



A Comparative Survey of

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Modernization, Institutionalism, Traditionalism, and the
Development of Democratic Orientation in Rural China

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A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

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The civic culture appears to be particularly appropriate for a democratic political system. It is not the only form of democratic political culture, but it seems to be the one most congruent with a stable, democratic system.

----Almond & Verba (1963: 366)

The Questions

China has embarked on market-oriented reform for more than two decades. The implications of the resultant rapid socio-economic transformation for the evolution of its political system are of great theoretical and practical importance. The prospect of further political liberalization and eventual democratization in China will not only profoundly affect the livelihood of 1.3 billion Chinese people; it also holds the key to the future of democracy in Asia. The adaptability and resiliency of China's communist regime has so far made the region's overall environment much more hospitable for non-democratic regimes. Unless China itself embarks on a path of democratization, the prospects for a democratic breakthrough in many Asian countries within China's political and economic orbit remain extremely dim.

China's economic reform has planted many seeds of democratic changes. It has gradually deprived the regime of the ability to effectively control the society. At the same time, with the growing number of private enterprises, fewer and fewer people in China depend on the state for their bread. This newly acquired economic freedom has laid the foundation for political liberalization in Chinese society. Economic reform has also had a significant impact on the ability of the government to control media and information. The widespread use of the internet, email, and short messages via cellular phones has made it impossible for the government to monopolize information any longer.

Most political scientists consider that China is now at the early stage of political liberalization and has not yet reached the prelude of democratization. However, certain meaningful political experiments, albeit limited in scope, have been steadily introduced by the incumbent elite to cope with the acute challenge of local governance. The first is the introduction of semi-competitive elections to select deputies at the lower levels of people's congresses. This experiment carries significance because elected deputies to various levels of people's congress are increasingly allowed to assert certain independent power. In a growing number of instances, deputies to people's congresses have not only nominated their own

candidates for leadership positions but have also rejected CCP nominees. The National People's Congress (NPC) itself also has played a more and more important role in the political life of China (O'Brien, 1990a, 1994b, 1994c).

The most well known political change in China in recent years is the introduction of semi-competitive elections in rural China. In 1987, the NPC passed the Draft Organic Law of Village Committees which stipulates that the chairman, deputy chairman, and members of village committees should be elected by popular vote in China. The actual implementation of the law started in 1988. Although the promotion of village autonomy was setback in the wake of 1989, the Internal Affairs Department won back approval to promote village elections in 1992. As of the end of 1997, more than 90 percent of villages on the mainland have implemented direct elections. In 1995, Lishu county in Jilin Province was the first to implement the *Haixuanzhi* (elections without special restrictions on the candidates or electorate) which widened the scope of the electorate's voting rights, and was soon implemented as a pilot program in Gansu and Fujian Provinces. On November 4th, 1998, the 9th NPC Standing Committee brought the principles of "Democratic Elections," "Democratic Supervision," "Democratic Administration," and "Democratic Policy-Making" into the "Village Committee Organization Law," thus concluding the trial period of village autonomy and starting its formal execution (Lianhe Bao 2001). In addition to this, there appeared two case of direct election for town mayors in Sichuan Province in December of 1998, which later received the tacit approval of the CCP. Starting with Shenyang Province in 1999, elections for urban communities spread to other mainland provinces (Li Fan 2002).

At beginning, many local officials strongly opposed such political change while many ordinary peasants could not believe that the government would actually allow them to freely choose their leaders. However, as some empirical studies have shown, the majority of peasants began to realize the meaning and implication of their votes usually after three rounds of elections (Lianjiang & O'Brien, 1999; O'brien, 1994). Also, more recently, with the assistance from international organizations, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has improved and standardized electoral procedures to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for local officials to manipulate those elections (O'Brien & Lianjiang, 2000; Shi, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Although many Western observers see a gap between this system of grass-roots elections and a genuine democratic system, they also believe that such elections will eventually provide mainland China with an impetus for democratization.

The article focuses on analyzing and exploring whether China's political culture, in particular its civic culture, will eventually undergo some profound transformation as a consequences of the far-reaching and rapid economic, social and institutional

changes occurring in China. This article will define the concept of civic culture and, using empirical data from China including both individual-level and village-level data, and identify the key socioeconomic structural and institutional factors that drive change in political culture.

The Theory of Culture Shift

There are currently three main research paradigms in comparative politics explaining cultural change: modernization (or post-modernization) theory, institutional theory, and culturalist theory.

Modernization and Postmodernization

Modernization theory has been developing for over a century. The central claim of Modernization theory, from Karl Marx and Max Weber to Daniel Bell, is that economic, cultural and political changes go together in coherent patterns that change in predictable ways. (Inglehart, 1997: 7) Modernization theory was understood by some as a variant of structural explanations (Bratton & Mattes, 2003) because many Modernization theorists emphasized social mobility and location in modern parts of the social structure as the leading cause of cultural change (Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Pye, 1990). While there has been continuing debate over the causal linkages, many empirical findings do support the claim that socioeconomic development generates more modern attitudes and values -- greater tolerance and valuing of freedom, higher levels of political efficacy, and greater capacity to participate in politics and civic life (Diamond, 1999). The Postmodernization theory developed by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues agrees with the Modernization theorists on their central claim but differs from most Modernization theorists on four essential points: change is not linear; economic determinism is oversimplified; the rise of the West is not the only version of Modernization; and democracy is not inherent in the Modernization phase, but democracy does become increasingly likely as societies move beyond the Modernization phase into Postmodernization (Inglehart, 1997: 10-25). Inglehart and his colleagues have accumulated three decades of time-series data to demonstrate an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values, linked with rising levels of economic development (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Abramson, 1999). As economic development brings rising levels of tolerance, trust, political activism, and greater emphasis on freedom of speech (the components of what they defined as "Self-expression values"), it leads to growing mass demands for liberalization in authoritarian societies and to rising levels of direct mass participation in societies that are already democratic. Insofar as Postmaterialists give high priority to protecting freedom of speech and to participation in making important government decisions,

this trend should bring growing mass demands for democratization and dwindling demand for authoritarian order. China provides the most challenging as well as the most fertile testing ground for the Modernization/Postmodernization perspective because the rapid socio-economic transformation China has experienced over that last quarter century was unprecedented in human history. Besides, during China's economic reform, the country also witnessed the glaring regional disparity between the coastal provinces and the heartland.

In short, according to modernization theory, a decline in traditional social values and an increase in modern values (including those of civic culture, democratic orientation) will result from economic and social modernization, in particular through increasing social mobility, participation in economic activity, and cognitive mobilization brought about by mass communications. Modernization and its effect on value change can supercede differing cultural systems and the transition experiences of different political systems. It can influence both Confucian cultural areas and non-Confucian areas, and both societies experiencing rapid democratic transition and those whose transitions are either slow or have not yet materialized. Other things being equal, modernization has led to a trend in global convergence of value orientations.

Institutionalism

A standard theoretical argument based on a neo-Institutionalist perspective would posit that people develop certain orientations toward democracy as well as non-democratic regimes as a *consequence* of the organizing principles of formal and informal institutions: specifically, the incentives, disincentives and habits created by the rules embedded in differing forms of political institutions (Bratton & Mattes, 2003; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Muller & Seligson, 1994; Norris, 1999; Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth, 1992). Participation in formal procedures like voting, working for parties or candidates, attending election rallies, attending community meetings, joining with others to raise issues or contacting elected leaders can have an educative effect increasing interest and efficacy (Finkel, 1987) as well as building support for democracy (Bratton et al, 1999; Finkel, Sabatine & Bevis, 2000). Also, membership in civic organizations may shape build up social capital and cooperative practices and organizational and communicative skills that individuals apply in other and larger political arenas (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995; McDonough, Shin & Moises, 1998; Nie, Powell & Prewitt, 1969; Putnam, 1993; Shin, 1999). The historical institutionalist perspective, in particular, emphasizes the socializing effects of institutions in shaping citizens' preferences or even identity over time (Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth, 1992). Practicing democracy over time would help citizens

develop a new and longer term perspective on judging democracy, based on an appreciation of the intrinsic nature of democracy rather than its consequences.

