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Does Economic Performance Matter?

Economic Evaluations and Support for Democracy in Seven
Asian Countries

By

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Introduction

There is no country without an economy, and there is also little doubt that economic well-being is a universal concern to people. Thanks to Marx or not, it is hard to think of politics without also thinking of economic matters today. Presumably, political affairs are taken as remote business for most common men, but economic situations are hardly denied as their daily-live experiences.

On aggregate level, modernization theory takes economic development as the prime mover for the growth of democracy, Marin Lipset's classic empirical studies (1959) further confirms the relationship between a nation's wealth and its democratic inclination. Adam Przeworski and associate (1966) also point out the crucial role of economic conditions for a viable democracy after examining democratic nations in the world. It is too good to be true that economic development is linked to happy political ends, as Guillermo O'Donnell's (1973) studies show, the relationship between economic growth and democratic development in some Latin American state is running in a vicious rather benevolent mode. The strong state and authoritarian rule has been taken as a necessary way to introduce and secure a growing economy, simply because democratic governments are too soft to mobilize resources for achieving higher rate of economic growth. In most societies, a prolonged sluggish economy or a serious

economic crisis is more likely to open the door for regime transformation, and a blooming or prosperous economy tends to shield the regime's authoritarian rule. However, there are many cases like East Asian countries where authoritarian regimes lost grounds of mass support just as a resultant development of their thriving economy and social modernization. In East European states, as Stephen White (1986) points out, traditionally Communist regimes have based their legitimacy on economic performance, and in late 1980s they also adopted many political reform programs to secure their power status in addition to maintaining a high level of economic growth, even before the fall of Berlin Wall. Yes, on macro level a country's economy does matter for its political form, but the relationship is not a linear one.

From a macro perspective, economic performance does matter for political change and vice versa, so has the politico-economic relationship long been a fascinating topic for both economic and political theorists, since Marx and Keynes. It should be a great project for others, however, in this small short paper it aims only at reporting some preliminary findings on the micro-level relationship between people's perception of economic performance and their attitudes toward democracy and confidence in newly installed democratic institutions. The analysis is based on available survey data collected in South Korea, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore under a collaborative research project of "Asian Barometer Survey."

Taking election in established democracies as an open market in the power game, intuitively research in voting behavior has assumed that economic performance of governments should translate into vote-choices either rewarding or punishing the incumbent. Many studies of "economic voting" have confirmed that, aside from the influence of party identification and social group membership, people's vote-choices in western democracies are indeed affected by their assessment of national economic conditions and in some cases also by people's personal economic concerns.

(Lewis-Beck 1988) Economic voting research has long been interested in estimating how and to what extent that voter's economic condition is linked to vote choices. In studying this micro-level linkage between economic conditions and vote-choices, two aspects of people's economic evaluation have been addressed. One is so-called "sociotropic" consideration with which people take the nation's economy as a frame of reference. The other is termed "egocentric" thinking on which people focus their personal or household financial situation. "Sociotropic voting" is given to people's vote-choices affected by the national assessments of economy, and "pocketbook voting" is then referred to voting decisions influenced by personal economic concerns. Most of economic voting is found sociotropic oriented in nature, only few are pocketbook voting. (Feldman 1982, Kiewiet 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981) Moreover, economic voting research has also discussed intensively the time perspective of people's economic evaluation, retrospective and prospective. Retrospective voters are assumed to look backward the records of government's economic performance in making of their vote-choices, and prospective voters are those whose vote-choices are influenced by their future economic expectation. (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Lockerbie 1991; Uslander 1989) Both models have been equally applied to economic voting studies.

In theory of voting behavior, the decision to vote for a party is implied more a choice about the future, however, the traditional reward-punishment theory of elections is based on the assumption that citizens vote retrospectively, just as V.O. Key (1968:7) points out that "voters are not fools," the responsible electorate would use vote to reward or punish the incumbent government. As more empirical studies of voting behavior have shown, whether people's political judgment is guided by their past "experience" or future "expectation" is contingent more on their level of sophistication (such as education and information) and political interest. As Fiorina points out,

American citizens who are less educated and less informed, more alienated and more distrusting are more likely to rely on evaluations of what they have actually experienced in their vote decision. (Fiorina 1981: ch.3) More evidence has shown that a sophisticated voter takes into account more the future benefits a party will deliver than just a party has done before. People with an informed view of the future economy would be hard to fool by a government bent on manipulating the economy for short-term electoral gain by many off-hand favorable economic policies that inevitably will run at the risk of a downturn later on. All these studies and debates about retrospect or prospective model of economic voting are mainly experiences found in western democracies, where the linkage between economic performance and incumbent government's policies are relatively clear. By contrast, in many new democracies or states in a transitional period, the economic conditions are constrained by the political system itself instead regulated by the current regime and its linkage is dubious enough in most of time.

Economic Performance and Support for Democracy and the Regime

Most literature on the micro-level relationship between economic conditions and political behavior is found in voting behavior studies. By contrast, there are only few studies focusing on the relationship between popular perceptions of economic conditions and their orientations towards democratic institutions, especially in those countries that are undergoing the process of democratization. (cf. Clarke *et al.*1993; Finkel *et al.*1989; Gibson 1996; Rose *et al.*1998) In addition to taking some lights of research findings from many economic voting studies, an empirical study of mass support for democracy in post Communist societies by Richard Rose and associates (1998) is noteworthy. In examining the impacts of economic performance on mass support for democracy, they have proposed two hypotheses to test with micro-level data.

One is called “buying support hypothesis”: if people believe the economy is developing positively, they are more likely to support the new regime. The other hypothesis is “democracy goes bankrupt”: if people believe the economy is going in the wrong direction, they are more likely to support undemocratic regimes. (Rose *et al.* 1998:161-2) They point out, economic variables do have some significant effect on regime support and on rejection to undemocratic alternatives, which is consistent with findings in economic voting studies in western democracies that people are more influenced by evaluation of the national economy than personal economic concerns. While further including political attitude variables into the same model, Rose and associates also assert that “politics matters more” on determining people’s support for democracy and the current regime, in which the effects of “sociotropic” economic variables are reduced accordingly but still significant. As they conclude, “political values affect how people evaluate democratic and undemocratic alternatives independently of their economic situation.” (*Ibid.*: 178)

In accordance with economic voting research and Rose and associates’ pioneer study of post communist societies, in the following analysis, two types economic evaluation, sociotropic and pocketbook, are considered to be the major explanatory variables in relating to people’s attitudes toward the regime and democracy. In the same vein, if economic performance does matter, the greater magnitude of effect is expected from people’s sociotropic rather than pocketbook economic considerations. Moreover, as empirical studies of democracy show that popular support for democratic norms and trust in democratic institutions has its origins in political culture, some constructed variables representing democratic values and political attitudes toward the regime are expected to have independent effects on people’s support for democracy and their political orientations toward the current regime, same as Rose and associates has confirmed that politics matters more in explaining people’s support for democracy.

