships, perfunctory though they are, serves to bring attention to the beginnings of individual-level, analysis of attitudinal cleavages between urban and rural populations that we observe often as conflictual cleavages. The major observations from the data indicate some dimensions that should be taken into account for future analysis:

1. The rural-urban cleavage among Asian peoples appears to be a striking force determining a variety of attitudes and opinions useful for the study of issues related to democratic governance;
2. Education, at least at the individual level, appears, contrary to modernization theory, not to be a component that assures democratic values or goals. One explanation for this finding is that in some countries education is more an indicator of social class rather than of critical intellectual abilities;
3. Although in principle there are data available to explore further issues of class and status through analysis of the data on "occupation," these data are not yet available across the nations of this data set.

The data also lend themselves to alternative interpretations of the urban-more-educated versus rural-less-educated cleavage. Because the former appear more critical of government this difference is often interpreted as support for a "critical citizens" construction. In fact, this group of "critical citizens" appear to take a somewhat "libertarian" approach, that is, more government of any kind is bad. An alternative interpretation, however, can come from the literature on "countervailing power." According to this view, persons of lower socioeconomic status (rural-less-educated) see government as a means of redressing imbalances in societies associated with biases in

economic distribution. In fact, both interpretations are consistent with the data and it might be useful to attempt to distinguish these two orientations in future surveys.

4. There are several pitfalls in a comparative study of urban cultures. First is the problem of determining who lives in an urban area. It is impossible to rely on national designations of what is urban. In many of the Asian countries, a population of 20,000 qualifies a community for designation as "urban." Clearly these populations do not have a basis for an urban culture that is really the subject of our analyses. Perhaps the scale used in the Asian Barometer noted above will provide a better indicator of the distinction between what is truly urban and what is not.

5. Finally, migration from rural areas to cities for temporary employment means that many respondents in the cities bring with them highly "rural" attitudes and values. In some countries, such as Thailand, recent migrants maintain their voting location in a rural community so that during elections there is a large flow of the population back to rural areas for this purpose. Perhaps a question could be added inquiring as to the voting location. China is loath to grant city status to migrants from the rural countryside. This constitutes another basis for identifying urban residents who represent essentially rural attitudes and cultures. These are manageable problems, but their solution requires enough interest in the cleavage between urban and rural populations to incorporate additional questions in surveys that can identify respondents on an urban-rural basis.

The major purpose of this paper is to stimulate thinking about what we regard as one of the most important topics of political behavior, especially as it relates to emerging democracies in Asia. Theories of urban politics have suffered from the overwhelming interest in urban policy that characterizes the field today. Without greater attention to urban theory, however, we are neglecting one of the most important variables for explaining cross-national differences and, perhaps more importantly, cleavages in national politics that threaten the ability of citizens to govern themselves, especially in new democracies.

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## **APPENDIX: An Approach to Defining Suburbs in Thailand**

### **The Rise of the Suburbs**

Development of suburban societies also has been at least as dynamic as the urban-rural cleavage. The process of suburbanization awaited levels of economic growth that give rise to a middle class and liberation of urban development from fixed transportation systems by means of the automobile and public highways. Economic prosperity creates new demands for land, especially detached housing, as middle-class families seek separation from confinement of high-rise dwellings. Automobiles and highways make it possible to live in areas far more removed from the workplace than was previously possible, while, at the same time, the movement of industrial employment has been outward from the city center. New sites for manufacturing and industrial employment are far too costly in the inner city and their development has produced new demands for space that the older areas are unable to satisfy. Together, these forces have created a new kind of urban society, a world of the housing development, the shopping center and the industrial park, a world tied together by the automobile and the expressway, and “*a world increasingly oblivious to the urban core*” (Danielson, 1971: 2). (Italics ours)

These patterns of urban change have developed only recently in most Asian nations, but they are prominent today. In addition to the automobile, other technological developments associated with economic advancement - electric power, telephone lines (or, in most cases, cell-phones), septic tanks, and other developments - have made it convenient to live outside the city core.

Even more important in development of suburbs is the dispersion of employment from the cities. Although it is common to speak of rural, young people “going to work in Bangkok,” what is most commonly meant (as far as industrial employment is concerned) is the ring of industries located in the provinces on the outskirts of Bangkok - *Chonburi, Chachoengsao, Samut Prakan, Nakhon Nayok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Nakhon Pathom, and Samut Sakhon* (Mills, 1999). Other important factors in the outward movement of the population have been the out-migration of government bureaucracies from the core city and educational institutions (for example, the *Rangsit* campus of Thammasat University and the *Nonthaburi* campus of Assumption University). More recently, the Thai government has moved some of its major agencies to a province outside Bangkok. This movement is part of a dynamic process common to countries undergoing industrialization and related economic structural change. Due to the rapid growth of the periphery, the metropolitan areas show increases in populations of the central cities, even while their populations as a proportion of the larger region are declining. (Willburn, 1964: 9-33). The development of transportation arteries extending outside Asian core cities and the growth of “suburban sprawl,” indicate that these processes are well under way in Asian nations, as well.