In short, according to institutional theory, institutions guide political behavior in such a way that after a certain period of time they also help determine changes in attitude and values. Grass-roots elections on the mainland have provided new opportunities for political participation because supposedly the practice of grassroots democracy would induce value change over time. Civic culture shall strengthen along with increasing experience in democratic participation, while at the same time, civic or democratic culture will be more valued in conjunction with high satisfaction with, or a high participation rate in, democratic process.

Culturalist

An alternative explanation of attitudes toward democracy proceeds from values that are culturally embedded and socially received (Almond & Verba, 1963a, 1980b). The touchstone of culturalist theory is the postulate of oriented action: actors do not respond directly to “situations” but respond to them through mediating “orientations.” What divides culturalist and other theoretical perspectives involves the issue of later-in-life learning, or re-socialization. Culturalists argue from a postulate of “cumulative” socialization that privileges early learning, or what psychologists mean by “primacy”. Prior learning is a basis for later learning, and therefore early learning not only conditions later learning but the beliefs learned early also are much more resistant to change. Exceptionally great forces are needed to induce great changes in these basic orientations. Eckstein, for example, describes the most likely cultural changes as pattern maintaining change (1988).

For more than a decade, scholars and policymakers have vigorously debated liberal democracy’s suitability for and compatibility with the populaces of East Asia (Fukuyama, 1995a, 2003b). To explain why so many East Asian countries have failed to complete the democratic transformation of their authoritarian or totalitarian communist states, many scholars and policymakers turn to the region’s Confucian political culture and traditions (Emerson, 1995; Hu, 1997; Hua, 2001; Huntington, 1991; Pye, 1985; Tamney, 1995; Zakaria, 2003). Paradoxically, their view is echoed by defenders of Asian values who have claimed that Western-style liberal democracy is neither suitable for nor compatible with Confucian East Asia, where collective welfare, a sense of duty, and other principles of Confucian moral philosophy run deep in people’s consciences (Lee, 1998; Barr, 2000). Even the political system of a given Asian country might become formally democratized, the new democracy would still carry many illiberal characteristics due to the slow acquisition of liberal democratic values and beliefs among its elite and populace (Zakaria 2003).

Previous Efforts in Testing the Three Competing Theories

The three perspectives are competing with each other. According to culturalist theory, value change in Confucian societies, such as China, would have been rather slow and uneven, regardless the transformative forces of modernization and globalization or the effects of democratic practice. For ordinary citizens, values that are more compatible with traditional values, such as equality, might be relatively easy to acquire. Certain liberal values not so compatible with traditional values, such as individualism, pluralism, and rule of law, would be more difficult to make their way into the prevailing value structure. In contrast, both the Modernization and the Institutional perspectives would postulate that the rapid socio-economic modernization, especially in the coastal provinces, and the practicing of grassroots democracy would be conducive to the growth of popular demand for greater scope of freedom, political participation and popular accountability.

There are a plethora of philosophical studies examining the linkage between Confucian values and the universality of human rights and basic democratic norms or their absence (Bell, 2000; Donnelly, 1999; Leary, 1990; Tamney & Chang 2002; Tremewan, 1993a; Tu, Hejmanek, and Wachman, 1992). However, with a few exceptions, empirical studies that systematically explore how Asian values actually affect the development of civic culture in Confucian East Asia are quite scarce. Most of the political science literature is based on anecdotal or impressionistic accounts of political attitudes and behavior among the masses and political leaders (Huntington, 1996; Pye, 1985; Scalapino, 1989). A systematic exploration requires both a conceptual scheme for measuring culture-specific traditional social values that people acquired during pre-adult life and a coherent conceptual framework for a cross-system and cross-time comparison of political culture.

Since late 1970s, Prof. Fu Hu and his colleagues pioneered the view that system culture, i.e., value orientations toward the normative principles that govern the organization of political power and authority in a society, should be the pillar of the political culture approach and that the existing literature on political culture places too much emphasis on what Almond termed process culture (1980), such as efficacy, compromise, trust, and tolerance. The Taiwan team has developed an original battery measuring the popular orientation toward political regime around five dimensions: *political equality, popular accountability, political liberalism, political pluralism and separation of power (or horizontal accountability)*, also known as five democratic value-orientations towards power (Chu and Hu 1996).¹

¹ For an elaboration on the conceptual underpinning of the five-dimensional measure, please refer to Appendix 1.

Anchoring on these five key dimensions of democratic vs. authoritarian value orientations, Fu Hu, Yun-han Chu, Huo-yan Shyu and their colleagues have tracked the evolution of political culture in Taiwan over more than two decades, covering the entire span of the island's regime transition, from the weakening of authoritarianism to the completion of the democratic transition (Chu and Hu 1996; Shin and Shyu 1998; Chu and Chang 2002). They found that the acquisition of pro-democratic value orientations along the five dimensions has been uneven, suggesting the lingering influence of traditional values. Support for political equality was high from the beginning, and endorsement of popular accountability rose dramatically from 1984 to 1993 (as did belief in political pluralism, even though it remained rather low). Their data also show that by the late 1990s substantial segments of Taiwan's public still manifested the fear of disorder and preference for communal harmony over individual freedom that Lucian Pye takes to be generally characteristic of Asian attitudes toward power and authority. Yet, they also note the generally steady increase since democratization began in the mid-1980s in the proportions of the public expressing pro-democratic value orientations and rejecting the paternalistic, collectivist, illiberal norms associated with the Asian values perspective.

This approach was later on applied to the comparative study of political culture among three Chinese societies, Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China.² Based on our comparative survey conducted between summer 1993 and spring 1994, we found that in Hong Kong, there was an overwhelming acceptance of popular accountability and political liberty values. 69.2% of the respondents answer "strongly disagree" or "disagree" (8.9% and 60.3% respectively) to the popular accountability vs. dependency on authority question. 63.2% of the respondents answer "strongly disagree" or "disagree" (6.5% and 56.7% respectively) to the political liberty question. Popular acceptance of political equality and political pluralism is also quite high, 49.2% and 48.9% respectively. In Taiwan, there was a majority acceptance of political equality and popular accountability values, 55.7% and 55.8% respectively. More significantly, respondents answering "strongly disagree" or "disagree" outnumber those who answer "agree" and "strongly agree" almost by 2:1 ratio. Popular acceptance of political liberty value was also quite high. However, there was a substantial portion of electorate on Taiwan held reservation about both separation of

² This project, titled "Comparative Study of Political Culture and Political Participation in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" is a collaborative effort among nine principal investigators, Fu Hu, Yun-han Chu, Andrew Nathan, James Tong, Hsin-chi Kuan, Siu-kai Lau, Tianjian Shi, Ming-tong Chen and Huo-yan Shyu. Under the project, a core questionnaire was implemented in the three localities between summer 1993 and spring 1994. In all three localities, territory-wide stratified samples based on the PPS (probability proportional to size) criterion were drawn. Our Hong Kong survey yields 892 valid cases, the Taiwan survey 1402 cases, and the mainland survey 3296 cases. All three samples are sufficiently large, relative to their respective degree of demographic heterogeneity.

power and political pluralism (please refer to Appendix 1 for the exact wording the six questions asked).

Mainland China, with her vast rural population registered very low level of support of all five value dimensions. The contrast between rural China and the China as a whole is substantial on all five items, in particular on the score of political liberty, where urban China registered comparable level support with Taiwan. In urban China, the acceptance of separation of power and political liberty is relatively high, 46.7% and 43.7% respectively.³ On both scores, respondents in urban China were way above the national average, 31.8% and 21.7%.

