



A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Working Paper Series: No. 122

Jointly Published by

GLOBALBAROMETER™

Who are the Protesters and Why are they Protesting?
A Comparative Study of Political Discontent and
Mass Protest under the Chen and Ma Presidencies

Min-Hua Huang

Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
mhhuang5103@ntu.edu.tw

Mark Weatherall

Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for East Asia Democratic Studies,
National Taiwan University
markweatherall@gmail.com

Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

Working Paper Series

Jointly Published by

Globalbarometer

The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied research program on public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance around the region. The regional network encompasses research teams from thirteen East Asian political systems (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). Together, this regional survey network covers virtually all major political systems in the region, systems that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

The ABS Working Paper Series is intended to make research result within the ABS network available to the academic community and other interested readers in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Scholars in the ABS network also devote their work to the Series with the hope that a timely dissemination of the findings of their surveys to the general public as well as the policy makers would help illuminate the public discourse on democratic reform and good governance.

The topics covered in the Series range from country-specific assessment of values change and democratic development, region-wide comparative analysis of citizen participation, popular orientation toward democracy and evaluation of quality of governance, and discussion of survey methodology and data analysis strategies.

The ABS Working Paper Series supercedes the existing East Asia Barometer Working Paper Series as the network is expanding to cover more countries in East and South Asia. Maintaining the same high standard of research methodology, the new series both incorporates the existing papers in the old series and offers newly written papers with a broader scope and more penetrating analyses.

The ABS Working Paper Series is issued by the Asian Barometer Project Office, which is jointly sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences of National Taiwan University and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica.

Contact Information

Asian Barometer Project Office

Department of Political Science

National Taiwan University

*No.1, Sec.4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei,
10617, Taiwan, R.O.C.*

Tel: 886 2-3366 8456

Fax: 886-2-2365 7179

E-mail: asianbarometer@ntu.edu.tw

Website: www.asianbarometer.org

**Who are the Protesters and Why are they Protesting? A Comparative Study of Political
Discontent and Mass Protest under the Chen and Ma Presidencies**

Min-Hua Huang *

Mark Weatherall[§]

Paper prepared for the 2016-17 Annual Conference on Taiwan Democracy, “Taiwan’s
Democratic Development: Reflections on the Ma Ying-Jeou Era.”
Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Palo Alto, California, the United States, March 9-10, 2017

(Very preliminary draft; please do not circulate without the author’s permission)

Abstract

Protest events have played a significant role in Taiwan’s democratic transition and consolidation, and been the subject of extensive research by scholars. However, most studies have focused on the leaders of protest movements and how they interact with other political actors, and given less attention the ordinary protestors who participated in these movements. These studies have also focused largely on protest movements mobilized by civil society, while overlooking the important role of partisan mobilization. Using data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), this study identifies two peaks of protest activity in the second terms of the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou presidencies, the first of which was largely partisan orientated and the second of which was largely mobilized by civil society. The study also seeks to answer some important empirical questions, including identifying the demographic profiles and ideological orientations of protestors, and examining why democracy proved to be resilient in the face of mass protest.

Keywords: protest. mobilization, political parties, generation, Taiwan

* Min-Hua Huang is Associate Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University, Taiwan. Email: mhhuang5103@ntu.edu.tw. All related correspondence should be directed to Min-Hua Huang.

[§] Mark Weatherall is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies, National Taiwan University. Email: markweatherall@ntu.edu.tw.

Introduction

Since the 2000 presidential election and the subsequent formation of the rival “Pan Blue” and “Plan Green” camps, Taiwanese politics has been marked by two major protest movements against the incumbent regime. The first wave of protests were directed against the administration of Chen Shui-bian, beginning in the aftermath of the president’s highly contested victory in the 2004 election and culminating with mass street protests against alleged corruption by the president and members of his family in late 2006. The second wave of protests were directed against the administration of Ma Ying-jeou, and reached their climax in March and April 2014 when student protestors occupied the Legislative Yuan for twenty-four days to protest the passage of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) without a full legislative review. In both cases, the protestors called into question the very foundation of the regime’s democratic legitimacy – claiming that it was either elected illegitimately and abusing state power for personal enrichment in the case of the Chen administration, or was riding roughshod over democratic processes to force a highly unpopular trade agreement through the Legislative Yuan with little parliamentary oversight. The two waves protests were major contributing factors to devastating electoral defeats suffered by the ruling parties in subsequent presidential and legislative elections. However, Taiwan’s democratic institutions have shown significant resiliency in the face of worsening polarization and mass protests, even as protestors called into question the legitimacy of democratic institutions by refusing to accept the president’s electoral victory or occupying the nation’s highest legislative body.