These are meta-hypotheses guiding our analysis in this paper. In the following, more relevant political variables and their effects on support for democracy and evaluation of regime's democratic performance are discussed and analyzed as follows. Now let's turn to briefly outline the variables in our model of analysis.

Economic, Political Variables and the Model of Analysis

As mentioned, empirical studies of economic voting consider "sociotropic" and "pocketbook" economic concerns as two major independent variables in the model to see how voter's partisan vote-choice is affected by people's economic conditions. In our analysis, two aspects of people's perception of economic performance, both the sociotropic assessment of the nation's economy and the pocketbook considerations of personal economic concerns are also treated as two major independent variables. In addition, these two aspects of economic evaluation are measured referring to past five years ago, now, and the future, three time perspectives. Therefore, we have six indicators of economic evaluations, and later on these six indicators are combined into two composite indexes of economic factors.

For the purpose of analysis, the people's economic evaluation of the current regime can be related to a variety of political attitudes, such as trust in political institutions, evaluations of regime's performance in democratic progress, and finally all together affect their support for democracy and objection to undemocratic alternatives, the major dependent variables in our model of analysis. All these intervening political attitudes are also combine into so-called "regime's democratic performance," based on statistical factor analysis. These intervening political attitudes in our analysis are people's trust in institutions as well as government, perceptions about increased political rights, improved policy performance, improved governance quality, democratic progress and desirable democratic progress, and satisfaction with

democracy works (measurements of variable and empirical indicators are listed in appendix).

Following the convention of political behavioral studies, people's demographic attributes and early internalized psycho-political characteristics are included in our model so as to fairly estimate the net effects of economic conditions on mass support for democracy and the regime. The three psycho-political variables considered in our model are involvement in politics, political efficacy, and democratic values. These psycho-political variables are to monitor the early socialization effect on people's support for democracy, where political culture studies argue that people's democratic inclinations are embedded in political culture. If these political culture variables are left out in our model, then any relationship between economic conditions and support for democracy is vulnerably to attribute to absent political culture factors. Finally, the demographic variables in our model of analysis are age, gender, education, marital status, and subjective social status, not only for their theoretical importance but because practically they have been measured and available in all seven Asian data sets.

In this paper, the data analysis is based on a pooled data of seven countries Asian countries, as mentioned earlier, in so doing only the findings on cross-national level are reported in stead of country-specific analysis. To avoid the peril of comparison study in that the relationship between economic performance and mass support for democracy and the regime at micro level is spurious but due to cross-national difference, two contextual variables are introduced. One contextual economic variable is GDP per capita in 2006 of these seven countries, which is treated as dummy, in which South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are belonging to the same category coded as 1, and Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are of the other category coded as 0.¹

¹ GDP per capita in 2006 of these seven Asian countries as the following: South Korea is 23,962USD, Taiwan is 29,000USD, Singapore is 30,900USD, Mongolia is 2,402USD, Philippines is 5,314USD, Thailand is 9,100USD, and Indonesia is 3,800USD.

The other contextual variable is political one, which is taken from the Freedom House's 2007 rating of freedom level based on political rights and civil liberties. This political variable is coded into three categories: 1 is "free" (South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, and Indonesia), 2 is "partly free" (Philippine and Singapore), and 3 is "not free" (Thailand). It is hoped that taking these two contextual variables in our causal models of analysis may well capture the country-level variation, and exclude the spurious relationship we find at the micro level. The ordinary least square regression method is applied to do the analysis.

Political Economy of Regime's Democratic Performance

People's sovereignty, political equality, freedom, participation, and social welfare are basic ideas of democracy. Democratization is a process to realize the embodiment of these democratic ideas. In most established democracies, these democratic ideas have been clearly crystallized into some alienable rights of citizens and protected. To record a regime's democratic performance, it is necessarily to examine the extent how these democratic political rights common to most democracies are protected and promoted under its rule. In our analysis, "regime's democratic performances" is a composite concept measured by several indicators. The first is a summated scale about people's evaluation of political rights. How are certain political rights promoted and protected under the current regime? These political rights in point are that of choosing a government, of equal treatment in the court, of fair competition in election, of holding the government to be responsible, and of checking government's out-law actions through legal system. These evaluations make up as an indicator called "improved political rights." The second indicator is about people's perception concerning equal treatment by the government, having basic social welfare, freedom of expression and of participation in civil organizations. These are taping government' output functions, so

the summated indicator is named as “improved policy performance.” The third composite indicator is about the quality of governance, which is comprised of question items intended to measure the government’s responsiveness, public consultation, law-abiding, and to see how democratic is the regime itself in terms of electoral choice, check and balance, and responsibility. The fourth indicator is based on an item directly asking people’s satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.

First, for Asian peoples in general that their perception of political rights being increased is affected by their evaluation of the national economic at present and in the future, and by personal economic concerns in the future. As shown in Table 1, Asians who rate better off in their nation’s economy at present and in the future, and those who expect better off in their future household economy, are more likely to hold positive views of political rights being increased. Asian’s view of being increased political rights under their current regime is not universal but determined by the level of economic development. In Table 1, the result of our analysis also shows that people in a wealthier country such as in Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan who tends to hold negative attitudes of increased political rights, comparing to other Asians from Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.

[Table 1 about here]

If we take country in separate in our analysis, we further find that the relationship between economic evaluation and increased political rights is not unitary. As shown in Table 2, most aspects of economic evaluations having effects on increased political rights are found in Taiwan’s case, and in other Asian countries, only one aspect of economic evaluation is causally lead to increased political rights. It is sociotropic-retrospective economic evaluation that matters in South Korea,

sociotropic-present economic evaluation in Mongolia, pocketbook-prospective economic concerns in Indonesia and Singapore. For Thailand's case, people's economic evaluation has nothing to do with their attitudes about the increased political rights. The research findings on the relationship between economic performance and regime performance in political rights are somewhat distorted if looks only at overall Asians without bringing their country-specifics back in.