Overall speaking, there exists a rough positive rank-order correlation between the level of socio-economic development and the popular acquisition of democratic value-orientation among the three. Hong Kong, being the economically most advanced and most urbanized society, registered the highest level of support on most of the democratic value-orientation items (three out of five). The mainland China, being the economically most backward and least urbanized society, registered the lowest level of support on most of the democratic value-orientation items (four out of five). However, there was one glaring exception to this general pattern. The acceptance of separation of power and political pluralism by the general public in urban China was higher than the general public in Taiwan. On the principle of separation of power, respondents in urban China had a higher probability acquiring pro-democratic value-orientation than that of both Hong Kong and Taiwan. The most plausible explanation for this puzzling discrepancy lies in differences in political experiences. People in Taiwan, and increasingly in Hong Kong, have experienced the assertiveness of legislatures over the executive and its resultant slow-down of decision-making process at both national and local levels. In China, the National People's Congress and people's congress at local level have never asserted the same kind of assertiveness (and hence a least obstructive political actor) in its political functioning.

Based on the three competing theoretical perspectives discussed earlier, the observed divergence as well as convergence in civic culture across the three Chinese societies could be attributed to at least three categories of explanatory variables -- their shared cultural heritage, the impact of political institutions and the impact of socio-economic modernization. Among the three, the impact of socio-economic development was most visible on aggregate level, while the effect of political learning under different institutional contexts also was evident in explaining the exceptionally

³ The mainland sample is sufficient large for statistically meaningful analysis of its sub-samples. In our analysis, we singled out respondents with urban household registration to create a "urban China" sub-sample (N=704). It is assumed that this sub-sample represents the most modernized segment of the vast Chinese population.

low level of acceptance for separation for power in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

For our 1993-1994 survey, we also examined the impact of socio-economic attribute on political culture at the individual level. The patterns of correlation are strikingly comparable across the four groups, Taiwan, Hong Kong, urban China and rural China. Level of education consistently exerted the most significant impact on the transformation of political culture at the individual level. Generally speaking, the higher the educational level, the more likely one acquires pro-democratic value-orientation. Age was the second the most significant explanatory variable across three Chinese societies. Its effects were, by and large, a mirror image of the education variable due to the fact that age and educational level are negatively correlated. If education approximates a process of social and economic empowerment at the individual level, our previous analysis suggested that socio-economic development tends to promote the growth of pro-democratic value-orientation across all Chinese societies regardless the difference in their political systems. This also means that traditional social values did not seem to hinder the growth of democratic legitimacy as the three societies becomes more industrialized and urbanized (Chu 1995; Chang and Chu 2001).

Our previous study, however, represents a very limited test of the three competing theoretical perspectives. First, we had only one cross-sectional data set from China and any extrapolation from this snapshot of popular orientations and attitudes for a dynamic understanding of the long-term impact of traditional values, socializing effects of political institution and the transformative power of modernization on political culture is heroic at best. Next, it is intrinsically difficult to capture the impact of political institutions with a limited number of country cases, the typical Small-N problem in comparative politics. Since regime characteristics are system-level variables, variances exist only across political systems but not among individual under the same regime. Thus, our preliminary findings are liable to the fallacy of ecological inference. Third, the socio-economic traits measured at individual level capture only some aspects of the socio-economic conditions individuals found themselves in. They are not a good approximation of the immediate social-economic environment under which people actually live and work. In this sense, the impact of socio-economic modernization on value changes was not fully specified.

An Improved Research Design

To overcome the above methodological shortcomings, during our last China survey, we had a built-in design for cross-level analysis. Although our 2002 China survey was a part of a larger cross-regional survey, known as East Asia Barometer Survey, an extensive array of China-specific questions was designed around village

elections by taking into account China's unique structural and institutional parameters.⁴ This design allowed us to answer the questions: First, how and to what extent have democracy in village committees in general and village election in particular planted the seeds of democracy among Chinese citizens in rural areas? Second, will these seeds, in turn, transform citizens' individual political values and attitudes in favour of greater democracy at higher levels.

More importantly, our design tried to capitalize on the huge differences in the basic demographic, social, economic conditions as well as institutional contexts of villages across rural China. It has been well documented that there exist wide diversity in the formal institutional arrangements for the electoral process and in the ways they are implemented in practice. Even within the same province, the specific local structural and institutional conditions might differ significantly from one village to another. To take the advantage of this diversity, we implemented a parallel survey on village-level characteristics. For each of the randomly selected villages, we normally interviewed five to eight villagers. At the same time, our fieldworkers approached the village committee for filling out a village survey questionnaire. This village survey questionnaire documented the macro-level traits as well as aggregate statistics of the village as a whole, such as geographical and demographic profile, lineage structure and kinship networks, economic activities and conditions, fiscal data, history of village elections, village electoral institutions, party recruitment procedures, backgrounds of political elites, and other aggregate information about the village. This two-pronged approach enable us not only to control for variation in village-level contextual variables but also to carry out cross-level analysis and ecological inference in the most rigorous way, something that has never been tried in the field of China studies.

Our latest nation-wide survey yielded 3,183 valid cases in total. Among them, village-level survey data are available for 1,202 cases scattering around 241 villages, which account for about 94% of our total 256 sampled villages across China. This unique sub-sample represents a miniature of China's the rural population. The integration of individual-level data with village-level socio-economic as well as institutional traits allows us to conduct a most rigorous test of the three competing theoretical perspective while searching for an explanation for how traditional culture, political institution and modernization interact to influence democratic value change and the development of civic culture.

Explaining the Growth of Democratic Orientation during China's Reform Era

⁴ Please refer to Appendix 3 for a brief introduction of East Asia Barometer and a non-technical note on the survey methodology.

To simplify our analytical task, we first condense our multiple-item battery into a composite index reflecting the overall level of democratic value orientations of individual citizens. As a standard procedure, we apply a dichotomous IRT analysis to formulate the variable of democratic orientation (Bock, Gibbons, and Muraki, 1988). With the procedures of dimensionality tests, item selection, and scaling, six indicators are chosen to form a continuous IRT scale, of which all of the 64 response patterns are identified and scaled.⁵ Missing values can be estimated by weighting closed response patterns with the endorsement rates of the six items. The result can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2.

[Tables 1 and 2 are about here]

Before trying to explain the variation of democratic orientation among villagers in rural China, we use the same scale to measure the mean level of democratic orientation of our 1993 dataset and compare it with the statistical distribution of our 2002 survey. The result in Table 3 shows that Chinese citizens' democratic orientation has grown stronger overall. In the rural subsamples, the score has risen from the mean of -0.5125 in 1993 to the mean of -0.3270 in 2002. In the urban subsamples, the score is also rising from the mean of -0.2078 to the mean of 0.0948, i.e., moving into the positive territory. Although the pace of change looks like glacier movement, but the magnitude of change is actually quite significant on an -2 to +2 scale. The magnitude of increase among both rural and urban residents is statistically significant at the level of $\alpha = 0.001$. More interestingly, rural people's democratic orientation in 2002 is approaching the level of urban people in 1993.

[Table 3 is here]

The above finding indicates that the level of democratic orientation of Chinese citizens has indeed risen over the last decade. But to what extent we can attribute the increase to the decade-long practices of grassroots democracy as Institutionalism claims? Among the three competing explanatory sources, which one has more explanatory power? Finally, if the three paradigms are not mutually exclusive but interrelated, how should we specify the causal chain underlying the changes in democratic orientation by identifying the relative importance of political institution, modernization, and traditional social values?

In the following, we approach these analytical issues with a two-level research

⁵ In our 2002 survey, altogether eight indicators were employed to measure democratic value-orientations. Two indicators were not chosen for the current exercise because their relatively low factor loading on the first factor.

design. At first level, the unit of our analysis is village, the primary geographic and administrative domain of grassroots democracy in China today. At this level, we utilize the data from our village survey to construct five system-level variables, Village-Level Education, Infrastructure, Ownership, Institutionalization, and Village-Level Traditionalism. The first three variables reveal the level of socio-economic development of the village. The next variable reveals the level of institutional development in the area of grassroots democracy. The last one reveals the micro cultural milieu in which a villager is situated.