Vernon (1966: 28-54) suggests that while the rich have attachments to the central city, it is the middle classes who seek the suburbs. The exodus of the urban middle classes from the core cities creates a more homogenous periphery and heterogenous core

that enhances the contrast between the rich and poor. Furthermore, the growing independence of the suburbs from the central city creates psychological distance, as well. The desire for open spaces, absence of pollution, crowding, and other infirmities of the city imply distance from annoyances, problems and peoples of the city. From the Thai perspective, the metropolitan areas feature many of the most common characteristics of suburbs in any country - increasingly higher levels of socioeconomic status, development of “bedroom” or commuter neighborhoods, all united by an almost hostility toward the dominant core city. While appreciating the amenities of the metropole, inhabitants of the suburbs are often united in resisting encroachments by the city.

The result of this changing urban pattern suggests that analysis of political cleavages requires attention not simply to an urban-rural cleavage. The growth of these “suburbs” in the areas surrounding major cities poses an entirely new dimension for political and social analysis. Politically, despite their proximity, suburbanites often differ dramatically in political orientations from individuals residing in older areas of the city. For one thing, like other suburban communities, the suburban areas are much more homogenous than the diverse populations of their dominant neighbor.<sup>2</sup> Suburban residents often resent this dominance of attention and resources that the city accrues - often by virtue of being a capital, whether of the nation or of a province. They resent, especially, being governed by city-dwellers. Thus, the suburban areas contain populations that in economic and social characteristics are similar to urban elites, but share the suspicions and hostilities toward the urban middle class that characterize rural villagers.

The development of a suburban corridor is the result of the economic booms that occurred in many Asian nations. Partly because these nations are still so rural in geography and culture, attention of scholars has focused primarily on rural sociology. But, a failure to distinguish between city, suburbs, and countryside leaves unanalyzed a rapidly developing political base that may tip the balance of politics. Because behavioral analysis assumes that demographic characteristics represent experiences with political socialization, if not direct political attitudes, this paper represents an effort to suggest the development of suburbs in the Asian context and to show the ways in which they are distinguished from both the core city and the rural countryside.<sup>3</sup>

One contribution of this appendix is the mapping of economic and social diversity to identify geographic or spatial patterns in the data. This can be done using a simple geographic information system (GIS) to manipulate the data. Such mapping offers a departure from conventional statistical analysis in that it is spatial and graphical, not just numerical and tabular. Patterns that emerge from this type of analysis provide an additional perspective on the data that is not easily apparent using tabular analysis alone. While the statistical methods used on the data may be the same as those applied in conventional quantitative analysis, the results can be displayed in geographic form that allows the analyst to see more clearly spatial patterns in the data, for example, whether or

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<sup>2</sup>For example, the area of Bangkok designated as Klongtoei contains some of the most elaborate homes and some of the most wretched slums.

<sup>3</sup> The ability to code suburban areas is a conundrum for the Asian Barometer. There is no clear concept of what constitutes a “suburb.” Thus, only a few of the country polls were able to provide data indicating suburban location.

not adjacent provinces have similar characteristics or how a given characteristic changes as it is compared across the provinces of a country.

Some of these characteristics also suggest that population centers are not the meccas of affluence and lifestyles often suggested in stereotypes. Rather, they imply a more heterogenous society in the core cities where affluence is mixed with poverty and deprivation in the aggregate. It is at the urban periphery where there exists more homogeneity of amenities and a more dynamic economy, also characteristics of suburbs in other societies.

## ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF VARIABLES FROM THE NATIONAL DATA OF THAILAND

Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis


Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Sources: National Statistical Office (Thailand), *Census of Population and Housing, 1990*;

VARIABLE	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
PCTMUN	.265	<b>.923</b>	-.099
PCTWATER	<b>.614</b>	<b>.571</b>	.039
POPDEN	.271	<b>.906</b>	.041
BANKDEP (PER 1000)	<b>.487</b>	<b>.855</b>	.065
CAR (PER 1000)	.195	<b>.949</b>	.047
TELEPH (PER 1000)	<b>.636</b>	<b>.723</b>	.053
PCTAGRI (HSLDS)	<b>-.843</b>	-.381	.045
PCTCRAFT (HSLDS)	<b>.909</b>	.171	.064
INDUSLABOR	<b>.857</b>	.043	.057
PCTMIG	<b>.807</b>	.341	-.056
GPP	<b>.794</b>	.385	.035
PCTHIED	<b>.674</b>	<b>.645</b>	-.066
INC (PERCAP)	<b>.673</b>	.491	.089
MINWAGE	<b>.773</b>	.391	.046
PCTELEC (HSLDS)	<b>.483</b>	.140	.186
PCTTV (HSLDS)	<b>.803</b>	.352	.027
CONTRACEP (15-45)	-.180	-.160	<b>.899</b>
PCTTOILET (HSLDS)	.448	.112	<b>.654</b>
LITERACY RATE	.221	.116	<b>.635</b>
PCT MUSLIM	.041	.005	<b>-.932</b>
PCT BUDDHIST	-.024	-.094	<b>.957</b>



**FIGURE 1: FACTOR OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE (FOUR CATEGORIES)**



**FIGURE 2: URBAN FACTOR SCORES**

