



A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Working Paper Series: No. 9

Attitudes toward Democracy Between Mass Publics and
Elites in Taiwan and Hong Kong

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Academia Sinica



Issued by
Asian Barometer Project Office
National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica

2003 Taipei

Asian Barometer

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Working Paper Series

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**Attitudes toward Democracy
Between Mass Publics and Elites
in Taiwan and Hong Kong**

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Having similar political ideas, values, and beliefs between mass publics and elites is an important component in democracy. In stable democracies, studies comparing the belief and value system of these two groups are important for evaluating the quality of representation. In societies undergoing democratic transition, such comparison may be more critical. Built on a system of representation and bolstered by the will of popular consent, democracy in its fledging stage requires these two groups to hold similar sets of values and preferences on issues, to see similar connections between various political stimuli, and more importantly to share a commonly constructed sense of social and political reality, and belief system.

In this paper, survey data from Taiwan and Hong Kong are provided to investigate the attitudes and values between ordinary citizens and elites towards democracy. The main issue to be explored is: do ordinary citizens and elites in these societies share similar positions on major democratic values? In raising this question, however, we have to pay attention to the fact that these two societies are in different stages of democratic transition, with Taiwan on the move towards consolidation and Hong Kong struggling to preserve its freedom and to attain more democracy in its governing structures. For this reason, our studies of political attitudes between mass publics and elites are closely connected to the value structures in the evolution and persistence of mass-based democracy. To what extent do the differences in political attitudes exist between societies where democracy is newly founded and the society where politics remains undemocratic? In the new democracy, to what extent has the consolidation oriented ordinary citizens toward democratic practices? How do individuals in an undemocratic society evaluate the performance of their political system and to what extent they support the principles that are closely related to democracy?

There are four concerns that have motivated the inquiry into the studies of the similarities and differences in political values between mass publics and elites in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The first concern is about the gap and the quality of representation between ordinary people and elites. The evolution and persistence of mass-based democracy requires the emergence of certain supportive values and attitudes among the general public and elites. If both these two groups come up with similar subjective orientations in political values and attitudes, it means that they have a common language and higher level agreement in political communication, both of which will in the end ensure the quality of representation by elites.

The second concern is related to the issue of value consistency in elites and masses. Converse has put this issue in a simple empirical proposition: if the public's political attitudes are deduced from general principles or ideological perspectives, attitudes toward one policy should predict attitudes toward other policy issues (1964). Using Converse's methodology to study ideological thinking among mass publics and political elites in the U.S. society, Jennings points out that studying of value consistency or issue constraint provides some better understanding of the communication difficulties that these two strata may encounter. As he puts, "if elite view the world in a decidedly more constrained and stable fashion, then it presumably becomes more difficult for them to fashion agendas and priorities that can appeal to large swatches of a more variegated, unconstrained rank and file. From the other side, if ordinary citizens do not put their political thoughts together in a consistent and stable fashion, or if they put them together in a quite different fashion than do elites, it is not difficult to see why they might be befuddled or discouraged by the behavior of what they see as doctrinaire or ideological elites." (1992).

The third concern to be addressed in this essay is about the level of constraints found in societies undergoing democratic transition. Previous studies of attitudinal constraints have been limited to countries with stable political system with little social and political upheaval. Yet, from the account made by the consistency theory of attitude change, we learned that during periods of rapid change, such as revolution, because of an increase in the presence of contradictory messages in the social environment, we might expect to find low level of individual attitude constraint (Graber 1988; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

The fourth concern is about the theoretical status of "elites" used in this study. In most previous studies, elites are conceived as persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially (Burton and Higley 1987). Operationally, most would adopt either political or economic status as the cutting point to differentiate elites versus non-elites. As a result, the elites in these analyses are usually the top-position-holders in the largest or most resource rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communication, and cultural organization and movements in a society (see Putnam 1976; Higley and Burton 1989). Methodologically speaking, when elites are defined in this manner, the backfire is that the statistical results of political attitudes upheld by individuals in the middle-upper stratum are hardly discernible in the comparison between elites and the rest of general publics. In the present study, elites are viewed as persons who have high social positions as identified by their relations within the labor markets and

have power, influence and capability to control over resources at least within their employment environments. Viewing elites in such a way, our definition is a more relaxed one, covering individuals in the middle-upper stratum who receive and diffuse cues from “political elites” and send messages upward to the latter. They are the individuals more likely to be seen and to have interactions in settings of daily life.