For instance, Village-Level Education is defined as the percentage of the population who have a technical/vocational school or above education in a village. “Infrastructure” indicates how many modern infrastructures, such as cable TV, tap water, asphalt-paved road, etc., are available (please refer to Appendix 2 for details). “Ownership” indicates the existence of large-scale private enterprise, suggesting that private entrepreneurship is flourishing in a given village. Village-Level Traditionalism is defined as the average score on “Traditionalism” battery of all the respondents in the village.⁶ “Institutionalization” measures the “democraticness” of the existing institutional arrangements and procedures for conducting village election. A village can qualify as a democratic system if the existing institutional arrangements meet all following criteria:

- (1) Multi-candidate election;
- (2) Members of the village election leadership group are chosen by villager’s assembly or villager’s representatives;
- (3) Candidates are nominated by villagers, self-nomination, or Haixuan;
- (4) Official candidates are decided by villagers or villager’s representatives.

Corresponding to the three theoretical perspectives, we use these five village-level variables to capture three kinds of macro-level mechanisms that constitute the immediate context in which individual are situated. Village-Level Education, Infrastructure, and Ownership variables define the level of modernization as defined by the modernization perspective, Institutionalization corresponds to the institutionalist perspective, and Village-Level Traditionalism corresponds to the

⁶ The “Traditionalism” battery taps into the prevailing traditional social values in East Asian societies that stressed social hierarchy based on filial piety and seniority, avoidance of open conflict and group primacy. Please refer to the Appendix 4 for the exact wording of the items used in the “Traditionalism” battery. Regarding the measurement, in order to reduce the correlation between individual- and village-level Traditionalism, we take the mean of the Traditionalism measurement at the county level but treat it as the village-level measurement. Some may doubt whether this measurement is valid, but we believe that using 20-30 observations instead of 5-8 observations to capture the micro cultural milieu is more reliable. As a matter of fact, while we lose some information of the within-county variation, county level is more suitable than village level to measure cultural variables in that county has always been the basic administrative as well as cultural (or even dialectical) unit in the Chinese history.

culturalist perspective.

At the next level, our unit of analysis is individual villager. To unravel the macro-micro relationship within a two-level framework, we identify three basic individual-level explanatory variables, education, political participation and traditionalism score, conceptually parallel to the three kinds of macro-level mechanisms identified earlier. Besides, we include three additional explanatory variables the supplement the three basic explanatory variables.

The first variable is Interest in Politics, a subjective measurement of political involvement. We consider this variable to be an alternative to the objective measurement (based on participatory actions) because it may yield more reliable information about the level of spontaneous political participation, rather than mobilized participations.⁷

The second variable is Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy, which may be an important factor intervening variable between Village-Level Institutionalization and people's democratic orientation. In our survey, many villages are situated in the remote and backward areas. People may not truly understand the meaning of democracy but somehow manage to shape their own definition of democracy through the implementation of grassroots democracy. We believe different cognitive processes, based on the villager's actual experiences, would affect their views about what democracy is and whether certain democratic principles are desirable. It is reasonable to expect that if competitive village election becomes more institutionalized, villagers will evaluate the performance of village self-governing more positively. This will, in turn, enhance their democratic value orientations. However, we should not rule out the possibility that the causal link may be reversed if villagers have developed specific political orientation and then affect their evaluation about performance of grassroots democracy.

Lastly, we decide to add Progovernment Inclination to the model because villager's evaluation of grassroots democracy and democratic orientation both are likely to be driven by their psychological attachment to the existing political regime, i.e., the CCP regime. No doubt, the political propaganda of the CCP did have a great influence on people's political opinions in the past, especially in the rural areas where alternative sources of information are not readily available. If the CCP's political propaganda still persists and works, villagers may still hold strong psychological attachment to the system. Without specifying this factor, our findings may be

⁷ Except for the item V33a, the distribution of the responses in other items is highly skewed to the "Never" answer. Therefore most of the variance in the variable of Political Participation comes from V33a, which asked people how often they participate in election meetings. We suspect this item may not truly represent people's actual participation since village cadres usually mobilized villagers to attend such meetings.

confounded by two different causal links; villagers may give a positive evaluation to grassroots democracy by his experiential or cognitive standpoint, or they may just give a positive evaluation to whatever governing practice the government endorses, including the practices of village self-governing.

Finally, in our multivariate analysis, we also control for three socio-economic background variables, i.e., age, gender and subjective economic situation, which are the “usual suspects” in a fully specified model for explaining the acquisition of democratic orientation (please refer to Appendix 2 for detailed information on how each variable is constructed).

As for model specification, we firstly specify two direct contextual effects of Village-Level Institutionalization and Modernization which are positively associated to democratic orientation. However, to corroborate the culturalist argument in a more rigorous way, we must specify a cultural intervening variable such as Traditionalism that mediates the macro-level sociological impact of democratic institutions and the process of modernization onto the individual level. Therefore, it is posited that democratic orientation increases as traditional culture is fading away. Corresponding to the three paradigms, our three explanatory variables at the individual level are designed to capture within-system effects and purge out spurious contextual relationships that might be ascribed to system-level effects.

We deliberately set up the individual-level relationships as simple as possible. All the individual-level independent variables are hypothesized related to democratic orientation. Nonetheless, Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy is also specified as an intervening variable that mediates the effect of Institutionalization as discussed earlier. Particularly we want to test whether this variable will affect democratic orientation, or the reversed causal link is also present.

As we are dealing with multiple indicators and complex structural relationships, we apply Mplus to conduct a structural equation analysis to distinguish different path effects. We are fully aware of the possibility of arriving at very poor indicators of model fit initially and the practical need to proceed with model modification. To reduce the data-driven problem, all of the modifications are based on the following two principles:⁸

- (1) Only Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy and Individual-Level Traditionalism are allowed to be explained by other individual-level variables. These two variables in our model are key intervening attitudinal variables. We think they are very complicated and it is reasonable to specify additional hypotheses such as the negative relationship between Education and

⁸ No attempt is made to pursue the search of the best model. We admit the arbitrariness of the two principles, but this is a part of structural equation analysis. We try to explain the reason behind our modifications and make the procedure as transparent as possible.

Individual-Level Traditionalism as well as the positive relationship between Subjective SES and Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy. If these unspecified relationships really matter, Mplus should show a large modification index to suggest possible improvement in model fit. The largest index is chosen in each modification step.

- (2) Considering the problem of poor fit and over fit, the modification proceeds until the model fit is acceptable while possible improvement based on the first principle is available. The acceptable standard is stipulated as around CFI=0.95, TLI=0.9, RMSEA=0.05, and SRMR=0.08. It is more desirable if CFI and TLI are higher and RMSEA and SRMR are lower. If no modification is possible, we report the findings after the last modification is made and caution readers that our findings only have heuristic values. We change the default value of the modification index in Mplus from 10 to 4 to increase the possible choices of modification.

[Figure 1 is here]

The overall specification of our model is illustrated in Figure 1. At the village level, we hypothesize that Institutionalization and Modernization are positively related to democratic orientation according to institutionalism and modernization theory, and that Traditionalism is inversely related to democratic orientation according to culturalist arguments. Traditionalism as a cultural variable contrasts to institutionalization of democracy and socio-economic modernization and therefore is inversely related to both, but intuitively the level of institutionalization and modernization are exogenous to cultural change. At the individual level, education, traditionalism, and political participation are corresponding to the arguments of modernization theory, culturalist explanation, and institutionalism. The expected path effects are the same with their village-level counterparts. We do not specify the sign of the control variables, but young, male, higher educated people are expected to have stronger democratic orientation. Furthermore, more political participation, more interest in politics, and less pro-government inclination are all assumed to be associated with stronger democratic orientation.