Despite the importance of these two waves of protest in the context of Taiwan’s democratic consolidation, there have been few attempts to provide empirical answers to answer some of

the important questions raised by the protests. For instance, who were the protestors in each wave of protestors? How did their demographic and ideological profiles differ from the wider society? What factors can account for the resilience of Taiwan's democratic institutions in the face of these waves of protests? What are the similarities and differences between the two waves of protest activity? This article attempts to answer these questions using data from four waves of the Asian Barometer Survey, focusing on two peaks of protest activity identified in the Second Wave (carried out between January and February 2006) and the Fourth Wave (carried out between June and November 2014) of the survey.

Political Protest During Taiwan's Democratic Transition and Consolidation

The mobilization of civil society forces in Taiwan can be traced back to the 1980s as social actors tried to force the government to move beyond its focus on economic growth and political stability and address the many serious social and environmental problems faced by the island (Hsiao, 1990). Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, there was a sharp upsurge in protest activity, with a flourishing civil society taking advantage of the more liberal political atmosphere to launch movements demanding reform across a range of issues including women's rights, workers' rights, environmental protection, and transitional justice (Ho, 2010).

Amidst the upsurge in civil society activity, two protest movements had a defining impact on Taiwan's political development and the island's eventual democratization. The first was the pro-democracy demonstrations in the southern city of Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979 to mark Human Rights Day and the subsequent government crackdown, which later became known as the Formosa (*Meilidao*) Incident. The protests ended with the arrest and trial of leading opposition figures, but coalesced the opposition to the ruling KMT which continued to strengthen through the 1980s. Many of the participants in the Formosa Incident went on to

become leading figures opposition figures – one of the defense lawyers was Chen Shui-bian, who went on to serve as president between 2000 and 2008, while his vice-president, Annette Lu, served a five-and-a-half-year prison sentence for her role in the protests. The second was the Wild Lily student movement which took place between March 16 and March 22, 1990.

The Wild Lily protests were instrumental in pushing for constitutional reforms that introduced direct elections for the president and vice-president and full elections to legislative bodies (the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly) for the first time since the KMT's retreat to Taiwan in 1948. As with the Formosa Incident, some of the student leaders of the Wild Lily Movement, including Lin Chia-lung and Cheng Wen-tsan (currently serving as mayors of Taichung City and Taoyuan City respectively) later became prominent figures within the DPP.

Notwithstanding the prominent role that many of the leaders of the Formosa Incident and the Wild Lily protests later went on to play within the DPP, the genesis of the two movements was markedly different. In 1979, Taiwan was still under martial law, and new parties were banned. Instead, opposition figures cooperated under the “*dangwai*” (literally “outside the party”) banner. The Formosa Incident protests were organized by the Formosa Magazine (*melidao zazhi*), a publication set up the *dangwai* under the direction of veteran opposition legislator Huang Shin-chieh, which was intended to act as a vehicle for an island-wide quasi-party (Rigger, 1999: 117). However, while the Formosa Incident protests were organized by a quasi-party organization (*dangwai*), the Wild Lily student protests were organized outside of the opposition DPP. Although the DPP subsequently mobilized large demonstrations in support of the students on March 18 and 19, and the students shared many of the same demands with the DPP, the Wild Lily protestors steadfastly maintained their independence from party politics (Smith and Yu, 2014).

Although civil society movements strove to maintain their independence from the DPP prior to 2000, following Chen Shui-bian's election as president, activists saw new opportunities to work within political institutions to achieve political change. However, once in power, the priorities of the DPP regime, which was constrained by the continued KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan, gradually turned towards ensuring stability rather than delivering on its promises of major reform. Furthermore, the economic slowdown during Chen's first term compelled the government to revert to KMT-style developmentalism at the expense of environmental protection and social welfare, further marginalizing the social movements that previously had such high expectations of the DPP regime (Ho, 2005). Despite the disappointment felt by many social movements towards Chen once in office, the 2000 election marked an important turning point. For the first time, civil society leaders held positions within the regime, and could to some extent pursue their agendas within formal political institutions. The KMT also actively courted civil society organizations that felt excluded by the new regime, albeit with varying degrees of success.