The Development of Democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong

Democracy has found its way in Taiwan and Hong Kong since the early 1980s. Both societies are in the Chinese culture circle, having similar traditional values. While they are incomparable in geographical size, the outward-looking economies in these two regions have led both to reach rapid and sustained economic development over the past decades and they are both considered well-to-do regions in Asia.

Yet, these two societies have very different political past, leading to not merely the differences in the pattern of party and elite formation, but also the differences in the orientations of political values amongst their citizenry. In Taiwan, the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) government in Mainland China fled to Taiwan in 1949 and since then started a long period of authoritarian rule for almost four decades. The government during this period was controlled firmly in the hands of the minority mainlander bureaucrats who possessed strong autonomy over Taiwanese business and local elites. Brutal political suppressions were found repeatedly during the entire period. As far as social inequality is concerned, while a nine-year compulsory education program was launched in the late 1960s and educational opportunity was greatly improved since then, many studies on Taiwan’s educational attainment show that ethnic differences continued to exist with students of mainlander background more likely to receive college education. Moreover, while income distribution in Taiwan during this period of rapid economic growth is considered relatively equal and is viewed as a deviant case in comparison with the worsening income distribution in most developing economies, the inequality in elite formation existed during the entire period of authoritarian rule. With the presence of a quota system in all levels of civil service examinations, the door opening for elites in government service to the majority Taiwanese was to a certain degree blocked. As a result, becoming a candidate and winning elections turned out to be the main avenue for local elites to participate political affairs. Without doubt, other options were found, but they needed more efforts to work on and it took more time to build. It was not until the late 1970s, when political liberalization reached to a point of not return, we begun to see more diversified patterns of elite formation in Taiwan society.

The 1970s was also an important period for party formation in Taiwan. A controlled political opening from above was launched and had at least two major effects on party formation: (1) strengthening the base and voice of local elites within the party, and (2) providing opportunities for the political forces who sought their political resources outside the party-state system to voice criticism, to mobilize, to coordinate, and to form an organized front of local oppositions during election campaign period. Moreover, through careful criticisms and constant test the outer limits of the KMT rule, these local oppositions step by step challenged the political base owned by the KMT and in 1986, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed, immediately emerged to be the second largest political party in Taiwan, having garnered approximately 25% to 35% of the vote share in all levels of elections. In the spring of 2000, the presidential candidate of the DPP, Chen Shui-bian, won the presidential elections and in the end of 2001, the DPP for the first time captured more seats in the legislative Yuan to become the largest party in Taiwan's parliament.

By contrast, political development in Hong Kong has been quite different from what we have seen in Taiwan. During the British ruling period, while governing structure remains colonial, undemocratic, and direct elections even at the upmost restricted level were postponed not until the early 1980s, political suppression was virtually unbound, judicial system operated in accordance with British jurisprudence, and citizens enjoyed individual rights and freedom almost the same degree as the citizens in stable democracies tend to have, with vote right the only exception. Between the early 1950s to the early 1980s, while Hong Kong underwent a rapid growth in population size, urbanization, and economic development, the society remained largely stable. To describe this intriguing feature of social and political stability, Lau introduces an explanation, which sounds very much like a laissez-faire policy in social and political aspect: Hong Kong society is "minimally integrated social-political system", characterized by (1) an autonomous and insulated colonial bureaucratic polity, (2) an atomistic Chinese society consisting a great portion of political apathetic rural immigrants who arrived Hong Kong mainly seeking individual and family safety and affluence, and (3) weak linkages between these two (Lau, 1982). To some extent, this system worked quite well in Hong Kong and could explain to a great extent the reasons why large scale elite formation among the local Chinese did not happen at least before the early 1970s.