Finally, as the two intervening variables, Individual-Level Traditionalism is assumed to be mediating the effect of Village-Level Traditionalism and results in inhibiting the growth of democratic orientation. Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy is assumed to be mediating the effect of Institutionalization and then result in strengthening democratic orientation. An endogenous relationship is specified between Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy and Democratic Orientation for reasons mentioned before.

The Empirical Findings

As can be seen in Table 4, the result of our structural equation analysis shows that the original model does not enjoy good fit. CFI and TLI are too low (0.75 and 0.615) and RMSEA is too high (0.063). When we follow the two principles to proceed with modification, it is clear that the poor fit is associated with the under-specification of explanatory variables for Individual-level Traditionalism and Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy. Six modification steps are made in total and the final model has fit statistics CFI=0.941, TLI=0.896, RMSEA=0.033, and SRMR=0.025, which all approach or pass the standard of reasonable fit set up earlier. Therefore we can focus on the result of the final model illustrated in Figure 2.

[Table 4 is here]

[Figure 2 is here]

The first finding suggests that the measurement model fits our expectation very well. The percentage of population with technical (vocational) school education or above (Highedu), whether any of the four biggest enterprises is privately owned (Ownership), and the availability of modern infrastructures (Infrastructure) are all significantly correlated to the latent variable of Modernization. In addition, Modernization by itself has a direct contextual effect on democratic orientation. The negative relationship to Village-Level Traditionalism is also corroborated and this finding suggests that the level of socio-economic development does have impact on traditional values and democratic orientation as hypothesized.

With regard to the causal mechanism of value changes, Village-Level Traditionalism does shape Individual-Level Traditionalism and then leads to weaker democratic orientation. The positive impact of Institutionalization on Village-Level Traditionalism is seemingly counter-intuitive. On surface, it suggests that highly institutionalized village election might actually induce the persistence of traditional value system. However, this positive relationship could be just spurious because it might be the epiphenomenon of the fact that competitively village election has been implemented relatively speaking more successfully and more extensively in economically less-developed areas than more prosperous region for reasons beyond the scope of our model specification.⁹

⁹ Our seemingly counter-intuitive findings actually corroborate the these of Jean Oi (1996: 140), who observed that there have been more successful models of grassroots democracy in the economic backwater than in the more prosperous coastal provinces. She suspects that both local officials and villagers in the poorer areas were more perceptive to experimenting new institutions, such as village

Another causal chain of Institutionalization, through Subjective Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy, is corroborated and easier to interpret. Unlike the change of culture such as the decline in Village-Level Traditionalism, evaluative opinions can be formed in a short-period of time and change people's attitudes as to whether such institutions perform well or whether they embrace them. Our finding suggests that the implementation of grassroots democracy is associated with villager's positive evaluation and this, in turn, enhances their democratic orientation. Nevertheless, we also found a reversed causal relationship between the two attitudinal variables. This means if villagers have developed higher democratic orientation prior to their experiences with grassroots democracy, this predisposition tends to induce negative evaluation of the performance of grassroots democracy. This countervailing reciprocal effect makes much sense if we consider the strongly negative effects of pro-government inclination and mobilized political participation on democratic orientation because the two effects possibly reflect the consequence of political mobilization or the impact of political propaganda. If people have a higher expectation about democracy, they will not be satisfied with the limited grassroots democracy practiced today, not to mention the strong presence of elite mobilization manipulation.

Except the findings mentioned above, we find that only Age exhibits statistically significant explanatory power in accounting for democratic orientation. The younger the villagers, the stronger the democratic orientation. An observation can be made if we summarize the findings related to democratic orientation. As Figure 2 shows, the three unexpected findings (marked with an asterisk) all can be explained if we put the pictures altogether. Institutionalization does exert positive impact on democratic orientation, but this is not a direct contextual effect of institution by itself, nor a mediating effect through the decline of Traditionalism. It is villagers' opinion about the performance of grassroots democracy under the influence of various factors that counts. If we examine closely what other factors affect villager's evaluation of grassroots democracy, we find that pro-government inclination, subjective evaluation of short-economic situation, and interest in politics all positively related. From this finding, we are more confident to argue that there are two mechanism contributed to evaluation of grassroots democracy but with different ramifications. The first mechanism is associated with autonomous political participation or political efficacy through the experience of democracy. The positive effect of Interest in Politics at the

self-governing, in the hope that the new mechanisms might stimulate economic development. On the other hand, cadres in the more prosperous region were more reluctant to implement competitive village election as they were content with the status quo. Tao Ran and Liu Mingxing (Tao and Liu 2003) also suggest that in the more prosperous region more villages have become *de facto* administrative units of the township government or the village affairs are monopolized by a few resourceful elite.

individual level and Institutionalization at the village level both suggest this mechanism. The second mechanism, on the other hand, is associated with psychological attachment to current political system and personal well-being. The former can be conceived as the trickle-down effect of overall regime support while the latter can be understood as a rational short-term calculation.

Finally, we do find that Individual-Level Traditionalism exerts a strong mediating effect from Village-Level Traditionalism to democratic orientation in our model. In addition, Individual-Level Traditionalism is also explained by Gender, Education, and Interest in Politics, and these findings are all easily interpretable. In brief, female, less educated, and villagers with less interest in politics all tend to have a higher level of Traditionalism than others.

Discussion

At the village level, our findings in the last section indicate that the three perspectives, Institutionalism, Modernization theory, and Culturalist theory, are all indispensable in formulating a full explanatory account of the steady growth of democratic orientation in rural China. Institutionalists are right about the experiential and learning process that grassroots democracy brings to villagers and contributes to the rise of democratic orientation through a two-step causal mechanism. First, villagers develop a positive evaluation of the performance of grassroots democracy when they experience a more “democratic” village electoral process. Next, a positive evaluation leads to stronger democratic orientation. This is a very significant finding because it not only corroborates a key hypothesis of the Institutionalism but also raises the hope that the introduction of competitive village election is inductive to the development of civic culture in general and democratic orientation in particular over the long run. However, there are two caveats. First, villagers’ evaluation of the performance of grassroots democracy is also affected by many other factors and not all of them are related to democratic experiences. So the impact of more institutionalized village election could be qualified by either villagers’ attachment to the existing political system or their satisfaction with their economic condition. A bright side of this multiple causality is that people will rationally make their evaluation of the grassroots political system according to their economic interest. However, a less sanguine implication is that villages might content with the existing “grassroots democracy” with all its shortfalls and limitations as long as they maintain a strong attachment toward the CCP regime. The latter could be manipulated by the incumbent regime through government-sponsored socialization and political control over information flows, albeit with a declining level of effectiveness.

Next, villagers holding stronger democratic orientation tend to have more

negative evaluation of the grassroots democracy opening up a much more complicated two-way causal relationship. If villagers have too much expectation about grassroots democracy, they may find the reality is not very satisfactory according to their knowledge of what democracy is like and should be. The distinction of the three reasons behind the evaluation of grassroots democracy is important because they will decide not only how strongly people support democracy, but also what kind of democracy they really support.

Modernization theorist's perspective apparently yields the strongest explanatory power without much surprise. First it exhibits significant direct contextual effect on the acquisition of democratic orientation while individual's age and education being held constant. This suggests that the process of modernization brings about both cognitive and social mobilization by making available new information about the outside world, more access to market transaction and job opportunities, and more frequent contact with complex modern organizations. Most of these transformative effects were not fully captured by the explanatory power of education background or age at individual level. In the mean time, modernization exerts attenuating effect on traditional value system, which in turns weaken individual's adherence to traditional social values. Both causal links are well-corroborated in our model.