[Table 2 about her]

Second, Asians on overall tends to take their evaluation of both present nation's economy and individual's household economy to determine their evaluation of policy performance of the regime. As shown in Table 3, Asians people's whose better assessment of both the national economy at present and of today's personal household economy are more likely hold views of policy performance being improved. However, if we look at each country, the picture is different by those significant effects of sociotropic-present economic evaluation only found in cases of Mongolia, Philippines and Taiwan, and significant effect of pocketbook economic assessment on improved policy performance is altogether disappeared in an analysis country by country, as reported in Table 4. It is in case of Indonesia, people's perception of improved policy performance is insignificantly affected by what their economic evaluation, and in other country, people's view of improved policy performance under the regime are influenced by at least one aspect of people's economic evaluations, either sociotropic or pocketbook. There is no unitary pattern in the effects of economic performance on regime's democratic performance regarding to improved policy efforts by comparing country by country in separate.

[Table 3 and 4 about here]

Third, for Asians people's perception of regime's democratic performance in the dimension of "governance quality" is significantly affected by their assessment of the nation's economy at present, the past and the future, and so by personal economic concern of household economy in the future, as shown in Table 5. What economic performance matters in the evaluation of regime's governance quality is varied to different country. The only aspect of economic evaluation is absent the significant effect on governance quality to all countries in our analysis is people's pocketbook-retrospective evaluation of economy, as reported in Table 6. For cases of Philippines and Thailand, there is only one aspect of people's economic evaluation that has effects on their perception improved quality of regime's governance. In Philippines, people's personal future economic concern matters, and it is evaluation of nation's economic situation in the past when people speak to governance quality. In other countries, there are at least two aspects of economic evaluations among six that affect people's evaluation of improved quality of governance.

[Table 5 and 6 about here]

Finally, it is straight to delve people's image of regime's democratic performance by asking how satisfied they feel with the democracy work in their country. In Asian, most aspects of people's economic evaluations are significantly like to their satisfaction of how democracy works, only leave out people's pocketbook economic concern at the present, as Table 7 shows. However, this seeming effect pattern of economic performance on democratic satisfaction is not hold by comparing country by country. As shows in Table 8, there are varied effects derived from different aspects of economic

evaluation. In Taiwan's cases, 5 of 6 aspects of economic evaluation has significant effect on people's democratic satisfaction, economic evaluation function more "feel good" factor for Taiwanese democratic satisfaction. It is in the case of Singapore, only pocketbook economic concern, the past, at present, or in the future, that has significant effect on democratic satisfaction on one hand, and in Mongolia, Thailand and Indonesia, people's pocketbook economic evaluation of whatever is not significant to their democratic satisfaction on the other.

[Table 7 and 8 about here]

To sum up, economic performance in term of people's economic evaluation does matter for people's attitudes toward regime's democratic progress; yet there is not unitary pattern found in our analysis of seven Asian cases. Those seeming effect patterns at overall level we found do not behave unitary traveling across seven Asian countries. As is conventional of many studies we referred earlier, people's political attitudes or behavior are determined more by politically related factors than by economic condition, and it is even so in our analysis. It is not trivial that effects of demographic attributes, psycho-political variables and other control variables such as level of economic development and freedom is not discussed here or in the following but only be given as a base line to uphold the effect of economic factor.

Political Economy of Institutional Trust

By definition institutions are not whimsical and trust in political institution is a core to political culture. Government comes and goes, and institutions have long life in comparison. People's economic or political lives are in fact structured and constrained by institutions of the regime. Most important functioning institutions in modern

societies are listed for people to rate a degree of trust in collecting survey data (all these institutions and measure are listed in appendix). What is termed “trust in institution” is based on a summated scale in the measure of people’s trust in institutions as a whole, and it is not intended to detail people’s trust level for each institution further.

Economic conditions are to some extent constrained by institutions, democratic institutions and authoritarian institutions set different regulations to economic activities of people. People’s evaluation of economic performance is expected to relate to their evaluation of trust in institutions. From our data analysis as shown in Table 9, all six aspects of people’s economic evaluation have significant effect on their trust in institutions. Of course, people’s trust in institutions is also influenced by other demographic attributes, psycho-political traits, and more importantly for our purpose of analysis is also conditioned by society’s both level of economic development and freedom in terms of GDP per capita and political rights and civil liberties. As reported in Table9, people in a well-to-do group of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are holding higher level of trust in institutions. However in term of level of freedom (coded from 1 to 3 representing three level of free, partly free and not free level) the positive sign of relationship indicates the negative result that people in free society are more skeptical to their institutions. Of all aspects of economic evaluation, people’s positive assessments of the nation’s economy or household economic concerns in whatever time perspective are bringing add-on positive effects on their trust in institutions.

[Table 9 about here]

The pattern of economic performance’s influence on the trust in institutions found in an overall analysis of seven Asian countries is consistent in the case of Mongolian, if

we do country by country comparison. As shown in Table 10, some aspects of economic considerations do not have any significant effect on people's trust in institutions while looking at by country in separate. And a startling finding is that in case of Philippines, only has people's sociotropic economic evaluation to do trust in institutions, other aspects of economic evaluation are silent, unlike the other extreme case of Mongolia, whose people's trust in institutions is affected by all aspects of economic evaluations. In other Asian countries, people's trust in institutions is affected by different combinations of economic assessments in different countries, but those important economic evaluations with greater magnitude of beta coefficient are found most of sociotropic in nature.

[Table 10 about]

Economic Performance and Support for Democracy

Support for democracy is the final set of dependent variables of in our causal analysis of the theoretic role of economic performance on democracy. In our analysis, three indicators are constructed to see how support for democracy is influenced by economic factors along with other social and psycho-political forces. One critical aspect of democratic consolidation in newly democracies is its people commitment to the liberal democracy. As shown in the measure items for indicator, focus is to look people view on the rule of law to government and to political leader, the separation of powers between judiciary and executive branches, and the necessity independent functioning of legislative and executive. One may argue these liberal democratic ideas are early learned and thus not appropriate to be taken as the end product influenced by people's economic evaluation of a short term. However, in new democracies liberal political forms are rather transplanted from outside. If economic condition serves as a

benevolent factor, we may expect when people look positively at their economy may also have a stronger confidence in liberal democracy. Other counter argument may also keep terms with developmental state theory, similar to Rose and associates' "democracy go bankrupt hypothesis," that people who are better off in their economic conditions are less likely to support liberal democracy simply for its chaotic and inefficient way of economic management. These speculations need to be tested with empirical data at micro level.

Second aspect of support for democracy is about the belief in democracy itself. The strategies in measuring people's deep-seated belief in democracy have been proposed by many pioneer studies but the most common way to measure is to see how preferable, desirable, efficient and suitable the democracy is in people's mind, and to detect what the priority of democracy when people have to choose democracy and other conflicting goal.