The governing structure in Hong Kong begun to make a change in the wake of 1967's riots and this moves opened up the door for local politicians and gave rise to

a larger scale local elite formation. The policy packages included at least the following features: (1) expanding the scale of co-optation by recruiting more members of Chinese elites into the Executive council and the Legislative council, (2) promoting local Chinese in governmental administration and grant them with more power in decision-making, (3) launching the City District Officers scheme to facilitate information interchange between government and local people and to provide government assistance to communal needs, and (4) expanding the quota to local successful individuals in receiving honors from the British honor system. It should be indicated that when the elections at the level of District Board become periodically held since the middle of 1980s and when more directly elected seats were introduced into the Legislative council, we begin to see major change in elite formation.

The last point to make about Hong Kong political development is party formation and the rise of pro-China elites. The rise of party politics in Hong Kong has to do with the implementation of institutional reform by the Hong Kong government in the middle 1980s and the 1989 Tiananmen incidents. Caused either by the reality 1997 handover or by popular request to have more democracy in governing structure, the former institutional reform had the effects of forcing the already mushroomed pressures groups, organized mainly by teachers, intellectuals, professionals, and middle classes, to coordinate and to form into the United Democrats who in the period after the Tiananmen incidents fielded a landslide victory in the elections and became the most influential political party in Hong Kong. To be sure, the institutional reform also lay down the foundation for the rise of pro-China forces in Hong Kong politics. According to Lo (1998), this happens because, in a bid to legitimize and stabilize the post-1997 government, China needs to absorb local elites into various bodies for handover arrangements. To do so, the objects of absorption include pro-China businessmen, leftist labor union activists, and neighborhood community leaders.

Data and Method

The survey data for the present analysis of political values and attitudes in Taiwan and Hong Kong are conducted by the team members in the project of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia. Both surveys were completed in the end of 2001 and involved 1415 Taiwanese and 881 Hong Kongers at the age 20 and above.

In this study, elites are viewed as persons who have high social positions as identified by their relations within the labor markets and have power, influence and capability to control over resources at least within their employment environments. To do so, we intend to include individuals of upper middle class background as elites, which is a little unconventional, but theoretically meaningful in viewing the change of class structures caused by rapid economic development in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. In measurement operation, we first adopt the class schema developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) by dividing classes into 7 categories and then we take class I (high grade professionals and administrators) and II (Professionals, administrators, managers and high grade technicians) as elites in our analysis.

Table 1: Background Profile
(Frequency in Parenthesis)

		Taiwan	Hong Kong
Gender	Male	68.53 (159)	76.54 (62)
	Female	31.47 (73)	23.46 (19)
Age	below 35	38.79 (90)	34.62 (27)
	35 - 44	37.07 (86)	38.46 (30)
	45 - 54	21.12 (49)	24.36 (19)
	above 55	3.02 (7)	2.56 (2)
	Average	38	44
Education	primary	2.59 (6)	4.94 (4)
	Junior High	1.72 (4)	7.41 (6)
	Senior High	20.26 (47)	18.52 (15)
	Junior college	25.00 (58)	8.64 (7)
	University	50.43 (117)	60.49 (49)
Party identification	Pro democrats	0 (0)	19.75 (16)
	Pro-China	0 (0)	13.58 (11)
	Pro KMT	42.24 (98)	0 (0)
	Pro DPP	22.41 (52)	0 (0)
	Independents	35.34 (82)	66.67 (54)

Table 1 shows background profile of respondents who are defined as elites. There are similarities and differences between these two societies in the elite background. First of all, the elite status is overwhelmingly dominated by males and it is especially seen in the case of Hong Kong in which male samples account for more than 75% of the samples. Secondly, there is difference in age: in Taiwan the

average is 38 years old, while in Hong Kong it is about 7 years older. Thirdly, elite status is affected by the degree of education one attained and the educational system itself. In Taiwan, the vocational tracking oriented junior college program provides more chances for elite status attainment. In contrast, the chances are limited in Hong Kong. Fourthly, Taiwan elites are much more willing to identify their party position than elites in Hong Kong. In the later case, more than two third elites would maintain an independent position in politics.