Culturalists are right about that Traditionalism does stand in the way of developing stronger democratic orientation at the individual level. At the same time, the process of modernization also induces stronger democratic orientation through a complex causal chain of cultural changes as stipulated by Culturalists. In this sense, traditional social values mediate the impact of modernization on democratic values. But contrary to the Culturalist's claim, this is not the only causal mechanism, not even the primary one, by which modernization could shape individual's political values. This qualification is also evident in the positive effect of Interest in Politics on democratic orientation. Furthermore, traditional social values are not immutable to social changes. This means, over the long term, traditional social values do not seem to be a major hindrance to the development of democratic value orientation among villagers.

Conclusion

Our cross-level analysis put the three competing theoretical perspectives to the most rigorous empirical test to date. Our empirical findings lend strong support to Modernization theory. Rapid socio-economic changes brought about by economic reform have had positive influence on the growth of democratic orientation among Chinese citizens. Our model also provides partial supporting evidences for both Culturalist and Institutional perspectives. However, we identify some complicated

causal relationships suggesting that the three perspectives are not incompatible. The corroboration of Culturalist's argument actually enhance the general validity of modernization theory in that the decline of Traditionalism from the village to individual level does explain the significant increase of democratic orientation. Overall speaking, our findings offer a more optimistic picture than proponents of Asian Values suggest.

At the same time, the introduction of grassroots democracy and its gradual institutionalization have had positive influence on the growth of democratic orientation among Chinese citizens although this influence is mediated through citizen's satisfaction toward the grassroots democratic system. So quality of democratic governance matters as much as the electoral process itself. Our findings supports the view that the introduction of village elections and other mechanisms of popular accountability at grassroots level (such as the introduction to public hearing system and competitive election for electing deputies of local people's congress), albeit quite limited in scope as yet, will lead to growing demand for democratic opening at higher level and eventually provide mainland China with an impetus for democratization.

Some people might argue that exactly for the reason identified above the communist leaders will be very cautious about or even hesitant at introducing popular direct election above village level (or community level in the urban area). However, the CCP leaders would find themselves caught in a dilemma. Without installing new and more extensive avenue of interest articulation and representation and mechanism of vertical and horizontal accountability, they won't be able to overcome the mounting challenge and governance as the social actors become more pluralistic and resourceful and the task of governing become much more complex in an increasingly market-oriented and globalized economy. They might be compelled to initiate political reform despite of their undesirable (and unintended) consequences and seek to manage political control through various ways of manipulation. In a nutshell, our analysis offers a ray of hope for the prospect of China's further political liberalization and eventual democratization as the momentum of socio-economic modernization continues to go strong.

Appendix 1

Constructing a scale for measuring a five-dimensional democratic vs. authoritarian value orientation toward political regime

Prof. Fu Hu and his colleagues conceptualize democratic vs. authoritarian value orientations toward regime legitimacy as the value orientation toward the normative principles that govern the organization of political power and authority in a society. These deeper values normative commitments lay the basis for the formation of evaluative attitude toward regime legitimacy, and support for the incumbent. A legitimacy orientation always consists of two components -- desirability and feasibility. To regard some norms legitimate means they are deemed not just preferable but also realizable or achievable.

The organizing principle of a political regime consists of three basic dimensions: 1) The legitimate power relationship among members of the political community. 2) The legitimate power relationship between the authorities and citizens. 3) The legitimate power relationship among the government authorities themselves. The value orientation toward political equality corresponds to the first dimension. It is a set of belief that all member of the political community should be equal and entitled to the same citizen rights regardless race, gender, education, religion, class, social-economic background, political affiliation, and etc. In contrast, in some societies a majority of people might believe in a hierarchical and/or exclusionary order than an equalitarian/inclusionary political order, and it is widely accepted as legitimate that certain groups are privileged and others should and can be disfranchised or discriminated against. The value orientation toward separation of power (or horizontal accountability) corresponds to the third dimension. It is a set of belief that governing authority should be divided among various branches of government and a good-order polity is achieved through a design of horizontal accountability, i.e., check-and-balance. In contrast, in some societies people may believe in the necessity and the desirability of the supremacy of executive power or the fusion of legislative, executive and judicial authority. The value orientation toward political liberty, pluralism and popular accountability corresponds to the second dimension. The second dimension should be tapped by more than one set of belief because conceptually it can be subdivided into three subdimensions: 1) The value orientation toward political liberty is a set of belief that there are certain legitimate realm of individual freedom and liberty which should be free from state intrusion and regulation; 2) The value orientation toward pluralism is a set of belief that there should be a legitimate realm of civil society in which the civic organizations can

freely constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements for expressing themselves and advancing their interests without state interference, and lastly, 3) The value orientation toward popular accountability refers to a set belief that government authority should be accountable to the people and that there should be some effective means for popular control and consent. In contrast, in some societies people might believe that the realm of individual liberty should be suppressed to the minimum, civil society must be subject to state guidance and control, and the assertion of popular control over authority is unacceptable and even dangerous. Thus, we build our measures of legitimacy orientation toward regime around five essential elements of democratic norms, in Professor Hu Fu's original formulation the five dimensions of democratic value-orientation towards power¹⁰:

1. Political equality
2. Popular accountability
3. Political liberty
4. Political pluralism
5. Separation of power

What distinguishes our approach from others (Booth and Seligson, 1986; Dalton, 1991) is that we don't think the best measurement strategy is to state these principles in an abstract and straight-forward way. Because indicators constructed this way won't be very discerning, and one tends to get uniform positive answers. In this sense, legitimacy orientation is not a set of political ideals, and the belief in democratic legitimacy becomes conceptually separable from support for democratic ideal.

We recognize that most modern authoritarian regimes don't challenge (or repudiate) these democratic norms in principle; rather, the lines of defense for an authoritarian arrangement (or the lines of subtle offense against democratic norms) typically fall into one of the two camps:

1) The *Desirability Argument*. The country should develop a different form of democracy (people's democracy, Chinese democracy, socialist democracy, guided democracy) which best suits herself and which might be superior to Western democracy.

2) The *Feasibility Argument*. The country is not ready for a full democracy (because lack of a civic culture; low level of socio-economic modernization; in conflict with other national development priorities, and/or imminent external threat). If the country had acquired Western democracy before its time, the society would pay a high price in terms of inefficiency, insecurity, and disorder.

¹⁰ The principle of majority rule is not explicitly included in our conceptual formulation. If Arend Lijphart (1984) is correct, then the majoritarian rule is not a first-order principle of Western democracy, or at least it is always qualified by the respect for minority and requirement of consensus.

To construct a valid scale, essentially we combine two analytical tasks in one. Our scale enables us not only to measure the popular commitment to democratic norms but to identify a cluster of mass belief and attitudes that are typically nurtured under authoritarian or anti-democratic regimes. They are more compatible with the authoritarian arrangements and are inimical to the development of democratic values and institutions. In short, it serves as a multi-dimensional scale for the measurement of pro-authoritarian legitimacy orientations and conversely pro-democratic values at the same time. This conceptual formulation provides a coherent framework for a cross-system and cross-time comparison of legitimacy orientation toward political regime.

For an empirical observation of individual's legitimacy orientations, we have developed a scale that consists of twenty-three indicators. In our comparative surveys, the following 6-item scale is employed in all three localities:

Political Equality: People with little or no education should have the same say in politics as better educated people.

Popular Accountability: Top government officials are like the heads of a big family. We should all follow their decisions on national issues.

Political Liberty: The government should have the power to decide which opinion (perspective) can be circulated in a society and which can not.

Political Pluralism:

a) If there are a variety of groups in a community, peace and harmony will be disrupted.

b) If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

Separation of Power: If a government is often constrained by an assembly, it will be unable to achieve great accomplishment.

By definition, respondents who acquire democratic value-orientation along the five dimensions are expected to answer “strongly agree” or “agree” to the first items and “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to each of the remaining five items.