The third indicator of democratic support is to see how strong objection to undemocratic alternative. It is measured from the other way around by putting ahead many undemocratic ways of governing for people to evaluate.

People's political attitude toward democracy is inevitably affected by their experience of functioning of democratic institutions, especially for new democracies, in which just newly installed into practice. The other factor is people evaluation of regime's democratic performance, which adds on an exacerbating or accelerating function, negative or positive, to the democratic learning of new regime. Together with these presumably conditional factors, if there is found the room for influence of economic factor, the theoretical role of economic performance for new democracy is then enriched and confirmed. At the final stage of analysis, for indicators of performance and six aspects of economic evaluations are combined into two factorial variables (The results of factor analysis are listed in appendix Tables).

First, among those explanatory variables for Asian's commitment to liberal democracy, people's national economic assessment is a significant one, as shown in Table 11. However, pocketbook economic concern is mute in this regards, indicating that pocketbook economic concerns in comparison sociotropic has less influence on political attitudes, similar to most cases in voting behavior studies . Has commitment to liberal democracy a deep-seated ideas long been socialized earlier, so as variables such as age, level of education, and democratic values have significant and positive impact, that is, those who are older, more educated, and with stronger democratic value-orientation (having the biggest magnitude of influence in terms of Beta) are more likely to prefer liberal democracy. The sign of effect of sociotropic evaluation on liberal democracy is negative and can be interpreted as those people who are more pessimistic about the nation's economy tends to reject the idea of liberal democracy. This finding may imply that liberal democracy is taken by those who are worry about the nation's economic future as inefficient in economic management. That effect of coefficient is significant also carries negative sign is also found, as reported in Table 11, in the control variables of GDP per capita and level of freedom, which signal two different meanings: one is about the level of economic development in that people in more well-to-do countries are more likely see the dark side of liberal democracy, due to the same reason that liberal democracy be attributed to blame for the sluggish economy; the other is that people from less free countries (with higher score in Freedom House index) are more likely innate with less commitment to liberal democracy.

[Table 11 about here]

While we go further to look at each country, the country findings are striking that the uniform relationship between economic evaluation and commitment to liberal

democracy is disappeared, as shown in Table 12. In fact, for cases of South Korea, Mongolia, Indonesia and Singapore, people's economic evaluation has not significant effect on their commitment to liberal democracy. In Philippines, the significant effect of economic evaluations is pocketbook personal economic concern, and its sign is positive, which reveals that in Philippines people who are expecting personal household economy better are more likely to accept liberal democracy. As evidenced in Table 12, both sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluation are effective in interpreting Thai people's inclinations to liberal democracy. Of course, the only unitary finding is that democratic value-orientations is the pivotal explanatory factor for commitment of liberal democracy. Regime's economic performance and trust in institutions are relative unimportant in deciding people's commitment to liberal democracy.

[Table 12 about here]

Second, turn to support for democracy in terms of how desirable, preferable, and efficient, and suitable is for the people, as expected as a democracy in the making, the function of institutions letting people to trust in and regime's democratic performance all should have weighted contribution. As shown in Table 13, on overall Asian countries, regime's democratic performance and trust in institutions have the lion-share contribution to people's support for democracy on the one hand. And, people's preferable, desirable and suitable judgment, partly guided by their value-orientation, and so has people's democratic values also serve as an important explanatory variable along with the variables of level of education and psychological involvement that signify people political traits.\

[Table 13 about here]

People's support for democracy is also affected by economic condition, as shows in Table 11, both sociotropic and pocketbook economic assessments are significant factors in interpreting the variation of people's support for democracy. Sociotropic economic evaluation carries a positive sign by indicating that Asians who are optimistic about their national economy are more likely to see democracy is the preferable and suitable for their countries. By contrast, the negative effect of pocketbook economic evaluation on support for democracy can be interpreted as for those whose economic situations getting worsened are from the disadvantage economic class and are likely to support for democracy in a hope to change their lock-down economic situations. If we turn to country by country comparison, as shown in Table 14, the case of Philippines showing that people's pocketbook economic is negatively causally linked to their democratic support may be giving a hint. In addition, Taiwan is another case that people's support for democracy is influenced by sociotropic economic factor, unlike that of Philippines' pocketbook consideration.

Finally, objection to undemocratic alternative is always a temptation for people who are frustrated in new democracies where the new regime has come with sociopolitical chaos and inefficiency, and sometimes worse is the deteriorated corruption level. To regain order or efficient for some or to restore old good days for others, people who are frustrated in new democracy cynically may option undemocratic alternative instead. As shown in Table 15, for Asian in general economic factor has no say in people's objection to undemocratic alternative, but dependent on their democratic values, and those who withholding higher democratic values are more likely to say no to undemocratic alternative. The difference between levels of economic development is also significant, as people of more wealthy countries are more likely to reject undemocratic alternative by comparison.

[Table 15 about here]

In a country by country comparison, as reported in Table 16, economic influences do have effect on people's objection to undemocratic alternative in the cases of Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. In Singapore, people whose pocketbook economic evaluation are better are more like to hold objection to undemocratic alternative, while in Philippines and Indonesia, effective economic concerns of political attitudes are sociotropic. For people of Philippines, those who are more optimistic about the nation's economy are less likely to object to undemocratic alternative, and this is contrary to that found in Indonesia, where people who are more optimistic tends to hold objection to undemocratic alternative. But in all seven Asian nations, people's objection to undemocratic alternative is uniformly and mostly affected by the democratic value orientations, the political culture variable.

[Table 16 about here]

In sum, people's economic evaluations do has same significant effect on support for democracy. On people's commitment to liberal democracy and affective support for democracy in terms of being desirable, suitable and preferable, people's economic evaluations have even strong effects. Even for peoples' objection to undemocratic alternative that mainly determined by political culture factor is still found the scar of economic influence in the cases of Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore.

By way of Conclusion

As well documented in economic voting, if there is the economic effects on

people's attitudes and behavior, there is found the most of sociotropic though pocketbook economic consideration is not totally absent. This is also attested to the analysis we report so far. However, it is also found that in some cases and for some target political attitudes, sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluation either reinforce together or function in separate in linking people's attitudes toward democracy and the regime back to their real world life.

In most cases, people economic evaluation of whatever aspects of the present, the past or the future from sociotropic or egocentric are directed to indicate economic performance under the current government or regime. As shown earlier, people's attitudes toward regime democratic performance, trust in institutions, and support for democracy are all in some aspect or in some cases of counties understudy affected by people's economic evaluation of the nation's or household economy. But, for sure the effect of economic performance on support for democracy is not uniform and variant among Asian countries. Methodologically, two level of analysis for comparison is unavoidable in practice.