At the same time, with the growing polarization of Taiwanese politics between "Pan-Green" and "Pan-Blue" camps, protest activities became increasingly partisan in nature, with civil society at most playing only a supporting role. In 2003, the KMT organized the first mass protests against the Chen regime, rallying against the so-called "three highs" (high tuition fees, high health insurance premiums, and high unemployment) (Ho, 2005). Following the contested election in 2004, which Chen won by less than 30,000 votes out of 13 million cast amidst opposition claims of voting irregularities and doubts about apparent assassination attempt on Chen on the final day of the campaign, KMT supporters launched large scale and often violent protests against the result. The protests climaxed on March 27, when as many as half a million protestors gathered in front of the presidential office to demand a vote recount and an investigation into the disputed shooting incident on the eve of the election (Gluck,

2004). Partisan mobilization was not limited to the Pan-Blue side. In 2005, following the passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, formalizing Beijing's long-standing policy to use "non-peaceful" means to prevent Taiwan from establishing formal independence, Pan-Green parties together with civic groups mobilized massive demonstrations in protest (BBC News, 2005). However, Pan-Green mobilization based on Taiwan independence appeals did not halt the tide of Pan-Blue protests, which culminated in 2006 with massive protests demanding the resignation of Chen for alleged involvement in corruption.

In 2008, after Ma Ying-jeou won back the presidency for the KMT, civil society led protest movements underwent a revival. The visits of China's top Taiwan affairs negotiator Chen Yunlin in 2008 and 2011 generated violent protests. The police crackdown on the 2011 protests against the visit of China's Chen Yunlin's visit led to the student-led Wild Strawberries Movement. The Wild Strawberries were unsuccessful in the demands, but the organizational skills developed during the protests laid the foundation for the Sunflower Movement three years later. That movement began at 9PM on March 18, 2014 when student protestors stormed Taiwan's Legislative Yuan to protest the passage of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA)¹ by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) without a full legislative review. The occupation of the Legislative Yuan eventually lasted twenty-four days, and the protests also briefly occupied the Executive Yuan (the Taiwan prime minister's office). While the protestors eventually withdrew from the Legislative Yuan on April 10, the movement was ultimately successfully in blocking the passage of the CSSTA and contributed to the KMT's devastating election defeat less than two years later.

¹ The CSSTA is an agreement between mainland China and Taiwan on the liberalization of trade in services. The agreement was signed in June 2013 but remains unratified by the Legislative Yuan.

From these four defining protest movements, we can identify two main sources of protest. The first is partisan mobilization, meaning protests against the incumbent regime mobilized by opposition parties. Although the DPP had not yet been founded in 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident protests belonged to this type, since they were organized by the Formosa Magazine which was run by the quasi-party *dangwai* under the leadership of veteran opposition legislator Huang Shin-chieh. The wave of protests that took place following Chen Shui-bian's contested electoral victory in 2004 and culminated with massive protests demanding Chen's resignation in 2006 were also partisan in their genesis, even though the 2006 protests were fronted by the former DPP leader Shih Ming-teh. The second source of protest is civil society organizations. Since the 1980s, Taiwan has witnessed numerous protests by a wide range of civil society groups, including environmental protection groups, women's rights groups, and workers' rights groups. However, the two most important civil society protests movements in terms of their long-term impact – the Wild Lily and Sunflower movements – were both organized by students. The success of the student movements in defining Taiwan's political trajectory can be attributed to their politically privileged status – in culturally Chinese societies students are assumed to be pure and not motivated by personal greed or self-interest. The student led protest movements fought hard to hold onto this “moral” advantage by rejecting the involvement of outside groups – particularly the opposition DPP.

Previous Research on Civil Society Activism and Protest Events in Taiwan

Since civil society activism and protest events played a critical role in Taiwan's democratic transition and consolidation, they have been the subject of academic interest from scholars. These studies have contributed significantly to our understanding of a number of important topics, including the historical origins and social and political context of rising civil society activism and protest movements in Taiwan, the strategies adopted by civil society activists,

the backgrounds of civil society activists, the relationship between civil society activists and other political actors in Taiwan, and the role played by civil society activism and protest events in Taiwan's democratic transition and consolidation.

Early research on civil society and protest movements coincided with the beginnings of Taiwan's democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and generally understood social movements as arising in opposition to the hegemonic party-state in the context of a rapidly modernizing society, while rejecting class-based accounts of social movements. For example, Hsiao (1990) argues that although protest movements pursued a "depoliticized" strategy by deliberately maintaining their independence from the opposition DPP, they ultimately arose out of and were defined by, their opposition to the dominant KMT party-state. However, as Ho (2003) points out with regard to Taiwan's anti-nuclear movement, social movements were often dependent on the DPP to achieve policy goals. Gold (1994) also takes a state-centered approach to the emergence of social movements of Taiwan, explaining the emergence of these movements in Taiwan as a challenge to the hegemony and dominant ideology of the KMT party-state. Tang and Tang (1997) look at the rise of environmental protest movements during Taiwan's democratization, arguing that such protests were increasingly effective as the retreating authoritarian regime was no longer able to ignore local environmental concerns in pursuit of economic growth. Wright (1999) argues that the emergence of student-led protest movements after the 1980s was facilitated by a change in the political opportunity structure caused by the decision of political elites to ease restraints on political expression.