Appendix 2: The Construction of the Variables

Variable Name	Operationalization	Range
Village-Level Education	The percentage of the population who have a technical (or vocational) school or above education in a village.	0~1
Ownership	Whether any of the first four biggest enterprises in a village is privately owned?	1=yes, 0=no
Infrastructure	How many of the following facilities are available in a village? Electric Power, Tap Water, Cable TV, Tweeter, Asphalt on the main street.	0~5
Institutionalization	Whether all of the following conditions are met in a village? (1) Multi-candidate election, (2) Members of the village election leadership group are chosen by villager's assembly or villager's representatives, (3) Candidates are nominated by villagers, self-nomination, or Haixuan, (4) Formal candidates are decided by villagers or villager's representatives.	1=yes, 0=no
Village-Level Traditionalism	Respondent's average score of Traditionalism in each country. (Each county has two village samples and therefore the observations in these two samples have the same measurement of village-level traditionalism.)	-0.77~1.56
Age	Respondent's age.	18~84
Gender	Respondent's gender.	1=men, 2=women
Subjective Short-term Economic Situation	Respondent's evaluation of his/her current economic situation.	1=the worst; 5=the best
Education	Respondent's year of education	0~20
Traditionalism	Positive responses to the traditionalism items, measured by a dichotomous IRT scale. The score is defined by the response patterns in V64, V65, V67, and V70 in the 2002 EAB China dataset	-0.48~0.65
Political Participation	How many political activities a respondent has ever participated? From V33A to V33I in the 2002 EAB China dataset. (number of activities/number of valid answers)	0~1
Interest in Politics	How many items a respondent shows interest in politics or correct political knowledge? Including V4, V12,	0~1

	V13a-V13h, and V14 in the 2002 EAB China dataset. (number of activities/number of valid answers)	
Evaluation of Grassroots Democracy	Positive responses to the evaluation question about grassroots democracy, measured by a dichotomous IRT scale. The score is defined by the response patterns in V40, V41, V42, and V43 in the 2002 EAB China dataset.	-1.55~0.97
Pro-government Inclination	How many items a respondent shows positive impression to the governmental institutions, including the Courts, the People's Liberation Army, public security, news media, local PC, national PC, and government officials? From V47a to V47g in the 2002 EAB China dataset. (number of activities/number of valid answers)	0~1
Democratic Orientation	Negative responses to the authoritarianism questions, measured by a dichotomous IRT scale. The score is defined by the response patterns in V133, V134, V136, V137, V138, and V139 in the 2002 EAB China dataset.	-1.32~1.47

Note: Both village-level and the individual-level data are collected under the auspices of East Asia Barometer Survey in China. The scale of Traditionalism and Democratic Orientation are formulated by a dichotomous IRT approach developed by Bock, Gibbons, and Muraki (1988).

Appendix 3: A Note on Data Sources

The East Asia Barometer Survey

The two surveys in China, the survey on Chinese citizens and the one on villages, were collected under the auspices of the Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer Survey). The Project was launched in summer 2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The Project is headquartered at the Department of Political Science of NTU in Taipei and under the co-directorship of Profs. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu of National Taiwan University. The project involves eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Coordination for the surveys was also supported by supplementary funding from National Taiwan University, the Academia Sinica and various national funding agencies across East Asia.

Leaders of the eight local teams and the international consultants collaboratively drew up a 125-item core questionnaire designed for a 40- to 45-minute face-to-face interview. The survey was designed in English and translated into local languages by the national teams. Between July 2001 and February 2003, the collaborating national teams administered one or more waves of this survey in eight Asian countries or territories – namely, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Mongolia, Hong Kong and the PRC – countries that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition..

The Barometer Survey in China

The China survey was conducted in March-June, 2002. Prof. Tianjian Shi of Duke University was responsible for overseeing the administration of the fieldwork with assistance and logistical support from Taiwan-based co-PIs and the Institute of Sociology of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The survey yielded 3183 valid cases out of 3,752 sampled cases for a response rate of 84.1%. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.

The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) employed in the sample design are counties (*xian*) in rural areas and cities (*shi*) in urban areas. In province-level municipalities, districts (*qu*) were used as PSU. Before selection, counties were stratified by region and geographical characteristic and cities or districts by region and size. A total of sixty-seven cities or districts and sixty-two counties were selected as the primary

sampling units. The secondary sampling units (SSUs) were townships (*xiang*) and districts (*qu*) or streets (*jiedao*). The third stage of selection was geared to administrative villages in rural areas and neighborhood committees (*juweihui*) or community committees (*shequweiyuanhui*) in urban areas. We selected 249 administrative villages and 247 neighborhood or community committees in the third stage of the sampling process. A total of 496 sampling units were selected. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.

In the selection of PSUs, the National Statistical Bureau's 1999 volume of population statistics¹¹ was used as the basic source for constructing the sampling frame. The number of family households for each county or city was taken as the measure of size (MOS) in the PPS selection process. For the successive stages of sampling, population data were obtained from the All China Women's Association (ACWA), using data collected by that organization for a 2000 survey on women's status in China. For areas not covered in the ACWA survey, we asked local ACWA chapters to collect sampling data for us. All village and neighborhood committee levels, household registration (*hukou*) lists were obtained. The lists were used as the sampling frame for the fourth stage of the sampling process.

The response rate for urban areas was lower than that for the rural areas. For urban area, the response rate was 82.5%, and rural areas it was 86.5%.

Weighting variables for the sample were calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.¹²

The questionnaire used in Mainland China varied from the core questionnaire used in the other societies in two ways. First, for all the questions in the core questionnaire asking respondents to compare the current situation in their society to that of the authoritarian past, we asked respondents to compare the current situation to that in Mao's period. Second, the questionnaire repeated some questions used in a 1993 survey, which was part of the Comparative Study of Political Culture and Political Participation in Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong Project, to facilitate possible cross time comparison.

Retired middle school teachers were employed as interviewers for the survey. Before interviews started, our collaborators in China contacted the association of retired middle school teachers in Dongcheng and Haidian districts in Beijing to ask their help in identifying newly retired teachers. We invited retired teachers aged 55 to 62 to apply for jobs as interviewers. About 150 retired teachers applied, and we

¹¹ Guojia tongjiju renkou tongjisi (National Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics), *Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian* (Population Statistics of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: National Statistics Press, 1999).

¹² Raking is a procedure to bring row and column totals of a table of survey estimates into close agreement with independent estimates of those totals by adjusting the entries in the table.

chose 67 as interviewers. The interviewers went through an intensive training program, which introduced basic concepts of social science research, survey sampling, and interview techniques, and familiarized them with the questionnaire to be used in the survey. After a course of lectures, the interviewers practiced among themselves and then conducted practice interviews with residents of a rural village near Beijing. At the end of the training course, interviewers were subjected to a rigorous test.

The mainland China team adopted two measures of quality control. First, we sent letters to prospective respondents, stating that an interviewer would come to his or her home to conduct an interview within a month. The letter included a self-addressed envelop and an evaluation form asking the respondent to report 1) whether the interviewer arrived as promised, and 2) the respondent's evaluation of the interviewer's attitude toward his or her job. Second, field supervisors randomly checked 5% of respondents to evaluate the quality of the interview. We informed interviewers about the control mechanisms to deter them from cheating. Mandarin was used for most interviews. Interviewers were authorized to hire interpreters to deal with respondents unable to understand Mandarin.

The Village Survey

The village survey was conducted in conjunction with the larger country-wide survey among Chinese citizens. The funding for the village survey was provided by National Taiwan University, Duke University, the Carter Center and other sources. Our research design tried to capitalize on the huge differences in the basic demographic, social, economic conditions as well as institutional contexts of villages across rural China. It has been well documented that there exist wide diversity in the formal institutional arrangements for the electoral process and in the ways they are implemented in practice. Even within the same province, the specific local structural and institutional conditions might differ significantly from one village to another. To take the advantage of this diversity, we implemented a parallel survey on village-level characteristics.