Finally, the effect of economic performance on support for democracy is much new field of study, some theoretical import derived from economic voting may still true but the logic behind may be quit different. As to two hypotheses that Rose and associates propose, in fact, behave quite well in our analysis, yet it is not specifically pointed and pin-down to elaborate. Political culture theory would like to argue politics matters more in realize viable democracy, and as shown in our analysis, political variables are more powerful predictor the support for democracy, however, economic factor are not entirely absent and in some case erect as the prime forces in the course, save economic determinism.

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Table 1: Economic Effects on Increased Political Rights (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Increased Political Rights				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	13.828	.205		67.607	.000
Actual age in years	-.006	.002	-.037	-2.422	.015
Level of education	-.077	.014	-.081	-5.565	.000
Gender(male)	-.051	.057	-.011	-.902	.367
Marital status(Married)	.066	.078	.012	.854	.393
Subjective Social Status	.068	.017	.053	4.058	.000
Psychological involvement in politics	-.070	.035	-.026	-2.011	.044
Political efficacy	-.026	.025	-.013	-1.013	.311
Democratic values	-.026	.009	-.041	-3.010	.003
Sociotropic_present	.093	.035	.040	2.622	.009
Sociotropic_retrospective	.008	.031	.004	.251	.802
Sociotropic_prospective	.093	.034	.042	2.764	.006
Pocketbook_present	-.019	.039	-.007	-.491	.623
Pocketbook_retrospective	.020	.036	.009	.552	.581
Pocketbook_prospective	.116	.037	.048	3.093	.002
GDP_Per capita	-.483	.067	-.107	-7.225	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	.038	.045	.011	.842	.400
Adjusted R-square	.050				
Valid N	6,263				

Table 2: Economic Effects on Increased Political Rights (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Increased Political Rights						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.012	-.049	.018	-.041	-.012	-.054	-.052
Level of education	-.023	-.076*	-.058	-.138***	.008	.042	-.009
Gender(male)	-.046	-.096**	-.017	.059*	-.080*	-.009	.029
Marital status(Married)	.026	-.034	-.038	.030	.056	.038	.040
Subjective Social Status	.065	-.035	.047	.092**	.009	.000	.076
Psychological involvement in politics	.044	-.050	.004	-.049	.027	.014	-.022
Political efficacy	-.009	.013	-.046	.037	-.028	.077*	.003
Democratic values	-.037	-.124***	-.091**	-.098**	-.148***	-.056	-.072
Sociotropic_present	.016	.072*	-.032	.122***	-.023	-.028	.023
Sociotropic_retrospective	.097*	.002	-.052	.060	.041	-.002	.015
Sociotropic_prospective	.016	.007	.064	.086**	.012	.016	.042
Pocketbook_present	-.029	.001	-.042	.012	.007	-.014	.075
Pocketbook_retrospective	-.029	.057	-.018	-.077*	.085	.031	.001
Pocketbook_prospective	.043	.024	-.011	.123***	-.014	.116**	.118**
Adjusted R-square	.008	.039	.010	.096	.029	.020	.051
Valid N	885	954	874	1,115	679	1,022	728

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 3: Economic Effects on Improved Policy Performance (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Improved Policy Performance				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	11.442	.193		59.144	.000
Actual age in years	.000	.002	.001	.037	.970
Level of education	-.118	.013	-.119	-8.969	.000
Gender(male)	.156	.055	.033	2.843	.004
Marital status(Married)	-.098	.075	-.017	-1.304	.192
Subjective Social Status	.101	.016	.076	6.313	.000
Psychological involvement in politics	.027	.033	.010	.809	.419
Political efficacy	-.081	.024	-.040	-3.361	.001
Democratic values	-.099	.008	-.147	-11.878	.000
Sociotropic_present	.201	.034	.083	5.904	.000
Sociotropic_retrospective	-.027	.030	-.013	-.893	.372
Sociotropic_prospective	.004	.032	.002	.126	.900
Pocketbook_present	.186	.038	.067	4.919	.000
Pocketbook_retrospective	-.006	.035	-.003	-.185	.853
Pocketbook_prospective	.065	.036	.026	1.811	.070
GDP_Per capita	-.808	.065	-.169	-12.499	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	.160	.043	.046	3.741	.000
Adjusted R-square	.138				
Valid N	6,798				

Table 4: Economic Effects on Improved Policy Performance (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Improved Policy Performance						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.095	-.001	.035	-.010	-.023	-.006	-.046
Level of education	-.008	-.100**	-.013	-.153***	-.074	.036	-.104**
Gender(male)	.056	.003	-.035	.100***	.027	.023	-.045
Marital status(Married)	-.029	-.060	-.037	.056	.025	.023	.021
Subjective Social Status	.090**	.014	.036	.110***	-.013	.067*	.013
Psychological involvement in politics	.057	-.017	.036	.016	-.007	-.014	.158***
Political efficacy	-.075*	.020	-.022	.016	.038	.010	-.135***
Democratic values	-.237***	-.154***	-.341***	-.130***	-.269***	-.118***	-.348***
Sociotropic_present	-.011	.187***	.080*	.109***	.036	.030	.059
Sociotropic_retrospective	.109**	.017	-.006	.089**	.083*	.053	.000
Sociotropic_prospective	.072*	.077**	-.031	.013	.014	.028	.044
Pocketbook_present	.039	.025	-.051	-.015	.058	-.010	.037
Pocketbook_retrospective	-.022	.049	.009	.040	-.010	.024	-.019
Pocketbook_prospective	-.052	-.025	.052	.086*	.057	.023	.133***
Adjusted R-square	.097	.089	.118	.112	.108	.020	.254
Valid N	951	1,063	905	1,174	738	1,157	804

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 5: Economic Effects on Improved governance Quality (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Improved governance Quality				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	12.073	.196		61.465	.000
Actual age in years	.000	.002	-.001	-.069	.945
Level of education	-.054	.013	-.059	-4.061	.000
Gender(male)	.019	.055	.004	.352	.725
Marital status(Married)	.094	.075	.018	1.246	.213
Subjective Social Status	.032	.016	.027	2.028	.043
Psychological involvement in politics	.079	.033	.031	2.361	.018
Political efficacy	-.046	.024	-.025	-1.888	.059
Democratic values	-.059	.008	-.095	-6.994	.000
Sociotropic_present	.243	.034	.110	7.126	.000
Sociotropic_retrospective	.084	.030	.044	2.784	.005
Sociotropic_prospective	.132	.032	.062	4.090	.000
Pocketbook_present	.050	.038	.020	1.320	.187
Pocketbook_retrospective	.033	.035	.015	.950	.342
Pocketbook_prospective	.118	.036	.050	3.275	.001
GDP_Per capita	.682	.064	.157	10.608	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	.065	.045	.019	1.433	.152
Adjusted R-square	.065				
Valid N	6,086				