The first peaceful transition of power in 2000 marked an important turning point for civil society in Taiwan, replacing the previously dominant KMT with a DPP administration that was expected to be more sympathetic to the demands of civil society. Researchers turned

their focus to the relationship between civil society and the new administration, showing how the relationship between state and civil society changed from confrontational in the 1980s and 1990s to a more cooperative relationship after 2000 (Fan, 2003). However, researchers found the ability of civil society to influence government policy was in fact quite limited as the new administration largely adopted the same growth-orientated developmentalist policies of the old regime (Ho, 2005). Following the return of the KMT to power in 2008, researchers turned to confrontations between the state and a resurgent civil society, marked by major protest movements including the Wild Strawberry protests of 2008, the anti-media monopoly protests of 2012, and the Sunflower Movement of 2014 (Rowen, 2015).


Although these studies have contributed to our understanding of the relationship between social movements and the state, and the role of social movements in Taiwan's democratic transition and consolidation, they suffer from some limitations. First, they tend to focus on protest movements arising from civil society organizations, which are generally assumed to be relatively independent from party politics. However, many of the most successful protest movements in the twenty years of Taiwan's democratic transition were in fact heavily influenced by and even organized by political parties, even when parties did not assume a formal leadership role so the movement could claim bipartisan support from across society. Even in cases such as the Sunflower Movement, which were organized by genuinely autonomous civil society organizations, the durability of the movement can be in a large part attributed to the tacit (and sometimes explicit) support of the opposition DPP. Second, studies of protest movements tend to focus on the choices of the major actors within the movements and their interactions with the state and other political actors using research methods such as in-depth interviews and participant observation. However, in the focus on the major actors in civil society movements, the importance of the ordinary participants in the movements and their supporters in the wider society are often overlooked.

Who is Protesting? Participants in Political Activism

To date, the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) has completed four survey waves in Taiwan. The First Wave was completed between June-July 2001, the Second Wave was completed between January-February 2006, the Third Wave was completed between January-February 2010, and the Fourth Wave was completed between June 2014 - November 2014. The First Wave and the Third Wave of the survey were completed during the first terms of President Chen Shui-bian and President Ma Ying-jeou respectively. In 2001, civil society was still adapting to a new administration that was potentially more sympathetic to their concerns, while the Pan-Blue camp remained in turmoil following Chen's unexpected victory. In sharp contrast, civil society protests against the Ma Ying-jeou administration started early in his term, most prominent being the Wild Strawberries Movement protests of late 2008. However, during this period, civil society protests were still confined to relatively small groups of political activists, with a majority of society continuing to adopt a "wait and see" attitude on the direction of the new regime. In contrast, early 2006 and mid-late 2014 were periods of widespread participation in protest movements from across society. In early 2006, President Chen Shui-bian was facing a series of protests following his contested election victory two years previously, while in mid-late 2014, the administration of Ma Ying-jeou was still dealing with the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement protests.

The two peaks in protest are reflected in the results from the ABS over the four survey waves. In Figure 1, we show political activism, measured as whether the respondent had participated in a protest or a march in the past three years, over the four waves of the survey. Since we are interested in identifying the background of participants in political activism, we divide the population into four generations. The first generation is the pre-1949 generation that reached elementary school age prior to the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. The second generation

Figure 1. Activism in Taiwan from 2001 to 2014 (ABS1-4)




completed high school before 1971, the year of the Republic of China’s withdrawal from the United Nations. This generation both oppressive authoritarian rule and rapid economic development during their period of political socialization. The third generation, who completed high school between Taiwan’s withdrawal from the United Nations and the end of martial law, grew up in a period of what scholars of Taiwan have referred to as “soft” authoritarianism (in contrast to the “hard” authoritarianism of the 1950s and 1960s) (Winckler, 1984), and enjoyed the benefits of increasing economic opportunities provided by the island’s continued rapid economic growth. The fourth generation completed their high school education after the lifting of martial law in 1987, enjoying the political freedoms offered by the island’s emerging democracy, but often suffering economically as the economy suffered a sustained period of stagnation. The fifth generation completed their high school education after the abolition of the joint entrance examination was abolished in 2001, and were socialized in a period of comprehensive educational reform that transformed the school curriculum in Taiwan.