The central purpose in the present analysis is to construct scales of congruence and constraints to measure how similar or how different political attitudes toward democracy are between elites and masses, and between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Within our questionnaire, 28 questions were asked regarding respondents' subjective orientations toward democracy. Rather than making comparison on each item, we follow the lead of Granberg and Holmberg (1988), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1995), and Chen (1999) by selecting and categorizing the questions according to their "nature occurring clusters". In each society, an exploratory factor analysis was used to reveal latent variables among these measures. As a result, five latent variables are found: liberty, pluralism, political efficacy, democratic style, and individual rights (See Appendix I). Starting first with the most clearly item, the variable of liberty reflects the attitudes toward strongman leadership, military governance, contestation with opposition parties, and freedom of speech. The questions related to the principle of liberty are important for Taiwan and Hong Kong. As both societies are still in the early stage of democratic development and many individuals may either have or learned the experience of personal livelihood under authoritarian or communist rule, civic liberty should be highly appreciated among most people in these societies.

The factor of pluralism covers questions on the extent to which one agrees social harmony would be endangered by too many organizations, on whether too many different thoughts in society could cause chaos, on whether judges should accept suggestions from administration in important cases, and whether central government's authority over local government should be increased. All of these questions have to do with the basic principles of pluralism that a pluralist society is one that has several centers of power and authority, rather than one in which the state is the sole controller of people's actions, and that different communities, political parties, interest groups and other social organizations should co-exist in peace and harmony with equal opportunities to promote their interests and aspirations through democratic and legitimate action.

The third factor is related to political efficacy. There are four questions related to efficacy and the main idea here is to tap whether one in his subjective feeling has the ability to participate in politics and to influence government. It has been argued that the higher one's degree of political efficacy, the greater one's political participation tends to be, and the more likely for one for vote. The democratic style factor has to do with respondent's orientation toward what type of leadership is selected. This concept was originally used in studies of group dynamics and its original purpose is to explore the type of leadership in relation to group efficiency (Kumpfer, Turner, Hopkins, and Librett 1993). In between the type of an autocratic and a laissez-faire leader, a leader with democratic style has the ability to recognize the importance of participation by members, but retaining part of the decision-making responsibility. In our research design process, we had the feeling that the much of the confusions about democratic values among general publics in a fledging democracy has to do with the problem of leadership style. Democracy, in its early stage, such as the case of Taiwan, is more likely to be affected by leadership style than stable democracies.

The last factor generated by factor analysis capture questions about the values of individual rights in democracy: rights of equality, the rights free from superior power, and the right of speech and press. Since these rights are critical to the emergence as well as the survival of a democratic system, we would expect that those favoring democratization are more likely to support these values.

The indicators of congruence and constrain are constructed after these latent variables are generated. As what Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1995) did in their studies on public opinions in the post Soviet Union, we first calculate the sum of the values in questions related to each latent variable (one for mass, the other for elite) and the congruence indicator is the average score of each group in comparison. The indicators of constraint computed in the present paper are the average interitem correlations for each of the five major latent variables. Used by Converse in "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964), this indicator is the degree to which a particular belief is predictive of another belief. Lower coefficient, for example, means belief system more likely to change.


Congruence between mass and elite subjective orientations toward democratic values

The comparison in the present paper is to study two sets of questions. (1) To

what extent do ordinary citizens and elites in either Taiwan or Hong Kong share similar positions on major democratic values? And (2) what are the differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong in attitudes toward democracy?

Figure 1:


Similarities and differences in values related to liberty



As shown figure one, in Taiwan, the differences in the liberty value between ordinary citizens and elites is not big, nor do the differences between parties. In Hong Kong, the gap between pro-democratic elites and ordinary citizens is more identifiable. When these two societies are compared, the gap between elites and masses is a bit larger than that in Taiwan. Generally speaking, in a scale from 0 to 4, both societies emphasize greatly the value of liberty and, for this reason, they dislike the military rule, or strongmen leadership. They are more willing to accept party competition and they cherish freedom of speech.