Table 6: Economic Effects on Improved governance Quality (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Improved governance Quality						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.009	.038	.025	-.035	-.026	.016	.053
Level of education	.018	-.049	.143***	-.074*	-.052	-.068*	.001
Gender(male)	.021	-.035	-.075*	.070*	-.033	-.068*	-.010
Marital status(Married)	.034	-.022	-.027	.012	-.010	.004	.044
Subjective Social Status	-.037	-.070*	.047	.049	.018	-.004	.037
Psychological involvement in politics	.117***	.032	.091**	.066*	-.005	.106***	.040
Political efficacy	.024	.006	-.003	.007	.056	.054	-.110**
Democratic values	-.034	-.141***	-.105***	-.076*	-.308***	-.005	-.349***
Sociotropic_present	-.051	.168**	.044	.148**	.049	.076*	.121**
Sociotropic_retrospective	.030	.101**	.014	.062	.093*	.054	.041
Sociotropic_prospective	.094*	.091**	-.069	.084**	.062	.023	.102*
Pocketbook_present	.130**	.025	-.028	.036	-.017	.024	.031
Pocketbook_retrospective	-.089	.041	-.011	.036	.024	.054	-.028
Pocketbook_prospective	.013	.036	.080*	.073*	.037	.094**	.040
Adjusted R-square	.044	.110	.039	.098	.134	.056	.212
Valid N	908	992	812	1,100	512	1,057	699

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***:p<.001

Table 7: Economic Effects on Satisfaction of How Democracy Works (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Satisfaction of How Democracy Works				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	2.167	.059		36.443	.000
Actual age in years	.000	.001	.002	.111	.912
Level of education	-.022	.004	-.071	-5.391	.000
Gender(male)	.033	.017	.023	1.993	.046
Marital status(Married)	.057	.023	.032	2.486	.013
Subjective Social Status	.020	.005	.049	4.124	.000
Psychological involvement in politics	.042	.010	.049	4.076	.000
Political efficacy	.015	.007	.024	2.069	.039
Democratic values	-.018	.003	-.087	-7.026	.000
Sociotropic_present	.101	.010	.135	9.691	.000
Sociotropic_retrospective	.054	.009	.083	5.859	.000
Sociotropic_prospective	.086	.010	.119	8.658	.000
Pocketbook_present	.001	.012	.001	.078	.938
Pocketbook_retrospective	.046	.011	.060	4.284	.000
Pocketbook_prospective	.032	.011	.040	2.859	.004
GDP_Per capita	.262	.020	.177	13.207	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	.102	.013	.095	7.809	.000
Adjusted R-square			.140		
Valid N			6,904		

Table 8: Economic Effects on Satisfaction of How Democracy Works (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Satisfaction of How Democracy Works						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.041	.000	.035	-.015	-.026	.043	.087*
Level of education	-.017	-.046	.024	-.046	-.072	-.071*	-.004
Gender(male)	.060	-.050	.067*	.049	.018	.029	-.007
Marital status(Married)	-.023	-.016	.008	-.031	.098*	.085**	.046
Subjective Social Status	.034	-.024	.000	.087**	-.036	.046	-.009
Psychological involvement in politics	.009	.028	.134***	.060*	.044	.055	-.087*
Political efficacy	-.047	.001	.022	.011	.004	.013	-.003
Democratic values	-.003	-.010	-.100**	-.153***	-.161***	-.041	-.172***
Sociotropic_present	.104**	.068*	.219***	.120***	.109**	.140***	.067
Sociotropic_retrospective	.030	.108***	.032	.074*	.044	.032	.056
Sociotropic_prospective	.079*	.040	.015	.095**	.120**	.069*	-.018
Pocketbook_present	.096*	.057	.051	.063*	.051	.043	.101*
Pocketbook_retrospective	.000	-.013	.079*	.059	.049	.042	.095*
Pocketbook_prospective	-.023	-.026	.036	.071*	-.033	-.037	.105*
Adjusted R-square	.038	.023	.129	.133	.118	.066	.100
Valid N	969	1,097	915	1,190	762	1,143	822

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 9: Economic Effects on Trust in Institutions (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Trust in Institutions				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	.328	.422		.778	.437
Actual age in years	-.004	.005	-.010	-.797	.425
Level of education	-.414	.029	-.168	-14.437	.000
Gender(male)	-.095	.119	-.008	-.795	.426
Marital status(Married)	.519	.165	.036	3.152	.002
Subjective Social Status	.119	.035	.036	3.404	.001
Psychological involvement in politics	-.144	.073	-.021	-1.968	.049
Political efficacy	.011	.053	.002	.208	.835
Democratic values	-.170	.018	-.101	-9.271	.000
Sociotropic_present	1.377	.074	.228	18.532	.000
Sociotropic_retrospective	.532	.066	.101	8.042	.000
Sociotropic_prospective	.885	.070	.153	12.583	.000
Pocketbook_present	.289	.082	.042	3.516	.000
Pocketbook_retrospective	.222	.076	.036	2.923	.003
Pocketbook_prospective	.310	.079	.048	3.931	.000
GDP_Per capita	.505	.141	.042	3.577	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	1.292	.093	.150	13.911	.000
Adjusted R-square	.315				
Valid N	7,076				

Table 10: Economic Effects on Trust in Institutions (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Trust in Institutions						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.032	-.032	-.015	.095*	-.019	.007	.112**
Level of education	-.043	-.162***	-.081*	-.154***	-.072	-.128***	-.072
Gender(male)	-.039	-.040	.032	.011	.018	-.120***	-.065
Marital status(Married)	-.025	-.027	-.012	-.005	.013	.058	-.004
Subjective Social Status	-.019	-.061*	.015	.026	-.039	-.025	.046
Psychological involvement in politics	.062*	.055*	.056	.063*	.030	.137***	-.071*
Political efficacy	.012	.001	.052	-.018	.071*	.017	-.007
Democratic values	-.085**	-.091***	-.096**	-.188***	-.295***	-.074**	-.117***
Sociotropic_present	.173***	.200***	.260***	.140***	.198***	.113***	.087*
Sociotropic_retrospective	.070	.077**	.020	.070*	.073*	.113***	.106**
Sociotropic_prospective	.205***	.199***	.033	.130***	.136***	.121***	.021
Pocketbook_present	.074	.102***	.036	.032	.017	-.001	.099*
Pocketbook_retrospective	-.098*	.063*	.059	.004	-.016	.051	.047
Pocketbook_prospective	.030	.060*	.057	.084**	.095*	.078*	.108*
Adjusted R-square	.133	.230	.148	.190	.261	.150	.124
Valid N	1,020	1,104	928	1,206	782	1,188	842