Comparing political activism between generation over the four waves of the survey, we find that between 2001 and 2006, the 1950-1971 generation followed by the pre-1949 generation showed the most dramatic increase in political activism. In contrast, political activism among the 1987-2001 generation barely increased at all over the same period. This finding demonstrates that participation in political activism during Chen's second term was dominated by older citizens, in particular the generation which completed high school between 1950-1971 who were socialized during the period of the Kuomintang's "hard authoritarianism." In 2010, activism fell across the population as a whole, most dramatically among the 1950-1971 generation, although activism continued to increase among the pre-1949 generation and 1987-2001 generation. In 2014, levels of political activism recovered, but the profile of activists in 2014 was very different to the peak of 2006, with a significant rise in activism among the youth and decline in activism among the older generations when compared to 2006.

In Figure 2, we divide participation in political activism for each generation by level of education, distinguishing between citizens with at least a university education and those educated only to high school or lower. Previous research has shown that educational attainment is positively associated with political participation (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Putman, 1995; Berinsky and Lenz, 2011). Our data show that participation in Taiwan is consistent with the findings of the current empirical literature, with the two spikes in political activism both dominated by citizens with at least a university level education, despite the substantial differences in patterns of political mobilization in 2006 and 2014. In 2006, there was a dramatic increase in participation in political activism among those educated to at least university level in the pre-1949 and 1950-1971 generations, while levels of political activism among those without a university education remained low. In 2014, there were substantial increases in participation among those educated to university level in the 1987-2001 and

post-2002 generations, while political activism among their counterparts without a university education remained at very low levels.

Figure 2. Fluctuating Activism by Education and Generation (ABS 1-4)



Why are they Protesting? The Political Views of Activists

In the preceding section, we showed that the protests in the years prior to the 2006 survey were dominated by the better educated older generations, while the protests in the years prior to the 2014 survey were dominated by the better educated younger generations. In Table 1, we show the results of an ANOVA analysis comparing the political attitudes of each of these demographic groups in 2006 and 2014 respectively with the attitudes of other demographic groups.

The top half of Table 1 shows a comparison of the political attitudes of the older generations with a university degree when compared with the younger generations with a university degree (A) and all generations without a university degree (B) across the four waves of the

Table 1. ANOVA Means Comparison For the Factor which Shows the “Spike” (P: significantly greater; N: significantly lesser; X: not significantly different)

<i>Comparing the Oldest Generation at Least a University Education to A and B Groups</i>								
Variables	W1		W2		W3		W4	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Defend our own way of life	X	X	X	N	X	X	X	X
Taiwan identity	X	N	X	N	X	N	N	N
Pan-green partisanship	X	N	X	N	X	X	N	N
Satisfaction of the Chen/Ma government	X	N	X	N	X	X	X	X
Corruption	N	X	X	X	N	N	N	N
China's influence is more harm than good	—	—	—	—	X	X	X	X
Last Presidential election was unfair	—	—	P	P	X	X	X	X

<i>Comparing the Youngest Generation with at Least a University Education to C and D Groups</i>								
Variables	W1		W2		W3		W4	
	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D
Defend our own way of life	X	X	X	N	X	X	X	X
Taiwan identity	P	X	P	X	P	X	P	P
Pan-green partisanship	P	X	P	X	X	X	P	X
Satisfaction of the Chen/Ma government	P	X	X	N	X	X	X	X
Corruption	X	X	P	P	P	P	P	P
China's influence is more harm than good	—	—	—	—	P	X	X	X
Last Presidential election was unfair	—	—	N	X	X	X	X	N
Taiwan identity & Corruption	P	X	P	X	P	X	P	P

Note: ANOVA tests were conducted using SPSS contrast tests with the within sampling weights. The reported results do not assume equal variances between groups. The level of significance is set at $p \leq 0.05$ for the contrast tests.

A group refers to other younger generations with at least a university education.

B group refers to all generations with high school or lower education.

C group refers to other older generations with at least a university education.

D group refers to all generations with high school or lower education.

Data Source: ABS 1-4.

survey. In 2006, when activism among the better educated older citizens peaked, there was no significant difference between this demographic group and the younger generations with a university degree on the first five items listed (defend our own way of life, Taiwan identity, pan-green partisanship, satisfaction with the Chen government, and corruption), but a significant negative difference with all generations without a university degree on all of the items with the exception of corruption. The only consistent finding was a significant positive

difference with the other demographic groups on the perception that the last election was unfair. Therefore, in early 2006, the consistent factor leading to discontent among the older better educated generation was the perceived unfairness of the 2004 presidential election, rather than corruption, which only became the dominant issue later in the same year.