In figure 2, the pluralistic value system is examined. Again, the differences are much smaller in Taiwan between masses and elites, and between political parties. In Hong Kong, the gap between ordinary people and elites tends to be larger, especially between supporters of pro-democratic alliance. When our focus turns to the comparison between these two societies, it seems that people in Hong Kong have more respect on pluralist value. We have reason to believe that the higher appreciation of pluralism has to do with the fact that Hong Kong has been, and still is, an international business center in the region and keeping its plurality, both culturally and politically is the best way to gain the winning edge.

Figure 2:
Similarities and differences in pluralist values



While the patterns in the gap between masses and elites remain relatively the same as previous figures, there are two interesting observations out of Figure 3. First, higher level of political efficacy is found among elites identifying themselves as Pro-DPP and Pro-China supporters. In Taiwan, the DPP is the ruling party since 2000 and, in Hong Kong, the pro-China alliance is closer to the image of the ruling party, since the real boss behind the scene is the Chinese government. Secondly, the level of political efficacy is much lower in Hong Kong, which confirms the report that Hong Kong is more or less a politically apathetic society. As to the argument that higher level of political efficacy can be found in society just passing thru the first run of democratic test, in comparison with the society where democracy is postponed, we have very little evidence to prove or disapprove at the present paper. For now, Lau’s “minimally integrated social-political system” hypothesis still has its validity, as far as political apathy is concerned.

Figure 3:
Similarities and differences in political efficacy




Figure 4:
Similarities and differences in values about democratic style





Figure 4 presents the subjective evaluation of democratic style in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Overall, a high degree of similarity in values about democratic leadership style is found in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the difference between mass publics and elites is minima in both cases. These observations suggest that there is a high level of consensus building in these two societies about leadership style: the political leaders who have the ability to respect other opinions, to strike a balance

between aims and procedural justice, and to cooperate with other people to plan, to organize, to take action, and at the end to get things done. In both societies and across elites and general publics, the autocratic type of leadership is definitely not what they value the most.

As to the congruence index in the values toward individual rights in Figure 5, there are little differences in Taiwan case between masses and elites, and between political parties. In Hong Kong, while individual rights are highly valued, it is particularly higher among pro democratic elites. With this observation, it is easy for us to understand the reason why half a million demonstrators took on the streets on handover memorial day to voice their disagreement in the legislation regarding subversion, secession, sedition, and treason (the so call Article 23), and why the Hong Kong democrats were able to field landslide victories in the District Board Elections four months after the demonstration.

Figure 5: Values related Individual Rights




Constraint in political attitudes toward democracy

The indicator of constraint is the degree to which a particular belief is predictive of another belief and higher coefficient represents a more consistent value system.

In Figure 6, the differences in values of liberty between elites and masses, and between Taiwan and Hong Kong are found in the following aspects. Firstly, the


liberty value system between elites and mass publics is generally not consistent in Taiwan. The only exceptional case is the elites supporting the DPP and its alliance. This means that the pro DPP elites are less likely to change their values toward liberty, and in Taiwan, the rest of elites, along with general publics, are more flexible on values of liberty. Thirdly, in contrast, citizens in Hong Kong, with the exception of masses supporting pro-China alliance, generally tend to be more consistent in values related to liberty. The lowest constraint coefficients found among pro-China publics means that this is the group of individuals who are most likely to change their values system toward liberty.

Figure 6: Constraint on the values of liberty




Similar pattern between elites and mass publics in Hong Kong and Taiwan is also found in the value system related to pluralism. However, there are two distinctive features here. First of all, the Taiwan elites showing no particular party preference tend to be more consistent in the value of pluralism, comparing with elites with particular party preference. Secondly, in Hong Kong, with the exception of supporters of pro-China alliance, all citizens, disregards their party preference, are more consistent in pluralist values than their counterparts in Taiwan. Together with the earlier observations on the congruence indicator on pluralism, we then conclude that pluralism is an important value supporting the democratic movements in Hong Kong.