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 11: Commitment to Liberal Democracy (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Commitment to Liberal Democracy				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	2.841	.090		31.700	.000
Actual age in years	.003	.001	.033	2.603	.009
Level of education	.028	.006	.054	4.484	.000
Gender(male)	.046	.025	.019	1.814	.070
Marital status(Married)	.080	.034	.027	2.326	.020
Subjective Social Status	-.001	.007	-.001	-.076	.939
Psychological involvement in politics	.015	.015	.010	.951	.342
Political efficacy	-.017	.011	-.016	-1.496	.135
Democratic values	.204	.004	.592	52.528	.000
Sociotropic economic evaluations	-.071	.016	-.058	-4.326	.000
Pocketbook economic evaluation	-.005	.015	-.004	-.307	.759
Regime's democratic performance	-.023	.014	-.018	-1.591	.112
Trust in institutions	-.005	.003	-.022	-1.760	.078
GDP_Per capita	-.342	.029	-.140	-11.591	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	-.453	.021	-.240	-21.824	.000
Adjusted R-square			.430		
Valid N			5,490		

Table 12: Commitment to Liberal Democracy (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Commitment to Liberal Democracy						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.028	.054	.057	.052	.039	.016	-.054
Level of education	.026	.059	.083*	.066*	.011	.092**	.045
Gender(male)	-.015	.118***	-.044	.043	-.072*	.012	.057
Marital status(Married)	.061	.039	.005	.063	-.019	-.012	.022
Subjective Social Status	.015	.090**	-.033	-.036	.031	-.040	-.052
Psychological involvement in politics	-.022	.031	-.027	.057*	.087*	.015	-.119***
Political efficacy	.015	.001	-.086**	-.018	.077*	-.083**	.017
Democratic values	.553***	.459***	.507***	.529***	.603***	.585***	.544***
Sociotropic economic evaluations	-.043	-.013	-.037	-.078**	-.085*	-.005	-.019
Pocketbook economic evaluation	.017	-.044	.073*	.006	-.093*	.014	-.031
Regime's democratic performance	.091**	-.085*	-.060	-.061*	-.044	-.058*	.002
Trust in institutions	.051	.036	-.035	.014	-.059	-.004	-.083*
Adjusted R-square	.289	.253	.275	.329	.509	.370	.346
Valid N	778	878	779	1,039	465	916	629

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 13: Support for Democracy (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Support for Democracy				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	2.580	.113		22.801	.000
Actual age in years	.003	.001	.032	2.035	.042
Level of education	.045	.008	.088	5.778	.000
Gender(male)	.066	.032	.027	2.069	.039
Marital status(Married)	-.039	.043	-.014	-.908	.364
Subjective Social Status	.022	.009	.032	2.335	.020
Psychological involvement in politics	.073	.019	.051	3.761	.000
Political efficacy	.019	.014	.018	1.347	.178
Democratic values	.038	.005	.109	7.680	.000
Sociotropic economic evaluations	.134	.021	.110	6.472	.000
Pocketbook economic evaluation	-.042	.020	-.034	-2.150	.032
Regime's democratic performance	.172	.018	.141	9.625	.000
Trust in institutions	.028	.003	.137	8.492	.000
GDP_Per capita	-.108	.037	-.044	-2.914	.004
FreedomHouse PL index	-.035	.026	-.019	-1.354	.176
Adjusted R-square	.088				
Valid N	5,490				

Table 14: Support for Democracy (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Support for Democracy						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.072	-.005	.034	.101*	-.067	.090*	-.001
Level of education	.089*	.047	.068	.141***	.103*	.188***	.017
Gender(male)	-.057	.049	.022	-.006	.121**	.070*	-.015
Marital status(Married)	-.075	.005	-.048	-.092*	.076	.018	.008
Subjective Social Status	.037	.020	-.049	.087**	-.100*	.034	-.088*
Psychological involvement in politics	.009	.118***	.019	.090**	.106*	.051	-.081
Political efficacy	.027	.009	-.023	-.001	-.004	-.057	.035
Democratic values	.165***	.160***	.010	.113***	-.024	.044	.081
Sociotropic economic evaluations	.036	.055	.071	.080*	-.005	.057	.016
Pocketbook economic evaluation	.042	-.045	-.079*	.040	.001	-.001	-.038
Regime's democratic performance	.261***	.014	.101**	.239***	.034	.138***	-.028
Trust in institutions	.070	.076	.060	.086**	.181***	.092*	.214***
Adjusted R-square	.116	.045	.015	.171	.084	.095	.038
Valid N	778	878	779	1,039	465	916	629

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 15: Objection to undemocratic Alternatives (overall)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Objection to undemocratic Alternatives				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	7.868	.172		45.808	.000
Actual age in years	.002	.002	.016	1.022	.307
Level of education	.091	.012	.114	7.700	.000
Gender(male)	.163	.048	.043	3.359	.001
Marital status(Married)	-.009	.066	-.002	-.137	.891
Subjective Social Status	.033	.014	.031	2.347	.019
Psychological involvement in politics	.039	.029	.017	1.307	.191
Political efficacy	-.038	.021	-.023	-1.759	.079
Democratic values	.129	.007	.241	17.340	.000
Sociotropic economic evaluations	-.025	.031	-.013	-.792	.428
Pocketbook economic evaluation	-.028	.030	-.015	-.932	.351
Regime's democratic performance	-.073	.027	-.039	-2.687	.007
Trust in institutions	-.010	.005	-.030	-1.924	.054
GDP_Per capita	.545	.056	.144	9.677	.000
FreedomHouse PL index	.223	.040	.076	5.618	.000
Adjusted R-square			.146		
Valid N			5,401		

Table 16: Objection to undemocratic Alternatives (by country)