In rural area, for each of the randomly selected villages, we normally interviewed five to eight villagers. At the same time, our fieldworkers approached the village committee for its assistance in filling out a village survey questionnaire. This village survey questionnaire was collectively designed by Tianjian Shi, Yun-han Chu, Chiy-yu Shih, Szu-chien Hsu and Chih-jou Chen, with input from Tom Bernstein, Xinxin Xu and Tangbiao Xiao. The questionnaire documented the macro-level traits as well as aggregate statistics of the village as a whole, such as geographical and demographic profile, lineage structure and kinship networks, economic activities and conditions, revenues and expenditures, history of village elections, village-level

electoral institutions, party recruitment procedures, backgrounds of village cadres, and other aggregate information about the village.

Altogether, we have successfully collected data from 241 villages, about 94% percent of the sampled 256 villages. At the next level, 1,202 villagers were interviewed across the 241 villages. For these 1,202 cases, we can undertake a cross-level analysis, employing both individual-level and village-level data. This unique sub-sample represents a miniature of China's rural population. This two-pronged approach enable us not only to control for variation in village-level contextual variables but also to carry out cross-level analysis and ecological inference in the most rigorous way, something that has never been tried in the field of China studies.

Appendix 4: Questions in the Traditionalism Battery

For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

Social hierarchy

- (1) Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask. (V64)
- (2) If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute. (V71)

Avoidance of Conflict

- (1) When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person. (V66)
- (2) A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him. (V68)

Group primacy

- (1) For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second. (V69)
- (2) For the sake of the society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice his personal interest. (This item is not available in the EAB China dataset)

In addition, there are three more questions available to measure Traditionalism in the EAB China dataset as following:

- (1) When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends. (V65)
- (2) Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate. (V67)
- (3) A man will lose face if he works under a female supervisor. (V70)

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Table 1 A Full-Information Item Factor Analysis of Democratic Orientation

Item	Difficulty	Communality	Factor Loading
V133	-0.146	0.404	0.636
V134	-0.259	0.411	0.641
V136	-0.064	0.362	0.602
V137	0.205	0.347	0.589
V138	0.011	0.498	0.705
V139	-0.251	0.307	0.554
Percent of Variance			38.817

Program: TESTFACT 4.0

Note: Two of the items employed to measure democratic orientation are not chosen (V132 and V135). The original scales are 4-point Likert scales with the answers of “Strong Agree”, “Somewhat Agree”, “Somewhat Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. The exact wording of the eight items are listed below:

- V132 People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.
- V133 Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.
- V134 The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.
- V135 Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.
- V136 When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.
- V137 If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.
- V138 If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.
- V139 If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

Table 2 The Dichotomous IRT Scale of the Democratic Orientation

R.P.	Score	R.P.	Score	R.P.	Score	R.P.	Score
111111	1.47	121111	0.91	211111	0.91	221111	0.46
111112	1.02	121112	0.55	211112	0.55	221112	0.13
111121	0.77	121121	0.36	211121	0.37	221121	-0.04
111122	0.45	121122	0.04	211122	0.05	221122	-0.38
111211	0.93	121211	0.5	211211	0.5	221211	0.1
111212	0.58	121212	0.17	211212	0.18	221212	-0.23
111221	0.4	121221	0.01	211221	0.02	221221	-0.4
111222	0.09	121222	-0.32	211222	-0.3	221222	-0.78
112111	0.95	122111	0.5	212111	0.5	222111	0.09
112112	0.59	122112	0.17	212112	0.18	222112	-0.25
112121	0.4	122121	0	212121	0.01	222121	-0.42
112122	0.09	122122	-0.33	212122	-0.32	222122	-0.81
112211	0.53	122211	0.13	212211	0.14	222211	-0.27
112212	0.22	122212	-0.19	212212	-0.18	222212	-0.62
112221	0.05	122221	-0.35	212221	-0.34	222221	-0.82
112222	-0.26	122222	-0.72	212222	-0.7	222222	-1.32

Program: TESTFACT 4.0

Note: R.P. Means “response pattern”. “2” refers to the answers of “Strong Agree” or “Somewhat Agree” and “1” refers to the answers of “Somewhat Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”. In terms of the wording, “2” means a positive response to the authoritarian value, “1” means a negative one.

Table 3 Comparing the Democratic Orientation among Chinese Citizens in 1993 and 2002

Subsamples	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Difference	Std. Error	Sig. (2-tailed)
(1)1993 Rural	1979	-0.5125	0.54276	(2)-(1)=0.18555	0.02392	0.000
(2)2002 Rural	1202	-0.3270	0.72525	(3)-(2)=0.11919	0.02614	0.000
(3)1993 Urban	1308	-0.2078	0.59472	(4)-(3)=0.30257	0.02331	0.000
(4)2002 Urban	1981	0.0948	0.73589			
Total	6470	-0.2305	0.69737			

Program: SPSS 10.0

Method: Scheffe

Table 4 The Result of the Structural Equation Analysis

	The Original Model	The Final Model
The Measurement Model		
Modernization <i>BY</i>		
Highedu	Fixed at 1	Fixed at 1
Ownership	2.694(0.795)***	2.708(0.812)***
Infrastructure	38.040(8.145)***	38.932(8.431)***
The Structural Model		
Village-Level Traditionalism <i>ON</i>		
Institutionalization	0.062(0.019)***	0.062(0.019)***
Modernization	-7.073(1.531)***	-7.048(1.551)***
Individual-Level Traditionalism <i>ON</i>		
Village-Level Traditionalism	1.046(0.070)***	0.883(0.068)***
Education	—	-0.031(0.006)***
Interest in Politics	—	-0.388(0.079)***
Gender	—	-0.151(0.037)***
Democratic Orientation <i>ON</i>		
Age	-0.010(0.002)***	-0.010(0.002)***
Gender	-0.025(0.049)	-0.031(0.044)
Subjective SES	-0.037(0.023)	-0.018(0.022)
Education	0.009(0.008)	0.006(0.007)
Individual-Level Traditionalism	-0.173(0.035)***	-0.185(0.033)***
Political Participation	-0.355(0.121)**	-0.308(0.109)**
Evaluation of Democracy	0.381(0.073)***	0.179(0.073)*
Interest in Politics	-0.060(0.106)	0.010(0.098)
Progovernment Inclination	-0.664(0.100)***	-0.483(0.108)***
Institutionalization	0.004(0.045)	0.031(0.041)
Modernization	8.290(2.976)***	6.974(2.449)**
Evaluation of Democracy <i>ON</i>		
Institutionalization	0.155(0.057)**	0.132(0.051)**
Democratic Orientation	-0.738(0.131)***	-0.372(0.127)**
Progovernment Inclination	—	0.771(0.124)***
Subjective SES	—	0.081(0.027)**
Interest in Politics	—	0.305(0.106)**
Fit Statistics		
CFI	0.750	0.941
TLI	0.615	0.896
RMSEA	0.063	0.033
SRMR	0.047	0.025
Modification Step		
	Specification (Modification Index)	
1	Individual-Level Traditionalism <i>ON</i> Education (61.232)	
2	Evaluation of Democracy <i>ON</i> Progovernment Inclination (36.431)	
3	Individual-Level Traditionalism <i>ON</i> Interest in Politics (14.065)	
4	Individual-Level Traditionalism <i>ON</i> Gender (15.859)	
5	Evaluation of Democracy <i>ON</i> Subjective SES (12.554)	
6	Evaluation of Democracy <i>ON</i> Interest in Politics (8.191)	

Program: Mplus 2.13

Note: N=989; *BY* means “measured by”; *ON* means “regress on”; Entry is unstandardized coefficient.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

Figure 1 The Original Structure Equation Model of Democratic Orientation and Its Specifications





Figure 2 The Final Structure Equation Model of Democratic Orientation and Its Outcomes



* means an unexpected finding

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