The bottom half of Table 1 shows that the political attitudes of the younger generations with a university degree when compared with the older generations with a university degree (C) and all generations without a university degree (D) across the four waves of the survey.

Interestingly, given the potentially adverse effects of China's growing influence during the Sunflower protests on Taiwan, in the 2014 survey, we found no statistically significant difference between the younger better educated group who were the main participants in political protests over the period and the other demographic groups. In addition, despite the attempts to link the Sunflower protests to the DPP, there was no significant difference in the level of pan-green partisanship between the younger better educated generation and the less educated (regardless of education). However, the younger better educated generation were more likely to be pan-green partisans than the older better educated generation. Finally, we found that the younger better educated generation consistently had greater levels of Taiwan identity and were more likely to believe that national officials are corrupt than the other demographic groups. We also found that this generation was consistently more likely to hold both of these orientations at the same time than the other demographic groups.

The findings of the ANOVA analysis show that Chen's fiercely contested re-election in 2004 was a crucial rallying point for protests among better educated and older voters against the president in the early years of his second term. Figure 2 showed that there was a spike in participation in protests among the pre-1949 and 1950-1971 generations educated to university level in 2006. In Figure 3, we show in 2006, a majority (56%) of respondents in

this group believed that the “last election was unfair,” while only around a third or less of the other demographic groups held the same view. The belief that Chen had “stolen” the 2004 election was widespread among older and better educated voters, but not among older and less educated voters, or among young voters regardless of their level of education.


Figure 3. Last Presidential Election was Unfair (ABS 2-4)



The ANOVA analysis also shows that younger and better educated citizens were more likely to hold Taiwanese identity and believe that most national officials are corrupt. Unlike the 2004 election, Ma Ying-jeou’s two election wins in 2008 and 2012 were relatively free of controversy. However, throughout Ma’s presidency, there was increasing tension between growing Taiwanese identity, particularly among young people, and Ma’s efforts to improve relations with Beijing. Furthermore, the claimed “peace dividend” from improved cross-Strait relations was perceived to be almost exclusively benefitting a narrow and corrupt business and political elite. To capture the intersection of these two items, we measure the proportion of respondents with both Taiwanese identity and who perceive that most national officials are corrupt. As Figure 4 shows, this view was increasingly held among young people (both the

1987-2001 and post-2001 generation) in the two surveys held during Ma’s presidency, but was most apparent among the youngest and best educated generation in the 2014 survey – 74% of the university educated post-2014 generation both express Taiwanese identity and believe that most national officials are corrupt.

Figure 4. Taiwan Identity & Perceived Corruption (ABS 1-4)



Mass Protest and Democratic Resilience

The mass protests in 2006 and 2014 were not only a challenge to the incumbent regime — at a more fundamental level they questioned the legitimacy of Taiwan’s democratic institutions. In the period leading up to the 2006 survey, protestors repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of Chen’s 2004 election victory, and by extension Taiwan’s ability to hold free and fair elections; in the period leading up to the 2014 survey, protestors challenged the legitimacy of the legislative process, arguing that the failure to follow correct legislative process was serious enough to justify the unprecedented occupation of the Legislative Yuan. Yet, ultimately, both crises were defused peacefully and the institutions of democracy survived.

This was because, at least in part, because despite the protestors' criticisms of the functioning of democratic institutions, discontent with how the institutions of democracy work in practice did not undermine the reservoir of support for democracy as a preferred political system or lead discontented citizens toward authoritarian alternatives.

In Table 2, we show items from the Asian Barometer Survey measuring support for democracy, rejection of authoritarianism, belief in procedural norms, and political efficacy across the four survey waves. We are interested in comparing whether attitudes on these dimensions showed the same peak-shaped covariation between the demographic groups that were most likely to be involved in political protests, namely the better educated older generations who believe that the last election was unfair in 2006, and the better educated youngest generation with strong Taiwan identity and who believe that most officials are corrupt in 2016. If we find that these groups have weaker democratic orientations when compared to the population as a whole, this may be an indicator that these groups are less committed to democracy, suggesting that the protests not only challenge the regime, but also the continued sustainability of democracy in the country.