Figure 7: Constraint on values related to pluralism



As far as the consistency in values toward political efficacy is concerned, the difference between Hong Kong and Taiwan is quite minimal. Yet there is difference within each own society that the political efficacy tends to be higher among elites who party preference are related to the ruling party and here the gap is the largest from the mass supporters of the ruling party. This picture can be interpreted as this: the elites of ruling party think that if they insist, they have more power to affect politics, but their crowds think differently. To some extent, the gap exists because higher involvement in politics and public affairs provides the pro-ruling party elites more opportunities to be familiar with and articulate sociopolitical issues, which helps strengthen their belief that they can make influences on politics.

Figure 8: Constraint on values related to political efficacy



The messages contained in constraint on values related to democratic style is more intriguing, as shown in Figure 9. At the first glance, the gap in Taiwan is relatively small regardless personal party preference. Nonetheless, in making association with previous observation on political efficacy, the picture seems to be interpreted in this way: while elites favoring the DPP tend to think, and would like to insist, that they have more power to affect politics, they too have questions over issues of leadership style within themselves and this picture is also seen in their crowds, where the insistence to have a democratic leadership is even higher. As to elites whose party preference favors the KMT, while they feel they have less power to influence politics, they are more willing to see a democratic style of leadership within the party itself or in the nation. In Hong Kong, to have a democratic leadership is also concerned by elites in the camp of the pro-democrats and pro-China alliance and the supporters of pro-democrats also share similar degree of insistence. With this findings, it is reasonable for us to argue that democratic leadership is the main concern among democrats in Hong Kong regardless the differences in social status. As argued by Lo, the style of leadership is the weakest part for the progress of democratic movements in Hong Kong.

Figure 9: Constraint on values related to democratic style





Figure 10: Constraint on values related to individual rights



In Figure 10, it is shown that citizens in Hong Kong tend to have higher consistency in values related individual rights than their counterparts in Taiwan and this is particularly seen among pro-China elites. Why is the level of consistency in values toward individual rights higher in Hong Kong and why elites favoring the pro-China camp in Hong Kong tend to be more consistency on this value system? Our interpretations is that, as a free society for a long period of time, people in Hong Kong have been used to the rights granted by the protection of law and, when the society is ruled, even in indirect manner, by a sovereign nation who has worse track records in rights protection, the defense of individual right turns out to be the frontline that they can hardly afford to make a retreat. This is attitude is particular found among pro-China elites in Hong Kong. For them, it is very likely that, with closer connection with China and better understanding the situation about rights protection in China, they too are clear about how individual rights are supposed to be appreciated in Hong Kong. If so, then it is a good news for Hong Kong, since the individuals having the closest connection to China are very consistent in their attitudes toward individual rights.

Conclusion

The analysis can provide some answers to the concerns discussed in the previous parts of the study. First of all, the differences in the attitudes toward democracy between elites and mass publics are quite complicated. In Taiwan, while the differences in attitudinal constrain are minimal, Taiwanese elites tend to be more

consistent in their attitudes toward democracy than mass publics. This is particularly seen the attitudes about political efficacy among elites favoring the DPP and its alliances. In Hong Kong, perhaps caused by a more elite oriented education system, the gap between elites and masses in various dimensions of political attitudes exists in the congruence scale and constraint scale in particular. This also means that politics in Hong Kong is more likely to be elite oriented.

Second, when the societies of Taiwan and Hong Kong are compared, the differences are substantial and are in a direction that higher degree of values toward democracy can still be found in society where democracy is relatively suppressed and postponed. Nevertheless, the above observation may not be correct in one important aspect, that is, citizens in a democratic society, the fledging democracy in particular, tend to have higher degree of political efficacy and this particularly found among elites favoring the ruling party.

While the present study has no intention to examine the debates between the political cultural approach and the institutionist approach with regards to importance of values in the transition toward democracy. Nevertheless, in the present study, it is found that the attitudes toward democracy indeed play an important role in either politics in Taiwan or in Hong Kong. As aptly put by Rose and his colleagues, if political institutions are the hardware of a democratic system, what people think about democracy and those institutions constitute the software of that system (Rose et al., 1999:7). Both are important to democracy whether it is in its early stage or whether it is postponed.