Predictors	Dependent Var.: Objection to undemocratic Alternatives						
	S.Korea.	Mongolia	Phil.	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore
	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Actual age in years	.083	.112**	.019	-.006	-.019	-.083*	-.012
Level of education	.046	.153***	.150***	.143***	.043	.146***	-.001
Gender(male)	-.044	.108***	-.012	.040	.055	.110***	.077*
Marital status(Married)	-.106*	-.062	-.024	-.074*	.081	.041	.058
Subjective Social Status	.001	.036	-.043	.039	-.054	.053	.186***
Psychological involvement in politics	.010	.083*	-.045	.089**	.004	-.020	-.044
Political efficacy	-.052	-.046	-.056	.054	-.006	-.071*	.020
Democratic values	.208***	.186***	.127***	.331***	.211***	.262***	.263***
Sociotropic economic evaluations	-.013	-.032	-.147***	.008	-.097	.089*	-.030
Pocketbook economic evaluation	-.010	-.007	-.027	-.006	-.022	-.040	.169***
Regime's democratic performance	.049	-.154***	-.123***	.008	-.001	.036	.060
Trust in institutions	-.011	-.025	-.032	-.054	-.117*	-.013	-.069
Adjusted R-square	.039	.130	.100	.229	.103	.119	.160
Valid N	771	857	764	1,019	459	902	623

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Appendix Table1: Factor Analysis of Sociotropic Economic Evaluation

	Component
	1
Sociotropic_present	.798
Sociotropic_retrospective	.816
Sociotropic_prospective	.730
Eigenvalues	1.837
% of Variance	61.226
Valid N	8,192

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Appendix Table2: Factor Analysis of Pocketbook Economic Evaluation

	Component
	1
Pocketbook_present	.759
Pocketbook_retrospective	.822
Pocketbook_prospective	.739
Eigenvalues	1.798
% of Variance	59.938
Valid N	8,334

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Appendix Table3: Factor Analysis of Regime's democratic Performance

	Component
	1
increased_political_rights	.670
improved_policy_performance	.703
improved_governance_quality	.638
satisfaction_how_democ_works	.532
Eigenvalues	1.634
% of Variance	40.861
Valid N	6,348

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Appendix: Measures of Variables/Indicators

Economic Evaluation:

Sociotropic present:

Q001: How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?
[2=very good; 1=good; 0=so so (no good no bad); -1=bad; -2=very bad]

Sociotropic retrospective:

Q002: How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last years?
[2=much better; 1=a little better; 0=about the same; -1=a little worse; -2=much worse]

Sociotropic prospective:

Q003: What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now?
[2=much better; 1=a little better; 0=about the same; -1=a little worse; -2=much worse]

Pocketbook present:

Q004: As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?
[2=very good; 1=good; 0=so so (no good no bad); -1=bad; -2=very bad]

Pocketbook retrospective:

Q005: How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago?
[2=much better; 1=a little better; 0=about the same; -1=a little worse; -2=much worse]

Pocketbook prospective:

Q006: What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now?
[2=much better; 1=a little better; 0=about the same; -1=a little worse; -2=much worse]

Psycho-political Variables:

Political efficacy (2 to 8)

Q127: I think I have the ability to participate in politics.
[1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree]

Q128: Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me

can't really understand what is going on.
[1=strongly agree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=somewhat disagree; 4=strongly disagree]

Psychological involvement in politics (2 to 8)

Q049: How interested would you say you are in politics?

[1=not at all interested; 2=not very interested; 3=somewhat interested; 4=very interested]

Q050: How often do you follow news about politics and government?

[1=not even once a week; 2=once or twice a week; 3=several times a week; 4=everyday]

Democratic Values scale:

Q132: People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.

[1.5=strongly agree; 0.5=somewhat agree; -0.5=somewhat disagree; -1.5=strongly disagree]

Q133: Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.

Q134: The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.

Q135: Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.

Q136: When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

Q137: If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

Q138: If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

Q139: If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

[1.5=strongly disagree; 0.5=somewhat disagree; -0.5=somewhat agree; -1.5=strongly agree]

Indicators of Regime's Democratic Performance:

Increased political rights (5 to 20) is measure by following question items:

Q103: People have the power to change a government they don't like

[1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree (else=missing)]

Q104: Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials

[1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree (else=missing)]

Q105: Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.

[1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree (else=missing)]

Q106: Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions.

[4=strongly disagree; 3=somewhat disagree; 2=somewhat agree; 1=strongly agree; (else=missing)]

Q107: When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.

[4=strongly disagree; 3=somewhat disagree; 2=somewhat agree; 1=strongly agree; (else=missing)]

Improved policy performance (4 to 16)

Q108: Everyone is treated equally by the government.

Q109: People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.

Q110: People are free to speak what they think without fear.

Q111: People can join any organization they like without fear.

[1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree; (else=missing)]

Improved governance quality (5 to 20)

Q112: How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?

Q113: How often do national government officials abide by the law?

Q114: How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?

[1=rarely; 2=sometimes; 3=most of the time; 4=always; (else=missing)]

Q115: To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?

[1=not at all capable; 2=not capable; 3=capable; 4=very capable; (else=missing)]

Q116: How well do you think the government responds to what people want?

[1=not responsive at all; 2=not very responsive; 3=largely responsive; 4=very responsive; (else=missing)]

Satisfaction with how democracy works

Q093: On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?

[1=not at all satisfied; 2=not very satisfied; 3=fairly satisfied; 4=very satisfied (else=missing)]

Trust in Institutions (0 to 33) is a summated scale measured by the following 11 items:

Q007: Trust in Prime Minister or president

Q008: Trust in the Courts

Q009: Trust in the national government

Q010: Trust in Political parties

Q011: trust in Parliament

Q011: Trust in Civil service

Q013: Trust in the military

Q014: Trust in the police

Q015: Trust in local government

Q016: Trust in newspaper

Q017: Trust in television

[-1.5=non at all; -0.5=not very much trust; 0.5=quite a lot of trust; 1=a great deal of trust; (else=0)]

Indicators of Support for Democracy:

Commitment to liberal democracy (0 to 4)

Q141: When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.

Q137: When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

Q139: If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

Q077: The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedures.

[1=disagree, strongly disagree; 0=else]

Support for Democracy:

Q121: Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?

[1=Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government;
0=under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable;
0=For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime democratic one]

Q122: Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?

[1=Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society;
0=Democracy can not solve our society's problems]

Q123: If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?

[1=Democracy is somewhat more important; democracy is definitely more important; 0=else]

Q097: To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now?

[1=score 6 thru 10; 0=else]

Q098: Which would you think democracy is suitable for our country?

[1=score 6 thru 10; 0=else]

Objection to non-democratic alternative (3 to 12)

Q124: We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.

Q125: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.

Q126: The army should come in to govern the country.

[1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree; (else=missing)]