First, we compare the attitudes of the better educated older generations who believe that the last election was unfair with the rest of the population in 2006. Since we do not have any items capturing perceived fairness of the latest presidential race in Wave 1, we only have the latest three waves of data to identify the variables that show the same covariation pattern, which can help us identify the factors behind the 2006 protests. Specifically, we need to identify the attitudinal deviation of the targeted groups from the remainder of the population in Wave 2, suggesting divergent findings from those observed in Wave 3 and Wave 4. The middle column of Table 2 shows three findings that indicate the potential causal impact related of the sudden peak in activism among the older educated generations: preferability,

Table 2. Means Comparisons of Targeted Groups for Democratic Attitudes

Target Group (vs. rest)	Oldest Generations + Univ. Edu + Unfair election			Youngest Generation + Univ. Edu + Taiwan Identity + Perceived Corruption			
Wave	W2	W3	W4	W1	W2	W3	W4
Support for Democracy							
• The extent you want our country to be democratic in the future. (desirability)	-3% (89%)	-4.0% (88%)	-6% (86%)	+2% (89%)	+1% (93%)	+3% (95%)	+1% (93%)
• Democracy is suitable for our country. (suitability)	-15% (61%)	-14% (65%)	-16% (65%)	-7% (65%)	+1% (76%)	+5% (84%)	+9% (88%)
• Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. (preferability)	+2% (53%)	+20% (71%)	+23% (69%)	+17% (61%)	-4% (47%)	+9% (61%)	-1% (46%)
• Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society. (efficacy)	-19% (45%)	-4% (62%)	+9% (71%)	+6% (63%)	+5% (66%)	+13% (78%)	+12% (72%)
Rejection of Authoritarianism							
• We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. (reject dictatorship)	+2% (84%)	-12% (73%)	-5% (80%)	+7% (86%)	-3% (80%)	+6% (89%)	+3% (87%)
• No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power. (reject one-party rule)	-6% (83%)	+0% (91%)	-6% (85%)	+3% (85%)	-2% (87%)	+4% (94%)	+1% (92%)
• The army should come in to govern the country. (reject military rule)	-5% (89%)	+0% (96%)	-5% (91%)	+4% (96%)	+3% (96%)	+1% (96%)	+3% (99%)
Belief in Procedural Norm							
• When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is not ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation. (reject disregard the law)	+4% (79%)	+4% (76%)	-5% (76%)	-7% (60%)	-3% (70%)	+15% (87%)	+3% (83%)
Political Efficacy							
• People like me have influence over the government (influence government)	—	+8% (39%)	-3% (33%)	-1% (32%)	—	-3% (28%)	+20% (53%)
• People have the power to change the government (change government)	-6% (59%)	+11% (70%)	-15% (44%)	—	+5% (69%)	-2% (58%)	-5% (54%)

Note: Entry is the means difference of the targeted vs. remaining groups. Numbers in parentheses are the percentages of the targeted group. Because we are interested in trends over time rather than a particular value in a specific time point, we do not report the result of significant tests.

Data Source: ABS 1-4.

efficacy, and rejection of dictatorship. In terms of commitment to the democracy, the preferability measure suggests that the older better educated generations in general have a far-greater rate of approval (around 20%) to the rest of the population, but this measure was largely reduced to a similar level to the rest of the population in Wave 2 (+2%). Regarding the efficacy of democracy, the measure of the targeted group in Wave 2 was far lower (-19%) than the rest of the population, deviating from the ascending trend in the later two waves. However, for the rejection of dictatorship, our finding shows the targeted group had a round the same level of liberal democratic orientations (+2%) as the rest of the population, which runs counter to the latter trend. These findings suggest that the 2006 protestors might have had a weaker commitment to democracy as well less confidence that democracy can solve societal problems, but simultaneously may have been more likely to reject dictatorship as an alternative to democracy. In other words, while the 2006 protests might be associated with weaker commitment to and confidence in democracy among the older educated generations, this group exhibited the same level of democratic attitudes by rejection of dictatorship.

Second, we look at the democratic attitudes of the second targeted group – the better educated youngest generation who have strong Taiwan identity and who believe that most national officials are corrupt. Of the four dimensions the 2014 protest might have impact, support for the suitability of democracy and two measures in political efficacy show peak-shaped covariation. In terms of the suitability measure, the targeted group shows even stronger belief that democracy is suitable for Taiwan than the rest of the population, and the trend is from a perception that democracy is less suitable when compared to the rest of the population in Wave 1 (-7%) to a greater belief in the suitability of democracy in Wave 4 (+9%). For the two political efficacy measures, the targeted group show two apparently conflicting psychological orientations: on the one hand, they are much more likely to believe that they can exert influence over the government (+20%) than the rest of the population; on the other hand, they

are less likely to believe that they have the power to change the government (-5%). In fact, such conflicting orientations are very salient only in Wave 4, and this belief that their actions could influence the government was likely a powerful motivating factor for the protestors.