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Appendix I. Factor Analysis of All Items of Attitudinal toward Democracy

Variable	Question wordings	Liberty			Pluralism			Efficacy			Democratic Style			Individual rights			Uniqueness
		1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	4	5	4	5			
q121	Strong leader or not	0.66055	0.13994	0.0801	0.07868	0.01842	0.43852										
q122	Opposition party should not be allow to compete for power	0.61862	0.08886	0.15018	0.21253	-0.03105	0.53016										
q123	The military should govern TWN or HKG	0.70874	0.01865	0.0247	0.02614	0.05518	0.4254										
q124	Stop election and expert to lead	0.67281	0.08367	0.07472	0.01929	0.1434	0.39272										
q125	During crisis, govt need not obey law	0.16135	0.12879	0.12577	0.23124	-0.07434	0.52244										
q126	Efficacy:I have the ability to participate in politics	0.21785	-0.17518	0.47901	-0.02462	0.0999	0.4827										
q127	Efficacy:politics and govt are too complicated to people like me	0.09705	0.16242	0.64405	-0.01569	0.22373	0.47282										
q128	Efficacy: govt is run by a powerful few	-0.01337	0.01595	0.69607	0.04224	-0.136	0.452										
q129	Efficacy:people like me have no influence over govt	0.07019	0.09834	0.66509	0.08036	-0.07578	0.51877										
q130	Current political system is the best at present situation	0.03625	0.11288	0.06035	0.00003	0.56127	0.43997										
q131	Govt decision must be correct	0.40178	-0.06603	-0.09431	0.16576	0.52917	0.46284										
q132	People with less education should have same say in politics	0.35283	-0.09336	-0.15624	0.15459	-0.17591	0.63215										
q133	Govt leaders like head of family and we should follow their decision	0.37685	0.20437	-0.05912	0.2611	0.42926	0.45335										
q134	Govt should decide which ideas are allowed to discuss in society	0.4003	0.17078	0.00768	0.25422	0.38695	0.46827										
q135	Too many organisations are harmful to social harmony	0.12966	0.70154	0.14041	0.05454	0.01221	0.43773										
q136	Judge should accept idea of administration in important case	0.48487	0.26137	0.01597	0.09224	-0.05655	0.53455										
q137	Govt can't accomplish great things if always checked by legislature	0.01659	0.56464	-0.02797	0.00294	0.09715	0.51287										
q138	Morally correct political leader can decided everything	0.34196	0.28407	0.07719	0.25964	0.35771	0.56995										

q139	Society will be chaotic if there are too many diff thinkings	0.14544	0.70445	0.10934	-0.00246	0.12098	0.43068
q140	Important enterprise should be govt-owned	0.08347	-0.05299	0.14354	0.25526	0.01036	0.35071
q141	Central govt's authority over local should be increase	0.08837	0.57085	-0.14642	0.03679	0.13587	0.55607
q142	TWN/Hk should maintain her own life-style	0.27306	-0.38826	-0.19226	-0.09064	-0.03402	0.60783
q143	Personal interest should be forgo for the sake of nation	-0.18314	0.17799	-0.16756	-0.029	0.53645	0.44716
q144	Individual is part of nation and has no independent status	0.03564	0.15591	0.25627	0.05903	0.49549	0.48799
q145	To political leader, aim is more important than means	0.25762	-0.06895	0.02285	0.53624	0.16553	0.59557
q146	Pol leader should uphold his or her standpoint	0.00197	0.04577	-0.04133	0.7523	-0.00992	0.3787
q147	Pol leader need to tolerate those challenge his or her belief	0.22229	0.08136	0.07891	0.677	0.02786	0.4488
q148	Political leader can ignore minority if supported by majority	-0.02229	-0.03298	0.11679	0.56777	0.17694	0.50007

Note: Figures in this table are factor loadings of 0.25 or larger from the varimax rotated matrix with eigenvalues greater than 1.0

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