Overall, the findings from the covariation analysis of the two protests in 2006 and 2014 show the same message: those who protested showed more apprehensive about the state of Taiwan's democracy and were more frustrated with the incumbent regime. In 2006, we found eroding democratic legitimacy in its preferability and efficacy for the better-educated older generation who believed that the last election was unfair. At the same time, this group were more aware of the political risks of dictatorship. In 2016, the apprehension about Taiwan's democracy was more apparent among the youngest generation with better education who expressed strong Taiwanese identity and perceived government officials as corrupt. This showed stronger support for the suitability and efficacy of democracy than the population as a whole, and were simultaneously more pessimistic about whether they can actually change the government but optimistic about whether they could exert influence over the government.

Conclusion

Political protests, from the Kaohsiung Incident protests in 1979, the growing civil society movements in the 1980s, to the Wild Lily student movement of 1991 are central to Taiwan's transition from authoritarian one-party rule to its current vibrant, multi-party democracy. As Taiwan's democracy has consolidated, political protests have continued to play a key role. However, despite the extensive research on civil society and political protest in Taiwan, there have been few attempts to investigate how the demographic profiles of the protestors or their ideological orientations differ from the wider society. In this paper, we highlight two waves of protest coinciding with the second terms of the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou presidencies. We find that the protestors against the Chen presidency tended to older and

well-educated, and were motivated by a belief in the illegitimacy of Chen's 2004 electoral win. In contrast, the protestors against the Ma presidency were younger and well-educated, and were more likely to have strong Taiwanese identity and believe that politicians are corrupt. Interestingly, however, these younger, well-educated citizens were no more likely than the population as a whole to view the influence of China in adverse terms. Finally, we show that the democratic orientations of these groups were not generally weaker than the population as a whole, and indeed in 2016, protestors had stronger democratic orientations than the population as a whole on a number of measures. Therefore, although the protestors were challenging the current institutions of democracy, they did not reject democracy as their preferred political system or consider authoritarian alternatives to democracy. This deep reservoir of support for democracy can help us explain how both crises were defused peacefully and the institutions of democracy were able to resume normal functioning.

Although this study can help us understand more about who was protesting and why they were protesting, there are a number of limitations due to the data we have available. First, we are unable to distinguish between whether the protestors were pro or anti-government. While protests in Ma's second term were largely anti-government, during Chen's second term, the government was actually also effective at mobilizing its own protests, most notably protests against the passage of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 formalizing Beijing's threat to use "non-peaceful means" against Taiwan in the event of a declaration of independence. The presence of protestors from both sides of the partisan divide will influence our findings on the demographic profiles and ideological orientations of protestors. Second, the timing of the surveys may be an issue. The Fourth Wave survey was conducted between June and November 2014 after the Sunflower Protests, effectively capturing the major protest movement of Ma's presidency. However, the Second Wave survey was conducted in early

2006, prior to the large anti-corruption protests against Chen later in the same year. If the survey had been carried out later in the year, we may expect to find some different results with regard to the ideological orientations of the protestors, in particular a greater focus on the problem of corruption in the national government.

References

- BBC News. "Taiwan Rallies against China Law," March 26, 2005.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4382971.stm>.
- Ho, Ming-sho. "Taiwan's State and Social Movements Under the DPP Government, 2000–2004." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 5, no. 3 (2005): 401–25.
doi:10.1017/S1598240800002058.
- . "The Politics of Anti-Nuclear Protest in Taiwan: A Case of Party-Dependent Movement (1980–2000)." *Modern Asian Studies* 37, no. 3 (2003): 683–708.
doi:10.1017/S0026749X03003068.
- Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael. "Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 24 (1990): 163–80. doi:10.2307/2158893.
- Lake, Ronald La Due, and Robert Huckfeldt. "Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation." *Political Psychology* 19, no. 3 (1998): 567–84.
- Putnam, Robert. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 65–78.
- Rigger, Shelley. *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform*. London ; New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Rowen, Ian. "Inside Taiwan's Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a Student-Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 74, no. 1 (February 2015): 5–21. doi:10.1017/S0021911814002174.
- Smith, Stephen, and Ching-hsin Yu. "Wild Lilies and Sunflowers: Political Actors' Responses to Student Movements in Taiwan," 2014.
- Tang, Shui-Yan, and Ching-Ping Tang. "Democratization and Environmental Politics in Taiwan." *Asian Survey* 37, no. 3 (1997): 281–94. doi:10.2307/2645664.
- Winckler, Edwin A. "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" *The China Quarterly* 99 (September 1984): 481–99.
doi:10.1017/S0305741000017148.
- Wright, Teresa. "Student Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents." *Asian Survey* 39, no. 6 (1999): 986–1008. doi:10.2307/3021149.